

CURRICULUM VITAE (24 JULY 2009)

Personal Information

Full name: Daniel Jonathan Seidmann
Date of birth: 11 June 1953

Nationality: British

Marital status: Married (3 children)

Education

Secondary: Haberdashers Aske's School, Elstree (1964-71)

Degrees: B.A. (2) in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
Balliol College, Oxford (1972-5)
M.Sc. in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
L.S.E. (1975-7)
Ph.D. in Economics
L.S.E. (1977-81).

Positions held

Junior Research Fellow, L.S.E. (1977-9)
Teaching Assistant, L.S.E. (1979-80)
Temporary Lecturer in Economics, L.S.E. (1980-1)
Lecturer in Economics, Trinity College, Dublin (1981-91)
Reader in Economics, Newcastle University (1991-3)
Professor of Economic Theory, Newcastle University (1993-2003)
Professor of Economic Theory, Nottingham University (2003-)

PUBLICATIONS

- Review of K. Laitner “A Theory of the Multiproduct Firm” *Economica* 1982, Vol. 49, pp. 100-101.
- “Asymmetric Price Adjustment” *Economics Letters* 1982, Vol. 10, pp. 17-21.
- “Target Buffer Stocks” *European Economic Review* 1985, Vol. 27, pp. 165-182.
- “Anticipatory Pricing with Negligible Uncertainty” *Economics Letters* 1987, Vol. 25, pp. 213-216.
- “Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure: Comment” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1987, Vol. 102, pp. 445-452.
- “Industry Factor Demand Curves can be Upward Sloping” *Economic Journal* 1987, Vol. 97, pp. 746-748.
- “The Impact of Interest Rates on Price and Supply” *Canadian Journal of Economics* 1987, Vol. 20, pp. 625-633.
- “The Distribution of Power in Dail Eiream” *Economic and Social Review* 1987, Vol. 19, pp. 61-68.
- “The Real Effects of Nominal Price Rigidity” *European Economic Review* 1989, Vol. 33, pp. 1831-1838.
- “A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling” *Journal of Industrial Economics* 1990, Vol. 33, pp. 283-298 (with Jose Carbajo and David de Meza).
- “Transactions/List Pricing” *Econometrica* 1990, Vol. 58, pp. 621-636.
- “Effective Cheap Talk with Conflicting Interests” *Journal of Economic Theory* 1990, Vol. 50, pp. 445-458.
- “Bundling as a Facilitating Device: A Reinterpretation of Leverage Theory” *Economica* 1991, Vol. 58, pp. 491-499.
- “Why are Idiosyncratic Goods Produced to Order?” *Journal of Economic Theory* 1992, Vol. 56, pp. 228-232.
- “Cheap Talk Games may have Unique, Informative Equilibria” *Games and Economic Behavior* 1992, Vol. 4, pp. 422-425.
- “Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining Games with Endogenous Commitment” *Journal of Economic Theory* 1993, Vol. 60, pp. 306-321 (with Chaim Fershtman).
- “Organizational Change and Hysteresis in British Manufacturing: A Perspective from the Donovan Commission Report” *Economica* 1995, Vol. 62, 507-520.
- “Strategic Information with Verifiable Messages” *Econometrica* 1997, Vol. 65, pp. 163-169 (with Eyal Winter).
- “A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation” *Review of Economic Studies* 1998, Vol. 65, pp. 793-815 (with Eyal Winter).
- “The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege” *Harvard Law Review* 2000, Vol. 114, pp. 430-510 (with Alex Stein).

“The Effects of a Right to Silence” *Review of Economic Studies* 2005, Vol. 72, pp. 593-614, reprinted in H. Mialon and P. Rubin eds. *The Economic Analysis of Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights* Routledge, London.

“Endogenous Contract Structure and Monetary Policy” *European Economic Review* 2006, Vol. 50, pp. 1043-1060.(with Avner Bar-Ilan)

“Secrecy, Two-Sided Bias and the Value of Evidence” *Games and Economic Behavior* 2007, Vol. 59, pp. 296-315 (with Francesco Giovannoni)

“The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation” *Economic Theory* 2007, Vol. 31, pp. 427-445 (with Eyal Winter and Elan Pavlov)

“Optimal Quotas in Private Committees” *Economic Journal* 2008, Vol. 118, pp. 16-36.

“Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule” *Journal of Public Economics* 2008, Vol. 92, pp. 448-455.

“Preferential Trading Arrangements as Strategic Positioning” *Journal of International Economics* 2009, Vol. 79, pp. 143-159.

UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH

Submitted papers

1) "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees"

We compare the decisions chosen by an individual with those implemented by public and by private committees when decision makers are susceptible to outside influence. If the agenda is binary or outsiders are symmetric then a private committee outperforms a public committee and a delegate randomly selected from the committee. A private committee's voting pattern satisfies "one-sided dissent": a weaker condition than Duverger's Law; and is more likely to have fewer dissidents if the agenda is binary. We use data on central bank decisions to (successfully) test for these implications.

2) "Protecting Buyers from Fine Print: Market Structure Matters" (with Elena D'Agostino)

Buyers who naively believe that fine print contains favorable terms gain from regulations which mandate favorable terms, irrespective of market structure, if enough buyers are naive. However, market structure matters in a surprising way if sophisticated buyers face a reading cost: mandating favorable terms must benefit all buyers if sellers are competitive; but cannot benefit, and may harm sophisticated buyers and few enough naive buyers if the seller is a monopolist. Regulations which mitigate rather than eliminate onerous terms may harm all buyers and a monopolist.

3) "Corruption and Power in Democracies" (with Francesco Giovannoni)

According to Acton: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". We study the implications of Acton's dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton's dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which cover plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.

ACADEMIC VISITS

Economics Department, Tel Aviv University (1988-9, 1993)
Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University
of Jerusalem (1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001)
C.O.R.E., Louvain la-Neuve (1990)
Economics Department, Haifa University (2000, 2001)
Economics Department, Kellogg Business School, Northwestern University
(1990, 1993, 1997)
Economics Department, University of Wisconsin at Madison (1993)
Economics Department, University of Pittsburgh (1993)
CentER, Tilburg University (1991, 1993)
University of Bonn (1992, 1998)
Economics Department, Washington University, St. Louis (1997)
Economics Department, UBC (1997, 1999, 2001)
Economics Department, UCSD at San Diego (1999)

JOURNAL REFEREEING

American Economic Review
American Political Science Review
Bulletin of Economic Research
Econometrica
Economica
Economic and Social Review
Economic Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
International Journal of Industrial Organization
Journal of Economic Theory
Journal of Political Economy
Journal of Public Economics
Mathematical Reviews
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Rand Journal of Economics
Review of Economic Studies

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Graduate Mathematics and Statistics for M.Sc. in Economics (L.S.E.)
Second Year Economic Principles (L.S.E.)
Third Year Applied Economics (L.S.E.)
Second Year Mathematics (T.C.D.)
Second Year Mathematical Economics (T.C.D.)
Third Year Macroeconomics (T.C.D.)
Fourth Year International Trade (T.C.D.)
Fourth Year Industrial Organisation (T.C.D.)
Macroeconomics for M.B.A. (T.C.D.)
Graduate Industrial Organisation Theory (Tel Aviv)
First Year Macroeconomics (Newcastle)
First Year Game Theory (Newcastle)
First Year Principles of Economics (Newcastle)
Second Year Microeconomics (Newcastle)
Second Year Applied Economics (Newcastle)
Second Year Current Economic Issues (Newcastle)
Third Year Game Theory (Newcastle)
Third Year Economics of Information (Newcastle)
Second Year Microeconomics (Nottingham)
Third Year Advanced Microeconomics (Nottingham)
Masters Microeconomics (Nottingham)
PhD: Voting Theory (Nottingham)

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Departmental committees on research and graduate studies (T.C.D. and Newcastle)
Postgraduate Research Committee (Nottingham)
University advisory committee on consequences of change to three-year undergraduate programme (T.C.D.)
University committee on students taking cross-faculty degrees (T.C.D.)
Organiser of Dublin Economics Workshop: weekly academic workshop group for all academic institutions in Dublin, Responsibilities included raising funds e.g. by running annual conference for higher civil servants on public policy issues.
Co-organiser of Scottish and Newcastle Theory Group
Economics department seminar organiser (Newcastle)
Departmental Executive Committee (Newcastle)
External examiner at Economics Department, Manchester University, 1996-8
External examiner at Economics Department, Essex University, 2002-6
Advisory Board of *Economic and Social Review*