CeDEx workshop - Alexander Matros (Lancaster University)

Date(s)
Wednesday 24th October 2012 (14:00-15:00)
Description

Contests with Identity-Dependent Externalities

Abstract:

In an n-player contest with externalities, each player has a multidimensional payoff function. This player's payoff function specifies the payoff she would get for each of the n possible outcomes: player i (i=1,...,n) gets the prize. We provide conditions for existence and uniqueness of full-participation equilibrium where each player exerts positive effort.

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD

telephone: +44 (0)115 951 5458
Enquiries: jose.guinotsaporta@nottingham.ac.uk
Experiments: cedex@nottingham.ac.uk