



Risk Behaviour and Group Formation in Microcredit Groups in Eritrea

by

Robert Lensink and Habteab T. Mehrteab

The Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade is based in the School of Economics at the University of Nottingham. It aims to promote research in all aspects of economic development and international trade on both a long term and a short term basis. To this end, CREDIT organises seminar series on Development Economics, acts as a point for collaborative research with other UK and overseas institutions and publishes research papers on topics central to its interests. A list of CREDIT Research Papers is given on the final page of this publication.

Authors who wish to submit a paper for publication should send their manuscript to the Editor of the CREDIT Research Papers, Professor M F Bleaney, at:

Centre for Research in Economic Development and International Trade,
School of Economics,
University of Nottingham,
University Park,
Nottingham, NG7 2RD,
UNITED KINGDOM

Telephone (0115) 951 5620
Fax: (0115) 951 4159

CREDIT Research Papers are distributed free of charge to members of the Centre. Enquiries concerning copies of individual Research Papers or CREDIT membership should be addressed to the CREDIT Secretary at the above address. Papers may also be downloaded from the School of Economics web site at:

www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/research/credit



Risk Behaviour and Group Formation in Microcredit Groups in Eritrea

by

Robert Lensink and Habteab T. Mehrteab

The Authors

Robert Lensink is Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen and External CREDIT Fellow, and Habteab Mehrteab is Research Student, Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen and College of Business and Economics, University of Asmara..

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Niels Hermes and Loic Sadoulet for constructive comments.

January 2003

Risk Behaviour and Group Formation in Microcredit Groups in Eritrea

by

Robert Lensink and Habteab T. Mehrteab

Abstract

We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programs in Eritrea. Using the results from this survey, this paper aims to provide new insights on the empirical relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea. Since the methodology to test for homogeneous matching needs estimating risk behaviour, the paper also provides new evidence on risk behaviour of members of microcredit groups in Eritrea. Our main results strongly indicate that groups are formed heterogeneously. Most importantly, we do not find support for the matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even if we control for matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist of borrowers of the similar risk type.

Outline

1. Introduction
2. Organisational Profile of the Group Lending Programs in Eritrea
3. Other Literature on Group Formation and Homogeneous Matching
4. The Methodology: The Role of Matching Frictions
5. How to Measure Risk?
6. Variables Proxying for First-Best Risk and Matching Frictions
7. Estimating Risk
8. Heterogeneity
9. Conclusions

1. INTRODUCTION

The performance of microfinance institutions has been debated quite extensively in the literature (for a recent survey, see Morduch 1999). This debate has focused on the (unconventional) methods that microfinance institutions use to improve borrowers' payback behaviour. The theoretical literature has especially dealt with the implications of group lending practices with jointly liable borrowers (see *e.g.* Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).¹ A joint liability contract specifies that the entire group is liable for loans that are given to individual group members. A well-known example is the Grameen Bank's group lending program. It has been emphasised that group lending with joint liability may lead to *peer-monitoring or peer-pressure* among group members which reduces problems of *moral hazard* and *enforcement* (Stiglitz, 1990 and Besley and Coate, 1995). The reason is that a high joint liability component in the debt contract provides incentives to borrowers to choose a safe investment project.

A recent group of theoretical papers has emphasised that joint liability induces group members to self-select each other (*e.g.* Ghatak, 2000). These papers argue that the optimal outcome is one in which all borrowers with the same probability of success match together (homogeneous matching). It has also been argued that the optimality of homogeneous matching only holds in a frictionless world (Sadoulet and Carpenter, 2001 and references therein). However, the real world is characterised by frictions due to *e.g.* imperfect information, the unavailability of partners with the same risk characteristics, the inability to enforce contracts and the inability to fully screen and monitor group members. The advocates of the matching frictions theory argue that heterogeneous matching might take place, but that the heterogeneity is entirely due to so-called "matching frictions." In other words, the matching frictions theory suggests that there will be homogeneous matching in the case where the analysis controls for matching frictions. In other words, when there are matching frictions leading to some heterogeneity, the matching is still "essentially homogeneous"; heterogeneity is simply due to frictions and therefore deviations from optimality. Yet, empirical evidence on the homogeneous matching hypothesis in general and the matching frictions theory in

¹ See Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) for microfinance practices beyond group lending.

particular is lacking. One of the few exceptions is Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) for microcredit groups in Guatemala.

This paper takes up the challenge by aiming to examine the empirical relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea. We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programmes in Eritrea.² The survey includes questions related to the group formation process, and provides information that can be used to test the matching frictions hypothesis.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some information on microcredit groups in Eritrea. Section 3 surveys the group formation and homogeneous matching literature that is most closely related to our paper. In Section 4 we explain the methodology we use to test the matching frictions hypothesis. In Section 5 we explain how we measure risk, a variable that we need to test for homogeneous matching. Section 6 presents two groups of independent variables that are assumed to affect risk behavior. In this section we also apply factor analysis to regroup these variables in a smaller number of factors. In Section 7, we estimate risk behavior. The results of this equation are used in Section 8 to test whether homogeneous matching holds if matching frictions are accounted for. Finally, Section 9 concludes.

2. ORGANISATIONAL PROFILE OF THE GROUP LENDING PROGRAMS IN ERITREA.

In Eritrea there are two microfinance institutions. The first is the Saving and Credit Programme (*SCP*), which operates as a component of the Eritrean community development fund (*EDCF*) since July 1996. The other is the Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (*SZSCS*) that has been launched by the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (*ACORD*) in 1994.

² Detailed information on the questionnaire can be obtained on request.

The saving and credit program ECDF/SCP

The government of Eritrea, the World Bank (IDA) and loans and grants from donors are the main sources of funds for ECDF/SCP. The aim of the SCP is to provide financial services to the vulnerable group in the rural and urban areas who have no access to formal banking services. Grassroots-based solidarity groups owning and operating “Village Banks” will form the backbone of the program.

While its immediate objective is to provide access to credit and saving to people who are outside the orbit of the formal banking network, its long term objective is to strengthen its institutional setting and together with SZSCS, establish the legal, regulatory and judicial framework for the microfinance sector of Eritrea.

The SCP is principally based on the creation of autonomously functioning Village Banks, “VB,” typically serving 35-105 members. The village bank is administered at the village level through a saving and credit unit made up of three members. The village/area administrator acts as a chairperson while the other two from client members are responsible for accounts and record keeping. All loan applications are processed in the village bank before they are forwarded to the regional SCP credit officer for final decisions and payments. However, repeated loans are processed during VB monthly meetings and loans are granted on the spot. Borrowers are allowed to select loan maturity periods instead of requiring that all borrowers comply with the fixed loan terms. Loans range from 1000 to 10000 Nakfas, although individuals are allowed to withdraw less if they want to. Note that Nakfa is the name of the Eritrean Currency. The official exchange rate is US\$ 1 = 14 Nakfas.

SCP charges a 16% interest rate, which is higher than what the commercial banks in Eritrea charge.

Beneficiaries will be eligible for SCP credit if and only if they are members of a solidarity group (SG). The solidarity group should consist of 3-7 members. The SG has to be governed by the principles of joint liability and members should not belong to the

same family. Group members become eligible for loans only after having successfully accumulated 10 % mandatory savings within a period of three months.

The Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (SZSCS)

The main objective of the Scheme is to provide underprivileged people access to credit. In addition it has the objective of strengthening the institutional capacity of the scheme.

The foundation of the scheme consists of 5-7 member credit and saving groups (CSGs) who are established based on the joint liability principles. The credit and saving groups elect five members to a Village Credit and Savings Committee (CSC). Loan applications forwarded by borrowing groups are screened and approved by the CSC. Once approved by the CSC the credit officer will forward the loan after further evaluation to the borrowing group in one of the monthly group meetings. Saving is mandatory and groups have to save 5 % of the requested loan amount before requesting a loan. Loans range between Nakfa 100 and 8000 and the maturity period is determined based on a mutual understanding between the loan officer and the borrower. The scheme charges an interest rate of 14 %.

3. OTHER LITERATURE ON GROUP FORMATION AND HOMOGENEOUS MATCHING

Most of the matching literature draws heavily from the work of Becker (1993), who has worked extensively on marriage matching theory. Ghatak (1999) presents a simple model why self-selection of groups will lead to homogeneous matching. Here we explain the main insights.

The main reason why the theoretical literature argues that borrowers with equal risk profiles will form groups is that the value of having a safe partner is positive for all individuals and increasing in the own probability of success. This implies that the gain for a risky borrower of joining a group with a safe borrower is always lower than the loss for a safe borrower of forming a group with a risky borrower. Hence, a risky borrower can not cross-subsidise a safe borrower in order to be accepted as a partner, leading to groups containing partners of equal risk.

One of the most sophisticated theoretical models on the homogeneous matching hypothesis is due to Ghatak (2000). He shows that if lenders are able to offer a continuum of debt contracts, containing different values for the interest rate and the joint liability component, incentive compatible separating equilibria may result. The safe types prefer a combination of a high joint liability component and a low lending rate, whereas the opposite will hold for a risky borrower. In this way, a lender may obtain information on the type of the borrower.

Xinhau Gu (2000) also deals with the formation of borrowing groups through the exploitation of local information and joint liability. He states that static models implicitly assume a borrower to always be endowed with acceptable (capable) projects. However, entrepreneurs usually have difficulties finding investment opportunities and dynamic search models are useful tools to address such problems. He examines the impact of uncertainty about investment opportunities on borrowers' project search decision and on the rate of loan repayment. He shows that safe borrowers prefer to group with safe borrowers since the effective cost of borrowing is positively related to risk taking by group members.

Laffont (2000) shows the role of group lending in differentiating between borrowers of different types (adverse selection). He states that group-lending contracts offer a subtle method of discrimination between borrowers. When collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed for, group lending as an instrument improves discrimination between entrepreneurs of different types. So, similar types match together.

Sadoulet (1999) presents a model that challenges the commonly assumed homogeneous matching hypothesis. In his model, group membership is endogenous and group performance depends on both members' types and on the distribution of those types. According to Sadoulet, group members choose partners in a context of missing insurance markets. The point he wants to make is that if insurance markets are missing, then homogeneity is not optimal anymore. Heterogeneity emerges as a constrained first best choice. Sadoulet suggests that members set up insurance arrangements within their group in which partners will cover each other's loans in case of project failure. The reason for insurance is that borrowers live and work in risky environments and hence

need insurance. If a member, who is able to insure a partner in need, refuses to pay for him, he will lose together with other member's access to future loans from the program because of the joint liability principle. Alongside these insurance arrangements there exists transfer payments between members when both members are successful to remunerate the safe one for covering for the risky one in times of need. Thus, this insurance arrangement is taken to be an important part of the group formation process. To this end, Sadoulet's model suggests a non-monotonic matching pattern in which safer borrowers will always form groups heterogeneously with partners riskier than themselves. Middle-type borrowers match either heterogeneously with safer borrowers or homogeneously with borrowers of their type depending on whether these are available. Finally, the riskier borrowers match homogeneously. Note that the models by Ghatak (1999) and Sadoulet (1999) are similar. Ghatak gets homogeneous matching since his model is static, whereas Sadoulet gets heterogeneous matching since his model is repeated. Moreover, in the model by Ghatak, the benefit of homogeneous matching is that it improves repayment rates and thus leads to lower interest rates. The problem is that the decrease in the interest rate can not compensate the safe borrowers for having to cover the risky borrowers' loans when they fail. So, safe and risky borrowers will not form groups. In the model by Sadoulet the benefit is not lower interest rates, but access to future loans, which has a much bigger direct value.

Armendariz De Aghion and Gollier (2000) state that, in urban economies with heterogeneous, anonymous, and relatively mobile borrowers, random (rather than assortative) matching is incentive compatible for all types of borrowers. A particular feature of their paper is that they assume that borrowers do not know each other. They show that cross-subsidisation among members provides a kind of a collateral that reduces the negative externalities from risky to safe borrowers. The main implication of their work is that, as we move away from village economies by allowing imperfect information, assortative matching no longer leads to an equilibrium, and yet group lending can improve efficiency and enhance welfare.

There are few empirical studies available that have rigorously tested the homogeneous matching hypothesis. Most empirical studies have simply assumed that homogeneous matching takes place. Some studies, however, provide some insights. For instance, van

Tassel (2000), for groups belonging to BancoSol, Bolivia, found that groups match heterogeneously in unobservable business characteristics.

The only empirical paper available that has rigorously tried to investigate the matching of group members is the one by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001). For credit groups in Guatemala they estimated the relationship between risk and the level of risk heterogeneity in the individual groups, explicitly accounting for the endogeneity of group formation and of borrowers' choice of project risk. Their results show that borrowers in Guatemala group heterogeneously, and that the heterogeneity can not be explained by matching frictions. In line with the theoretical paper by Sadoulet (1999), they suggest that borrowers might want to form heterogeneous groups in order to set up insurance arrangements.

4. THE METHODOLOGY: THE ROLE OF MATCHING FRICTIONS

We follow the methodology set out by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001). The reader is referred to their paper for a detailed explanation of the methodology. The main problem we have to deal with is as follows. The matching frictions theory states that homogeneous matching only holds in a frictionless world, and that all heterogeneity comes from matching frictions. This implies that there should be no statistically significant relationship between first best risk (risk in a frictionless world) and heterogeneity. In order to test this theory, we need indicators for first-best risk and matching frictions. The problem is that these variables are not observable. Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) solve this problem as follows. They start by arguing that with matching frictions the full system of equations (the structural model) can be specified as:

$$1) h_i = H(r_i^*, f_i)$$

$$2) r_i = R(X_i, f_i)$$

$$3) r_i^* = k(X_i, 0)$$

where h_i is a measure for risk heterogeneity, r_i is actual risk, r_i^* a borrower's choice of risk in a frictionless world, f_i are matching frictions (in fact it refers to a matrix of

variables determining the friction level f_i) and X is a set of variables that determines the risk choice in a frictionless world. If the matching frictions hypothesis holds, $\frac{\partial h_i}{\partial r_i^*} = 0$.

The trick is to first estimate the actual risk equation, for which we take, for reasons of convenience, a linear specification:

$$4) r_i = X_i \alpha + f_i \beta + \varepsilon_i .$$

From this regression, estimated values for first-best risk and matching frictions can be obtained:

$$5) \bar{r}_i^* = X_i \bar{\alpha}$$

$$6) \bar{\beta} f_i = f_i \bar{\beta}$$

Note that a problem may emerge when X_i also affects f_i . As will become clear below, we will try to come around this problem by using factor analysis to separate effects, which will be orthogonal by construction.

These estimated values are then substituted in the equation for heterogeneity:

$$7) h_i = \alpha + \gamma \bar{r}_i^* + \delta \bar{\beta} f_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Homogeneous matching will be empirically confirmed if $\gamma = 0$.

5. HOW TO MEASURE RISK?

The first step in the analysis is to develop a measure for the risk of a borrower's repayment strategy, which is needed to estimate the risk equation (equation 4). Unfortunately, risk is not directly measurable, and therefore has to be proxied by an (admittedly imperfect) indicator. In line with Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001), we proxy risk (r) by:

$$r_i = \frac{P_i - S_i}{P_i}, \text{ for } P_i \geq S_i.$$

and $r_i = 0$ for $P_i < S_i$

where P_i is the loan payment due per month (loan payments are once per month for the credit programmes)³ and S_i is the amount the borrower reported having saved one week before the due date to cover the loan payments.⁴ The risk indicator varies between 0 and 1. The higher the percentage amount saved a week before the repayment date, the lower is the risk of a borrower's repayment strategy. It should be noticed that a possible caveat of our risk measure is that a person who gets a fixed payment (more than P_i) in the week before the payment can be very safe despite the fact that $S_i=0$. However, we don't think that this will substantially affect our results since this does not seem to happen often in practice. A problem Table 1 gives information on the risk measure, and the variables used to construct this measure. The table also provides data on the credit amount. Figure 1 gives a kernel distribution of r .

Table 1: Information on Credit and Risk

	<i>Credit Size</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>r</i>
<i>Mean</i>	3961	422	356	0.17
<i>Median</i>	3500	380	300	0.09
<i>Maximum</i>	8500	2320	2080	1.00
<i>Minimum</i>	750	71.25	0.00	0.00
<i>Std. Dev.</i>	1802	315	272	0.213
<i>Skewness</i>	0.468	2.714	2.440	1.967
<i>Kurtosis</i>	2.406	13.008	12.257	7.761
<i>Jarque-Bera</i>	17.97	1895.87	1601.76	557.80
<i>Observations</i>	351	351	351	351

³ Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) consider the three last dates before the repayment date since repayments in their case take place once per week. In our case loan payments are once per month.

⁴ Note that Sadoulet and Carpenter use the sum of expected sales in the last three days before the due date as the scaling factor, instead of P_i . Our questionnaire also contains a question on the expected sales in the last days (week in our case) before the due date. However, since the answers to this question were totally unreliable we decided to scale by P_i .




Figure 1: risk (r)

The value of loans ranges from 750 Nakfas⁵ to 8500 Nakfas, with mean and median loan size of 3961 and 3500 Nakfas. Loan terms vary between 3 months and 24 months. Loans are used most of the time for working capital (information not in table). The mean of our risk indicator is about 0.17, with an even lower median (0.09). Of the 351 borrowers, 105 are left censored on the risk measure ($r=0$), 10 are right censored ($r=1$) and 236 are uncensored ($0 < r < 1$). Note that none of the variables is normally distributed.

6. VARIABLES PROXYING FOR FIRST-BEST RISK AND MATCHING FRICTIONS

The next step in the analysis is to determine which variables possibly affect risk, which of those variables are related to first-best risk and which of them are related to matching frictions. Hence, referring to equation 4 above, we need to determine a vector of variables X (first best) and f (matching frictions).

Matching frictions (f)

Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) argue that variables proxying for matching frictions include indicators of the degree of asymmetric information among different members of a group, proxies for the ability to monitor and screen the activities of the different members in a group, and variables on the available borrowing options. From our data set we select the following list of variables related to monitoring, screening, the available information about each other and the possibility to obtain credit.

BORN: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower is born in the village, zero otherwise

KNOW: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knew the members well before meeting them in the group, zero otherwise

INTEG: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knew about the behavioural integrity of all potential group members before the formation of the group, zero otherwise

ACTIV: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knows what the (daily) economic activities of the other group members are, zero otherwise

⁵ Nakfa is the name of the Eritrean Currency. The official exchange rate is US\$ 1 = 14 Nakfas.

PURP: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower knows for what purpose the other group members acquired their last loans

SEL: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower approximately knows the weekly sales of the other group members, zero otherwise

NUMBER: the amount of members of the group

LDIST: the logarithm of the average distance of the business of the borrower from that of the other group members

VISIT: a dummy variable with a one if the members visit each other regularly, zero otherwise.

PROBLEM: a dummy with a one if the borrower has had problems in repaying debt before, zero otherwise.

OTHER: a dummy with a one if the borrower has other sources of credit, zero otherwise

ACORD: a dummy variable with a one if the group belongs to the *SZSCS (ACORD)* system, 0 otherwise

CHANGE: a dummy variable with a one if the borrower has participated before in another group, zero otherwise

From this list of variables, *BORN*, *KNOW*, *INTEG*, *ACTIV*, *PURP* and *SEL* primarily refer to social ties and the amount of information members have about each other. Some of these variables deal in particular with the available information before forming the group (especially *KNOW* and *INTEG*, and to some extent *BORN*), others refer to information after the group has been formed (*ACTIV*, *PURP* and *SEL*). An increase in value of one of these indicators implies more information about each other and probably stronger social ties. *NUMBER*, *LDIST* and *VISIT* have to do with the (possibility of) monitoring and screening each other's activities. More visits among members, and a lower distance between members probably increase screening possibilities. More group members tend to increase monitoring efforts, but there is also more scope for free riding. *PROBLEM* and *OTHER* refer to possibilities to obtain credit from other sources. *OTHER* directly measures whether a borrower has been able to raise funds from other sources than the microfinance institution. *PROBLEM* measures repayment problems in the past, and may give an indication of future possibilities to raise credit. *ACORD* and *CHANGE* are not directly related to the issues mentioned so far, but, as will become clear later, they have been included since they are highly correlated with one of the other indicators from this list.

First-best risk (X)

We assume that *first-best* risk can be picked up by variables that are directly related to the socio-economic situation of the borrower. We consider the following variables:

- 14) *LINC*: the logarithm of total monthly income
- 15) *AGE*: the age of a borrower
- 16) *GENDER*: a dummy with a one for a male, and a zero for a woman
- 17) *ILLIT*: a dummy with a one if the borrower is illiterate, zero otherwise
- 18) *PRIM*: a dummy with a one if the borrower has primary education, zero otherwise
- 19) *SEC*: a dummy with a one if the borrower has secondary education, zero otherwise
- 20) *LEADER*: a dummy with a one if the borrower is a group leader, zero otherwise
- 21) *MUSLIM*: a dummy with a one if the borrower is a Muslim, zero otherwise.

Table 2: Independent variables: Zero-One dummies

	No. of observations with 1 (% total)	No. of observations with 0	Total No. of observations
<i>BORN</i>	179 (51)	172	351
<i>KNOW</i>	287 (82)	64	351
<i>INTEG</i>	290 (83)	61	351
<i>ACTIV</i>	307 (87)	44	351
<i>PURP</i>	333 (95)	18	351
<i>SEL</i>	19 (5)	332	351
<i>VISIT</i>	265 (75)	86	351
<i>PROBLEM</i>	60 (17)	291	351
<i>OTHER</i>	18 (5)	333	351
<i>ACORD</i>	167 (48)	184	351
<i>CHANGE</i>	35 (10)	316	351
<i>ILLIT</i>	111 (32)	240	351
<i>PRIM</i>	128 (36)	223	351
<i>SEC</i>	19 (5)	332	351
<i>LEADER</i>	102 (29)	241	351
<i>MUSLIM</i>	70 (20)	281	351
<i>GENDER</i>	155 (44)	196	351

Table 2 provides information on the zero/ one dummies. The table shows that about half of the borrowers interviewed born in the village. A substantial number of the borrowers knew each other before forming the group. Also, most borrowers have some knowledge about the activities of the other members of the group. Nevertheless, there is only a small fraction of the total group of borrowers that knows the approximately weekly sales of other borrowers. About 28 % of the borrowers admitted to have had repayment problems. Only 18 borrowers reported that they have other sources of credit, in addition to the micro credits. Moreover, almost nobody ever applied for a bank credit (only 14 borrowers did). For six of them, the bank refused a loan (the latter information is not given in the table). The total sample consists of 351 borrowers, of which 167 are borrowers from *SZSCS* and 184 from *SCP*.

The majority of the respondents are illiterate or with only reading and writing abilities. Out of the total 32 % admitted that they are illiterate and 36 % have only primary school education. Secondary graduates include only 5 % of the data. About 20% of the respondents are Muslim, the rest are Christian. There are 155 women and 196 men in the data set.

Table 3 provides data on the remaining independent variables.

Table 3: Information on remaining independent variables

	<i>INC</i>	<i>AGE</i>	<i>DIST</i>	<i>NUMBER</i>
<i>Mean</i>	1017	46	499	4
<i>Median</i>	1000	45	200	4
<i>Maximum</i>	13000	77	5000	8
<i>Minimum</i>	300	18	5	3
<i>Std. Dev.</i>	752	11.67	863	1.32
<i>Skewness</i>	11.661	0.002	3.52	0.66
<i>Kurtosis</i>	185.24	2.65	17.01	2.80
<i>Jarque-Bera</i>	493661	1.76	3595	23.87
<i>Observations</i>	351	351	351	325

The table shows that the average borrower is 46 years old, with an average monthly income (*INC*) of 1017 Nakfas. Trading is the main occupation of the majority of the borrowers (63%), followed by farming (17 %). The remainder is distributed between services, daily labourers, and others. Often borrowers have different occupations at the same time, for instance, food vending and traditional restaurant. The borrowers sell articles ranging from food items to clothing and provide services such as the provision of hot meal, pubs, local beverages and teashops (latter information is not in table). The number of members per group varies between 3 and 8, with an average of 4. In the median group, 60% is woman. The average distance between group members' business is about 500 meters.

Regrouping of the variables

The concepts matching frictions and first-best risk are latent variables, which are not directly observable. Above, we have selected a group of variables that is assumed to be related to matching frictions, and a group of variables that is assumed to be related to first-best risk. In order to better account for the high collinearity between some of the variables within the two groups, and in order to test whether we can reduce the number of independent variables by constructing a smaller amount of new composite variables, we performed a multiple factor analysis (*MFA*).

We started by applying a factor analysis on the indicators of the group of variables related to matching frictions. The analysis suggests that 11 indicators in this group can be decomposed into 3 underlying factors. The two remaining indicators (*PROBLEM* and *OTHER*) are left out of this analysis since they have very low factor loadings, even if more underlying factors are allowed for. The factor loadings of the analysis are given in Table 4.

Table 4 Factorloadings

	<i>FACTOR1</i>	<i>FACTOR2</i>	<i>FACTOR3</i>
--	----------------	----------------	----------------

<i>ACORD</i>	-0.146	0.916	0.129
<i>BORN</i>	0.275	-0.227	-0.021
<i>CHANGE</i>	0.018	0.236	-0.019
<i>KNOW</i>	0.923	0.038	0.208
<i>INTEG</i>	0.935	0.050	0.202
<i>LDIST</i>	-0.176		-0.025
<i>ACTIV</i>	0.226	-0.093	0.376
<i>PURP</i>	0.058	0.120	0.733
<i>SEL</i>	0.102	0.185	0.048
<i>VISIT</i>	0.152	0.323	0.306
<i>NUMBER</i>	0.077	-0.632	0.019
Chi square Statistic: 24. 7; 25 Df; p-value 0.479; CUMVAR=0.394			

Note: Factor loadings smaller than 0.01 are not reported. Df denotes the degrees of freedom. CUMVAR gives the cumulative variance explained by the factors taken into account. The factor analysis is done on 323 observations (the common sample of all indicators).

The first factor mainly has to do with *KNOW* and *INTEG*, suggesting that the underlying factor in this case relates to information members have about each other before they formed a group. *ACORD* and *NUMBER* mainly determine the second factor. *NUMBER* has a negative factorloading, which suggests that, with respect to our sample, the average amount of members in credit groups from the *ACORD* (*SCSZS*) system is lower than that of the *SCP* microfinance system. A closer look at the data set confirms this: the average number of members in credit groups from the *SCP* is 5.2, whereas it equals 3.6 for the *ACORD* (*SCSZS*) system. The positive factor loading on *VISIT* suggests that members of credit groups from the *ACORD* system visit each other more regularly than those of the *SCP* system. The third factor mainly has to do with *PURP* and to a lower extent with *ACTIV*. This gives the impression that in this case the underlying factor relates to information members have about each other's business, after the group has been formed.

In the remainder of the analysis we will use the three factors, instead of the 11 original indicators. We interpret *FACTOR1* and *FACTOR3* as factors that primarily have to do with the asymmetry of information among group members. *FACTOR1* picks up information before forming the group, *FACTOR3* picks up information after the group has been formed. *FACTOR2* primarily relates to being a member of a credit group within the *ACORD* microfinance system. This factor might be important for risk taking since it

strongly correlates with the number of members within a group. This gives information on a possible peer monitoring effort. Armendariz de Aghion (1999, proposition 3, p.95) states “A larger group size tends to increase peer monitoring effort, due to a joint-responsibility, a cost-sharing, and a commitment effect. However... a larger group size (also) increases the scope for free riding in debt-repayment decisions”.⁶

We also tried a factor analysis on the indicators for first-best risk. However, here the factor analysis showed that it is not possible to combine the indicators into a smaller group of underlying factors. The number of factors that has to be taken into account to accept the null hypothesis of enough factors is almost equal to the original amount of indicators. Therefore, we decided to proceed with the individual first-best indicators in the remainder of the analysis.

7. ESTIMATING RISK

The next step in the analysis is to examine the possible empirical relevance of our matching frictions and first-best risk variables for explaining risk of a borrower's liquidity strategy. In other words, the next step is the estimation of equation (4).

The dependent variable is the proxy for risk, r , which we have constructed. The independent variables are the 8 first-best risk indicators, the three factors related to matching frictions, and the remaining two variables (*PROBLEM* and *OTHER*), which are also related to matching frictions. To examine non-linear effects we also tried quadratic terms, but, except for the quadratic term of *LINC* (*LINC2*), none of them appeared to be significant, and hence were left out of the analysis.

The constructed dependent variable is censored between 0 and 1. Therefore, we estimate with the *TOBIT* estimation technique with left and right censoring (using *NORMAL* distribution of error terms). We also present ordinary least squares (*OLS*) estimates, to test for differences in outcome due to different estimation techniques. The estimation results are presented in Table 5

⁶ Note that in Armendariz groups are exogenously given. In practice, there is a tradeoff between group size (monitoring effort) and benefits of size (diversification, easier to cover one defaulting partner). Group size is thus endogenous. We ignore this problem in our analysis.

Table 5 Estimating risk

	1A	1B	2A	2B	3A	3B
Method	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT
LINC	-0.866 (-2.93)	-1.224 (-3.48)	-0.880 (-3.05)	-1.260 (-3.63)	-0.487 (-2.19)	-0.790 (-2.77)
<i>LINC2</i>	0.055 (2.73)	0.078 (3.31)	0.056 (2.86)	0.080 (3.48)	0.029 (1.93)	0.048 (2.51)
<i>AGE</i>	0.0002 (0.22)	0.0003 (0.21)				
<i>GENDER</i>	-0.016 (-0.63)	-0.029 (-0.84)				
<i>ILLIT</i>	-0.029 (-0.96)	-0.037 (-0.91)				
<i>PRIM</i>	0.004 (0.16)	0.0020 (0.06)				
<i>SEC</i>	0.111 (2.40)	0.149 (2.39)	0.116 (2.78)	0.157 (2.72)	0.116 (2.85)	0.148 (2.59)
<i>LEADER</i>	0.0585 (2.70)	0.073 (2.46)	0.060 (3.00)	0.074 (2.62)	0.042 (2.25)	0.049 (1.91)
<i>MOSLIM</i>	0.012 (0.40)	0.019 (0.47)				
<i>PROBLEM</i>	0.320 (8.35)	0.386 (8.38)	0.321 (8.53)	0.386 (8.47)		
<i>APROBCRED</i>					0.399 (6.72)	0.540 (7.61)
<i>OTHER</i>	0.0028 (0.06)	-0.0049 (-0.08)				
<i>FACTOR1</i>	-0.00076 (-0.07)	0.0078 (0.50)				
<i>FACTOR2</i>	-0.022 (-2.07)	-0.049 (-3.16)	-0.022 (-2.13)	-0.050 (-3.25)	-0.016 (-1.73)	-0.037 (-2.74)
<i>FACTOR3</i>	-0.006 (-0.47)	-0.011 (-0.68)				
<i>CONSTANT</i>	3.443 (3.18)	4.734 (3.64)	3.480 (3.28)	4.846 (3.78)	2.092 (2.54)	3.188 (3.03)
adj. R ²	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.49	0.53

Note: the amount of observations is 323 for all regressions. t-values (z-values for Tobit) based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors (for the OLS regressions) and QML (Huber/ White) standard errors between parantheses. The Tobit estimates are done with left (0) and right (1) censoring; there are 94 left censored observations and 10 right censored observations.

Equations 1A and 1B show that *LINC*, *LINC2*, *LEADER*, *SEC*, *PROBLEM* and *FACTOR2* significantly affect risk behaviour. Since *LINC* has a significantly negative coefficient and *LINC2* a significantly positive coefficient, there seems to be a non-linear relationship between the income of a borrower and his risk behaviour. For low income

levels, an increase in income lowers risk, whereas it increases risk after a certain threshold level of income has been passed. Positive significant coefficients for *LEADER*, *SEC* and *PROBLEM* suggest that a group leader takes more risk than a normal group member, that members who are more educated take more risk, and that members who have had payment problems in the past also take more risk. The negative coefficient for *ACORD* implies that borrowers in a borrowing group belonging to the *ACORD* system take less risk. The underlying reason probably is that the number of members in credit groups belonging to the *ACORD* system is lower. So, larger groups lead to more risk taking of the individual members, possibly due to a better scope for free riding. These results hold for both the *OLS* and *TOBIT* estimates.

In equations 2A and 2B the regressions are repeated by ignoring the insignificant terms. These regressions confirm the results suggested by equations 1A and 1B. Finally, we re-estimate the equations by replacing *PROBLEM*, by *APROBCRED* (equations 3A and 3B). *APROBCRED* measures the amount of money that was involved when the borrower had problems repaying the debt, as a percentage of the size of the loan in the previous loan cycle. This indicator serves as an alternative indicator for *PROBLEM*. The results of these regressions again confirm the basic message of equations 1A and 1B.

Since *FACTOR2* mainly has to do with three indicators, *ACCORD*, *VISIT* and *NUMBER*, we also perform regressions in which *FACTOR2* is replaced by one of these individual indicators. OLS and TOBIT regressions for these cases are presented in Table 6. The table shows that each of these individual terms, with the exception of the OLS estimate for *NUMBER*, are significant. Being a borrower from a credit group associated with the *ACORD* system has a negative effect on risk taking. The same holds for more visits among members of a credit group. An increase in the number of members of a credit group enhances risk taking of an individual borrower.

Table 6 Estimating risk, replacing *FACTOR2* by *ACCORD*, *VISIT* and *NUMBER*

	1A	1B	2A	2B	3A	3B
Method	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT

LINC	-0.833 (-2.95)	-1.179 (-3.49)	-0.800 (-2.87)	-1.074 (-3.25)	-0.840 (-2.89)	-1.166 (-3.35)
<i>LINC2</i>	0.053 (2.77)	0.076 (3.35)	0.051 (2.68)	0.068 (3.07)	0.053 (2.69)	0.074 (3.18)
<i>SEC</i>	0.085 (2.25)	0.114 (2.04)	0.078 (2.12)	0.092 (1.70)	0.109 (2.64)	0.139 (2.47)
<i>LEADER</i>	0.060 (3.10)	0.075 (2.74)	0.057 (3.02)	0.071 (2.65)	0.060 (3.00)	0.074 (2.64)
<i>PROBLEM</i>	0.324 (8.74)	0.392 (8.73)	0.316 (8.66)	0.373 (8.54)	0.318 (8.50)	0.379 (8.39)
<i>ACORD</i>	-0.042 (-2.31)	-0.097 (-3.48)				
<i>VISIT</i>			-0.049 (-2.37)	-0.076 (-2.79)		
<i>NUMBER</i>					0.010 (1.43)	0.023 (2.40)
<i>CONSTANT</i>	3.310 (3.21)	4.578 (3.68)	3.224 (3.17)	4.246 (3.48)	3.301 (3.08)	4.422 (3.43)
adj. R ²	0.39	0.41	0.39	0.41	0.39	0.41

Note: see note Table 5

We are now able to come up with an estimate of $\bar{r}_i^* = X_i \bar{\alpha}$ and $\bar{\beta}f_i = f_i \beta$ (equations 5 and 6, above). For this we use the estimation results of equation 2B (the TOBIT estimates) presented in Table 5. As we have explained before, we argue that the variables that are related to the socio-economic situation (*i.e.* *LINC*, *LINC2*, *SEC* and *LEADER*) determine the risk choice in a frictionless world. The other variables (*PROBLEM* and *FACTOR2*) are primarily related to matching frictions. By using the estimated coefficient of equation 2B (Table 5) we can now come up with an estimate of \bar{r}_i^* , which we name *FIRSTBEST* and $\bar{\beta}f_i$, which we name *FRICTION*.⁷

8. HETEROGENEITY

The final step in the analysis is to estimate the heterogeneity equation (equation 7). For this we first need to develop a measure of risk heterogeneity.

The measure for risk heterogeneity:

⁷ We assume that the conditional mean ($E[y_i]$) of the TOBIT regression equation $y_i = \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$ equals $K_i x_i$. If all independent variables are taken into account, this forecasts the so-called expected *latent variable*.

In line with Carpenter and Sadoulet (2001) we measure risk heterogeneity (h) by:

$$h_i = \sum_{r_j \in G_i} \frac{(r_i - r_j)^2}{(N_i - 1)} \text{sign}(r_i - \bar{r}_i), \text{ where } \bar{r}_i \text{ is the mean risk in } i\text{'s group } G_i^8.$$

Table 7 gives descriptive statistics of h . Figure 2 graphs heterogeneity by means of kernel distributions.

Table 7 Heteogeneity

	h
<i>Mean</i>	-0.005
<i>Median</i>	-2.78E-17
<i>Maximum</i>	1.00
<i>Minimum</i>	-1.00
<i>Std. Dev.</i>	0.265
<i>Skewness</i>	0.115
<i>Kurtosis</i>	5.227
<i>Jarque-Bera</i>	72.65

⁸ We also used a measure for heterogeneity that is not adjusted for having a risk above or below the mean risk. This gave qualitatively the same results.




Figure 2: heterogeneity (h)

The graphs clearly show that heterogeneity in almost all cases differs from zero. This seems to imply that we have to reject the hypothesis of homogeneous matching since with homogeneous matching the risk heterogeneity within groups should be equal to zero. However, it may be the case that this heterogeneity is caused by matching frictions, an issue we will examine by estimating equation 7.

Estimation results

The estimates of the heterogeneity equation are presented in Table 8.⁹ Again we use the *OLS* as well as the *TOBIT* estimation technique. The dependent variable in the regressions is our proxy for heterogeneity (h). It appears that the coefficient for *FIRSTBEST* is significantly different from zero at the 99% level, strongly suggesting that homogeneous matching will not take place, even if the estimates are controlled for matching frictions.

Table 8 Estimating heterogeneity

	1	2
<i>METHOD</i>	<i>TOBIT</i>	<i>OLS</i>
FIRSTBEST (\bar{r}_i^*)	0.663 (3.20)	0.660 (3.19)
FRICTION ($\bar{\beta}_i$)	0.623 (5.54)	0.620 (5.52)
CONSTANT	3.129 (3.13)	3.115 (3.13)
adj R ²	0.15	0.16

Note: the amount of observations is 323 for all regressions. t-values (z-values) for *OLS* (for *TOBIT*) between paranthesis (based on White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariances and Huber/White robust standard errors&ccovariances, respectively). In equation 1 there is 1 right and 1 left censored observation.

9. CONCLUSIONS

⁹ It should be noted that the variables *FIRSTBEST* and *FRICTIONS* are measured with errors. OLS estimates of the heterogeneity equation may therefore be biased. A possible solution, used by Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001) is to estimate the heterogeneity equation with instrumental variables. However, due to a lack of candidates for instruments in our sample, we decided to rely on the OLS estimates.

We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from two microcredit programs in Eritrea. Using the results from this survey, this paper aims to provide new insights on the empirical relevance of the homogeneous matching hypothesis for microcredit groups in Eritrea. A better insight about how groups are formed and whether these groups are homogeneous is extremely important for our understanding of the working of microcredit programmes. The results of our analysis can be used as inputs, or as intermediate results, for an analysis on repayment performance of joint liability schemes versus individual liability debt contracts.

An important part of the methodology to test for homogeneous matching consists of estimating risk behaviour. This analysis suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between the income of a borrower and risk taking. Below a certain threshold level of income, an increase in income will lead to less risk taking, whereas an increase in income will increase risk taking above a certain level of income. We also find that group leaders take more risk than normal group members, that better educated borrowers take more risk, and that borrowers that have had payment problems in the past will take more risk. Moreover, we find some evidence that borrowers in larger groups will take more risk than borrowers in smaller groups.

Concerning the homogeneous matching hypothesis, our results strongly indicate that groups are formed heterogeneously. Most importantly, we do not find support for the matching frictions hypothesis, in the sense that even if we control for matching frictions, credit groups in Eritrea do not seem to consist of borrowers of the similar risk type.

Of course, some reservations with respect to our main conclusions can be made. For instance, the classification of variables in a group that primarily deals with matching frictions, and a group of variables dealing with first-best risk determinants may be criticised. In addition, our variables *FIRSTBEST* and *FRICTION* are constructed variables, and therefore are measured with error. This may bias the estimates of the coefficients. Moreover, the measure of risk we use may not be the most accurate measure for risk taking. There may exist other measures of risk that are better proxies. It

may then be the case that using another measure for risk will lead to homogeneous matching, instead of the heterogeneous matching we found by using our measure for risk. More research on these issues is needed. Nevertheless, given the data we have, and taking into account all possible drawbacks of the methodology used, we think that our analysis, at the least, suggests that the commonly held assumption of homogeneous matching can not be confirmed for the case of Eritrea. If one accepts that groups are formed heterogeneously, an important issue is then to examine why this is so. A possible reason brought forward in some recent papers is the insurance that risky and safe borrowers may provide. This issue, however, is left for future research.

REFERENCES

- Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch (2000), "Micro Finance Beyond Group Lending," *Economics of Transition* 8 (2): 401-420.
- Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz and Gollier, Christian (2000), "Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model," *The Economic Journal* 110 (01):632-643.
- Becker, Gary (1993), *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Besley, Timothy and Steven Coate (1995), "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral," *Journal of Development Economics* 46: 1-18.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh and Timothy W. Guinnane (1999), "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," *Journal of Development Economics* 60: 195-228.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh (1999), "Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection," *Journal of Development Economics* 60: 27-50.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh (2000), "Screening by the Company you Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," *The Economic Journal* 110: 601-631.
- Morduch, Jonathan (1999), "The Microfinance Promise," *Journal of Economic Literature* 37 (4): 1569-1614.
- Laffont, J.J, (2000), "Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection," Working Paper, University of Social Sciences of Toulouse, ARQADE < GREMAQ, France.
- Sadoulet, Loic and Seth B. Carpenter (2001), "Endogenous Matching and Risk Heterogeneity: Evidence on Microcredit Group Formation in Guatemala," ECARES, Free University of Brussels.
- Sadoulet, Loic (1999), "Equilibrium Risk-Matching in Group Lending ," ECARES, Free University of Brussels.
- Stiglitz, Joseph (1990), "Peer monitoring and Credit Markets," *World Bank Economic Review* (4): 351-366.
- Xinhua Gu, (2001), "A Search Approach to Group Lending with Joint Liability under Asymmetric Information," Working Paper, University of Toronto, Ontario.
- Van Tassel, Eric (1999), "Group Lending under Asymmetric Information," *Journal of Development Economics* 60: 3-25.

Van Tassel, Eric (2000), “ A Study of Group Lending Incentives in Bolivia,”
International Journal of Social Economics 27 (7): 927-942.

CREDIT PAPERS

- 01/01 **Tim Lloyd, Oliver Morrissey and Robert Osei**, “Aid, Exports and Growth in Ghana”
- 01/02 **Christophe Muller**, “Relative Poverty from the Perspective of Social Class: Evidence from The Netherlands”
- 01/03 **Stephen Knowles**, “Inequality and Economic Growth: The Empirical Relationship Reconsidered in the Light of Comparable Data”
- 01/04 **A. Cuadros, V. Orts and M.T. Alguacil**, “Openness and Growth: Re-Examining Foreign Direct Investment and Output Linkages in Latin America”
- 01/05 **Harold Alderman, Simon Appleton, Lawrence Haddad, Lina Song and Yisehac Yohannes**, “Reducing Child Malnutrition: How Far Does Income Growth Take Us?”
- 01/06 **Robert Lensink and Oliver Morrissey**, “Foreign Direct Investment: Flows, Volatility and Growth”
- 01/07 **Adam Blake, Andrew McKay and Oliver Morrissey**, “The Impact on Uganda of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation”
- 01/08 **R. Quentin Grafton, Stephen Knowles and P. Dorian Owen**, “Social Divergence and Economic Performance”
- 01/09 **David Byrne and Eric Strobl**, “Defining Unemployment in Developing Countries: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago”
- 01/10 **Holger Görg and Eric Strobl**, “The Incidence of Visible Underemployment: Evidence for Trinidad and Tobago”
- 01/11 **Abbi Mamo Kedir**, “Some Issues in Using Unit Values as Prices in the Estimation of Own-Price Elasticities: Evidence from Urban Ethiopia”
- 01/12 **Eric Strobl and Frank Walsh**, “Minimum Wages and Compliance: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago”
- 01/13 **Mark McGillivray and Oliver Morrissey**, “A Review of Evidence on the Fiscal Effects of Aid”
- 01/14 **Tim Lloyd, Oliver Morrissey and Robert Osei**, “Problems with Pooling in Panel Data Analysis for Developing Countries: The Case of Aid and Trade Relationships”
- 01/15 **Oliver Morrissey**, “Pro-Poor Conditionality for Aid and Debt Relief in East Africa”
- 01/16 **Zdenek Drabek and Sam Laird**, “Can Trade Policy help Mobilize Financial Resources for Economic Development?”
- 01/17 **Michael Bleaney and Lisenda Lisenda**, “Monetary Policy After Financial Liberalisation: A Central Bank Reaction Function for Botswana”
- 01/18 **Holger Görg and Eric Strobl**, “Relative Wages, Openness and Skill-Biased Technological Change in Ghana”
- 01/19 **Dirk Willem te Velde and Oliver Morrissey**, “Foreign Ownership and Wages: Evidence from Five African Countries”
- 01/20 **Suleiman Abrar**, “Duality, Choice of Functional Form and Peasant Supply Response in Ethiopia”
- 01/21 **John Rand and Finn Tarp**, “Business Cycles in Developing Countries: Are They Different?”

- 01/22 **Simon Appleton**, “Education, Incomes and Poverty in Uganda in the 1990s”
- 02/01 **Eric Strobl and Robert Thornton**, “Do Large Employers Pay More in Developing Countries? The Case of Five African Countries”
- 02/02 **Mark McGillivray and J. Ram Pillarisetti**, “International Inequality in Human Development, Real Income and Gender-related Development”
- 02/03 **Sourafel Girma and Abbi M. Kedir**, “When Does Food Stop Being a Luxury? Evidence from Quadratic Engel Curves with Measurement Error”
- 02/04 **Indraneel Dasgupta and Ravi Kanbur**, “Class, Community, Inequality”
- 02/05 **Karuna Gomanee, Sourafel Girma and Oliver Morrissey**, “Aid and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Accounting for Transmission Mechanisms”
- 02/06 **Michael Bleaney and Marco Gunderman**, “Stabilisations, Crises and the “Exit” Problem – A Theoretical Model”
- 02/07 **Eric Strobl and Frank Walsh**, “Getting It Right: Employment Subsidy or Minimum Wage? Evidence from Trinidad and Tobago”
- 02/08 **Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp**, “On the Empirics of Foreign Aid and Growth”
- 02/09 **Teresa Alguacil, Ana Cuadros and Vincente Orts**, “Does Saving Really Matter for Growth? Mexico (1970-2000)”
- 02/10 **Simon Feeny and Mark McGillivray**, “Modelling Inter-temporal Aid Allocation”
- 02/11 **Mark McGillivray**, “Aid, Economic Reform and Public Sector Fiscal Behaviour in Developing Countries”
- 02/12 **Indraneel Dasgupta and Ravi Kanbur**, “How Workers Get Poor *Because* Capitalists Get Rich: A General Equilibrium Model of Labor Supply, Community, and the Class Distribution of Income”
- 02/13 **Lucian Cernat, Sam Laird and Alessandro Turrini**, “How Important are Market Access Issues for Developing Countries in the Doha Agenda?”
- 02/14 **Ravi Kanbur**, “Education, Empowerment and Gender Inequalities”
- 02/15 **Eric Strobl**, “Is Education Used as a Signaling Device for Productivity in Developing Countries?”
- 02/16 **Suleiman Abrar, Oliver Morrissey and Tony Rayner**, “Supply Response of Peasant Farmers in Ethiopia”
- 02/17 **Stephen Knowles**, “Does Social Capital Affect Foreign Aid Allocations?”
- 02/18 **Dirk Willem te Velde and Oliver Morrissey**, “Spatial Inequality for Manufacturing Wages in Five African Countries”
- 02/19 **Jennifer Mbabazi, Oliver Morrissey and Chris Milner**, “The Fragility of the Evidence on Inequality, Trade Liberalisation, Growth and Poverty”
- 02/20 **Robert Osei, Oliver Morrissey and Robert Lensink**, “The Volatility of Capital Inflows: Measures and Trends for Developing Countries”
- 02/21 **Miyuki Shibata and Oliver Morrissey**, “Private Capital Inflows and Macroeconomic Stability in Sub-Saharan African Countries”
- 02/22 **L. Alan Winters, Neil McCulloch and Andrew McKay**, “Trade Liberalisation and Poverty: The Empirical Evidence”
- 02/23 **Oliver Morrissey**, “British Aid Policy Since 1997: Is DFID the Standard Bearer for Donors?”

- 02/24 **Öner Günçavdi, Suat Küçükçifçi and Andrew McKay**, “Adjustment, Stabilisation and the Analysis of the Employment Structure in Turkey: An Input-Output Approach”
- 02/25 **Christophe Muller**, “Censored Quantile Regressions of Chronic and Transient Seasonal Poverty in Rwanda”
- 02/26 **Henrik Hansen**, “The Impact of Aid and External Debt on Growth and Investment”
- 02/27 **Andrew McKay and David Lawson**, “Chronic Poverty in Developing and Transition Countries: Concepts and Evidence”
- 02/28 **Michael Bleaney and Akira Nishiyama**, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”
- 03/01 **Stephen Dobson, Carlyn Ramlogan and Eric Strobl**, “Why Do Rates of Convergence Differ? A Meta-Regression Analysis”
- 03/02 **Robert Lensink and Habteab T. Mehrteab**, “Risk Behaviour and Group Formation in Microcredit Groups in Eritrea”

SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS

In addition to the CREDIT series of research papers the School of Economics produces a discussion paper series dealing with more general aspects of economics. Below is a list of recent titles published in this series.

- 01/01 **Spiros Bougheas**, “Optimism, Education, and Industrial Development”
- 01/02 **Tae-Hwan Kim and Paul Newbold**, “Unit Root Tests Based on Inequality-Restricted Estimators”
- 01/03 **Christophe Muller**, “Defining Poverty Lines as a Fraction of Central Tendency”
- 01/04 **Claudio Piga and Joanna Poyago-Theotoky**, “Shall We Meet Halfway? Endogenous Spillovers and Locational Choice”
- 01/05 **Ilias Skamnelos**, “Sunspot Panics, Information-Based Bank Runs and Suspension of Deposit Convertibility”
- 01/06 **Spiros Bougheas and Yannis Georgellis**, “Apprenticeship Training, Earnings Profiles and Labour Turnover: Theory and German Evidence”
- 01/07 **M.J. Andrews, S. Bradley and R. Upward**, “Employer Search, Vacancy Duration and Skill Shortages”
- 01/08 **Marta Aloi and Laurence Lassele**, “Growing Through Subsidies”
- 01/09 **Marta Aloi and Huw D. Dixon**, “Entry Dynamics, Capacity Utilisation, and Productivity in a Dynamic Open Economy”
- 01/10 **Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley**, “Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies”
- 01/11 **Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley**, “Disguised Aggregative Games”
- 01/12 **Spiros Bougheas and Tim Worrall**, “Cost Padding in Regulated Monopolies”
- 10/13 **Alan Duncan, Gillian Paull and Jayne Taylor**, “Price and Quality in the UK Childcare Market”
- 01/14 **John Creedy and Alan Duncan**, “Aggregating Labour Supply and Feedback Effects in Microsimulation”
- 01/15 **Alan Duncan, Gillian Paull and Jayne Taylor**, “Mothers’ Employment and Use of Childcare in the United Kingdom”
- 02/01 **Mark A. Roberts**, “Central Wage Setting Under Multiple Technological Equilibria: A Mechanism for Equilibrium Elimination”
- 02/02 **Mark A. Roberts**, “Employment Under Wage-Only and Wage-Employment Bargaining: The Role of the Government Budget Constraint”
- 02/03 **Mark A. Roberts**, “Can the Capital Gains Arising from an Unfunded Pensions Reform Make it Pareto-Improving?”
- 02/04 **Mehrdad Sepahvand**, “Privatisation in a Regulated Market, Open to Foreign Competition”
- 02/05 **Mark A. Roberts**, “Can Pay-As-You Go Pensions Raise the Capital Stock?”
- 02/06 **Indraneel Dasgupta**, “Consistent Firm Choice and the Theory of Supply”
- 02/07 **Michael Bleaney**, “The Aftermath of a Currency Collapse: How Different Are Emerging Markets?”
- 02/08 **Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley**, “Dissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests with Entry Costs”

- 02/09 **Eric O’N. Fisher and Mark A. Roberts**, “Funded Pensions, Labor Market Participation, and Economic Growth”
- 02/10 **Spiros Bougeas**, “Imperfect Capital Markets, Income Distribution and the ‘Credit Channel’: A General Equilibrium Approach”
- 02/11 **Simona Mateut, Spiros Bougeas and Paul Mizen**, “Trade Credit, Bank Lending and Monetary Policy Transmission”
- 02/12 **Bouwe R. Dijkstra**, “Time Consistency and Investment Incentives in Environmental Policy”
- 02/13 **Bouwe R. Dijkstra**, “Samaritan vs Rotten Kid: Another Look”
- 02/14 **Michael Bleaney and Mark A. Roberts**, “International Labour Mobility and Unemployment”

Members of the Centre

Director

Oliver Morrissey - aid policy, trade and agriculture

Research Fellows (Internal)

Simon Appleton – poverty, education, household economics

Adam Blake – CGE models of low-income countries

Mike Bleaney - growth, international macroeconomics

Indraneel Dasgupta – development theory, household bargaining

Norman Gemmell – growth and public sector issues

Ken Ingersent - agricultural trade

Tim Lloyd – agricultural commodity markets

Andrew McKay - poverty, peasant households, agriculture

Chris Milner - trade and development

Wyn Morgan - futures markets, commodity markets

Christophe Muller – poverty, household panel econometrics

Tony Rayner - agricultural policy and trade

Research Fellows (External)

David Fielding (*University of Leicester*) – investment, monetary and fiscal policy

Ravi Kanbur (*Cornell*) – inequality, public goods – Visiting Research Fellow

Henrik Hansen (*University of Copenhagen*) – aid and growth

Stephen Knowles (*University of Otago*) – inequality and growth

Sam Laird (*UNCTAD*) – trade policy, WTO

Robert Lensink (*University of Groningen*) – aid, investment, macroeconomics

Scott McDonald (*University of Sheffield*) – CGE modelling, agriculture

Mark McGillivray (*WIDER, Helsinki*) – aid allocation, aid policy

Doug Nelson (*Tulane University*) - political economy of trade

Shelton Nicholls (*University of West Indies*) – trade, integration

Eric Strobl (*University of Louvain*) – labour markets

Finn Tarp (*University of Copenhagen*) – aid, CGE modelling