ESRC DTC PhD Student, Faculty of Social Sciences
My first chapter provides a new way to measure information accuracy embedded in financial reports. We also attempt to understand motivations underlying decisions of disclosure and sequential… read more
My first chapter provides a new way to measure information accuracy embedded in financial reports. We also attempt to understand motivations underlying decisions of disclosure and sequential precision of financial information. We provide a theoretical and empirical analysis to support our results: higher performance measurements (such as programme ratios) and higher spending on governance activities may not guarantee more accurate financial records.
My second chapter aims to use statistical models to discern the motivations underlying the observed level of reporting accuracy. Using a unique dataset of the Ugandan non-profit sector, we show evidence to support that NGOs may not disclose their financial information because they are aware of their report's low quality (a corner solution to withhold information). Conditioning on disclosure, the sequential precision is positively associated with better charitable services provided to their beneficiary community. We also support the hypothesis that the request for more spending on governance activities may be counter-productive in the non-profit sector. We account for potential endogeneity by proposing a sample-selection model and a double-hurdle model with endogenous explanatory variables.
My third chapter aims to understand the motivations underlying NGOs' decision to diversify. Following a theoretical model, we propose a clear test to distinguish the driving incentive of an NGO (agent) in response to a contract that rewards better development project's value and penalises less-focused portfolios. Consistent to previous literature, we show evidence that Ugandan NGOs were not exerting their best effort to work on their aims. Instead, there is evidence of the dominating effect of private benefits on their decision-making process.
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