The Ideological Basis of the Grexit Debate

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January 2016

Abstract

What explains the sharp divide among European publics over the Grexit? We explore this question using original surveys from four of the largest European economies. We contend that differences in citizens' own economic interests, as well as the often-mentioned chasm between supporters of mainstream and extremist parties, provide little insight into the public divide over the Grexit. Instead, we show that the key factor is the split between the left and right. We then develop and test a set of theoretical explanations for this cleavage. We find that the left-right divide over the Grexit is not driven by differences in attitudes on redistribution, levels of empathy, or general EU support. Instead, we find that the primary mechanism is that left and right voters have different expectations about the impact of a Grexit on the European economy as a whole. These expectations largely reflect differences in core beliefs about the promise of a free-market approach.

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We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant #100017_146170/1 and grant #PP00P1-139035). Any errors remain our own.

I. Introduction

The financial crisis in Europe reached a boiling point in mid-2015, when intense negotiations between the Greek government and its main creditors appeared to reach a deadlock. Without an agreement, the Greek government was to be denied financial assistance, and thus many viewed a default and subsequent exit from the Eurozone – a "Grexit" – as a likely scenario. Greek citizens fiercely debated the tough conditions demanded by the creditors as part of any deal. Yet the agreement and its terms also divided citizens of many other European nations. In particular, disagreement centered on the desirability of a Grexit. Whereas some supported providing another bailout to ensure Greece stayed within the Eurozone, others opposed additional financial transfers and viewed a Grexit as an acceptable, preferred, or even necessary outcome.

This was, in fact, the first time since the formation of the Eurozone that citizens of member states were debating the very real prospect of another member state being forced out of the currency union. Unsurprisingly, both supporters and opponents of a deal invoked a range of considerations: economic factors, the national interest, European solidarity, and even historical precedents. What explains the contours of this divide over assistance to Greece and the potential outcome of a Grexit? More generally, how do publics weigh the costs and benefits of maintaining a currency union?

We address these questions using original data collected in a cross-national survey that we administered to national samples in four of the largest European countries: France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The data, gathered during the negotiations and at the height of the Greek debt crisis in 2015, allow us to assess the role of egocentric economic considerations in shaping individuals' attitudes. We also examine the influence of other potential factors, such as people's level of political sophistication or knowledge on the topic. We find that the statistical evidence linking these factors and attitudes on the Greek crisis is overall weak and offers limited explanatory power.

In contrast, we find a clear pattern whereby the deepest cleavage among publics in Europe on the Grexit question runs along the ideological left-right divide. The magnitude of this divide is

striking: controlling for a large set of economic variables, socio-demographics, and country fixed effects, voters on the far left are about 31 percentage-point more likely to oppose the Grexit than voters on the far right (the average level of opposition is 55%). This finding, which is consistent across all four countries and robust to multiple checks and alternative measures, counters many accounts explaining attitudes on EU integration, which describe a cross-cutting or inverted-U curve that pits pro-EU centrist voters against anti-EU voters on the ideological extremes (Hix and Lord, 1997; Taggart, 1998; Hooghe et al., 2002). Yet our analysis shows that placement on the ideological spectrum is, by far, the strongest predictor of individual attitudes on the Grexit question, even controlling for a wide range of other predictors. In fact, we show

We then explore in detail why that is the case: Why has a cleavage that tends to delineate debates over domestic policy questions come to structure people's position also on a foreign policy issue, namely the possible default and exit of a currency-union member state? We propose and test four possible explanations for the prominence of the left-right divide on the Grexit question. The first explanation holds that because the Grexit debate required financial assistance amounting to redistribution at the international level, this may have led to a reproduction of the same political divisions that characterize debates over domestic redistribution. A second explanation centers on the possible differences between left and right voters in levels of empathy. Attitudes on the use of taxpayer funds to assist a target in need, in this case a foreign state, may reflect citizens' ability or willingness to empathize with the unfortunate and downtrodden. Third, left and right voters may differ systematically in their broader attitudes toward EU integration, in which case disagreement on the question of assistance to Greece perhaps reflects different interests with respect to strengthening or weakening the integration project. Finally, the divide may reflect different sociotropic concerns among left and right voters about the likely effects of a Grexit on the larger European economy. If the two camps hold systematically divergent expectations about the impact of Greece leaving the Eurozone, this could account for the prominence of the ideological cleavage in the current debate.

Our empirical investigation disconfirms the first two explanations and casts doubt on the third. More specifically, we find that individuals who hold very different views on domestic

redistribution exhibit, on average, almost identical views on the Grexit question. Similarly, we find that the attitudes of people with different levels of empathy are not different with respect to the question of assistance to Greece. With respect to broader support for EU integration, we find that EU attitudes are correlated with opposition to the Grexit, but there is a lack of a clear correspondence between left-right ideology and EU attitudes, which casts doubt on the idea that this mechanism provides a pivotal explanation for the observed ideological divide on the Grexit.

In contrast, our evidence is consistent with the fourth account, namely that left and right hold very different views regarding the likely impact of a Grexit: whereas many on the left believe a Grexit would damage the European economy, the proportion who believe it would have a positive impact increases systematically when moving toward the right, a pattern we observe in all four countries. We offer a number of additional empirical tests that give credence to this claim of divergent beliefs about broader economic outcomes as a key channel accounting for the striking left-right divide on the Grexit question. As part of this we also rule out the possibility that the left-right divide on the Grexit question is driven by party cueing.

Our study contributes to the literature on the sources of foreign economic policy preferences, which analyzes the relative influence of economic interests and ideological concerns in shaping mass attitudes on issues ranging from trade policy, immigration, the financing of international organizations, or inter-regional residtribution (Balcells et al., 2015; Facchini and Steinhardt, 2011; Broz and Hawes, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b). Our results indicate that on international financial rescues, ideological dispositions are key to explaining citizens' policy preferences, whereas personal economic interests have only a peripheral influence. Relatedly, our findings also speak to the debate over the extent to which the left-right cleavage, which typically centers on domestic issues, also structures voters' preferences on foreign policy matters (Kuo and Fernández-Albertos, Forthcoming; Balcells et al., 2015; Gabel and Hix, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Milner and Judkins, 2004; Noël and Thérien, 2008). Our results regarding the public divide over the Grexit indicate that the left-right split is indeed a central factor structuring mass opinion on economic policy debates that extend well outside the national

borders.

Finally, our results also highlight the importance of the often-overlooked issue of citizens' beliefs about the conseqeunces of economic policy as a source of divergent preferences. In line with earlier studies (Broz, 2005a,b) we conjecture that when people form a stance on complex economic issues, they often use their general dispositions toward government intervention as a heuristic for making judgements, rather than delve into the specifics of the policy. Our finding that left and right voters exhibit systematically different expectations regarding the likely impact of a Grexit support this conjecture, and highlights the value of further investigating the mechanisms underlying voters' beliefs about economic policy outcomes.

II. Opposition to the Grexit: Economic Interests and Ideology

A currency union resembles a club that provides its members with benefits such as lower consumer prices and reduced inflation (Padoan, 1997, 2004). Yet members states of a currency union often face collective action problems that arise because the benefits from sustaining the union are often non-excludable, regardless of who bears the costs. For example, if a member state experiences an economic shock, maintaining a stable common currency can require the members to incur significant funding costs. But since the benefits of an effective response to the crisis are shared by all member countries, governments have an incentive to free-ride on the stabilization efforts of other member states. As a consequence, the club may fail to craft a coordinated intervention capable of saving the struggling member state and keeping it within the currency union.

In dealing with such a collective action problem, domestic political support may be a crucial factor. If publics in the currency union support the idea of saving the debt-ridden member state from default, this could counteract the incentives governments face to free-ride on the efforts of other member countries. Conversely, mass opposition to funding a bailout may exacerbate the free-rider problem. This possibility, however, depends on the level and structure of domestic support: Who is in favor of the crisis country leaving the currency union and who is against?

What theories can account for variation in public attitudes on an exit? Answering these question is important to determine the future stability of currency unions like the Eurozone.

The literature on individual on foreign economic policy preferences has increasingly focused on the question of whether citizens form their views mainly based on economic interests or on social dispositions and ideological convictions. These two strands of explanations have been prominent in studies of people's attitudes on issues such at immigration, trade, FDI and foreign aid (Bechtel, Bernauer and Meyer, 2012; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Margalit, 2012; Milner and Tingley, 2011; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a). To extend this line of research to our subject matter, this section develops the theoretical arguments about the factors that could account for attitudes on the Grexit.

A. The Ideological Center-Periphery Divide

Scholars studying citizens' attitudes on European economic integration have long argued that a key dividing line is that between supporters of mainstream and extremest parties. Whereas the former embrace what is widely seen as a liberal economic arrangement, voters of extremist parties oppose EU integration due to concerns on issues such as immigration and loss of national sovereignty, or as an expression of discontent with mainstream politics. Indeed, evidence in support of the ideological center-periphery cleavage has been documented with respect to European integration in general (Hix, 1999; Markowski and Tucker, 2005), as well as with regard to more specific policy issues such as EU fiscal policy, employment, and integration initiatives (Hooghe et al., 2002). If assistance to Greece represents an extension of the broader question of EU integration, the center-periphery distinction may also structure the cleavage in attitudes over the Grexit.

Hypothesis 1 (Ideological Center-Periphery Cleavage) *Individuals on the ideological extremes will support an exit of Greece more strongly than those in the ideological center.*

B. The Left-Right Cleavage

An alternative view holds that the debate over keeping a member state within the union would divide publics along a traditional left-right cleavage. This may be due to a number of reasons, such as opposing views on redistributive measures, differences in levels of empathy toward the least well off, divergent beliefs about the efficacy of market-based outcomes as opposed to government-led intervention, or differences in attachments to national and EU identities. For any of these reasons (all of which we discuss in detail later), the left-right dimension could be central to explaining the divisions in the Grexit debate.

Hypothesis 2 (Ideological Left-Right Cleavage) *Individuals on the ideological left will be more opposed to an exit of Greece from the Eurozone than those on the right.*

C. Economic Interests

Another line of explanation for the variation in views on assistance to Greece and a possible Grexit centers on how individuals expect such outcomes to affect their own economic standing. If this approach has merit, the key dimension likely to shape citizens' attitudes on a Grexit is the extent to which their earnings are exposed to changes in market conditions following a Greek default and possible exit from the currency union. Such exposure could take various forms. For example, citizens that own financial assets such as stocks and bonds will be more adversely affected than others if a Greek default leads to bearish financial markets. Other exposure could be in terms of real estate investments that are tied to changing interest rates. In particular, individuals that have a large mortgage to pay out are less immune to the effects of a market downturn as compared to citizens who rent or own their home with no loans to repay. As a result, one might expect mortgage owners to exhibit greater support for actions aimed at staving off a Grexit.

A different form of exposure to Greece's plight could also arise from dependence on government assistance. If citizens expect that providing further financial aid to Greece would come at the expense of funds available for spending on domestic social programs, those who are more

dependent on government assistance – the unemployed, the poor, and other segments of society whose income is more reliant on the public purse – should be more in favor of shunning Greek requests for financial assistance.

In sum, the economic self-interest logic gives rise to the following expectations:

Hypothesis 3 (Asset Ownership) *Ownership of financial assets will increase opposition to a Grexit.*

Hypothesis 4 (Mortgage Holders) *Mortgage owners will be more opposed to a Grexit than renters or non-mortgaged homeowners.*

Hypothesis 5 (Welfare recipients) *The poor, unemployed, and other beneficiaries of public income sources will be less opposed to a Grexit.*

III. Data

To test these hypotheses, we designed and fielded an original online survey in France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The surveys, carried out among national samples in May 2015, were administered by Respondi, an international polling firm. We made a substantial effort to match the known population margins on socio-demographic and regional variables.[1] The total number of respondents in the final sample was about 12,800.[2] Our main outcome variable measures opposition to the Grexit using the following question:

> "Some people would like Greece to exit the Eurozone (i.e. use a currency other than the Euro). Others prefer Greece to remain in the Eurozone (i.e. keep the Euro as its currency). Where do you stand on this issue? Do you favour or oppose a Greek exit from the Eurozone?"

[1] Tables A.1 to A.3 report the distributions of the socio-demographics in detail.

[2] More specifically, 12,839 respondents were included in the final sample that serves as the basis for analysis in this paper. The final sample was reduced from the 13,361 respondents who provided an answer to our primary outcome variable question pertaining to the Grexit, as 522 observations (3.9%) were dropped due to missing data on other variables. The final number of observations by country are: France: 3886, Italy: 3473, Spain: 3471, United Kingdom: 2009.

Possible answers were "strongly favour," "favour," "neither favour nor oppose," "oppose," or "strongly oppose." For those respondents who answered "neither favour nor oppose," we included a branch in which we asked:

> "If you had to decide, would you say you favour or oppose a Greek exit from the Eurozone?"

Since we offered only two possible answers to this branch, "favour" and "oppose," we elicited a position on the Grexit issue for all respondents. For ease of interpretation, we converted the measure into a binary variable that equals 1 for respondents that either oppose or strongly oppose the Grexit and is 0 for respondents who favor or strongly favor the Grexit. The analysis presented in this paper employs the binary form of our Grexit attitude variable.[3]

We measure left-right ideology using the standard question wording: "In politics people often talk of 'left' and 'right'. On this scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), where would you classify your own political views?" To map out the ideological cleavage in detail, we distinguish between far left (0-2), left (3-4), center (5), right (6-7), and far right (8-10).[4] We use the center as the reference category in our regression models. Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix show the distribution of political ideology by country.

We included a large set of items capturing respondents' economic and financial circumstances.[5] To measure respondents' general economic situation, we collected information on income and employment status. To measure more specific types of financial concerns that relate directly to the theoretical arguments, we also collected information about asset ownership by asking respondents to report whether they currently did or did not "have money invested in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, money market funds or other listed securities." To measure financial exposure in the housing market, respondents were asked to report whether or not they owned a home as well as whether they had a mortgage.

[3]The results of the same analyses performed using a 5-point ordinal version of the variable are similar to the results presented in this paper.

[4]The cut-points used to construct the five ideological bins were chosen in order to optimize balance in the size of the bins. The results of the analyses presented in this paper are similar when ideology is coded as far left (0-1), left (2-3), center (4-6), right (7-8), and far right(9-10). In addition, data were also collected on respondents' party identification, and analyses employing party identification in place of left-right ideology are also consistent.

[5]Appendix B provides details about question wording and answer categories.

IV. Results

A. Bivariate Analysis

We begin by assessing the basic distribution of support and opposition to an exit of Greece from the Eurozone. Table 1 reports both the pooled results and separately by country. The Grexit issue clearly divides the public in the four countries: 45% of all respondents favor Greece leaving the common currency while 55% oppose the Grexit. However, opposition to the Grexit varies across countries. We find the least support for a Grexit in Spain (36%), while a larger share of the population in Italy and France would prefer a Grexit (43% and 45%, respectively). In the United Kingdom, a substantial majority (63%) actually supports Greece leaving the Eurozone. This may reflect the fact that the UK still has its own currency and therefore, British citizens might expect that an exit of Greece from the Eurozone would not affect them much.

Table 1: Support for/Opposition to an Exit of Greece from the Eurozone in France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (in %)

Sample	% Support Grexit *(# respondents)*	% Oppose Grexit *(# respondents)*	*(total #)*
Full	45% *(5,786)*	55% *(7,053)*	*(12,839)*
France	45% *(1,753)*	55% *(2,133)*	*(3,886)*
Italy	43% *(1,501)*	57% *(1,972)*	*(3,473)*
Spain	36% *(1,265)*	64% *(2,206)*	*(3,471)*
United Kingdom	63% *(1,267)*	37% *(742)*	*(2,009)*

Note: This table reports the share of individuals supporting/opposing the exit of Greece from the Eurozone (Grexit) with the absolute numbers in parentheses.

Which of the theoretical arguments developed above best accounts for the variation in public attitudes over the Grexit? We begin by assessing the two main competing hypotheses about the role of ideology in structuring the debate over the Grexit (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Figure 1

presents the raw differences in opposition to the Grexit as a function of respondents' position on the ideological left-right scale, with centrist voters serving as the baseline. The upper panel shows the results for all countries. The lower panels show the results by country. When looking at the pooled data, we find that voters' left-right position strongly correlates with their views on the Grexit question: support for a Grexit increases as one's position shifts rightwards on the ideology scale. On average, citizens situated on the far left have a 17 percentage-point higher probability of opposing the Grexit than those located at the center of the ideological spectrum, and left-leaning individuals have a 14 percentage-point higher probability of opposing the Grexit relative to the center. In contrast, those on the right and far right have a substantially lower probability of opposing the Grexit, relative to the center (5 percentage points and 16 percentage points, respectively).

The results indicate that individuals on the far right have a 33 percentage-point lower probability of opposing the Grexit than individuals on the far left. This represents an immense difference in substantive terms, particularly given that the average level of opposition to the Grexit is 55% (see Table 1). Strikingly, this pattern persists with only minor deviations across all four countries in the sample: The more to the left an individual is located ideologically, the more likely is opposition to the idea of letting Greece exit the Eurozone. In fact, in all four countries moving from the left to the right involves moving from a majority against the Grexit to a majority in favor of the Grexit. Overall, this indicates that a strong left-right divide—not a center-periphery cleavage—underlies the Grexit debate.

To ensure that the pattern uncovered in Figure 1 does not simply result from the coding rule used for constructing the five ideology bins, Figure 2 presents bivariate LOESS fits of Grexit opposition predicted using the full 11-point (0-10) ideology variable for each country. We find that the relationship between ideology and Grexit attitudes is monotonic and almost linear, with the only deviation from the trend is the far left in Spain.[6] Figure 1 also clearly illustrates the substantial magnitude of the ideological divide in attitudes toward the Grexit. In all countries, a majority of the respondents on the far left are opposed to the Grexit while a majority on the

[6]Note that the far left is still more opposed to the Grexit than the center, the right, and the far right.

Figure 1: The Relationship between Opposition to the Grexit and Left-Right Ideology



Note: This figure shows the differences in opposition to Greece leaving the Eurozone (Grexit) by ideology groups. The upper panel shows the results across all countries. The lower panel reports the results by country. Opposition to the Grexit is measured using the question "Some people would like Greece to exit the Eurozone (i.e. use a currency other than the Euro). Others prefer Greece to remain in the Eurozone (i.e. keep the Euro as its currency). Where do you stand on this issue? Do you favour or oppose a Greek exit from the Eurozone?" Answers on a five-point scale were converted into a binary variable that equals 1 for respondents that either oppose or strongly oppose the Grexit and is 0 for respondents who favor or strongly favor the Grexit.

far right are in favor of the Grexit.

As a final verification of the relationship observed between left-right ideology and Grexit opposition, we use data on respondents' party identification rather than their self-placement on

Figure 2: The Relationship between Opposition to the Grexit and Ideology by Country



Note: The plots show the predicted share of opposition to the Grexit from a LOESS model using the full 11-point (0-10) ideology variable.

the ideology scale. For each party in the graph, we calculated the proportion of party identifiers who are opposed to the Grexit.[7] In addition, we assign each of those parties a left-right placement score using the results of the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which employs the same scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right).[8] This allows us to examine the relationship between a party's left-right ideological position and the proportion of respondents identifying with that party who oppose the Grexit. The results, displayed in Figure 3, are very much consistent with the pattern illustrated above. On average, the further the ideological placement of a party is to the right, the smaller the proportion of party identifiers who oppose the Grexit. This relationship holds up in all four countries.

[7]To reduce measurement error, we restricted the analysis to parties with at least 100 respondents identified as supporters, accounting for 60%, 62%, 62%, and 77% of the respondents in the sample for France, Italy, Spain, and the UK, respectively.

[8]We use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's measure of the overall ideological stance (LRGEN) of each party.

Figure 3: The Relationship between Left-Right Party Placement and Opposition to the Grexit among Party Identifiers by Country



Note: The plots show the proportion of party identifiers who are opposed to the Grexit for mainstream parties in each country. Included in the plots are all parties with which at least 100 respondents in the sample identified. The fitted lines are linear regression lines.

B. Multivariate Analysis

Next, we examine the robustness of the left-right relationship with Grexit opposition to the inclusion of controls. Figure 4 reports results from a linear probability model in which we regress our binary measure of opposition to the Grexit on indicator variables denoting voters' positions on the left-right scale, along with a large set of economic variables, socio-demographic controls, and country fixed effects.[9] As before, ideology still accounts for a substantial share of the variation in opposition to the Grexit. In particular, controlling for all covariates, being on the far left is associated with a 30.6 percentage-point increase in the probability of being opposed

[9]Note that throughout the study we use linear probability models because of the ease of interpretation as compared to limited dependent variable models. In the appendix we also reestimate all model models using logit and probit models. As expected, the results are unchanged both substantively and statistically.

to the Grexit as compared to counterparts at the far right. Examining the results separately by country, the findings remain unchanged: those on the left are significantly more opposed to the Grexit than individuals in the center (the reference category) and on the right. As this pattern highlights, the publics in the four countries are sharply divided on the Grexit question along a left-right cleavage rather than a center-periphery divide.

Figure 4: The Correlates of Opposition to the Grexit



Note: The plots show the marginal effect estimates with 95% confidence intervals from regressions of the binary Grexit opposition outcome variable on the predictor variables. Dots without confidence intervals mark the reference categories for the respective predictors.

Notably, we find that views on the Grexit only weakly correlate with the various economic factors included in our analysis. Views on the Grexit hardly vary across income groups, in both the pooled regression and the country-specific regressions. Other measures of economic exposure to potential market shifts resulting from a Grexit also reveal small or no effects. Employment status, reliance on government assistance, owning financial assets or a home, and holding a mortgage are all associated with substantively small shifts, mostly insignificant in statistical terms. Women and individuals with higher educational backgrounds appear overall to be more apprehensive about a Greek default and exit from the Eurzone. In addition, we see that overall age differences have a small effect in the pooled regression, but this finding masks some heterogeneity across countries. In Italy in particular, older individuals oppose a Grexit much more strongly. However, the substantive magnitudes of these differences pale in comparison to the differences across ideological groups.

Taken together, we find little evidence to suggest that personal economic considerations account for much of the variation in attitudes toward the Grexit debate. We also find no support for the view that the Grexit issue pits centrist voters against those on the ideological extremes. Rather, we see the traditional left-right split dominating the Grexit issue, by far the strongest cleavage structuring the debate. What explains this pronounced ideological cleavage? Addressing this question is the task to which we turn next.

V. The Left-Right Divide and the Grexit Debate

In this section we tease out the logic of four possible explanations for the left-right divide over the Grexit, lay out their key observable implications, and then subject each explanation to an empirical examination.

Redistributive Concerns

One explanation that predicts a left-right divide on mass support for the Grexit relies on the idea that an important dimension underlying ideological differences is individuals' views on income

redistribution. The left generally favors policies that reduce income differences and provide welfare support for the needy. The right, in contrast, prefers minimal government involvement in shaping the distribution of wealth. If the Grexit is perceived by citizens in the donor countries as a redistributive measure, because it requires the funneling of taxpayer funds to the Eurozone's hardest hit members, that could translate into a cleavage that mirrors the domestic debate over social-economic policies.

Hypothesis 6 (Mechanism: Redistributive Concerns) *(a) Left wing voters will be more supportive of redistribution at the domestic level; (b) The share of individuals opposing (supporting) the Grexit will be higher among individuals who support (oppose) redistribution at the domestic level.*

Empathy

Left-right differences in views on the Grexit may also stem from differences in other-regarding concerns. If left-wing attitudes reflect higher levels of empathy toward the needy, then media reports of the ongoing economic hardships among the Greek populace may have resonated more strongly among left-leaning voters in other European countries. The common portrayal of a Greek default and Eurozone exit as an outcome that would exacerbate the country's suffering should then also translate into stronger opposition among the left to a Grexit.[10]

Hypothesis 7 (Mechanism: Empathy Gap) *(a) Left wing voters exhibit higher levels of empathy than voters on the right; (b) The share of individuals opposing (supporting) the Grexit will be higher among individuals who exhibit higher (lower) levels of empathy.*

General Support for European Integration

As noted, earlier studies of public attitudes toward EU integration suggested that the key divide is that between centrist voters and those on the two ideological extremes (Hix and Lord, 1997;

[10]To be sure, there is no consensus on this point. Some have argued that a Grexit would actually lessen Greeks' suffering in the long-term as it would allow them to rebuild their economy with a new and sharply devalued currency, and absolve them of accepting harsh new austerity measures.

Taggart, 1998). Yet more recently, some studies have suggested that the debate over the EU has been subsumed into the traditional left-right divide in certain countries (Hooghe et al., 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). More specifically, the claim is that voters on the left exhibit greater support for the EU project, while those on the right are increasingly apprehensive about yielding national authority to a supranational entity.

In the context of the Greek crisis, voters on the left may believe that EU integration crucially hinges on the Eurozone's ability to assist the region's weaker members in a time of crisis. For the same reason, voters on the right might support letting Greece default and leave the common currency union. This logic suggests that we should observe the following:

Hypothesis 8 (Mechanism: General EU Support) *(a) The share of individuals supporting the European Union is higher among left-wing voters than among individuals on the right; (b) EU supporters are more opposed to a Grexit.*

Expected Grexit Impact

A fundamental component of a political ideology is defining a position about the desired role of the market and the state in allocating economic resources. Whereas the right generally holds that societies should rely on the free market to allocate resources efficiently, the left holds that persistent market failures and morally-arbitrary inequalities justify more interventionist policies that would produce better and more equitable outcomes. Indeed, this divergence in views has been pronounced during the early stages of the financial crisis, with publics across different countries debating the need for government intervention to bail out ailing domestic industries. In particular, national polls fielded during the negotiations over bailouts for firms in the financial and automotive sectors, consistently showed that voters on the left and right differed in their views about the desirability of such interventions (Smith, 2014).[11]

[11]For example, according to surveys carried out in 2008 by ABC News/Washington Post and Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg News, 57% of Democrats supported the bailouts for the auto industry while 35% opposed it. The picture among self-described conservatives was almost the exact the opposite: 30% supported and 59% opposed the bailouts. Comparison of Democrats and Republicans reveals a similar picture. See (Smith, 2014) for a broader review of the evidence on the determinants of attitudes toward domestic bailouts.

In the same vein, if letting Greece default and drop out of the Eurozone is seen by citizens as as a choice between a market-based outcome versus intervention by the (supra-)state, we would predict a divide between left and right voters in terms of both their expectations of the likely economic impact of the Grexit, and their level of support for such an outcome.

Hypothesis 9 (Mechanism: Expected Grexit Impact) *(a) Left-wing voters exhibit greater belief that the Grexit would adversely affect the European economy; (b) Individuals that expect the Grexit to have a negative effect on the European economy are more likely to oppose the Grexit.*

The mechanisms outlined above offer four different explanations for the striking significance of voters' left-right position in structuring the divide over the Grexit question. These alternative explanations also yield clear predictions that we can test using measures for each of the four mediators: domestic redistribution attitudes, empathy levels, EU support, and Grexit impact expectations.[12] In the next section we assess the empirical support for each of the predictions.

VI. Testing the Theoretical Mechanisms

A. Bivariate Analysis

For any one of these mechanisms to hold, we must find support for two links in that mechanism's chain, a link leading from ideology to the potential mediator, and a link between the mediator and opposition to the Grexit. We begin by examining the two predictions derived from the first explanation, centered on redistributive concerns. The top panel of Figure 5 presents the results pertaining to the two relevant hypotheses. As the graph on the left indicates, we find strong support for the first prediction (*H6a*), whereby left and right voters differ significantly in terms of their attitudes on questions of domestic redistribution. Voters on the far left have the greatest propensity to support redistributive measures aimed at reducing inequalities between the rich and the poor, and pro-redistribution attitudes decline steadily moving to the right on the ideological spectrum. In contrast, the graph on the top right offers no support for the second, and critical, prediction (*H6b*). We find that within each of the five groups across the

[12] Appendix B contains full details of how we construct the measures.

left-right scale, opposition to the Grexit is almost identical among citizens that exhibit pro- and anti-redistribution attitudes. Put differently, attitudes on domestic redistribution account for almost none of the variation on the Grexit question. As the directed acyclic graph (DAG) in the center of the top panel indicates, the explanation that people's views on domestic redistribution are the link between left-right ideology and attitudes on the Grexit fails the empirical test, as the second link in the chain is not supported by the data.

Turning to the second explanation centered on an empathy gap, the evidence is again not supportive. Consistent with *H7a*, though only weakly, the left graph in the bottom panel of Figure 5 indicates that voters on the left exhibit slightly higher levels of empathy than voters on the right. Yet as the figure on the bottom right shows, once accounting for voters' position on the left-right scale, there is almost no difference in opposition to the Grexit between individuals with high and low levels of empathy. Thus, as the DAG in the bottom panel indicates, the second link of the causal chain is empirically unsubstantiated, allowing us also to discard

Figure 5: The Ideological Basis of Grexit Opposition: Redistributive Concerns and Empathy



this line of explanation.[13]

The top panel of Figure 6 shows the DAG and the corresponding graphs for the EU support explanation. Hypothesis 8 laid out the expectation that voters on the left are more supportive of the EU project, and hence more likely to see Greece defaulting and leaving the Eurozone as a bad outcome. Yet as the figure on the left indicates, we find no clear evidence for the first claim.[14] Instead, a seemingly idiosyncratic relationship between left-right ideology and EU attitudes emerges, with voters on the far left exhibiting similar attitudes toward the EU as voters on the right, and voters in the center being most similar to voters on the far right. Thus, while we find a close link between pro-EU attitudes and opposition to the Grexit (right graph), the lack of a clear correspondence between left-right ideology and EU attitudes (left graph) suggests that attitudes on the EU do not provide a key explanation for the left-right divide over the Grexit.

Finally, in the bottom panel of Figure 6 we present results pertaining to fourth explanation, centered on people's economic beliefs. Here, we find strong support for both links of the chain. As the graph on the left indicates, we find a strong empirical relationship between ideological position and beliefs about the impact of a Grexit on the European economy. Whereas a sizable plurality of voters on the left expect a Grexit to have an adverse effect, as we move rightwards on the ideological scale the numbers shrink dramatically. This relationship is notable in its magnitude, and in our view, also far from obvious. At the same time, we find that the share of voters who expect a Grexit to aid the European economy grows monotonically as one moves rightwards, reaching a plurality among those on the far right. With respect to the second, perhaps more obvious prediction, the figure on the right indicates that people's beliefs about the economic effects of the Grexit are

[13] For the first link in the logical chain we draw a dashed, bidirectional arrow since one might question in what direction the causal arrow should go: does ideology shape one's empathy, does empathy shape one's ideological disposition, or is there some factor further upstream that shapes both? In this case, given that the second link of the chain fails the empirical test, resolution of this question of directionality becomes a moot point in the context of our specific investigation.

[14] As with the empathy mechanism, for the first link in this mechanism's chain we draw a dashed, bidirectional arrow since some upstream factor may be argued to lead to both ideology and EU attitudes, calling into question the precise directionality between these two variables. Yet in this case, we do not find a clear relationship between ideology and EU attitude, and thus resolution of this question of directionality becomes a moot point in the context of our specific investigation.

closely tied to their expressed support for this outcome. Opposition to the Grexit within each ideological segment is about three to five times higher among those who expect it to have adverse economic effects on Europe than among those who hold the opposite view. In sum, we find strong evidence in support of the fourth account: citizens on the left and the right have strongly divergent views about what a Grexit's economic impact is likely to be, corresponding with very different patterns of support for letting Greece default and drop out of the currency union.

B. Multivariate Analysis

In Table 2, we examine whether the results regarding the different mechanisms hold up once we adjust for other covariates in a regression. Model 1 replicates the linear probability baseline model where we regress our binary measure of opposition to the Grexit on the ideology indicators (with centrists as the omitted category), country fixed effects, and our full battery of controls.[15] In Model 2 we add the four potential mediating variables to this baseline model, to allow for a test of the second link in the chain for each potential mechanism. Redistribution attitudes and empathy levels are binary, whereas EU support and expected Grexit impact are both 3-point variables.[16] To test the first link in the chain for each potential mechanism in Models 3-6, we regress the four potential mediating variables on the ideology indicators, a full battery of controls and country fixed effects.

[15]These include: income (by quintile), an indicator for being employed, an indicator for having a public primary source of income, an indicator for having professional experience in the public sector, an indicator for having investments, an indicator for owning a home, an indicator for having a mortgage, education (with four categories), gender, age (with four categories), number of children, and an indicator for having voted in the most recent national election.

[16]For the EU Support variable, 1 denotes a pro-EU stance, -1 denotes anti-EU, and 0 denotes a neutral position. For the Positive Expected Grexit Impact variable, 1 denotes belief that the Grexit will have a positive effect on the European economy, -1 denotes belief that the Grexit will have a negative effect on the European economy, and 0 denotes a neutral position.

Figure 6: The Ideological Basis of Grexit Opposition: General EU Support and Expected Impact



Consistent with the patterns observed in graphs Figures 5 and 6, we find a clear monotonic increase in opposition to the Grexit moving from right to left on the ideological spectrum. When estimating the model without the mediators as regressors (i.e. Model 1), we find that individuals on the far left have approximately a 31 percentage-point greater probability of opposing the Grexit relative to counterparts on the far right. The results in Model 2 are also consistent with the graphs in Figures 5 and 6. Neither attitudes on redistribution nor empathy levels appear to explain attitudes toward the Grexit in statistically or substantively significant terms. In contrast, a pro-EU stance is associated with a 26 percentage-point increase in opposition to the Grexit relative to an anti-EU stance, and a positive perspective regarding the expected impact of a Grexit is associated with a roughly 50 percentage-point decrease in opposition to the Grexit relative to a negative perspective.

Similar to Figure 6, regression Model 5 casts doubt on the first link of the chain in the EU support mechanism. There do appear to be clear differences in levels of support for the EU among the different ideological segments. However, the relationship between ideology and EU support is non-monotonic, and hence it seems unlikely that EU support is systematically mediating the monotonic relationship between ideology and opposition to the Grexit.[17] In contrast, Model 6 shows that positive expectations regarding the impact of a Grexit do increase monotonically when moving from left to right along the ideological spectrum. This supports the explanation centered on people's expectations regarding a Grexit's impact as the link between ideology and their stance toward the Grexit.

Finally, to further explore the relative power of the competing explanations, Table 3 shows how regression results with opposition to the Grexit as the dependent variable change as the potential mediators are added to the model. Consistent with the results reported earlier, we find

[17]However, it should be noted that the non-monotonic relationship between ideology and EU support that manifests in the pooled sample masks some heterogeneity across countries. Looking individually at Italy, France, and the United Kingdom (but not Spain), there is stronger evidence of the possibility of a more systematic relationship between ideology and EU support. However, that relationship is not monotonic in any of these countries, whereas the relationship between ideology and Grexit impact expectations does remain monotonic in all four countries. Thus, we conclude that also when analyzed individually by country, the Expected Grexit Impact mechanism remains the most likely mechanism linking left-right ideology and attitudes on the Grexit. These results are contained in Appendix C, in Tables C.3, C.4, C.5, and C.6.

Table 2: Testing the Competing Mechanisms (Full Sample)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Far Left	0.128*	0.061*	0.220*	0.158*	0.111*	−0.188*
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Left	0.105*	0.049*	0.123*	0.061*	0.198*	−0.110*
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Right	−0.070*	−0.065*	−0.128*	−0.026*	0.107*	0.065*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Far Right	−0.178*	−0.104*	−0.155*	0.010	−0.135*	0.218*
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Pro-Redistribution		0.013				
		(0.008)				
High Empathy		0.013				
		(0.008)				
EU Support		0.130*				
		(0.005)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.254*				
		(0.005)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.083	0.285	0.115	0.070	0.097	0.087
Adj. R^2	0.081	0.284	0.113	0.068	0.095	0.085
Num. obs.	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$

Note: All models are linear regression models. Models 1-4 reported in this table are linear probability models, while the dependent variables in Models 5 and 6 take the values -1, 0, and 1. All regressions include the full, pooled sample and contain country fixed effects as well as the full battery of control variables. This includes: income level, employment status, whether primary income source is a public source, public sector experience, ownership of investments, home ownership, mortgage holdings, education, gender, age, number of children, and voting behavior.

that relative to Model 1, which does not include any of the potential mediators as regressors, the ideology coefficients hardly change as the redistribution, empathy, and EU support variables are added (Models 2-4). In contrast, when Grexit impact expectations are added (Model 5), the ideology coefficients are substantially attenuated. Furthermore, the share of explained variation in the model triples as compared to the baseline level in Model 1. We see a similar pattern when we compare Model 6, which includes all of the potential mediator variables other than expected Grexit impact, and Model 7 which includes this additional variable.

To conclude, a comparison of the results when estimating the model with and without people's economic expectations, highlights the same finding: the coefficients on the ideology variables shrink substantially and the overall fit of the model improves markedly when economic expectations are included. Recall that in Model 1, which does not include the mediators, being on the far left is associated with a 30.6 percentage-point increase in the probability of being opposed to the Grexit as compared to counterparts at the far right. Yet once economic expectations are added as a mediator in Models 5 and 7, the estimated difference between far left and far right shrinks by about half to only 19.5 and 16.5 percentage points, respectively. Taken together, these results suggest that a sizable portion of the left-right difference in support for the Grexit can be accounted for by the divergent views about its likely economic impact, while the other three mechanisms offer limited explanatory power.

Table 3: Predictors of Opposition to the Grexit (Full Sample)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	**Model 5**	Model 6	**Model 7**
Far Left	0.128*	0.124*	0.123*	0.109*	0.076*	0.100*	0.061*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Left	0.105*	0.103*	0.104*	0.073*	0.075*	0.068*	0.049*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Right	−0.070*	−0.068*	−0.069*	−0.087*	−0.052*	−0.083*	−0.065*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Far Right	−0.178*	−0.176*	−0.179*	−0.156*	−0.119*	−0.152*	−0.104*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Pro-Redistribution		✓				✓	✓
High Empathy			✓			✓	✓
EU Support				✓		✓	✓
Positive Expected Grexit Impact					✓		✓
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.149	0.245	0.150	0.285
Adj. R^2	0.081	0.081	0.081	0.147	0.243	0.148	0.284
Num. obs.	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$

Note: All models are linear probability models. All regressions include the full, pooled sample and contain country fixed effects as well as the full battery of control variables. This includes: income level, employment status, whether primary income source is a public source, public sector experience, ownership of investments, home ownership, mortgage holdings, education, gender, age, number of children, and voting behavior.

VII. Why do the Left and Right Hold Differing Expectations Regarding the Impact of a Grexit?

So far, our results suggest that a pronounced left-right divide characterizes preferences over the Grexit issue and that this relationship largely reflects divergent expectations about the economic impact of a Grexit. This raises the question: Why do individuals on the left and the right have such different expectations about how a Grexit would affect the European economy?

One possibility is that the divergent expectations regarding the Grexit's impact result from a process whereby voters rely on their dispositions regarding core economic questions to deal with the uncertainty surrounding the likely consequences of a Grexit. As the public debate about the Grexit had made clear, there was (and is) tremendous uncertainty about what will happen to the European economy if Greece were to default on its debt and exit the Eurozone. Even experts disagreed widely on this issue with predictions ranging from those who argued that a Grexit would lead to a ruinous domino effect of defaults to those who argued that the Eurozone would be made stronger and more disciplined if market forces prevailed and Greece left the Euro.[18]

Research has shown that to deal with this type of uncertainty, people tend to fall back on simple heuristics when forming expectations about complex matters, such as the likely consequences of various actions or policies (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985; Feldman and Zaller, 1992; Marietta and Barker, 2007). For several years since the eruption of the crisis, dealing with Greece's mounting debt had required significant political intervention in the markets in the form of bailouts and various monetary policy efforts. We therefore expect that when confronted with the highly uncertain and complicated issue of a Grexit, citizens utilize their basic intuitions about the merits of market intervention to form their views on the matter. Those espousing a free-market ideology are likely to oppose efforts to keep Greece in the Eurozone in light of the strong pressure of free markets towards a default and the likely risk of increased moral hazard

[18]See for example, Raoul Ruparel, "Would Grexit Strengthen Or Weaken The Euro?" Forbes. June 15, 2015; Jamie Robertson, 2015. "Would Grexit spell disaster for Europe's single currency?" BBC World News. July 1, 2015; Mathieu von Rohr, "Why a Grexit Must Be Avoided". Der Spiegel. July 10, 2015. Martin Wolf, "Grexit will leave the euro fragile" Financial Times. July 7, 2015; Matthew Yglesias. 2015, "5 reasons the eurozone could be stronger without Greece" VOX Business and Finance, July 8, 2015; Timothy Garton Ash. 2015. "Europe must save Greece to save itself" The Guardian. June 15, 2015.

resulting from further bailouts. In contrast, individuals who view government intervention as necessary to counteract the negative aspects of unfettered international markets should support policy measures designed to avoid the Grexit and see them as necessary and stabilizing. To the extent that individuals on the left and on the right differ in terms of their economic ideology, particularly in their beliefs about the merits of a free-market approach, this heuristic would explain why the voters on the two sides of the ideological divide form divergent expectations about the likely economic impact of the Grexit. Indeed, this expectation is consistent with Broz (2005b,a), who finds that American Congress Members voted on bailouts and IMF quotas largely in ways that reflected their core economic principles. He attributes this pattern to the lack of consensus among experts about the costs and benefits of these two proposals that were put to vote, which led elected officials to base their votes on basic economic principles of support or opposition to market intervention.

To evaluate this conjecture, we regress opinions about the expected impact of the Grexit on voters' left-right ideology, a measure of their free-market ideology, and the interaction between the two. We also include the full set of covariates from the baseline model. Our variable "Free-Market Ideology" is based on a 9-point score computed from two survey items that measure the extent to which a respondent's economic ideology emphasizes the importance of free-market forces versus the value of government intervention.[19]

Table 4 reports the results. We find that among every ideological segment—except for the center, for reasons that remain unclear—those with stronger free-market views are more likely to view a Grexit as likely to have a positive impact on the European economy. This can also be seen graphically in Figure 7, which presents for each ideological segment a LOESS fit of individuals' predicted expectations regarding the Grexit's impact as a function of respondents' free-market ideology.[20] Figure 7 highlights two phenomena. First, the upward shift in the LOESS lines indicates that the average expectations regarding the impact of a Grexit are more positive on the right and more negative on the left. Second, Figure 7 shows that within each ideological

[19]See Appendix B for more detail.

[20]The predicted values of the expected Grexit impact are taken from the regression Model 2 in Table 4.

segment—again, except for the center—a stronger free-market attitude is associated with more positive expectations regarding the Grexit's impact.[21]

Taken together, the graphical and regression evidence suggests that the difference between left and right in expectations about the likely impact of Grexit on the European economy is at least partly a result of voters falling back on their core economic ideology when dealing with the significant uncertainty about the Grexit's economic consequences. Among the right, the Grexit is perceived as having a positive effect because it discourages moral hazard and is seen as the logical outcome of the unperturbed operation of the free market. Conversely, among the left the prevention of a Grexit is seen as having a positive outcome because it provides the necessary government intervention to correct a market failure. One might argue whether either view is justified in real terms, but nonetheless this heuristic appears to play an important role.

Figure 7: LOESS Fits: Expected Economic Impact of Grexit



Note: This plot shows LOESS lines (with 95% confidence bands) of predicted expectations regarding the Grexit's economic impact fitted on the free market ideology variable, for each of the left-right ideological bins. The predicted expectation are extracted from the regression reported in Model 2 of Table 4.

[21] As expected, Figure C.2 shows that the distribution of free-market ideology increasingly shifts upwards when moving from left to right along the ideological spectrum.

Table 4: Predictors of Expectations regarding Impact of Grexit on European Economy (Full Sample)

	Model 1	Model 2
Far Left	−0.188*	−0.245*
	(0.019)	(0.025)
Left	−0.110*	−0.168*
	(0.019)	(0.028)
Right	0.065*	0.016
	(0.020)	(0.033)
Far Right	0.218*	0.129*
	(0.022)	(0.035)
Free-Market-Ideology (0-8)		−0.003
		(0.007)
Far Left * Free-Market-Ideology		0.044*
		(0.012)
Left * Free-Market-Ideology		0.033*
		(0.012)
Right * Free-Market-Ideology		0.020
		(0.011)
Far Right * Free-Market-Ideology		0.035*
		(0.011)
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓
Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓
R^2	0.087	0.090
Adj. R^2	0.085	0.088
Num. obs.	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$

Note: Both models are linear regression models. The dependent variable takes the values -1 (negative expectations), 0 (neutral expectations, and 1 (positive expectations). Regressions include the full, pooled sample and contain country fixed effects as well as the full battery of control variables.

VIII. Robustness

We conducted various checks to corroborate the robustness of the findings and examine rival explanations and mechanisms. Here, we present these tests in brief, while Appendix C reports them in greater detail.

A. Estimation Method, Coding of Dependent Variable, Model Specification

The main results we report are based on estimating a linear probability model. However, our results are similar when using logit and probit models instead (Table C.9). Furthermore, our results hold for each country individually (Tables C.3, C.4, C.5, and C.6), when using the 5-point ordinal version of the Grexit opposition variable (Tables C.7 and C.8), when ideology is measured using different bins on the 11-point scale[22] (Tables C.11, C.12, and C.13), or when instead of ideology we use respondents' party identification and code the parties based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey left-right party placements (Tables C.14, C.15, C.16, and C.17). Our results are also robust to different model specifications, including the addition of pairwise interactions of all covariates (Table C.10) or when using formal causal mediation analysis (Tables C.18 and C.19).

B. Alternative Explanation: Party Cues

A possible alternative explanation for the relationship between left-right ideology and opposition to the Grexit relates to party cues. There are two variants of this alternative explanation: one involving European voters' attitudes toward Syriza, the ruling party in Greece, and one involving European voters' relationships with their own parties.

In terms of the first variant, it may be argued that higher opposition to (support for) a Grexit among left-wing (right-wing) European voters was the product of ideological affinity (hostility) directed toward the Greek government's far-left ruling party, Syriza. While we do not have data to directly test this possibility, we perform indirect tests that cast doubt on this explanation being the crucial link between left-right ideology and attitudes toward the Grexit. Specifically, we re-specify a linear probability model that regresses Grexit opposition on our ideology indicator variables as well as a measure of political knowledge about the European debt crisis, together with interactions between ideology and the knowledge measure.[23] If ideological affinity with,

[22]The alternative coding of the ideology bins is as follows: Far Left (0-1), Left (2-3), Center (4-6), Right (7-8), Far Right (9-10).

[23]To construct this knowledge measure, respondents were presented with a list of European countries and asked to identify which of the countries received financial bailout assistance. Respondents were given +1 points

or hostility toward, the left-wing Greek government was the motivation for European voters' position on the Grexit, a necessary condition is that voters actually knew that a left-wing party led the Greek government. One would assume that those voters who know more about the European debt crisis would also have a higher probability of being aware of Syriza's left-wing status. Consequently, the left-right divide on the Grexit question should be significantly less pronounced or even non-existent among less knowledgeable voters, in which case the interaction terms in the re-specified regression should be substantively large and statistically significant. However, as Table C.20 in the appendix shows, we do not find support for this prediction, either in the pooled sample or for each country individually. This evidence suggests that if attitudes toward the Greek ruling party were motivating voters' Grexit positions, then they exhibit only a small effect and do not account for the huge left-right difference in attitudes toward the Grexit question.[24]

The second variant of a party cueing explanation is that European voters' own parties had staked out positions on the Grexit issue that differed in a consistent manner along the left-right scale, and that voters simply adopted the positions of their own parties. This explanation seems somewhat implausible because of the tremendous intra-party conflict on this issue. In fact, many parties did not establish clear-cut positions on the matter. Moreover, some parties took stances that seemed to conflict with what one would expect given their ideological orientation.[25] In addition, we are able to indirectly test this possibility of in-party cueing using data on our respondents' intensity of partisanship, and we find little empirical evidence for this phenomenon. More specifically, we re-specify a similar linear probability model as described above, except that instead of interacting the ideology indicators with political knowledge, we interact the ideology

for all correct selections and -1 points for all incorrect selections. In the regression specification described here, the variable was put into binary form, using the mean as the cut point, thus serving as an indicator for high knowledge. As with all previous analyses, the regression includes also the full battery of economic, social, and demographic controls.

[24]Relatedly, it is perhaps worth emphasizing that at the time, Syriza formed a coalition government with the right wing Independent Greeks (ANEL) party.

[25]In Germany, for example, party leaders of the far left party (Die Linke) were actually in favor of a Grexit, see `http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/linke-streitet-ueber-grexit-lafontaine-und-wagenknecht-gegen-alle-anderen-13675143.html`.

indicators with a measure of partisan intensity.[26] If it is the case that voters on the left (right) are more (less) likely to oppose the Grexit due to party cues, we should also expect the relationship between left-right ideology and Grexit attitudes to be stronger among voters who are more receptive to their party cues, presumably those who are more intensely partisan. Thus, the interaction terms in the new regression model should be substantively large and statistically significant. Yet as Table C.21 shows, the evidence is not supportive of this explanation.

C. Endogeneity

The correlation between Grexit opposition and ideology could also arise because people change their ideological positions to match their stance on the Grexit issue. We cannot rule out or test this endogeneity using observational data. However, it appears highly implausible that this type of reverse causality plays a role in this case. Empirically, we find that the ideological distributional margins across Europe are remarkably stable over time, as shown by Figure C.1. Therefore, it seems unlikely that ideological positions would adjust quickly depending on individual preferences over the highly specific Grexit question. Second, it seems unlikely that many individuals would quickly alter their ideological position in response to a single episodic issue, even one as consequential as the European debt crisis. Given the extensive work on the ideological origins of preferences over specific policy choices, it seems more plausible that people change their opinions on a single position such that it corresponds with their ideology.

D. Germany and the Left-Right Divide

Our sample includes France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which constitutes a set of economically important countries with great influence over European Union politics. However, we do not include Germany, which may seem problematic because any effective political response to the Eurozone crisis would require its support. We decided to exclude Germany because the

[26] For all respondents who reported an identification with a particular party, a follow-up question was presented: "How close do you feel to this party? Do you feel that you are..." Answer choices included "very close," "quite close," "not close," and "not at all close." This was then coded as an ordinal variable from 0 ("not at all close") to 3 ("very close"), thus constituting a measure of partisan intensity.

German case has been studied extensively with respect to a related question, mass support for financial bailouts (see Bechtel et al. (2014) and Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2012)). In fact, data from these earlier studies suggest that the findings presented in this paper have the potential to generalize to the German case. As Figure C.3 shows, when we re-analyze the data from Bechtel et al. (2014), we find that there is a clear left-right divide underlying individual support for providing financial bailouts to countries with debt problems.

E. Alternative Measures of Grexit Impact Expectations

We have argued that differences in expectations about the impact of a Grexit on the European economy help explain the left-right divide in opposition to the Grexit. One may argue, however, that the left and the right not only have different expectations about how the Grexit will impact the European economy as a whole, but also how it will affect other related economic and political outcomes, such as the performance of their own national economies or political stability in the European Union. To the extent that such expectations correlate, our measure of expectations about the Grexit impact on the European economy would partly pick up expectations about how an exit of Greece would affect those other outcomes. To explore this question we also measured respondents' expectations regarding the Grexit's impact on two other potential areas of concern: the performance of the respondents' own national economy and the stability of the European Union. In Table C.22 we regress Grexit attitudes on all covariates as well as all three impact expectation measures. We find that both in the pooled sample as well as all four countries individually, expectations about a positive impact on the European economy as a whole are much stronger predictors of opposition to the Grexit than expectations about a positive impact on the national economy or on the stability of the European Union. In fact, the coefficients on the positive impact on the European economy outsize the coefficients on the other expectation measures by a factor of 2 to 5 (the coefficients are also statistically significantly different at conventional levels across all models). This additional evidence suggests that the mechanism that links ideology to Grexit attitudes works mostly through voters' positive expectations about

the impact of the Grexit on the European economy as a whole, rather than their expectations about other economic and political consequences of a Grexit.

IX. Discussion

In the early years of the European Union project, much of the scholarly discussion centered on the question of whether EU integration will be a dimension that cross-cuts the traditional political cleavages, or whether it will submerge over time into the dominant left-right divide. Indeed, a range of analyses examining data from the 1990s found that the topic of EU integration cleaved the publics primarily along a center-vs-extreme division (Hix and Lord, 1997; Taggart, 1998; Hooghe et al., 2002). Yet this pattern differs markedly from what we observe with respect to the Grexit question, where the left-right ideological divide forms the dominant cleavage among European publics. This could indicate the beginning of a more fundamental change, in which highly salient events such as the European debt crisis, mass demonstrations over austerity and negotiations over Grexit, transform the mass politics of European integration and subsume it into the traditional left-right divide.

Such a process could have transformative implications for the European integration project as a whole. As long as the issue of EU integration pitted the center versus the extremes, governments and political elites could act under the assumption that the bulk of voters in Europe were firmly within the pro-EU camp. However, the shift toward a new politics whereby maintaining the EU whole becomes a divisive issue *between* left and right, means that the pro and anti EU camps could be far more evenly split than before, with the distinct possibility of the Euroskeptics increasingly gaining the upper hand.

Another potentially important consequence of EU integration becoming a left-right issue is the possibility of cross-country political alliances becoming increasingly prevalent. As the European Union becomes both a contentious political issue and a political entity that ties together voters from the region's different nations (e.g. through elections to the European Parliament), the rationale for linking similar ideological forces operating in different countries is bound to

grow. This also implies that the future of European integration could increasingly depend on the ideological congruence of governments. Indeed, the debate over the Grexit and the austerity program brought together forces on the far left from Greece's Syriza party with those of the Spanish Podemos. At the same time, far right parties from seven countries – including France, Italy, and the Netherlands – coalesced to act together against what they described as the creation of a "European Super-state." Whether these recent developments merely constitute one-off events remains to be seen, but our findings suggest that they may be part of a more substantial shift in the political cleavage that underlies the European policy space.

As noted, our analysis indicates that the divisions between left and right over the Grexit are not a result of disagreements over redistributive politics. Rather, they reflect profoundly different expectations about the Grexit's likely economic effects. We present some evidence that these expectations are borne from views about outcomes resulting from the operation of the free market. The right, much more skeptical of the effects of government intervention, is more supportive of a Grexit that it sees as following the dictates of market forces and, as such, likely to produce economically superior outcomes. In contrast, the left is more accepting of intervention aimed at avoiding a potential economic calamity and believes such interventions will yield better outcomes, thus leading the left to more strongly oppose the Grexit. The phenomenon of divergent sociotropic beliefs about the economic consequences of policy choices has been largely ignored in the context of international economics. Our analysis suggests that it may offer a fruitful avenue for future research.

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Supporting Information Appendix (Not for Publication)

Appendix A: Survey

A. Survey

Our survey was fielded in May 2015. Respondents were recruited by Respondi, an international survey firm.

The following tables show the demographic and ideological margins of the sample.

Table A.1: Gender Distribution by Country

	Male	Female
France	45%	55%
Italy	46%	54%
Spain	54%	46%
United Kingdom	44%	56%

Table A.2: Age Distribution by Country

	<=29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
France	29%	19%	20%	16%	12%	4%
Italy	19%	25%	25%	20%	12%	0%
Spain	20%	24%	27%	20%	8%	0%
United Kingdom	11%	16%	19%	25%	24%	5%

Table A.3: Education Distribution by Country

	Less than HS	HS Degree	BA Degree	Graduate Degree
France	9%	66%	9%	16%
Italy	12%	51%	12%	24%
Spain	16%	35%	20%	29%
United Kingdom	24%	49%	19%	8%

Table A.4: Sample Ideological Distribution by Country (11-point)

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
France	6%	3%	7%	8%	7%	29%	9%	11%	8%	4%	7%
Italy	6%	5%	8%	10%	9%	27%	9%	9%	7%	4%	5%
Spain	8%	7%	13%	15%	10%	26%	8%	6%	4%	1%	1%
United Kingdom	3%	3%	6%	9%	8%	38%	9%	11%	7%	4%	3%

Table A.5: Sample Ideological Distribution by Country (5-Point)

	Far Left	Left	Center	Right	Far Right
France	16%	16%	29%	20%	20%
Italy	19%	19%	27%	18%	16%
Spain	29%	25%	26%	14%	6%
United Kingdom	11%	17%	38%	20%	14%

Appendix B: Variable Definition

Primary Outcome Variable:

- *Opposition to Grexit*: Opposition to Grexit; binary version used in analysis with 1 indicating opposition to Grexit and 0 corresponding to favouring Grexit, where opposition/support was dichotomized using two questions. First question wording: "Some people would like Greece to exit the Eurozone (i.e. use a currency other than the Euro). Others prefer Greece to remain in the Eurozone (i.e. keep the Euro as its currency). Where do you stand on this issue? Do you favour or oppose a Greek exit from the Eurozone?" Answer categories: 1="Strongly favour", 2="Favour", 3="Neither favour nor oppose", 4="Oppose", 5="Strongly oppose." Follow-question for respondents choosing "Neither favour nor oppose": "If you had to decide, would you say you favour or oppose a Greek exit from the Eurozone?" Answer categories: 1="Favour", 2="Oppose."

Covariates:

- *Ideology*: Self-reported placement on left-right ideology scale. Question wording: "In politics people often talk of 'left' and 'right'. On this scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), where would you classify your own political views?"

- *Party Identification*: Question wording: "Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties? Which one?" Respondents were shown a list of political parties in their respective country, and they had the option of choosing a particular party from the list, selecting "other," or selecting "don't know."

- *Partisan Intensity*: For all respondents who reported an identification with a particular party, a follow-up question was presented: "How close do you feel to this party? Do you feel that you are..." Answer choices included "very close," "quite close," "not close," and "not at all close." This was then coded as an ordinal variable from 0 ("not at all close") to 3 ("very close").

- *Household Income*: Self-reported monthly household income. Answer categories are the ten population household income deciles, which vary by country.

- *Employed*: Self-reported employment status; binary version used in analysis with 1 indicating employment as either a paid employee or self-employed, and 0 corresponding to any other answer choice. Question wording: "Which of these options best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?" Answer categories: 1="Paid employee (including temporary leave of absence due to maternity/paternity, accident, illness or vacation)", 2="Self-employed (e.g. freelancer, independent contractor, or family-owned business), 3="Student (excluding employer-sponsored education), 4="Unemployed, actively searching for a job", 5="Unemployed, not actively searching", 6="Chronic illness or permanent disability", 7="Retired", 8="Working at home, caring for children or others."

- *Public Income Source*: Self-reported indicator for whether a respondent's primary income source is a type of public source; binary version used in analysis where 1 indicates pensions, unemployment/redundancy benefit, or any other social benefits or grants constituting the respondent's main source of household income, and 0 otherwise. Question wording: "Please consider the income of all household members and any income which may be received by the household as a whole. What is the main source of income in your household?" Answer categories: 1="Wages or salaries", 2="Income from self-employment (excluding farming)", 3="Income from farming", 4="Pensions", 5="Unemployment/redundancy benefit", 6="Any other social benefits for grants", 7="Income from investments, savings, etc.", 8="Income from other sources."

- *Public Sector Experience*: Self-reported indicator for respondent's past or present public sector experience. Question wording: "Do you currently or have you ever worked for the government in a full-time public sector job?" Answer categories: 0="No", 1="Yes."

- *Investments*: Self-reported indicator for whether or not respondent has money invested. Question wording: "Do you currently have money invested in stocks, bonds, mutual funds, money market funds or other listed securities?" Answer categories: 0="No", 1="Yes."

- *Own Home*: Self-reported indicator for current or planned home ownership; binary version used in analysis where 1 indicates current or planned home ownership. Question wording: "Do you/Does your family own your home/apartment, pay rent, or have other arrangements?" Answer categories: 1="Own or are buying", 2="Pay rent", 3="Other."

- *Mortgage*: Self-reported indicator for whether or not respondent has a mortgage. Question wording: "Do you have a mortgage?" Answer categories: 0="No", 1="Yes."

- *Education*: Self-reported level of education. Answer categories were customized to each country's educational system, and answers were then mapped onto the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 scale, which measures education on a scale from 0 to 8. For analysis, this scale was mapped onto a set of four categories equivalent in the American system to: (1) less than a high school degree; (2) high school degree; (3) bachelor's degree; and (4) graduate degree.

- *Children*: Self-reported number of children.

- *Voted*: Self-reported indicator for whether or not the respondent voted in the most recent national election.

- *Pro-Redistribution*: Measures whether the respondent is relatively in favor of or opposed to governmental redistribution. Binary version used in analysis, where 1 indicates redistribution preferences that are are greater (i.e. more in favor of redistribution) than the mean and 0 corresponds to redistribution preferences that are lower than the mean. Question wording: "Some people think that the income differences between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that the government should reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and 5 means that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences? What score between 1 and 5 comes closest to the way you feel?"

- *High Empathy*: Measures whether the respondent registers a relatively high level of empathetic concern. Binary version used in analysis, where 1 indicates empathetic concern that is higher (i.e. more empathetic) than the mean and 0 corresponds to empathetic concern that is lower than the mean. Empathetic concern is measured using the combination of responses to two questions. Wording of questions: "On a scale from 1 (does NOT describe you well) to 5 (describes you well) how would you rate the following statements? [1] I am often touched by the things that I see happen. [2] When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them."

- *EU Support*: Measures whether the respondent believes his/her country's membership in the European Union is a good thing or a bad thing. A 3-point version is used for analysis, where 1 indicates belief in the EU membership being good, -1 corresponding to belief in EU membership being bad, and 0 corresponding to neutrality. Question wording: "Generally speaking, do you

think that the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union is...?" Answer categories: 1="A very good thing", 2="A good thing", 3="Neither good nor bad", 4="A bad thing", 5="A very bad thing." Follow-up question for respondents choosing "Neither good nor bad": "If you had to decide, would you lean toward saying that the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union is...?" Answer categories: 1="A good thing", 2="A bad thing."

- *Expected Grexit Impact*: Measures the respondent's belief in whether Grexit would be good or bad for the European economy. A 3-point version is used for analysis, with -1 indicating belief that Grexit would be bad for the European economy, 0 corresponding to belief that Grexit would have a neutral effect on the European economy, and 1 indicating belief that Grexit would be good for the European economy. Question wording: "Do you think that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would have a positive or negative impact on the European economy?" Answer categories: 1="Very positive", 2="Positive", 3="Neutral", 4="Negative", 5="Very negative."

- *Free-Market Ideology*: Measures extent to which respondent's economic ideology emphasizes the importance of free-market forces, versus the importance of government intervention. Variable is a 9-point scale (0-8), constructed based on the combination of answers to two questions: the redistribution question described above and a more general question on government intervention. Question wording for the more general intervention question: "Next, we would like you to think more broadly about the purposes of government. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? You may use any number from 1 to 5." The value of the respondents' answers to both questions were added and then subtracted from 10. As a result, 0 correspondents to weak free-market ideology (i.e. strong belief in government intervention) and 8 corresponds to strong free-market ideology.

- *Political Knowledge of the European Debt Crisis*: Measures that extent to which respondents are familiar with details about the European debt crisis. More specifically, respondents are presented with a list of European countries and asked to identify which the countries received financial bailout assistance. For variable construction, respondents were given +1 points for all correct selections and -1 points for all incorrect selections.

Appendix C: Additional Results and Robustness Checks

Reported here are the additional results and checks we conducted that are referenced in the text.

- Linear probability models explaining opposition to the Grexit, pooled and by country: Tables C.1 and C.2.
- Comparing logit and probit model results to linear probability model resuls: Table C.9.
- Linear regressions testing full set of mechanisms by country: Tables C.3, C.4, C.5, and C.6.
- Linear probability models explaining opposition to the Grexit, pooled and by country, when using the 5-point ordinal version of the Grexit opposition variable: Tables C.7 and C.8.
- Linear probability models explaining opposition to the Grexit, and linear regressions testing full set of mechanisms, when ideology is measured using different bins on the 11-point scale: Tables C.11, C.12, and C.13
- Linear regressions testing full set of mechanisms by country, when using respondents' party identification and coding the parties based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey left-right party placements: Tables C.14, C.15, C.16, and C.17.
- Linear probability models explaining opposition to the Grexit, pooled and by country, when including pairwise interactions of all covariates: Table C.10
- Results from formal causal mediation: Tables C.18 and C.19.
- Testing interactions between ideology and knowledge about the European debt crisis in explaining opposition to the Grexit: Table C.20.

Table C.1: Linear Probability Model - DV: Probability of Being Opposed to Grexit (Full Sample)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	0.532*	0.536*	0.353*
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Income Quintile 1	−0.037*	−0.034*	−0.020
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Income Quintile 2	−0.014	−0.010	−0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income Quintile 4	0.002	0.003	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income Quintile 5	−0.015	−0.003	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Employed	−0.014	−0.011	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Public Income Source	−0.007	−0.011	−0.001
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Public Sector Experience	0.009	0.001	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Investments	−0.016	0.003	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Own Home	0.013	0.019	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Mortgage	−0.024*	−0.017	−0.014
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
HS Degree	0.037*	0.034*	0.022
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Bachelor's Degree	0.076*	0.065*	0.029
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Graduate Degree	0.133*	0.120*	0.074*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Female	0.043*	0.036*	0.031*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age 30-44	−0.028*	−0.021	−0.006
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Age 45-64	0.016	0.017	0.020
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Age 65+	0.019	0.040	0.038
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
# Children	−0.017*	−0.015*	−0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Voted	−0.017	−0.014	−0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Far Left		0.128*	0.111*
		(0.012)	(0.012)
Left		0.105*	0.073*
		(0.013)	(0.012)
Right		−0.070*	−0.078*
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Far Right		−0.178*	−0.142*
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Pro-EU			0.269*
			(0.009)
High Empathy			0.029*
			(0.009)
Pro-Redistribution			0.028*
			(0.009)
High Knowledge			0.040*
			(0.009)
High Interest			−0.049*
			(0.009)
R^2	0.042	0.083	0.149
Adj. R^2	0.041	0.081	0.147
Num. obs.	12839	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$
Country fixed effects included.

Table C.2: Linear Probability Model - DV: Probability of Being Opposed to Grexit (by Country)

	Model 1 France	Model 2 France	Model 3 France	Model 4 Italy	Model 5 Italy	Model 6 Italy	Model 7 Spain	Model 8 Spain	Model 9 Spain	Model 10 UK	Model 11 UK	Model 12 UK
(Intercept)	0.520*	0.505*	0.312*	0.442*	0.466*	0.259*	0.653*	0.615*	0.416*	0.438*	0.388*	0.232*
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Income Quintile 1	−0.013	−0.015	−0.011	−0.041	−0.038	−0.019	−0.083*	−0.078*	−0.052*	−0.011	−0.009	0.001
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Income Quintile 2	0.020	0.024	0.026	−0.030	−0.031	−0.021	−0.023	−0.018	−0.009	−0.040	−0.031	−0.025
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Income Quintile 4	0.008	0.018	0.002	−0.005	−0.010	−0.003	−0.007	−0.002	0.002	−0.002	−0.009	−0.009
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Income Quintile 5	0.007	0.025	−0.018	−0.029	−0.028	−0.043	−0.054	−0.037	−0.028	−0.021	−0.019	−0.024
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Employed	−0.015	−0.010	0.002	0.006	−0.000	0.001	−0.020	−0.015	−0.023	−0.047	−0.032	−0.028
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Public Income Source	0.003	−0.006	0.006	0.014	−0.002	0.009	−0.013	−0.013	−0.013	−0.060	−0.041	−0.027
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Public Sector Experience	0.005	−0.010	−0.003	0.001	−0.002	−0.008	−0.007	−0.011	−0.004	0.058*	0.045	0.045
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Investments	0.007	0.027	0.014	−0.020	−0.008	−0.024	−0.029	−0.015	−0.014	−0.039	−0.000	−0.020
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Own Home	0.007	0.010	0.004	0.043*	0.051*	0.034	−0.011	−0.007	−0.017	0.035	0.047	0.033
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Mortgage	−0.000	0.008	0.024	−0.016	−0.011	−0.010	−0.039*	−0.035	−0.030	−0.048	−0.038	−0.036
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)
HS Degree	0.041	0.044	0.026	0.033	0.034	0.021	0.028	0.016	0.006	0.065*	0.066*	0.062*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Bachelor's Degree	0.119*	0.117*	0.065	0.053	0.046	0.025	0.048	0.034	0.004	0.117*	0.092*	0.066*
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Graduate Degree	0.192*	0.174*	0.099*	0.123*	0.112*	0.073*	0.083*	0.074*	0.040	0.140*	0.119*	0.088
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Female	0.039*	0.028	0.031*	0.066*	0.054*	0.038*	0.026	0.025	0.029	0.041	0.039	0.023
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age 30-44	−0.001	−0.003	0.020	−0.029	−0.013	−0.003	−0.036	−0.032	−0.023	−0.023	−0.011	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Age 45-64	0.012	0.008	0.029	0.098*	0.103*	0.085*	−0.012	−0.010	−0.014	−0.060	−0.066	−0.030
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age 65+	0.034	0.064	0.066	0.158*	0.173*	0.154*	0.056	0.055	0.048	−0.077	−0.074	−0.046
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.048)
# Children	−0.021*	−0.021*	−0.013*	−0.031*	−0.030*	−0.023*	−0.007	−0.003	0.002	−0.001	0.000	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Voted	−0.046	−0.043	−0.037	0.032	0.019	0.001	0.031	0.037	0.030	−0.069*	−0.049	−0.028
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Far Left		0.183*	0.139*		0.105*	0.063*		0.075*	0.092*		0.193*	0.162*
		(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.022)	(0.023)		(0.037)	(0.038)
Left		0.127*	0.091*		0.083*	0.032		0.088*	0.080*		0.119*	0.088*
		(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.024)	(0.023)		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.032)	(0.032)
Right		−0.021	−0.041		−0.105*	−0.104*		−0.099*	−0.105*		−0.071*	−0.060*
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.026)	(0.024)		(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.029)	(0.028)
Far Right		−0.166*	−0.138*		−0.209*	−0.149*		−0.119*	−0.117*		−0.175*	−0.129*
		(0.023)	(0.023)		(0.026)	(0.026)		(0.039)	(0.038)		(0.031)	(0.033)
Pro-EU			0.288*			0.301*			0.219*			0.238*
			(0.016)			(0.018)			(0.019)			(0.022)
High Empathy			0.034*			0.013			0.020			0.046*
			(0.015)			(0.017)			(0.017)			(0.022)
Pro-Redistribution			0.010			0.030			0.060*			0.007
			(0.016)			(0.017)			(0.019)			(0.022)
High Knowledge			0.032*			0.093*			0.012			0.013
			(0.016)			(0.017)			(0.020)			(0.022)
High Interest			−0.012			−0.065*			−0.031			−0.102*
			(0.018)			(0.017)			(0.018)			(0.023)
R^2	0.021	0.074	0.151	0.028	0.076	0.164	0.013	0.035	0.077	0.027	0.075	0.137
Adj. R^2	0.017	0.068	0.145	0.022	0.070	0.157	0.007	0.029	0.069	0.018	0.064	0.125
Num. obs.	3886	3886	3886	3473	3473	3473	3471	3471	3471	2009	2009	2009

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.3: Mechanism Regressions (France)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Far Left	0.183*	0.083*	0.226*	0.204*	0.248*	−0.245*
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Left	0.127*	0.075*	0.120*	0.057*	0.221*	−0.078*
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Right	−0.021	−0.034	−0.132*	0.009	0.158*	0.031
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Far Right	−0.166*	−0.115*	−0.116*	0.025	−0.129*	0.137*
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Pro-Redistribution		0.012				
		(0.015)				
High Empathy		0.027				
		(0.014)				
EU Support		0.135*				
		(0.009)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.240*				
		(0.009)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.074	0.269	0.098	0.048	0.110	0.049
Adj. R^2	0.068	0.264	0.093	0.042	0.105	0.044
Num. obs.	3886	3886	3886	3886	3886	3886

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.4: Mechanism Regressions (Italy)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Far Left	0.105*	0.019	0.171*	0.108*	0.285*	−0.159*
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Left	0.083*	0.005	0.054*	0.027	0.301*	−0.127*
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Right	−0.105*	−0.085*	−0.135*	−0.071*	0.063	0.108*
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Far Right	−0.209*	−0.106*	−0.162*	−0.006	−0.225*	0.258*
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Pro-Redistribution		0.006				
		(0.016)				
High Empathy		−0.002				
		(0.015)				
EU Support		0.150*				
		(0.010)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.263*				
		(0.009)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.076	0.300	0.074	0.070	0.095	0.066
Adj. R^2	0.070	0.294	0.068	0.064	0.089	0.060
Num. obs.	3473	3473	3473	3473	3473	3473

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.5: Mechanism Regressions (Spain)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Far Left	0.075*	0.045*	0.235*	0.165*	−0.236*	−0.181*
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.032)
Left	0.088*	0.050*	0.159*	0.080*	−0.007	−0.127*
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Right	−0.099*	−0.088*	−0.113*	−0.029	0.140*	0.079
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Far Right	−0.119*	−0.062*	−0.135*	−0.008	0.121*	0.236*
	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.066)
Pro-Redistribution		0.028				
		(0.017)				
High Empathy		−0.009				
		(0.015)				
EU Support		0.107*				
		(0.010)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.281*				
		(0.010)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.035	0.256	0.113	0.063	0.097	0.054
Adj. R^2	0.029	0.250	0.107	0.056	0.091	0.048
Num. obs.	3471	3471	3471	3471	3471	3471

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.6: Mechanism Regressions (United Kingdom)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Far Left	0.193*	0.100*	0.300*	0.167*	0.447*	−0.153*
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Left	0.119*	0.059*	0.167*	0.091*	0.318*	−0.083
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Right	−0.071*	−0.065*	−0.121*	−0.030	0.038	0.044
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.046)
Far Right	−0.175*	−0.099*	−0.259*	0.018	−0.068	0.311*
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.058)	(0.055)
Pro-Redistribution		−0.000				
		(0.021)				
High Empathy		0.040*				
		(0.020)				
EU Support		0.120*				
		(0.012)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.221*				
		(0.012)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.075	0.250	0.172	0.077	0.128	0.047
Adj. R^2	0.064	0.239	0.162	0.067	0.118	0.036
Num. obs.	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.7: Linear Regression - DV: Degree Opposed to Grexit (5-point Ordinal Version), Full Sample

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	−0.070	−0.070	−0.425*
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Income Quintile 1	−0.083*	−0.074*	−0.047
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Income Quintile 2	−0.061*	−0.052*	−0.042
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Income Quintile 4	0.026	0.028	0.024
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Income Quintile 5	0.012	0.040	0.006
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Employed	−0.019	−0.012	−0.009
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Public Income Source	−0.008	−0.018	−0.000
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Public Sector Experience	0.010	−0.007	−0.005
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Investments	−0.054*	−0.012	−0.035
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Own Home	−0.003	0.010	−0.009
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Mortgage	−0.048*	−0.032	−0.027
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
HS Degree	0.060*	0.052*	0.026
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Bachelor's Degree	0.166*	0.139*	0.065*
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Graduate Degree	0.279*	0.246*	0.151*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Female	0.071*	0.054*	0.051*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Age 30-44	−0.072*	−0.055*	−0.027
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Age 45-64	0.069*	0.071*	0.076*
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Age 65+	0.098*	0.146*	0.136*
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.043)
# Children	−0.041*	−0.036*	−0.025*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Voted	−0.059*	−0.054*	−0.055*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Far Left		0.329*	0.283*
		(0.025)	(0.025)
Left		0.229*	0.162*
		(0.024)	(0.024)
Right		−0.121*	−0.138*
		(0.025)	(0.024)
Far Right		−0.412*	−0.351*
		(0.030)	(0.030)
Pro-EU			0.507*
			(0.018)
High Empathy			0.058*
			(0.017)
Pro-Redistribution			0.067*
			(0.018)
High Knowledge			0.080*
			(0.018)
High Interest			−0.050*
			(0.021)
R^2	0.046	0.099	0.156
Adj. R^2	0.044	0.097	0.154
Num. obs.	12839	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$

Country fixed effects included.

Table C.8: Linear Regression - DV: Degree Opposed to Grexit (5-point Ordinal Version), by Country

	France	France	France	Italy	Italy	Italy	Spain	Spain	Spain	UK	UK	UK
(Intercept)	−0.108	−0.156	−0.548*	−0.204*	−0.191*	−0.584*	0.192*	0.075	−0.365*	−0.167	−0.199*	−0.448*
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.105)
Income Quintile 1	−0.054	−0.059	−0.052	−0.088	−0.074	−0.041	−0.121*	−0.107*	−0.050	−0.067	−0.059	−0.041
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Income Quintile 2	−0.009	0.001	0.003	−0.081	−0.082	−0.067	−0.039	−0.028	−0.009	−0.192*	−0.167*	−0.155*
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.057)
Income Quintile 4	0.014	0.036	0.005	0.074	0.059	0.070	0.018	0.028	0.029	−0.052	−0.063	−0.064
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.061)
Income Quintile 5	0.060	0.101	0.013	0.030	0.034	0.007	−0.017	0.023	0.030	−0.081	−0.075	−0.084
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Employed	−0.046	−0.033	−0.009	0.027	0.012	0.011	−0.077	−0.065	−0.075	0.029	0.058	0.063
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.049)
Public Income Source	0.014	−0.005	0.018	0.019	−0.018	−0.004	−0.062	−0.061	−0.062	−0.060	−0.020	0.006
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.055)
Public Sector Experience	0.006	−0.033	−0.018	−0.041	−0.048	−0.057	0.045	0.036	0.049	0.066	0.045	0.047
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Investments	−0.006	0.040	0.013	−0.024	−0.000	−0.027	−0.066	−0.034	−0.034	−0.176*	−0.084	−0.116*
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Own Home	−0.052	−0.043	−0.055	0.084*	0.102*	0.071	−0.013	−0.005	−0.030	0.031	0.055	0.025
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Mortgage	−0.024	−0.004	0.030	0.002	0.016	0.017	−0.095*	−0.085*	−0.068	−0.124*	−0.102	−0.099*
	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.050)
HS Degree	0.094	0.099	0.064	0.102	0.100	0.076	0.113*	0.082	0.049	0.010	0.019	0.017
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Bachelor's Degree	0.299*	0.295*	0.192*	0.203*	0.186*	0.147*	0.151*	0.113*	0.031	0.127*	0.089	0.050
	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Graduate Degree	0.489*	0.443*	0.293*	0.273*	0.239*	0.170*	0.221*	0.194*	0.097	0.099	0.078	0.027
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.095)	(0.090)	(0.087)
Female	0.095*	0.070*	0.080*	0.080*	0.052	0.028	0.007	0.004	0.030	0.128*	0.112*	0.090*
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Age 30-44	−0.020	−0.023	0.025	−0.064	−0.026	−0.006	−0.066	−0.052	−0.049	−0.043	−0.033	0.004
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Age 45-64	0.058	0.045	0.091*	0.198*	0.212*	0.179*	0.001	0.008	−0.035	0.054	0.029	0.100
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Age 65+	0.148	0.214*	0.219*	0.439*	0.474*	0.444*	−0.046	−0.031	−0.091	−0.015	−0.015	0.047
	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.097)	(0.193)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.091)
# Children	−0.051*	−0.050*	−0.034*	−0.063*	−0.060*	−0.047*	−0.020	−0.009	0.001	−0.009	−0.007	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Voted	−0.110*	−0.109*	−0.100*	0.021	−0.020	−0.051	0.041	0.049	0.012	−0.169*	−0.122*	−0.073
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Far Left		0.501*	0.406*		0.337*	0.255*		0.234*	0.215*		0.251*	0.227*
		(0.049)	(0.048)		(0.051)	(0.050)		(0.043)	(0.044)		(0.067)	(0.069)
Left		0.280*	0.207*		0.255*	0.160*		0.225*	0.185*		0.080	0.043
		(0.047)	(0.045)		(0.049)	(0.047)		(0.043)	(0.042)		(0.058)	(0.058)
Right		−0.032	−0.072		−0.154*	−0.147*		−0.153*	−0.172*		−0.176*	−0.156*
		(0.044)	(0.043)		(0.049)	(0.048)		(0.053)	(0.052)		(0.054)	(0.052)
Far Right		−0.350*	−0.294*		−0.426*	−0.314*		−0.282*	−0.294*		−0.527*	−0.434*
		(0.048)	(0.046)		(0.057)	(0.057)		(0.077)	(0.076)		(0.071)	(0.072)
Pro-EU			0.596*			0.532*			0.429*			0.430*
			(0.032)			(0.036)			(0.035)			(0.040)
High Empathy			0.063*			−0.003			0.107*			0.026
			(0.031)			(0.035)			(0.033)			(0.040)
Pro-Redistribution			0.029			0.105*			0.135*			−0.017
			(0.031)			(0.035)			(0.036)			(0.041)
High Knowledge			0.039			0.174*			0.056			0.028
			(0.031)			(0.035)			(0.036)			(0.043)
High Interest			0.006			−0.108*			0.077*			−0.228*
			(0.042)			(0.038)			(0.039)			(0.047)
R^2	0.034	0.104	0.182	0.030	0.091	0.155	0.015	0.047	0.094	0.033	0.088	0.147
Adj. R^2	0.030	0.099	0.176	0.025	0.085	0.148	0.010	0.041	0.087	0.024	0.077	0.135
Num. obs.	3886	3886	3886	3473	3473	3473	3471	3471	3471	2009	2009	2009

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.9: Coefficients from Main Linear Probability Model (Model 2 in Table C.1) vs. Average Effects Estimated by Logit and Probit Models with Same Regressors

Ideology	LPM Coefficients	Logit Average Partial Effects	Probit Average Partial Effects
Far Left	0.12773	0.12552	0.12544
Left	0.10544	0.10201	0.10266
Right	-0.06975	-0.06732	-0.06798
Far Right	-0.17849	-0.17572	-0.17670

Table C.10: Linear Probability Model - DV: Probability of Being Opposed to Grexit - Robustness Check with Pairwise Interactions between all Covariates

	Full	France	Italy	Spain	UK
Far Left	0.125*	0.179*	0.107*	0.071*	0.191*
	(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.037)
Left	0.102*	0.119*	0.081*	0.084*	0.109*
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Right	−0.070*	−0.022	−0.104*	−0.100*	−0.063*
	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Far Right	−0.176*	−0.172*	−0.208*	−0.125*	−0.163*
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.031)
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pairwise Interactions between All Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.088	0.096	0.100	0.051	0.116
Adj. R^2	0.082	0.076	0.079	0.028	0.078
Num. obs.	12839	3886	3473	3471	2009

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.11: Linear Probability Model - DV: Probability of Being Opposed to Grexit, Full Sample, with Alternative Coding of Ideology Bins

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	0.532*	0.543*	0.351*
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Income Quintile 1	−0.037*	−0.034*	−0.020
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Income Quintile 2	−0.014	−0.010	−0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income Quintile 4	0.002	0.004	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income Quintile 5	−0.015	−0.003	−0.020
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Employed	−0.014	−0.011	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Public Income Source	−0.007	−0.011	−0.001
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Public Sector Experience	0.009	0.002	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Investments	−0.016	0.002	−0.010
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Own Home	0.013	0.019	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Mortgage	−0.024*	−0.018	−0.016
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
HS Degree	0.037*	0.033*	0.021
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Bachelor's Degree	0.076*	0.062*	0.026
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Graduate Degree	0.133*	0.118*	0.071*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Female	0.043*	0.036*	0.032*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age 30-44	−0.028*	−0.021	−0.006
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Age 45-64	0.016	0.017	0.020
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Age 65+	0.019	0.038	0.035
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
# Children	−0.017*	−0.014*	−0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Voted	−0.017	−0.013	−0.011
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Far Left		0.102*	0.108*
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Left		0.128*	0.099*
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Right		−0.131*	−0.119*
		(0.013)	(0.012)
Far Right		−0.207*	−0.146*
		(0.016)	(0.016)
Pro-EU			0.269*
			(0.009)
High Empathy			0.030*
			(0.009)
Pro-Redistribution			0.030*
			(0.009)
High Knowledge			0.041*
			(0.009)
High Interest			−0.049*
			(0.009)
R^2	0.042	0.081	0.148
Adj. R^2	0.041	0.079	0.146
Num. obs.	12839	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$
Country fixed effects included.
The alternative coding of the ideology bins is as follows:
Far Left (0-1), Left (2-3), Center (4-6), Right (7-8), Far Right (9-10)

Table C.12: Linear Probability Model - DV: Probability of Being Opposed to Grexit, by Country, with Alternative Coding of Ideology Bins

	France	France	France	Italy	Italy	Italy	Spain	Spain	Spain	UK	UK	UK
(Intercept)	0.520*	0.520*	0.317*	0.442*	0.464*	0.246*	0.653*	0.615*	0.411*	0.438*	0.404*	0.233*
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Income Quintile 1	−0.013	−0.015	−0.011	−0.041	−0.039	−0.018	−0.083*	−0.080*	−0.054*	−0.011	−0.005	0.004
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Income Quintile 2	0.020	0.025	0.026	−0.030	−0.032	−0.021	−0.023	−0.019	−0.011	−0.040	−0.027	−0.021
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Income Quintile 4	0.008	0.020	0.004	−0.005	−0.014	−0.004	−0.007	−0.000	0.004	−0.002	−0.003	−0.005
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Income Quintile 5	0.007	0.030	−0.015	−0.029	−0.027	−0.042	−0.054	−0.033	−0.024	−0.021	−0.021	−0.026
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Employed	−0.015	−0.012	0.001	0.006	0.004	0.004	−0.020	−0.015	−0.023	−0.047	−0.032	−0.027
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Public Income Source	0.003	−0.003	0.008	0.014	−0.001	0.009	−0.013	−0.010	−0.010	−0.060	−0.047	−0.033
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Public Sector Experience	0.005	−0.010	−0.002	0.001	−0.003	−0.009	−0.007	−0.009	−0.002	0.058*	0.048	0.047*
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Investments	0.007	0.030	0.016	−0.020	−0.009	−0.024	−0.029	−0.020	−0.018	−0.039	−0.001	−0.022
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Own Home	0.007	0.011	0.005	0.043*	0.053*	0.034	−0.011	−0.013	−0.022	0.035	0.049	0.034
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Mortgage	−0.000	0.010	0.026	−0.016	−0.014	−0.012	−0.039*	−0.034	−0.029	−0.048	−0.041	−0.038
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)
HS Degree	0.041	0.047	0.027	0.033	0.032	0.019	0.028	0.016	0.006	0.065*	0.061*	0.057*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Bachelor's Degree	0.119*	0.119*	0.065	0.053	0.042	0.023	0.048	0.033	0.003	0.117*	0.084*	0.058
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Graduate Degree	0.192*	0.179*	0.102*	0.123*	0.106*	0.069*	0.083*	0.072*	0.039	0.140*	0.116*	0.086
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Female	0.039*	0.030	0.033*	0.066*	0.057*	0.039*	0.026	0.026	0.030	0.041	0.035	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age 30-44	−0.001	−0.006	0.018	−0.029	−0.012	−0.001	−0.036	−0.027	−0.019	−0.023	−0.012	0.006
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Age 45-64	0.012	0.003	0.026	0.098*	0.104*	0.087*	−0.012	−0.008	−0.013	−0.060	−0.066	−0.032
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age 65+	0.034	0.057	0.061	0.158*	0.173*	0.157*	0.056	0.070	0.060	−0.077	−0.075	−0.048
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)
# Children	−0.021*	−0.020*	−0.012	−0.031*	−0.029*	−0.023*	−0.007	−0.003	0.001	−0.001	0.000	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Voted	−0.046	−0.044	−0.038	0.032	0.018	−0.001	0.031	0.038	0.030	−0.069*	−0.046	−0.026
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Far Left		0.152*	0.126*		0.105*	0.087*		0.034	0.072*		0.182*	0.168*
		(0.027)	(0.026)		(0.026)	(0.025)		(0.024)	(0.025)		(0.047)	(0.047)
Left		0.156*	0.113*		0.108*	0.055*		0.119*	0.116*		0.118*	0.074*
		(0.022)	(0.021)		(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.032)	(0.032)
Right		−0.123*	−0.124*		−0.149*	−0.123*		−0.123*	−0.129*		−0.126*	−0.088*
		(0.022)	(0.021)		(0.024)	(0.024)		(0.030)	(0.029)		(0.027)	(0.027)
Far Right		−0.183*	−0.131*		−0.243*	−0.155*		−0.108	−0.078		−0.244*	−0.200*
		(0.026)	(0.025)		(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.055)	(0.055)		(0.035)	(0.039)
Pro-EU			0.293*			0.300*			0.217*			0.244*
			(0.016)			(0.018)			(0.019)			(0.022)
High Empathy			0.034*			0.016			0.022			0.053*
			(0.015)			(0.017)			(0.017)			(0.022)
Pro-Redistribution			0.011			0.030			0.064*			0.014
			(0.016)			(0.017)			(0.019)			(0.022)
High Knowledge			0.034*			0.096*			0.012			0.015
			(0.016)			(0.017)			(0.020)			(0.022)
High Interest			−0.013			−0.066*			−0.031			−0.094*
			(0.018)			(0.017)			(0.018)			(0.023)
R^2	0.021	0.070	0.150	0.028	0.077	0.164	0.013	0.036	0.076	0.027	0.070	0.134
Adj. R^2	0.017	0.065	0.144	0.022	0.070	0.157	0.007	0.029	0.069	0.018	0.060	0.122
Num. obs.	3886	3886	3886	3473	3473	3473	3471	3471	3471	2009	2009	2009

*$p < 0.05$

The alternative coding of the ideology bins is as follows:
Far Left (0-1), Left (2-3), Center (4-6), Right (7-8), Far Right (9-10)

Table C.13: Mechanism Regressions with Alternative Coding of Ideology Bins (Full Sample)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Far Left	0.102*	0.050*	0.234*	0.174*	−0.029	−0.195*
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Left	0.128*	0.068*	0.193*	0.102*	0.137*	−0.151*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Right	−0.131*	−0.089*	−0.149*	−0.017	−0.039	0.135*
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Far Right	−0.207*	−0.102*	−0.137*	0.030	−0.277*	0.264*
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Pro-Redistribution		0.015				
		(0.008)				
High Empathy		0.014				
		(0.008)				
EU Support		0.130*				
		(0.005)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.254*				
		(0.005)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.081	0.285	0.111	0.069	0.095	0.087
Adj. R^2	0.079	0.283	0.109	0.067	0.093	0.085
Num. obs.	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839	12839

*$p < 0.05$

The alternative coding of the ideology bins is as follows:
Far Left (0-1), Left (2-3), Center (4-6), Right (7-8), Far Right (9-10)

Table C.14: Mechanism Regressions with Party ID (and L-R Score)
France, Reference Party: UMP (7.7)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
EELV (3.1)	0.247*	0.154*	0.296*	0.182*	0.230*	−0.246*
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.067)
FDG (1.8)	0.232*	0.190*	0.424*	0.248*	−0.184*	−0.219*
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.067)
FN (9.6)	−0.156*	−0.025	0.202*	0.013	−0.741*	0.198*
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.045)
PS (3.8)	0.232*	0.145*	0.289*	0.093*	0.231*	−0.225*
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.048)
UDI / MoDem (5.9)	0.208*	0.171*	0.102*	0.085*	0.028	−0.130*
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Pro-Redistribution		0.014				
		(0.019)				
High Empathy		0.025				
		(0.018)				
EU Support		0.119*				
		(0.013)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.233*				
		(0.012)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.146	0.313	0.113	0.059	0.299	0.078
Adj. R^2	0.137	0.304	0.103	0.049	0.292	0.068
Num. obs.	2345	2345	2345	2345	2345	2345

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.15: Mechanism Regressions with Party ID (and L-R Score)
Italy, Reference Party: Partito Democratico (3.6)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Forza Italia (6.7)	−0.289*	−0.133*	−0.202*	−0.092*	−0.478*	0.340*
	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.064)
Fratelli Italia (7.9)	−0.251*	−0.135*	−0.177*	−0.113*	−0.708*	0.084
	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.082)
Lega Nord (8.9)	−0.334*	−0.147*	−0.157*	−0.082*	−0.865*	0.283*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.052)
M5S (4.7)	−0.246*	−0.143*	0.046	0.056*	−0.695*	0.070
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Sinistra EL (1.3)	0.085*	0.039	0.131*	0.145*	−0.045	−0.175*
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.059)
Pro-Redistribution		0.027				
		(0.019)				
High Empathy		0.007				
		(0.020)				
EU Support		0.123*				
		(0.013)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.269*				
		(0.012)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.109	0.329	0.066	0.083	0.218	0.064
Adj. R^2	0.099	0.320	0.055	0.073	0.209	0.053
Num. obs.	2165	2165	2165	2165	2165	2165

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.16: Mechanism Regressions with Party ID (and L-R Score)
Spain, Reference Party: PSOE (3.8)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Ciudadanos (5.6)	−0.101*	−0.083*	−0.138*	0.021	0.018	0.061
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.053)
ERC (3.7)	−0.007	0.040	0.003	−0.028	−0.230*	0.074
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.071)
IU (2)	0.006	−0.011	0.069*	0.106*	−0.404*	−0.205*
	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Podemos (1.7)	−0.044	−0.018	0.084*	0.130*	−0.458*	−0.087
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.050)
PP (7.3)	−0.211*	−0.139*	−0.354*	−0.101*	0.110*	0.276*
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.063)
Pro-Redistribution		0.006				
		(0.022)				
High Empathy		−0.016				
		(0.019)				
EU Support		0.109*				
		(0.013)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.303*				
		(0.012)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.037	0.286	0.142	0.069	0.152	0.062
Adj. R^2	0.026	0.277	0.132	0.058	0.142	0.051
Num. obs.	2166	2166	2166	2166	2166	2166

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.17: Mechanism Regressions with Party ID (and L-R Score)
United Kingdom, Reference Party: Conservative (7)

	Model 1 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 2 Oppose Grexit (Binary)	Model 3 Pro-Redistribution (Binary)	Model 4 High Empathy (Binary)	Model 5 EU Support (3-Point)	Model 6 Positive Expected Grexit Impact (3-Point)
Green (1.9)	0.150*	0.029	0.413*	0.143*	0.430*	−0.229*
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.080)	(0.087)
Labour (3.6)	0.131*	0.041	0.415*	0.104*	0.363*	−0.136*
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.049)
LibDem (4.9)	0.203*	0.063	0.319*	0.106*	0.543*	−0.272*
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.082)
UKIP (9.1)	−0.141*	−0.059*	0.177*	0.010	−0.486*	0.126*
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Pro-Redistribution		0.027				
		(0.024)				
High Empathy		0.042				
		(0.022)				
EU Support		0.121*				
		(0.014)				
Positive Expected Grexit Impact		−0.226*				
		(0.014)				
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.089	0.274	0.199	0.066	0.250	0.047
Adj. R^2	0.076	0.261	0.187	0.052	0.238	0.033
Num. obs.	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548	1548

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.18: Proportion of Total Ideology Effect (in linear form) on Grexit Opposition (Binary) Mediated by...

Mediator:	Pro-Redistribution	High Empathy	EU Support	Expected Grexit Impact
95% CI Lower	0.00177	0.00752	0.08953	0.32311
Point Estimate	0.02435	0.01463	0.11759	0.36031
95% CI Upper	0.05262	0.02327	0.13878	0.39770

Note: This table reports the results of a formal causal mediation analysis. The analysis employs the Baron-Kenny linear structural equation models (LSEM), with ideology treated as a linear 11-point variable and the full set of economic, social, and demographic controls included as covariates. Confidence intervals are generated via the bootstrap method. The `mediation` package in `R` was used to implement the causal mediation analysis. See Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T., Hirose, K., Keele, L., & Imai, K. (2014). "mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis." *Journal of Statistical Software*, 59(5).

Table C.19: Proportion of Total Ideology Effect (in linear form) on Grexit Opposition (5-Point Version) Mediated by...

Mediator:	Pro-Redistribution	High Empathy	EU Support	Expected Grexit Impact
95% CI Lower	0.01173	0.00547	0.07394	0.27160
Point Estimate	0.02727	0.01386	0.10025	0.31134
95% CI Upper	0.04868	0.02535	0.11998	0.33326

Note: This table reports the results of a formal causal mediation analysis. The analysis employs the Baron-Kenny linear structural equation models (LSEM), with ideology treated as a linear 11-point variable and the full set of economic, social, and demographic controls included as covariates. Confidence intervals are generated via the bootstrap method. The `mediation` package in `R` was used to implement the causal mediation analysis. See Tingley, D., Yamamoto, T., Hirose, K., Keele, L., & Imai, K. (2014). "mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis." *Journal of Statistical Software*, 59(5).

Table C.20: Interactions between Ideology and Knowledge of European Debt Crisis (Binary) in Explaining Opposition to Grexit

	Full	France	Italy	Spain	UK
Far Left	0.104*	0.147*	0.085*	0.037	0.144*
	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.050)
Left	0.088*	0.117*	0.077*	0.007	0.135*
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Right	−0.080*	−0.021	−0.111*	−0.128*	−0.102*
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.038)
Far Right	−0.178*	−0.145*	−0.214*	−0.112	−0.189*
	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.065)	(0.040)
Knowledgeable	0.025	0.044	0.045	0.000	−0.018
	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Knowledgeable * Far Left	0.046	0.087	0.052	0.055	0.111
	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.074)
Knowledgeable * Left	0.035	0.014	0.019	0.112*	−0.026
	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.065)
Knowledgeable * Right	0.022	−0.007	0.024	0.045	0.070
	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Knowledgeable * Far Right	−0.003	−0.068	0.019	−0.006	0.040
	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.061)
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Fixed Effects	✓				
P-value from F-Test of Joint Significance of Interactions	0.305	0.084	0.932	0.205	0.368
R^2	0.084	0.077	0.080	0.039	0.077
Adj. R^2	0.082	0.070	0.072	0.031	0.064
Num. obs.	12839	3886	3473	3471	2009

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.21: Explaining Grexit Opposition, Interacting Ideology with Partisan Intensity (0-3)

	Full	France	Italy	Spain	UK
Far Left	0.086	0.079	0.007	0.056	0.121
	(0.045)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.082)	(0.134)
Left	0.073	0.105	0.032	0.001	0.089
	(0.045)	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.111)
Right	−0.045	0.044	−0.068	−0.200*	−0.070
	(0.048)	(0.080)	(0.105)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Far Right	−0.146*	−0.161*	−0.228*	−0.060	−0.030
	(0.051)	(0.080)	(0.108)	(0.134)	(0.122)
Partisan Intensity	−0.064*	−0.060	−0.141*	−0.051	−0.038
	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Partisan Intensity * Far Left	0.046*	0.101*	0.079	0.019	0.047
	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.061)
Partisan Intensity * Left	0.028	0.051	0.031	0.044	0.021
	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.055)
Partisan Intensity * Right	−0.006	−0.006	−0.026	0.057	0.009
	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.049)
Partisan Intensity * Far Right	0.005	0.029	0.044	−0.024	−0.050
	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.052)
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Fixed Effects	✓				
P-value from F-Test of Joint Significance of Interactions	0.141	0.094	0.265	0.679	0.690
R^2	0.105	0.114	0.115	0.040	0.092
Adj. R^2	0.102	0.104	0.104	0.029	0.077
Num. obs.	9134	2598	2358	2494	1684

*$p < 0.05$

Table C.22: Linear Probability Model - DV: Probability of Being Opposed to Greek Exit - Comparing the Measures of Grexit Impact Expecations

	Full	France	Italy	Spain	UK
Far Left	0.068*	0.109*	0.052*	0.014	0.149*
	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.034)
Left	0.067*	0.096*	0.046*	0.035	0.094*
	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Right	−0.051*	−0.014	−0.071*	−0.064*	−0.066*
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Far Right	−0.110*	−0.122*	−0.129*	−0.036	−0.088*
	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Positive Expected Grexit Impact on European Economy	−0.185*	−0.171*	−0.202*	−0.179*	−0.189*
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Positive Expected Grexit Impact on National Economy	−0.074*	−0.034*	−0.090*	−0.097*	−0.062*
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Positive Expected Grexit Impact on EU Stability	−0.077*	−0.115*	−0.046*	−0.089*	−0.050*
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Economic, Demographic, Additional Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country Fixed Effects	✓				
R^2	0.262	0.247	0.264	0.254	0.219
Adj. R^2	0.260	0.242	0.259	0.248	0.209
Num. obs.	12839	3886	3473	3471	2009

*$p < 0.05$

Figure C.1: Stability of Ideological Distributions Over Time (France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom)



Note: This figure shows the evolution of ideological distributions over time. The left panel shows the results across all countries. The right panel reports the results by country. The results are based on Eurobarometer data and uses the following coding: Far left (1-2), left (3-4), center (5, median), right (6-7), far right (8-10). The coding differs minimally from our the left right coding in our data because the Eurobarometer uses a 1-10 scale while we used a 0-10 scale.

Figure C.2: Distribution of Free Market Ideology



Note: For each of the left-right ideological bins, this plot includes a histogram presenting the distribution of free-market ideology. The dashed vertical lines denote the mean level of free market ideology for each left-right bin.

Figure C.3: Ideology and Support for Eurozone Bailouts in Germany



Note: This figure shows the correlation between ideology and support for financial bailouts in Germany (data source: Bechtel et al. (2014)).