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Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies
   
   
  

Funding Travel Prize Winner

 

Winner 2008 Thomas Kirk

I plan to investigate the effects of 9/11 and the GWOT on the conflict in Kashmir, focussing particularly on the perceived lack of interest from the international community that should ultimately be challenged given the regions proximity to Afghanistan. Due to the unreported and largely ignored dynamics of this conflict I think I will benefit greatly from travelling to the area.

I will visit Indian held part of Kashmir, spending time in the Vale of Kashmir and the capital city Srinagar. I also plan to travel into Azad [free] Jammu and Kashmir in Pakistan were I shall meet with a contact in the Kashmir Institute of International Relations. On both sides of the Line of Control I hope to meet and interview various players in the conflict from all three concerned camps; Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris themselves.

I wish to explore the views of those on the ground in relation to 9/11, the international community, especially the US and UN, recent efforts at CBM's between the two regional players and any hopes for an enduring peace.


Report from Thomas Kirk-- Summary of Kashmir Research Trip funded by the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies Nottingham

Aim

The purpose of the trip was to carry out qualitative research in support of my dissertation investigating the unresolved conflict in the Kashmir region of India and Pakistan. I aimed to investigate the effects of September 11th on the conflict, the ongoing peace initiatives, perspectives of the issue and the situation on the ground.

Planning

After obtaining the award from the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies my first point of contact was supplied by Professor Pauline Eadie who arranged a meeting with a visiting Kashmiri from the Kashmiri Institute of International Relations [KIIR].

Sardar Amjad Yousaf Khan suggested I visit the KIIR offices in Pakistani held Kashmir [AJK] and agreed to facilitate meetings between myself and a variety of political players, ex-militants and commentators. This avenue was to prove even more useful than at first expected.

Professor Matthew Rendall upon learning of my plan suggested I contact a former student of his Deepti Mahajan who resided in Delhi and had previously worked for Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace [WISCOMP]. As well as planning to interview her for an insight into civil society initiatives in Kashmir Deepti proved to be helpful in suggesting other points of contact in Delhi.

Before leaving I arranged to meet a variety of individuals in Delhi, Srinagar University and Islamabad from academia, NGOs, politics, and journalism. My method was to be the use of informal and free ranging interviews so as to allow the pursuit of relevant strains of thought or argument that may arise in discussion.


The Trip

Delhi

I arrived in Delhi on the 21st of July and made my way to the centre of town. Despite having travelled extensively in India before and read numerous accounts of scams perpetrated by unscrupulous guides I fell victim to a Taxi claiming to take me to a 'official' government tourist office. Of course the office not affiliated with the government in any capacity but was run by a Kashmiri who had left the Valley to seek better employment opportunities elsewhere after violence broke out in 1989. Upon the divulgence of my plans for my time in the region Ali, who never told me his full name, became my unofficial guardian in India. Having a Kahmiri heritage of over five generations Ali knew much about the political situation in the Valley and turned out to be acquainted with many players from the recent history of the turbulent state.

Through Ali I was to have my first meeting in Delhi with Javed Mir and one of his deputies [asked to remain anonymous] of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front [JKLF]. Javed was a member of the four strong 'Haj' group who crossed into Pakistan after the rigged 1987 state elections in Indian Kashmir in order to receive weapons and training. They returned and arguably begun the first phase of large scale militancy in the Valley in 1988/9. The JKLF gave up violence in 1995 and have since split into two groups, one with leadership largely in AJK and the other in Indian held Kashmir [IJK] led by Yasin Malik. Javed was to introduce me to the Kashmiri trait of speaking from the heart and the nationalist/separatist characteristic of distrusting Pakistan more than India. Javed was able to shed light on the torture carried out by Indian forces, the plight of citizens in the Valley, the clash between nationalist and fundamentalist militants, the danger of Al Qaeda hijacking the conflict and the relative ignorance of the Western world to the differences between the Bin Laden's group and Kashmiri ethnic nationalist militancy. Javed was keen to express the idea that their [JKLF] fight was about internationalising the conflict and getting attention, it was however felt that at the current moment this looked to have be in vain with the world once again relegating Kashmir to the backburner. This talk was largely unscripted, was unrecorded upon request and involved heavy sentiments from those concerned, to say it was a awakening to the human face of the conflict does not do this first meeting justice. 

My second meeting and the first pre-planned interview was with Chris Morris the Kashmir correspondent for the BBC. Taking place in Hindustan Times building the meeting allowed me to glimpse the inner workings of the global news behemoth  and most amusingly the standard uniform of Chinos and Oxford shirt worn by the majority. Chris allowed me to practice my interview technique in front of a native English speaker, commented on the failure of Islamists in Pakistan to capitalize on political power won in the 2002 elections and also provided me with a recent opinion poll of Pak/Indo public thoughts on resolving the Kashmir crisis. His analysis was general, sweeping and simplistic, which is what I expected from a correspondent from the West.

My last meeting in Delhi was with Deepti Mahajan who proved to be extremely optimistic about the prospects for a resolution of the conflict and knowledgeable on aspects of civil society initiatives aimed at promoting peace. She talked about the work being done by Virginia University on conflict transformation led by civil society, informed me of the existence of the Jammu & Kashmir Federation of Civil Society Organisations [JKFCSO] and Pakistan-Indian Peoples' Forum for Peace and Democracy [PIPFPD] and suggested that international pressure to resolve the conflict was largely brushed off by strong headed Pakistan and India. Her belief in civil society meant she viewed the conflict as ultimately be solved by the changing attitudes of generations not the implementation of dialogue at the international or state level.

Srinagar IJK

The flight to Srinagar, the capital of IJK, was to give a taste of what life for Kashmiris is like. Numerous security checks far beyond the normal, armed guards and an unexplained delay for security reasons before even leaving Delhi. Leaving Srinagar airport one has the distinct feeling that an occupation is in force in the city. Although visible troop deployments are down from 2005 the appearance of body armoured commandos, bunkers and armoured troop carriers stands in stark juxtaposition to the natural beauty of the Valley and Dal lake.

While in Srinagar my movements were curtailed by my host to daytime and only upon much insistence that I will be sensible was I allowed to explore the city alone. Reports suggest tourism is up as much as 95% on previous years but the population still seemed surprised to see a young Western male traversing the back streets of the old city, Jama Majid mosque and the Mogul Gardens. They stop and stare, wave and occasionally insist on photo opportunities, all this takes place among the presence of barded wire, watching armed soldiers and firing posts hidden behind sand bags or the knocked through walls of deserted homes. The casual or uninformed observer could be excused for being oblivious to the random searches of bags and garments taking place, the dispersal of innocent gatherings of young men at junctions and the signs constantly reminding you of the presence of yet another Border Security Force regiment or police post. Srinagar does not reflect the optimism I encountered in Delhi or the analysis of many Western commentators following the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, but then Srinagar has little to do with interstate war and everything to do with the birth of violent Kashmiri ethnic nationalism. 

On the third day in IJK I made my way to Srinagar University, the proud owner of a recently opened Kashmir studies department and an sprawling campus not dissimilar to Nottingham. Identified as a breeding ground for dissent by the Indian forces the university has more army personnel in sight than students and my first interviewee historian Dr Altaf Hussain Pasa had an armoured carrier to admire from his office window.

With an encyclopedic knowledge of Kashmiri history Altaf made a big impression on the way I viewed Kashmiris. Throughout our conversation he spoke as an academic but also a sufferer of the conflict, restricted in how he lived in and how he taught the history of the region to his students. Altaf held a belief in the inevitability of peace tempered by an assertion that Kashmiri aspirations are not dead. His historical understanding of the conflict led him to argue that reports of Kashmiri youth turning towards Western culture and materialistic pursuits instead of the struggle of their fathers from foreign commentators failed to grasp the reality of the situation. He argued that the hopes of Kashmiris for rights, democratic representation and variations on the theme of self determination would be taken up by these youth when a strong leader came to galvanise them once again. He viewed society as divisible into the thinking minority and the apathetic majority who would be willing to shout the slogans and participate in marches. Recent reductions in violence did not mean peace in his assessment and the protests surrounding the proposed Amarnath land transfer certainly supported the thrust of his analysis. He viewed the present movement of Kashmiri nationalists as having far less politicisation than Sheik Abdullah and the National Conference of the post war era. 

My second meeting with Dr Noor Ahmed Baba, the dean of the university and the head of political science was less informative by far. I was previously warned that he would roll out what can only be termed an Indian view of the dispute due to central government having involvement in appointments among the upper echelons of the university. He expressed an opinion that fundamentalist militant attention has been diverted to the Afghan border post 9/11 and that Kashmiri must contest elections to win legitimacy while accepting Indian sovereignty over the state. Although largely valid in his argument he failed to elaborate on the obstacles in the way for Kashmiris and appeared to be uninterested in deep conversation with myself. I don't wish to put this negative experience down to theories or conspiracy expressed to me by various sources before our meet but I Dr Baba appeared largely mentally absent throughout.

The following day I interviewed Dr Javid Ahmad Dar, a expert in conflict resolution, who explained the multi level analysis needed to understand the conflict. The conflict has internal and external dimensions, conflict within the state, within India and between India and Pakistan. Dr Dar felt failure in resolutions between any area would result in failure in at all levels. He also suggested that the motivations for the external dimensions of the conflict had morphed from essentially political pre-1947, to ideological over the later half of the twentieth century and in recent times back to politically motivated post 9/11. Internally the conflict was shifting from a political movement concerned with self determination to a ideological conflict dominated by Kashmiri calls for separatism along ethnic, nationalistic and cultural lines; ''social and political crisis act as a growth of theories, growth of ideologies'', ''Kashmiri struggle is gaining a ideology of ethnic nationalism'', ''dissatisfied with Indian sovereignty and simultaneously and with equal intensity dissatisfied with Pakistani sovereignty''.  

He agreed with my assertion that recent emphasis on confidence building measures [CBMs] was largely misplaced and that they represented ''superficial'' progress, he believed the only CBM with true impact potential would be demilitarisation by concerned parties. The Irish model of unconditional talks and disarmament was cited as an important case study, the ability to talk to militants regardless of operational capacity was crucial in his opinion. He suggested India had made recent attempts to link the Kashmir issue to international terrorism yet iterated the fact that Kashmir was a nationalist struggle first and foremost. Dar suggested Kashmir must be understood in these terms by the international community before extremists are further allowed to hijack the conflict and the damaging dominant Western perspective becomes reality. 

Pakistan

This portion of my trip was more eventful and useful than could have possibly have been expected. While crossing the border at Wagah I met a Greek on his return journey having driven from his home in Athens to Nepal. I hitched a ride to Islamabad cutting a journey that would have previously taken 2 days to one.

In order to arrange an armed escort for travel outside of Islamabad the Greek and I met Haji Mir Lashkari Raisani [tribal prince of Balochistan & president of the Balochistan PPP] at the cities most expensive and well fortified hotel. The presence of many Americans within the complex presumably with the US government or one the assortment of NGOs working in Pakistan served to remind one of the 'Green zone' like enclaves that foreigners in Pakistan tend to occupy. Mr Raisani would not allow me to record the interview but his insights into the fragile coalition of different ethnicities, religious ideologies and tribes that make up Pakistan was extremely insightful. He was particularly vocal regarding the Gas reserves under his ancestral homeland of Balochistan, the central governments failure to channel money back into the area despite taking its resources and the necessity of free and fair elections in Pakistan to prevent the countries fragmentation. His analysis f the Kashmir conflict focussed on the Pakistani establishments interest in keep the conflict alive, which is paralleled by the international communities 'Great Game' in the region. The evidence for this was revealed in the great powers relative silence on the issue despite over 50 [votes?] by the UN in the past decade. He also identified the impact that ignored Mujahideen from the Afghan Soviet conflict have had on Kashmir and Pakistan. Altogether the experience of meeting such a man brought home the fact that Pakistan is largely a divided nation facing problems on multiple fronts; ethno nationalist, socio-economic, political, human rights and importantly for the West Islamic terrorism of the international variety.

The following day I arrived at the offices of KIIR in Islamabad, the atmosphere was electric as final preparations for the following days First Kashmiri Leadership Conference were being finalised. The NGO has a motto of 'peace through dialogue' and was of the firm belief that Kashmiri needed a voice in the ongoing peace initiative between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Led by a member of the Muslim Conference Shah Ghulam Qadin the organisation is a vocal voice in internationalising Kashmir, highlighting the need to Kashmiri participation in dialogue and pursuing the investigation of human rights abuses in the conflict.

 The first person I interviewed was Altaf Hussain who was working with the human rights deak at KIIR. Altaf's story was extremely interesting and mirrored that of other young men turned militants from Indian Kashmir. Altaf, a former school master from the valley, helped form Tahreek Jihad [not sure of group but later may have become Tehrik e Jihad] after turning to militancy in 1989 after becoming disillusioned with politics. He was always politically active having been a member of student run organisations before the outbreak of violence. Altaf provided me with important insights into the militancy, its continuation despite the post 9/11 climate and the recent events surrounding the Amarnath shrine land sale in J&K. He was of the opinion that the militancy would be sustained indefinitely by the ''topography and people's love and sentiment''. Altaf also lamented the effect of 9/11 on the perception of Kashmiri militancy by the West and the portrayal of the struggle which is no longer represented correctly; they have ''no international agenda''. He suggested that India had used the global war on terror by ''blackmailing the international community into believing Kashmir is part of an international conspiracy'' when in reality the ''movement is for the rights of the people of Kashmir''. Altaf appeared optimistic that an investigation into the recently discovered unmarked graves in the valley might be pushed for by the European Parliament who had called the valley ''prison on the earth''. Altaf, aside from dashing preconceptions of militants with his fatherly manner, consistently emphasised the importance of foreign perceptions of the conflict in the international community, the Kashmir conflict must be recognised as separate from the Islamist terrorism sweeping parts of the world.

Shah Ghulam Qadin, member of the ruling party of AJK the Muslim Conference, speaker in the legislative assembly and chairman of KIIR was my next interviewee. Like many Kashmiri he seemed to keen to emphasize that he belonged to a tolerant society despite recent provocation from the BJP over Amarnath. By now it was evident from my meetings that most Kashmiris are keen to shape, change and portray perceptions of themselves as humans firstly, an oppressed people in recent history and lastly Muslims. He suggested that the United Nations failure to define terrorism since and before 9/11 has left ambiguity over the classification of 'freedom fighters'; ''one thing is certain, before 9/11 it was acceptable in the world to use arms against occupiers to get freedom, but now it is wrong'', however a side effect of 9/11 and the new global consensus is that ''everybody turned back to dialogue''. He was however of the opinion that ''militancy should stop but that does not mean they should surrender'', dialogue has to be given a chance but Kashmiris must retain the capacity to carry out an armed struggle. He was an advocate of civil society initiatives but believed that Kashmiri leaders needed political space to talk and meet away from outside involvement. Despite this he believed the international community had tried to resolve the conflict but due to outside events had only found the time to ''manage'' the conflict. On the portrayal by outside media of the conflict he feels that Indian lobbies in foreign countries are strong and frame the conflict as an India and Pakistani issue instead of a Kashmiri issue. He argued that getting across the message that Kashmiri human rights are being abused is extremely difficult given the current environment and concentration on interstate warfare in foreign perceptions. Mr Shah, as I came to call him, had an in depth analysis of the conflict but of course was constrained by party lines on the eventual fate of the state [secession to Pak]. Despite this he suggested that no ultimate end game of any of the competing interest parties would be ultimately viable. 

KIIR had been working towards the organisation of the First Kashmiri Leadership Conference which I had the opportunity to attend the following day in Islamabad. The conference was the first time a wide spectrum of leaders from Kashmiri communities on both sides of the LoC had met to discuss initiatives to aid the current dialogue on the dispute. Only the leadership of various groups were invited along with a sprinkling of Kashmiri academics. No Pakistanis, Indians or foreigners [myself excepted] were allowed to take part. Notable attendees included Omar Abdullah president of the ruling National Conference of IJK, president Raja Zulqarnain Khan and Minister Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan from AJK, Amanullah khan JKLF founding father of the JKLF, Mohammad Yousuf Tarigami leader of the communist party of India CPI [M], Altaf Hussain Wani of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference [APHC] and Professor Nazir Ahmed Shawl of the Kashmir justice foundation.

The conference took the form of speeches by all participants and then a informal debate to be followed by an declaration of agreement. The talks lasted all day and were mostly in Urdu, despite this participants were keen to talk to me in intervals, breaks for food and after which gave me an opportunity to pose questions to a gathering of players never before assembled in one room. I was told by Imran, the English speaking son of Shia spiritual leader Molvi Iftikhar Ansari that the conference was largely monopolised by latest ongoing crisis in IJK yet the leaders managed to agree on the need for dialogue to continue. It was however apparent that the APHCs decision to not send top leaders was a major, if typical, frustration. I discreetly suggested that the inability for all leaders to attend did the perception of Kashmiris and their struggle no favours, a view that was already deeply ingrained in the minds of everyone present. That night I was invited to a dinner at Kashmir House in Islamabad diplomatic quarter hosted by the Prime Ministar of AJK Sardar Khan. Afterwards the PM was to give me a hour of personnel interview time during which he informed me of the economic potential of the region, the improved literacy rate in AJK and the safe working environment for the foreign NGO in flux in response to the 2005 earthquake. 

I shall not go into detail about the various meetings of this day as they were short, I was largely not allowed to record and the most participants were more interested in pointing me in the direction of their work/theory/propsed solution than having serious academic conversations. Suffice to say it was an extremely valuable day.


Conclusion

I have no hesitation in saying the trip was one of the most eye opening, at times moving, and always revealing experiences of my life. My purpose in choosing Kashmir for my dissertation topic was to investigate a suspicion that the mainstream literature and perspectives on the conflict lacked nuances and an balanced understanding. This has, I have come to believe, manifested itself in an over optimism in current dialogue between the two concerned nations. Purported reasons for this focus on the state level can be traced to a concern with September 11th and the Global War on Terrorism, the reaffirmation of realism as a dominant lens for the West [read India also] post mentioned tragedy, the concurrent brushing aside of non-state actors in IR and the historical hijacking of the conflict by various parties; opportunistic Kashmiri Abdullah in the early years, the great powers in the cold war, India and Pakistan in their various tussles and finally 9/11 and radical Islamic Militancy in recent times. As all of this has taken place Kashmiris and their struggle has been silenced.

After speaking with the founders of the 1988 militant struggle and the leaders trying to scrape out their peoples future while the world largely ignores them it has become glaringly apparent to me that Kashmir is not settled, nothing is certain, so far there is little reason for optimism and if recent events are a judge of the future a slide towards communalism is further changing the nature of the conflict. This is all taking place against the backdrop of a international war between Islamists, international terrorists and the world hegemon in Pakistan. It appears sadly ironic that the latest event to arguably silence the Kashmiris' struggle in the mind of the world may also come to engulf, hijack and overtake the state physically as well as perceptually.

Despite this pessimism my trip has taught me that Kashmir has root causes, causes that are ultimately fixable, and that there are people trying to fix them. Before Kashmir sinks to the level of the nihilistic war on its doorstep these causes must be examined, identified and tackled. This I believe is possible but only with the right lens to view the issue as separate from September 11th and unaccountable by mainstream paradigms of IR. 

 

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