
Philip Percival
Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts
Contact
Biography
Philip Percival received his PhD from the University of Cambridge. He works primarily in the four fields of metaphysics (artworks, time and modality, existence, realism vs. anti-realism, indeterminism (including counterfactuals, explanation, and chance), epistemology (induction, basic first order theories, including virtue theoretic vs. consequentialist (in particular, decision-theoretic) approaches), philosophy of science (the nature of science, the nature and role of theory acceptance), and philosophical logic (paradox of knowability, the semantics of tense, the language of science). He enjoys occasional forays into other fields, however.
Expertise Summary
I have wide-ranging philosophical interests. My most recent publications belong to the three fields of metaphysics (artworks, time, existence, indeterminism (including counterfactuals, explanation, and chance), epistemology (induction, basic first order theories, including virtue theoretic vs. consequentialist (in particular, decision-theoretic) approaches), and philosophy of science (the nature of science, the nature and role of theory acceptance, the language of science). I have additional research interests, however, and I have supervised research in two further fields--philosophy of mind (episodic memory) and moral philosophy (metaethics, basic first order theories).
I welcome applications from prospective research students wishing to focus on particular topics within any of these five fields, broadly conceived.
Recent Publications
PERCIVAL, P., 2009. Determinism and Probability. In: LE POIDEVIN, R. ET. AL., ed., The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics
PERCIVAL, P., 2007. An empiricist critique of constructive empiricism: the aim of science. In: MONTON, B., ed., Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances Oxford: Oxford University Press. 83-116
PERCIVAL, P., 2006. On realism about chance. In: MACBRIDE, F., ed., Identity and modality Oxford: Oxford University Press. 74-106
PERCIVAL, P., 2003. The pursuit of epistemic good Metaphilosophy. 34, 29-47