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Spiros Bougheas

Produced By:

Centre for Finance, Credit and
Macroeconomics
School of Economics
Sir Clive Granger Building
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham
NG7 2RD

Tel: +44(0) 115 951 4763

Fax: +44(0) 115 951 4159

hilary.hughes@nottingham.ac.uk

Contagion in Stable Networks*

Spiros Bougheas[†]
University of Nottingham

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Abstract

We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics, underground resistance organizations, trade networks) where we find that stable networks are comprised of completely connected disjoint subnetworks. Then, we consider networks with directed links and we find that the completely connected network is stable, although, its exact structure, and thus contagion implications, is sensitive to parameter values for costs and benefits. Lastly, we introduce aggregate externalities (e.g. fire sales for the case of financial networks) and we find that stable networks can be asymmetric, connected but not completely connected, thus capturing the main features of inter-industry and financial networks.

Keywords: Network Formation, Stability, Contagion

JEL: C72, D85

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[†]School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK; e-mail: spiros.bougheas@nottingham.ac.uk

1. Introduction

A significant part of the literature on strategic network formation has focused on variants of the ‘connections’ model studied by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The common idea of this literature is that being part of a network allows agents to benefit not only from their direct links but also from indirect connections to other agents in the network. In contrast, the costs of network participation in these models are only associated with the creation of direct links. However, as Blume *et al.* (2011) observe in many networks studied in economics and other disciplines the structure of costs and benefits is inverted. As an example from economics they refer to the extensive body of work on issues related to systemic risk in financial networks. In those networks two institutions form a link by signing a loan agreement from which each party derives a benefit. A failure by one institution to meet its obligations inflicts costs not only to the two parties that have signed the agreement but also to other institutions connected to them, directly or indirectly, by other financial agreements.

The above observation motivated Blume *et al.* (2011) to study the formation of networks with this alternative general payoff structure. They have restricted their analysis to undirected graphs where information can flow in either direction along a link. Using stability as a solution concept that allows them to make predictions about which network structures are more likely to form they find stable networks that consist of fully connected disjoint subgraphs (cliques). Such arrangements might be offering a good description of some examples of social networks they mentioned in their paper (e.g. formation of groups that minimize the risk of disease epidemics and the organization of cladenstine operations) but definitely less so for financial systems that have network structures which are connected but incomplete.¹ In such networks there is always a path connecting any of the nodes (financial institutions) with every other node (ignoring for the moment that links can also be directed), however, not all nodes are directly linked with every other node.

In this paper, we argue that by distinguishing between directed and undirected graphs we can explain such variations in network structures. We begin by analyzing the formation of undirected networks in a variant of the Blume *et al.* (2011) model. As in their model (a) agents derive a benefit by forming a link, and (b) each agent fails independently with some fixed probability. The difference in the two models is related to the way the costs associated with such failures spread through the network. In their model after a failure each node with some probability becomes live and shocks can only be transmitted through live nodes. In our model all nodes are live and thus affected by the shock, however, the magnitude of the losses for each node depends on its distance from the one that initially failed. We confirm that when links are undirected there exist stable networks that consist of fully connected disjoint subgraphs but we go one step further by showing that these are the only structures that can be stable.

Then, we turn our attention to directed networks where shocks can be only transmitted along directed paths. In financial networks an outgoing (ingoing) link means that the institution represented by the node is a borrower (lender). Thus, the link captures the flow of financial liabilities. By having only a subset of nodes being live the Blume *et*

¹For a variety of examples see the review article by Bougheas and Kirman (2015).

al. (2011) model mimics the transmission of shocks in directed networks. However, there is an important difference. In their model the paths are exogenously determined but in our model are equilibrium outcomes. The direction of the links are determined by the strategic decisions of agents. We find that the most likely stable structures are complete directed networks (tournaments). More interestingly, we find that small variations in the parameters of the model can significantly affect the vulnerability of the network to a failure of any randomly chosen node. In particular, we find that by either slightly decreasing the benefit derived from forming a link or slightly decreasing the cost associated with being hit by a shock we can move from a network structure where there is only one (critical) agent whose failure would affect all other agents to a stable structure where all agents become critical.

The prediction that stable networks with directed links are connected fits well with what we know about the structure of financial networks, however, our prediction that such networks are complete is not. With that in mind we next consider a modified version of our model that allows for aggregate externalities. More specifically, we consider the case where the costs suffered by each agent following a shock on the network is increasing in the number of agents being affected. Now we find that there are parameter values such that any stable network is connected but not complete. Moreover, we find that such networks are more likely to be asymmetric that is also a feature of real networks.

In the following section, we describe a few examples of networks from economics and other disciplines, both undirected and directed, whose general structure is captured by our model.² We also offer examples of aggregate externalities that might generate network structures similar to those predicted by our final version of our model.

1.1. Contagion in Social and Economic Networks

The first three are examples of undirected networks and the following two are examples of directed networks.

Contagious diseases and group size As Blume *et al.* (2011) observe there is a trade-off related to the formation of social groups. Larger clusters increase the benefits of participants, however, they also increase the risk of contagion. This trade-off is clearly illustrated in the study by Hamilton *et al.* (2007) of hunter-gatherer societies where they make the distinction between cohesive and disruptive forces in the process of group formation and among the latter they identify the spread of diseases.

Underground resistance networks This is another of the examples offered by Blume *et al.* (2011). Participants in such organizations benefit by working in groups but also there is a risk that the group might be infiltrated. Chai (1993) explores this trade-off in the context of groups that resist governments while Morselli *et al.* (2007) do the same for criminal networks.

²Many more examples of social and economic networks can be found in Jackson (2008) and Newman (2010).

Globalization and the international transmission of shocks The free movement of goods and services, intermediate inputs in production (labor and physical capital) and financial capital can be welfare enhancing during times of prosperity but they also facilitate the transmission of regional shocks around the globe. This trade-off has been studied by Imbs (2004), Kose *et al.* (2003) and since then it has been an active topic of research.

What all three examples mentioned above have in common is that links are symmetric and thus undirected.³ In all three examples the size of the group is a source of tension between opposing forces. Larger groups confer benefits to participants as there are more opportunities for collaboration. However, larger groups also expose a greater number of participants to shocks in their network (new virus, an agent caught by the authorities, a macroeconomic downturn). How big the network will be it will depend on balancing the costs and benefits of participation. The risk of losing a member in clandestine operations might be unacceptable and thus would keep the size of the network small. In contrast, the international trade network has been expanding both by enlisting more trading partners and reducing barriers to trade.

Financial networks and systemic risk This is our first example of a directed network. In the description we offered above shocks are transmitted around the network from borrowers to lenders. The inability of a borrower institution to meet its obligations with its lenders can cause a cascade of failures through the system. The lenders of the initially failing institution might be unable to meet their own obligations and this process can keep going till the system is cleared (e.g., Eisenberg and Noe, 2001).⁴ Shocks can also be transmitted from lenders to borrowers when the former group suddenly interrupts established credit lines that it has earlier provided to the latter group. Episodes of market freezes usually take place before the onset of a crisis as lenders anticipate that borrowers will, in the near future, have a hard time repaying their debts (e.g. Diamond and Rajan; 2011).⁵

During a crisis, systemic losses can get magnified because of ‘fire sales’.⁶ As Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have shown the simultaneous liquidation of assets by multiple institutions can depress the market prices of these assets which in turn further deteriorates the balance sheets of other institutions that hold similar assets thus potentially leading to further failures.

Firm linkages and macroeconomic fat tails Directed networks are also useful for understanding the causes of fat tails in the distribution of macroeconomic shocks. Recent work by Acemoglu *et al.* (2012, 2017b) have shown that the interaction between the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and the structure of the network can become a shock

³There are exceptions but to address them we need a more specialized model. For example, as Chai (1993) suggests while it is true that exposure to the risk of infiltration keeps the size of resistance groups small, these groups can be further protected by having a hierarchical structure where every person is in contact with no more than three other members (one above and two below).

⁴For excellent literature reviews see Acemoglu *et al.* 2017a, Babus and Allen (2009) and Glasserman and Young (2016).

⁵For a network approach to market freezes see Gabrieli and Georg (2014).

⁶See Shleifer and Vishny (2011) for a review of the literature.

amplification mechanism that can explain ‘abnormal’ shocks at the aggregate level.⁷ They analyze networks where nodes represent firms that buy from and sell goods to each other thus creating a web of complex relationships.

In Acemoglu *et al.* (2017b) they show that light-tailed risks (small deviations from the normal case) in conjunction with some lack of balance in terms of economic importance across the sectors of the economy can give rise to macroeconomic fat tails. One possible explanation for the deviation of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks from the normal case can be related to what in the past macroeconomists have identified as aggregate demand externalities. Examples of such externalities have been studied in a variety of contexts, such as search in labor markets (Diamond, 1982), coordination of economic activity (Cooper and John, 1988), market structure (Kiyotaki, 1988) and industrial development (Murphy *et al.*, 1989).

By introducing in our model aggregate external effects we are able to show that directed networks, such as those considered above, though connected are not complete. We also find that such networks are more likely to be asymmetric which is consistent with real-life macroeconomic and financial networks.

1.2. Related Literature

Our paper is related to a quickly expanding literature on the endogenous formation of economic and social networks. Early work focused on variants of the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) connectionist model.⁸ We focus our literature review on works that consider network formation in environments with systemic risk.

As we mentioned above, the most closely related paper to ours is Blume *et al.* (2011). They restrict their attention to undirected graphs. However, the transmission of a shock is restricted to spread only through live nodes. In contrast, in the undirected graph version of our model all nodes are live but we allow for losses to be discounted as the distance of nodes from the one hit by the shock goes up. The two models become identical by setting equal to one (a) the probability of a node being live in Blume *et al.* (2011), and (b) the discount factor in our model. In addition, to finding, as they do, that there exist stable networks that consist of disjoint fully connected subgraphs we also show that any stable network must have that structure.

Erol and Vohra (2014) also consider formation of undirected links and derive a similar result, however, they do so from a network formation game that has a quite different structure. In their model any pair of agents linked together play a coordination game, each agent deciding whether to default or not and where their expected payoffs also depend on their beliefs about the default strategies of all other agents. At an earlier stage agents form undirected links anticipating the later stage possibilities.

Our work is also related to a number of papers in the finance literature that explore the links between network structure and systemic risk. In particular, there has been a lot

⁷See also Carvalho (2014) for a less technical exposition of this topic.

⁸See, for example, Bala and Goyal (2000), Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), Jackson and Watts (2002) and Watts (2002).

of work attempting to understand which types of network structures are more vulnerable to systemic risk (e.g., Acemoglu *et al.*, 2015; Elliott *et al.*, 2014).

Recently, there has also been some work on the formation of such networks. Cohen-Cole *et al.* (2010) study competition in the financial market where participants form undirected links. In Babus (2013) financial institutions form links to insure themselves against the probability of system wide default. In contrast, in the financial interpretation of our model financial institutions are participating in an interbank market. Acemoglu *et al.* (2014) also study network formation but they exogenously restrict the links that are allowed to be formed. When such restrictions are lifted then the complete network can be stable. By introducing aggregate externalities we have derived alternative equilibrium structures.

Lastly, Caballero and Simpssek (2013) also consider externalities in financial markets within a network approach. They introduce the concept of ‘price complexity externality’ to refer to the negative externality imposed to the rest of the system by the liquidation of assets by failing institutions.

2. Undirected Networks

There are n agents represented as nodes on a graph (network). Let $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ denote the set of nodes. A link between two nodes indicates that the corresponding agents have a direct relationship. Let g^N denote the complete network where all agents are directly connected and let $G = \{g \mid g \subseteq g^N\}$ denote the set of all possible graphs. For two agents i and j who are directly linked in network g we write $ij \in g$.

The following notations will be useful. We will write $g + ij$ for the network that we obtain when we add link ij to an existing network g . Similarly, we will write $g - ij$ for the network that we obtain after deleting link ij . A *walk* between agents i and j is defined as a sequence of agents beginning with i and ending with j such that for every pair of adjacent agents in the sequence there exists a direct link. A *path* between agents i and j is defined as a sequence of agents beginning with i and ending with j such that for every pair of adjacent agents there exists a direct link and each agent appears only once in the sequence. We let $t(ij)$ denote the number of direct links in the shortest path between agents i and j . A *cycle* is formed by adding the link ij to a path between agents i and j . A *complete cycle* is a cycle where all the agents that belong on the cycle are connected with each other. An *empty cycle* is a cycle that there are no links between any two agents that belong on the cycle and are not adjacent.

For any network g we let $C(g)$ denote the set of all distinct connected subgraphs and $D(g)$ the set of all isolated nodes. Then $g = (\cup_{g' \in C(g)} g') \cup D(g)$. We let g'^N denote that the subgraph g' is complete.⁹

For any player i we define $T_k^i = \{j : t(ij) = k\}$, that is the set of agents with a shortest distance from agent i equal to k . Let $|T_k^i|$ denote the cardinality of the set. Then we have $\sum_{k=1}^{n-1} |T_k^i| = n - 1$. Notice that $|T_1^i|$ is equal to the *degree* of node i .

⁹Notice that there is a distinction between a complete cycle and a complete connected subgraph. An agent on a cycle path can be linked to an agent that does not belong to the cycle path. This is not allowed in the latter case.

Next, we define the benefits and costs from network participation. With probability θ one of the nodes of the network is hit by a shock. Given that all nodes are hit by a shock with the same probability, the unconditional probability that a node is hit by a shock is equal to $\frac{\theta}{n}$.¹⁰ Agents derive benefit b from each direct link as long as one of the following two conditions holds: Either the network is not hit by a shock or the network is hit by the shock but they are not connected, neither directly nor indirectly, to the agent hit by the shock. There is no benefit from indirect links. The cost to an agent of being hit by a shock is equal to $c < 1$. Other agents of the network will suffer losses only if they are connected to the agent who is hit by the shock (they have to belong to the same connected graph). Suppose that agent j is hit by a shock. For any agent i connected to agent j this indirect cost is given by $\delta^{t(ij)}c$, where $0 < \delta < 1$; thus, the cost is declining with the number of links in the shortest path between the two agents.

Suppose that $g' \in C(g)$ and let $|g'|$ denote the cardinality of g' . Then, the expected net payoff $v_i(g', N)$ of agent $i \in g'$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} v_i(g', n) &= \left(1 - \frac{|g'_i|\theta}{n}\right) |T_1^i| b - \frac{\theta}{n} c (1 + \delta |T_1^i| + \dots + \delta^{n-1} |T_{n-1}^i|) \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{|g'_i|\theta}{n}\right) |T_1^i| b - \frac{\theta}{n} c (1 + \sum_{k=1}^{n-1} \delta^k |T_k^i|) \end{aligned}$$

The first term is equal to the expected benefit derived from belonging in a subset of the network g represented by a connected subgraph g' . The subgraph has $|g'|$ nodes and thus the probability that one of the corresponding agents is hit by a shock is equal to $\frac{|g'|\theta}{n}$. As long as no agent that belongs to the subgraph is hit by the shock agent i will derive a benefit b from each of the direct links where the total number of these links is equal to $|T_1^i|$. The second term is equal to the corresponding expected costs. Each agent fails with probability $\frac{\theta}{n}$. When an agent who belongs to the subgraph is hit by the shock all agents suffer a loss that is equal to c times a discount factor that depends on the shortest distance of the agent from the one hit by the shock. Thus, costs due to contagion rise as the distance from the agent hit by the shock declines.

2.1. Stability

As in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we use the notion of *pair-wise stability* to allow us to make predictions about the types of networks that are likely to form. The formation of a new link requires the approval of both agents forming the link. But any players can sever a link unilaterally. This is a relatively weak notion of stability given that, as we will see below, allows for stable networks where every participant would prefer to sever all links simultaneously. In Section 4, we discuss alternative notions of stability where such cases would be eliminated. Still, the notion of pair-wise stability by sufficiently restricting the set of stable networks allows us to make interesting predictions. Moreover, as Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) note pairwise stability is independent of any particular dynamic process through which the network is formed.

¹⁰In Section 4, we discuss alternative specifications of the distribution of shocks.

Definition 1 A network, g , is stable if no agent i prefers to sever a link, and no pair of agents i and j prefers to form link ij .

The following result addresses the two benchmark cases.¹¹

Lemma 1 (a) if $(1 - \frac{2\theta}{n})b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c$ then the empty network is stable, and
(b) if $(1 - \theta)b > \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c$ then the complete network, g^N , is stable.

Corollary 1 If

$$(1 - \theta)b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c < \left(1 - \frac{2\theta}{n}\right)b \quad (1)$$

then neither the complete network nor the empty network are stable.

Our next result shows that stable networks always exist. In particular, as in Blume *et al.* (2011), we will show that we can always construct stable networks that consist of disjoint connected subgraphs. Then, we will go one step further and show that any stable network has that structure.

Proposition 1 Stable networks always exist and consist of disjoint complete subgraphs.

Example 1 Let $n = 9$, $\delta = 0.9$, $b = 5$, and $c = 1$. Then the network comprised of two complete subgraphs of sizes 5 and 4, respectively, is stable (see Figure 2.1).¹²

Proposition 1 has identified some sufficient results for stability but by no means are necessary.¹³ Even if a network might not be stable in the presence of isolated agents might be so in their absence. For example, a subgraph of size, say m' might not be stable if there are isolated agents, however, it might be stable if the smallest size complete connected subgraph in the network exceeds some minimum value. An implication of the last comment is that a multiplicity of stable networks is almost certain.

Remark 1 As we mentioned above pair-wise stability is a very weak concept. For example, the stability condition for complete networks given in Proposition 1 might hold even if the expected payoff of all agents is negative and thus they would prefer to be isolated. This is because from the moment that the network is complete the net benefit of breaking a single link can be negative even if the agent can be better off had been able to sever all links at once. However, we can eliminate such networks if we restrict our attention to the (very realistic) case where the starting point of every network is the empty network (all

¹¹All proofs are presented in the Appendix.

¹²Notice that (A2) in the proof given in the Appendix is satisfied for these parameter values. In addition, we need to ensure that no agent belonging to the size 4 subgraph would like to link with an agent belonging to the size 5 subgraph. The expected payoff from creating the new link is given by

$$(1 - \theta)4b - \frac{\theta}{9}c(1 + 4\delta + 4\delta^2)$$

which is less than the expected payoff from not creating the link given by (A1) for $n = 9$ and $m = 4$.

¹³See A3 in the proof of the result in the Appendix.



Figure 2.1: A Stable Network ($n = 9$, $\delta = 0.9$, $\theta = 1/3$, $b = 5$, $c = 1$)

agents are isolated). Under this restriction we can provide an upper bound on the size of subgraphs that can be parts of stable networks. Define $m^{**}(n)$ as the maximum value of m such that the following inequalities hold $\left(1 - \frac{(m+1)\theta}{n}\right) b \geq \frac{\theta}{n} c (\delta + (m-1)\delta^2)$. Thus, m^{**} is equal to the largest size of fully connected subgraph that an isolated agent would wish to join and thus sets an upper bound for the size of such subgraphs. Notice that the lower bound can be an isolated agent. To see this suppose that $m^{**} = n - 1$. In that case, one stable network consists of a completely connected subgraph of size $n - 1$ and an isolated agent.

Next, we show that any stable network consists of disjoint fully connected subgraphs. We first show that completeness is necessary for stability.

Proposition 2 *Any incomplete connected subgraph is not stable.*

Then, the following result follows immediately from Propositions 1 and 2.

Corollary 2 *Stable networks exist and each stable network consists of a collection of connected subgraphs.*

Stable networks respond to a trade-off between large size structures that bring more benefits to participants and small size structures that protect them from shocks. Given that indirect connections do not confer any benefits but are still potentially harmful they are absent in stable networks. The small size of hunter-gatherer societies might have indeed protected them against epidemics as the small size of resistance groups protects them against infiltration. In contrast, when the expected costs of contagion are low relative to the benefits of new connections the formation of large complete networks becomes possible.

For example, despite the losses in welfare resulting from the transmission of macroeconomic shocks there is still a tendency for expanding globalization by opening international borders to allow for the movement of goods and services, inputs in production and financial capital.

2.2. *Ex Ante* Efficiency vs *Ex Post* Systemic Losses

Up to this point we have been focusing on the types of network structures that are more likely to form. Now we turn our attention to relative performance. For the types of networks that we are interested there are two potentially interesting ways of measuring performance. The first one is having a measure of *ex ante* performance as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) who used the sum of expected utilities of network participants. The second way provides a measure of *ex post* performance by focusing on the magnitude of potential systemic losses after a shock on the network. Clearly, these losses are minimized by not having any links at all, that is all agents are isolated, $|D(g)| = n$. Such a measure ignores the benefits of creating networks in the first place. Nevertheless, such a measure can be beneficial to policymakers who are interested in minimizing the damage from contagion. With that in mind, we are going to identify among all stable networks the one that minimizes *ex post* losses.

Definition 2 A network g^* is *ex ante* efficient if it maximizes the sum of the payoffs of all agents:¹⁴

$$g^* = \arg \max_g \sum_{i=1}^n v_i(g, n) = \arg \max_g \sum_{g' \in C(g)} \sum_{i \in g'} v_i(g', n) - |D(g)| \frac{\theta}{n} c$$

Proposition 3 Efficient networks are such that every $g' \in C(g)$ is complete.

Corollary 3 Efficient networks are stable.

The expected payoff of an agent i belonging to one of the complete subgraphs of size m is given by $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})(m-1)b - \frac{\theta}{n}c(1 + (m-1)\delta)$. By maximizing this payoff with respect to m we can find the size of a completely connected subgraph \hat{m} that offers the maximum expected payoff to its members.¹⁵ Setting the f.o.c. equal to 0 and solving for m we get:

$$\hat{m} = \left(1 + \frac{n}{\theta} - \frac{c\delta}{b}\right) / 2$$

Notice that for a fixed size, n , of the network, the higher is the probability that the network will be hit by a shock the lower is the size of the optimal subgraph. If $n \bmod \hat{m} = 0$ then the network consisting of completely connected subgraphs of size \hat{m} is the one that maximizes *ex ante* efficiency. If $n \bmod \hat{m} > 0$ then not all agents will be receiving the same payoff

¹⁴Notice that the expected payoff of each $i \in D(g)$ is equal to $-\frac{\theta}{n}c$. This expression cancels out in all our derivations with only exceptions those in the last section where we introduce aggregate externalities. For this reason we opted to keep it rather making an *ad hoc* introduction later in the paper.

¹⁵Given that \hat{m} is probably not an integer we need to compare the payoffs of subgraphs of sizes equal to the first integer higher than \hat{m} with the payoffs of subgraphs of sizes equal to the first integer lower than \hat{m} . We will ignore this complication

and the most efficient network might not feature subgraphs of size \hat{m} . However, for high values θ , c and δ or low values of b , \hat{m} will be small relatively to n in which case it is more likely that the efficient network mainly consists of subgraphs of size \hat{m} .

Next, we consider the relationship between stability and systemic losses. Clearly, the magnitude of systemic losses following a shock decline as the size of subgraphs gets smaller. Therefore, we are looking for the smallest fully connected subgraph that is stable when all other subgraphs have the same size.¹⁶ Denote the size of such subgraph by \check{m} . If the following inequality holds an agent belonging to a fully connected subgraph of size \check{m} would prefer not to link with another agent belonging to another similar subgraph:

$$\left(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n}\right)(m-1)b - \frac{\theta}{n}c(1 + (m-1)\delta) > \left(1 - \frac{2m\theta}{n}\right)mb - \frac{\theta}{n}c(1 + m\delta + (m-1)\delta^2)$$

The left-hand side is equal to the expected payoff from being part of a completely connected subgraph of size m . If the agent links with an agent in another similar subgraph the size of the new network will double and thus the probability that the subgraph will be hit by a shock also doubles. There is the additional benefit b from the extra link but also there are additional costs. There is an additional expected cost $\frac{\theta}{n}c\delta$ related to the new link and an additional expected cost $\frac{\theta}{n}c(m-1)\delta^2$ from the new indirect links. \check{m} is the smallest value of m such that the above inequality is satisfied. In that case a network consisting of fully connected subgraphs of size \check{m} is stable.

Example 2 Let $n = 6$, $\delta = 1$, $b = 1$, $c = 7$, and $\theta = \frac{1}{2}$. Then $\hat{m} = 3$. The above inequality is satisfied for $m = 2$ but not for $m = 1$ and thus we have $\check{m} = 2$. Notice that this example also trivially satisfies the stability condition for the complete network.

The above example identifies a tension between stability, efficiency and the size of systemic losses. The observation that stability can be satisfied with networks that are much larger than those that maximize efficiency is not necessarily due to the notion of stability that we use. When agents make decisions about forming or breaking a link they ignore the negative impact that these decisions have on the payoffs of other agents. This negative externality implies that agents would tend to form too many links relative to the number of links of the efficient network.¹⁷

3. Directed Networks

Up to this point we have treated symmetrically two agents forming a link. In our model the paths formed by the links of the network capture the path of contagion following a shock. Thus far, we have allowed the flows to follow both directions defined by a link. After a link is formed when any one of the two agents is hit by a shock then the other agent also suffers losses. However, in many applications contagion flows only in one direction which depends on the nature of the relationship between the two agents. For example, for any two linked banks in a banking network there is a lender bank and a borrower bank.

¹⁶Once more, we need to do a bit more work when n is not divisible by that particular size.

¹⁷As Acemoglu *et al.* (2014) show in financial markets ignoring this external effect leads to overlending.

When the borrower bank is hit by a shock and is unable to meet its obligations to the lender bank the latter also suffers a loss. The lender bank might also play the role of a borrower bank in another link in which case the shock can be further transmitted.¹⁸

We will use directed links to capture these one way flows. In what follows ij captures not only the fact that agents i and j are linked but also that shocks are transmitted from agent i to agent j . Graphically, there will be an arrow between nodes i and j pointing at node j . Using the new interpretation of ij we can define, *directed walks*, *directed paths* and *directed cycles* using the definitions for walks, paths and cycles offered in the last section. $t(ij)$ now denotes the shortest directed path from i to j .¹⁹ We let $T(in)_k^i = \{j : t(ji) = k\}$ denote the set of agents with a shortest distance to agent i equal to k and $T(out)_k^i = \{j : t(ij) = k\}$ denote the set of agents with a shortest distance from agent i equal to k . Notice that the cardinality of these sets for $k = 1$ are the *in-degree* and the *out-degree* of node i , respectively. When there is no path leading from agent i to agent j we set $t(ij) \approx \infty$. Lastly, a *Hamiltonian path* is a directed path that visits each node exactly once while a *Hamiltonian cycle* is obtained from a Hamiltonian path by adding the link from the last node to the first node.

We define the benefits and costs from participation in directed networks in a similar way as we have done for undirected networks. As above, the unconditional probability that an agent is hit by a shock is equal to $\frac{\theta}{n}$. As long as there is no agent hit by a shock each agent obtains a benefit b from each direct link irrespectively of the link's direction.²⁰ As above, an agent hit by a shock suffers cost c . The only difference is that in directed networks other agents of the network will suffer losses only if they are connected to the agent who is hit by the shock by a directed path. Say agent j is hit by a shock. For any agent i connected to agent j this indirect cost is given by $\delta^{t(ji)}c$, where $0 < \delta < 1$; thus, as above the cost is declining with the number of links in the shortest path between the two agents. The loss of benefits that each agent suffers following any shock it will depend on the connectedness of the network. When agent j is hit by a shock all links located on directed paths beginning with agent j are affected and the corresponding benefits are lost for both agents of each link. Consider the network $g'(j)$ obtained from the original network g after we have eliminated all affected links. Each agent will keep the benefits from all their remaining direct links in either direction. Then we can write the expected payoff function of agent i from participating in the original network g as:

$$v_i(g, n) = \left(1 - \frac{|g|\theta}{n}\right) |T_1^i| b - \frac{\theta}{n} \left(c - |T_1^i|_{g'(i)} b + \sum_{j(\neq i) \in g'(i)} \left(\delta^{t(ji)} c - |T_1^i|_{g'(j)} b\right)\right)$$

where $|T_1^i| = |T(in)_1^i| + |T(out)_1^i|$ and $|T_1^i|_{g'(j)}$ is defined in a similar way for the network obtained after agent j is hit by a shock. The costs are calculated as in the case for undirected networks but now only those paths leading to i are included. Notice that for all agents such that there is no directed path leading from them to agent i , $\delta^{t(ji)} \approx 0$.

¹⁸In many real world networks some links can be bi-directional. In order to keep the analysis simple we ignore such links.

¹⁹Keep in mind that now it is most likely that $t(ji) \neq t(ij)$.

²⁰The idea here is that both agents benefit for forming the link. For example, in banking networks both the lending and the borrowing bank benefit from the loan.

The following example describes the expected net payoffs obtained from being part of a complete directed networks of size 3. Understanding these simple networks is crucial for the general analysis of directed networks of any size greater than 3.

Example 3 Suppose that $n = 3$ (i, j, k). There are two possible types of complete directed networks (see, Figure 3.1)

(a) *Cycle*: The links are ij, jk, ki . The network is symmetric as all agents have exactly the same net expected payoff given by:

$$v(g, 3) = (1 - \theta) 2b - \frac{\theta}{3} (c + \delta c + \delta^2 c)$$

In this case when any agent is hit by a shock all benefits are lost and all agents will suffer losses.

(b) *Complete Order*:²¹ The links are ij, ik, jk . The net expected payoffs are given by:

$$v_i(g, 3) = (1 - \theta) 2b - \frac{\theta}{3} (c - 4b)$$

$$v_j(g, 3) = (1 - \theta) 2b - \frac{\theta}{3} (c + \delta c - 3b)$$

$$v_k(g, 3) = (1 - \theta) 2b - \frac{\theta}{3} (c + 2\delta c - 3b)$$

When agent i is hit by a shock all links are affected, when agent j is hit by a shock only link jk is affected and when agent k is hit by a shock none of the links are affected. Remember that agents keep receiving benefits from links that are not affected.²²

The above example illustrates how small changes in connectivity can have large aggregate and distributional effects.

3.1. Stability

Definition 3 A network, g , is stable if no agent i prefers to sever a link, and no pair of agents i and j prefer to form either link ij or link ji .

The definition of stability is similar as that used in the case of undirected networks. The only difference is that now stability requires that any pair of agents not linked do not want to form a link in any of the two directions.

Lemma 2 Suppose that $(1 - \theta) b + \frac{\theta(n-1)}{n} b > \frac{\theta}{n} \delta c$. Then the empty network is not stable.

²¹A complete directed graph of size n is a *complete order* if we can label the nodes v_1, \dots, v_n such that there is a link from v_i to v_j , link ij , if and only if $j < i$. Notice there are links from v_n to all other nodes and there are links to v_1 from all other nodes. A complete directed graph is also known as a *tournament*.

²²In a banking network after a bank is hit by a shock, its debtors (other banks that have borrowed from it) still need to meet their obligations.



Figure 3.1: (a) $n = 3$ Cycle; (b) $n = 3$ Complete Order


When the empty network is not stable a link ij is always beneficial to agent i (the origin of the link). In contrast, whether the link is beneficial to agent j it will depend on the distribution of shortest paths that include link ij . If any agent along these paths is hit by a shock agent j will also suffer a loss. In contrast, the only benefit that agent j obtains from such paths is from the link to agent i . Below we will show that small changes in this trade-off can have large consequences for the structure of the network and, hence, for aggregate losses due to shocks. For making these comparisons we define an agent as *critical* if when after this agent is hit by a shock all links of the network are affected. We begin by looking at the extreme case where any shortest path larger than 1 is unstable.

Proposition 4 *Suppose that the empty network is not stable and $(1 - \theta)b + \frac{\theta(n-2)}{n}b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 + \delta)c$. Then the only stable network is a complete order tournament.*

In the case of the above proposition there is a single critical agent associated with the single Hamiltonian path (see, Figure 3.2) For the above result, we have imposed the constraint that directed paths of length two are not stable. Next, we relax the constraint by allowing directed paths of length two but not directed paths of length three. The following result identifies conditions such that there exists a Hamiltonian cycle; that is every agent is critical.²³

Proposition 5 *Suppose that (a) the empty network is not stable, (b) $(1 - \theta)b + \frac{\theta(n-2)}{n}b > \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 + \delta)c$, (c) $(1 - \theta)b + \frac{\theta(n-3)}{n}b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 + \delta(1 + \delta))c$, and (d) $c > \frac{2b}{\delta^2}$. Then for odd*

²³There is quite a lot of work trying to establish the maximum number of hamiltonian paths and hamiltonian cycles in tournaments (e.g. Adler *et al.*, 2001). It is well known that the number can be very large. Here, we are interested in the existence of such paths and cycles when we impose restrictions on the maximum allowable shortest path.




Note: Hamiltonian path

Figure 3.2: A Complete Order for $n = 5$

values of n there exist stable tournaments where every agent is critical and for even values of n there exist stable tournaments where $n - 1$ agents are critical.

According to Proposition 4 when chains (shortest path greater than one) are too costly the only connected stable network is the complete order tournament where there is exactly one critical player. In Proposition 5 we have shown that when we allow for shortest paths equal to two then the conclusions change dramatically. There are stable tournaments where every agent is critical because there exists a Hamiltonian cycle (see, Figure 3.3). Any shock will affect all agents. Of course, the complete order tournament is still stable as there are many other tournaments with the number of critical agents ranging from one to n . In fact, it might be possible to construct stable networks that are not connected but which are comprised of sets of disjoint complete subgraphs. The reasoning behind this argument is based on what we know from our results related to undirected networks. However, there is a crucial difference. When the networks are directed the only network with isolated agents that can be stable is the empty network. As long as the empty network is not stable then any agent belonging to a connected subgraph would prefer to link with an isolated agent (in either direction but an outgoing link would be preferable) and any isolated player would definitely prefer to link with a connected subgraph as long as the link is outgoing (the agent might also prefer an incoming link).

The last observation suggests that the formation of stable networks that are not connected are less likely. Furthermore, our results for undirected networks also suggest that the only stable networks are complete. We have already shown that this is the case when



Note: A Hamiltonian cycle

Figure 3.3: Hamiltonian Cycle for $n = 5$

the shortest path cannot exceed one. It follows that relaxing this constraint should not alter our conclusion that incomplete but connected networks are not stable.²⁴ However, the real-life directed economic networks that have the general structure of our model (e.g. input-output and financial) are connected but incomplete. Below we consider a simple extension of our basic model that will restrict the connectivity of stable structures.

3.2. Aggregate Externalities

Up to this point, we have assumed that the cost c is independent of the number of agents that are affected by the shock. However, both the macroeconomics and the financial economics literatures suggest that there exist mechanisms generating aggregate externalities that exacerbate the impact of shocks on each market participant. We capture these externalities by allowing the cost associated with a shock to be increasing in the number of affected agents, \hat{n} . Thus, we now write $c(\hat{n})$, where $c(1) > 0$ and $c' > 0$. The following result has important implications for the stability of the network.

Proposition 6 *Suppose that $c'(n) \rightarrow \infty$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$ and $\delta \approx 1$. Then there exists n^* such that in any complete network with $n \geq n^*$ there are agents with negative expected payoff.*

²⁴We have not proved that any subgraph has to be complete for the case of directed networks, which automatically would also include connected networks, but we have argued that if such stable networks exist are unlikely to be formed.




Figure 3.4: A connected but incomplete network, $n = 4$

The above result does not imply that these complete networks are not pair-wise stable as breaking a single link might not necessarily increase the expected payoff. However, as we explain in Section 4, this will not be the case if we introduce a stronger notion of stability where agents are allowed to brake any number of links.

Moreover, any network with isolated agents cannot be stable. This is because creating a link directed from the isolated agent to any agent in the network will increase the payoff of both agents. Thus, stable networks are very likely to be connected but incomplete (see, Figure 3.4). In this example, if $c(4)$ is sufficiently high then agents i and k will prefer not to link in either direction as in that case a failure of the agent from whom the link originated would affect the whole network, thus increasing the cost to $c(4)$. As the network stands the maximum number of agents that will be affected after a shock is 3 in which case the cost will be equal to $c(3)$.

The general effect of aggregate externalities is to decrease the average number of agents that can be affected by a shock. However, that number can be small even in networks that are connected but not comple. Furthermore, as the above example suggests such networks can be asymmentric a standard feature of real-life networks.

4. Final Remarks

In this section, we consider the implications for our main results of changing some of the main assumptions of our model.

Stability The notion of pairwise stability that we have used throughout this paper is weak. In some cases it allows for stable networks that would not survive a stronger notion while in other cases has complicated the proofs of some of the results.

Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we have assumed that agents cannot break more than one link. Alternatively, consider the case where agents can break as many links as they like. One implication of this change is that the proof of part (cii) of Lemma 5 (Appendix) can be greatly simplified. While all other steps of the proof are straightforward, this particular case is not and only arises because our stability notion does not allow agent k to break both links on the cycle. Even if the expected payoff from retaining both links is negative there is no benefit in severing only one of them. Under the alternative notion of stability k would break both links thus violating the supposition that the subgraph is stable and completing the proof at that point.

The notion of pairwise instability might allow stable networks where each agent's next expected payoff is less than $-\frac{\theta}{n}c$. In contrast, such networks would not be stable had we allowed agents to break more than one link. We identified such a case above when we considered the impact of aggregate externalities on network formation. By breaking a single link an agent loses the benefit of having the link without significantly reducing the cost given that the probability that the network is hit by a shock has remained the same.

Discounting We have introduced discounting (decay) in our model to capture the possibility that costs related to shocks are decreasing as the shortest distance from the agent hit by the shock goes up. Further, to keep the exposition simple we have followed other examples in the literature (see, Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Watts, 2002) and have assumed geometric discounting. Our results still hold if we allow for a weakly decreasing decay function.

Distribution of shocks We have only allowed shocks that directly affect only one agent. Allowing for multiple shocks, either independent or correlated, would definitely affect quantitatively our results but not qualitatively. In all cases multiplicity of shocks would increase the parameter space within which the empty network is stable. For the case of undirected graphs it would also decrease the size of stable disjoint fully connected subgraphs. For the case of directed graphs it could make more likely the formation of networks that are not fully connected.

Nodes and links In many interesting applications of directed graphs links can be bidirectional. For example, in financial networks two institutions can hold claims against each other. Generally, bankruptcy procedures do not allow the bilateral clearance of such claims following the failure of an institution as it would violate priority rules (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001). Thus, allowing for bidirectional links would not fundamentally affect our analysis. We only observe that as the number of such links increases the network would behave more as an undirected one.

Moreover, in many applications of directed graphs (financial and macroeconomic networks) links and nodes can be weighted. Weights on links would capture the size of the

transaction while weights on nodes would capture the size of the institution and thus potentially the probability of being hit by a shock. Introducing weights it is a potentially interesting area for future research.

Dynamics In the present work, we have concentrated on the properties of networks that in principle could be formed but we have ignored the dynamics of network formation and thus potentially the likelihood of these networks being formed. Our main objective in this paper has been to extend the analysis of Blume *et al.* (2011) to networks with directed links. The main message of the paper does not depend on any particular dynamics. However, such dynamics can be important when we consider particular applications.²⁵ Moreover, as we have already argued above, we might be able to eliminate some of the less appealing stable networks (e.g. those where each agent's expected net payoff is negative) as dynamically unstable.

5. Appendix (Proofs)

5.1. Proof of Lemma 1

(a) Consider the empty network and any pair of agents i and j . The probability that one of the two agents is hit by a shock is equal to $\frac{\theta}{n}$ in which case, if the link has been formed, the agent not hit by the shock will bear an indirect loss δc . With probability $1 - \frac{2\theta}{n}$, none of the two agents is hit by a shock in which case each agent obtains benefit b . Thus, if $(1 - \frac{2\theta}{n})b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c$ the two agents will decide not to form the link.

(b) The payoff to an agent i who is part of the complete network is given by:

$$v_i(g^N, n) = (1 - \theta)(n - 1)b - \frac{\theta}{n}c(1 + (n - 1)\delta)$$

Agent i by severing a link, say with agent j , loses benefit b when there is no shock on the network and this happens with probability $1 - \theta$. Given that $t(ij) = 2$ by severing the link the expected cost of participating in the network for agent i has been reduced by $\frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c$. The proof follows from comparing benefits and losses. \square

5.2. Proof of Proposition 1

We will prove the proposition in two steps. We will first show that the existence of a stable complete subgraph is sufficient for the existence of at least one stable network. Then we will show that a stable complete subgraph exists.

Lemma 3 *If there exists a stable complete subgraph g^N then there also exists at least one stable network.*

²⁵Predictions will not only depend on the structure of the dynamic model but also on the tradeoff between a more detailed characterization of equilibrium networks when agents are myopic (e.g. Bala and Goyal, 2000) and a less detailed characterization with farsighted agents (e.g. Dutta *et al.*, 2005).

Proof Let $|g'^N| = m$. Suppose that $n \bmod m = v$ and consider the network with $\frac{n-v}{m}$ complete subgraphs each with m nodes and 1 complete subgraph of size v . To prove the proposition we need to show that the complete subgraph of size v is stable, given that all other subgraphs are of size m and thus, by supposition, stable. The expected payoff of an agent i belonging to one of the complete subgraphs of size m is given by:

$$v_i(g'^N, m, n) = \left(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n}\right) (m-1)b - \frac{\theta}{n}c(1 + (m-1)\delta) \quad (\text{A1})$$

One of the necessary conditions for the stability of the subgraph is that agent i does not want to sever a link. The new payoff of an agent who severs a link is given by $\left(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n}\right) (m-2)b - \frac{\theta}{n}(c + (m-2)c^2 + c^3)$, and thus the stability condition, which by supposition holds, is given by:

$$\left(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n}\right) b - \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c > 0 \quad (\text{A2})$$

Next, we consider the stability of a complete subgraph of size v . The stability of the rest of the subgraphs implies that none of the agents belonging to the other subgraphs are willing to link with any agent belonging to another subgraph. In order to complete the proof we need to show that none of the agents in the complete subgraph of size v prefers to sever a link, which follows from the fact that the left-hand side of (4) is decreasing in m and the inequality $m > v$. \square

Suppose that (1) holds; that is neither the empty network nor the complete network are stable. Clearly, if this is not the case existence of stable networks is trivially satisfied. Then the lemma implies that it is sufficient to show that a stable complete subgraph exists. The existence of a stable complete subgraph of cardinality m requires that two conditions are satisfied: (a) no agent prefers to break a link, that is $\left(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n}\right) b > \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c$, and (b) that no isolated agent would like to join the graph, that is $\left(1 - \frac{(m+1)\theta}{n}\right) b < \frac{\theta}{n}c(\delta + (m-1)\delta^2)$. (Stability also requires that none of the agents belonging to the subgraph would like to be linked with agents outside the graph but this constraint does not bind. Further, if no isolated agent would like to join the complete subgraph then this will also be the case for any other agent belonging to any subgraph as joining an even larger network always decreases expected payoff.) Then it suffices to show that if (1) holds then there exists $m \in [2, n-1]$ such that the following inequalities are satisfied:

$$\left(1 - \frac{(m+1)\theta}{n}\right) b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c < \left(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n}\right) b \quad (\text{A3})$$

The proof of Proposition 1 follows from the observations that for $m = 2$ the second inequality is satisfied by (1) and for $m = n-1$ the first inequality is satisfied by (1). \square

5.3. Proof of Proposition 2

We prove the following results:

Lemma 4 *If a complete subgraph of size m is not stable because agents would prefer to sever a link then any connected subgraph of size m is also not stable because agents would prefer to sever a link.*


Proof We need to consider two cases:

- (a) A broken link does to alter the size of the subgraph: Form (A2) we know that instability implies that $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})b < \frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c$. The left hand side is equal to the expected loss from breaking a link which does not depend on the structure of the subgraph as long as its size is equal to m . When the original graph is not complete then it must be the case that for no agent the expected benefit of breaking a link can be lower than $\frac{\theta}{n}\delta(1 - \delta)c$ (the expected benefit corresponding to breaking a link of a complete subgraph) and there must be at least one agent whose expected benefit must be higher. Similarly, expected costs because of the direct link decline by at least $\frac{\theta}{n}\delta c$ but now they can decline even more because the shortest path to other agents has increased. This is because after the break of a link in the complete network the shortest path between the two corresponding agents has increased to 2 and when the subgraph is not complete the shortest path can be even higher.
- (b) A broken link decreases the size of the subgraph: The lowest expected payoff that an agent can gain be severing a link is when the other agent is not connected to anyone else. This is because, first, the probability of being affected by a shock depends on the size of the subgraph which in this case only declines by 1, and, second, there are no additional benefits from cost reduction given that the shortest path to other agents is not affected. For such an agent the expected benefit from participating in the network prior to the break of the link is equal to $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})(m - 1)b$ and the corresponding benefit after the break is equal to $(1 - \frac{(m-1)\theta}{n})(m - 2)b$. There is also a reduction in expected costs by $\frac{\theta}{n}\delta c$. These conditions imply that the agent would prefer to break the link if $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})b - \frac{\theta}{n}(m - 2)b - \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c < 0$ which is implied by the instability condition of the complete subgraph. \square

Lemma 5 *Consider a complete subgraph of size m where no agent prefers to sever a link. Then any incomplete connected subgraph of size m is not stable.*

Proof Notice that the fact that no agent prefers to sever a link when the subgraph is complete implies that (A2) holds. Consider any incomplete connected subgraph of size m where no agent prefers to sever a link. (If this is not the case the lemma holds.) Then there exist agents i, j, k such that $ik \in g', kj \in g', ij \notin g'$. We will show that either agents i and j would like to form link ij or that there exists another pair of agents taht are not linked but would prefer to be linked. We focus on the decision of agent i given that the decision of agent j is symmetric. We need to consider three cases:


- (a) j is a terminal node: agent i 's expected payoff from creating a link with agent j is given by the left-hand side of (A2) and therefore is positive.



Note: S_1 and S_2 denote subsets of the subgraph

Figure 5.1: Proof of Lemma 5 (b)

- (b) Breaking link jk would divide the original subgraph into two distinct connected subgraphs: Agent i 's expected payoff from creating link ij is higher than agent k 's expected payoff from maintaining kj . This is because agent k by breaking kj could benefit, first, from reducing the costs due to all indirect links through agent j , and, second, from reducing the size of the subgraph and thus the likelihood of being affected by a shock. In contrast, agent i 's decision does not affect the size of the subgraph. Moreover by creating the link ij the only additional cost is that the shortest path to all indirect links is reduced by 1. (See, Figure 5.1)
- (c) In the original subgraph there exists at least one cycle such that the subgraph remains connected after link jk is broken and jk belongs to the cycle. Agent i 's net expected payoff from linking with agent j depends on the distance from only those agents from whom the shortest path includes link jk . (The shortest paths from all other agents is not affected by creating the link ij .) We need to consider two cases:
- (i) ik also belongs to the cycle (by definition the cycle is not complete given that link ij does not exist): Consider all agents from whom the shortest paths to i after linking with j are through the link ij . Then the shortest paths of these agents to agent k are through link kj . (The reverse is not true as there are agents whose shortest paths from agent i are not through agent j - other way around the cycle - but their shortest path to agent k is through agent j .) From the above it follows that if agent k prefers to maintain link kj then agent i will prefer to create link ij . (See, Figure 5.2)




Note: S_1 and S_2 denote subsets of the subgraph;
 denotes a path between S_1 and S_2

Figure 5.2: Proof of Lemma 5 (ci)

(ii) ik does not belong to the cycle but jk does: Suppose that the cycle is empty. If the number of links in this empty cycle is odd then the arguments used in part (i) above still hold as what matters is only the shortest path. If the number of links in the cycle is even then there exists an agent l such that there exist two (shortest) paths from agent k to agent l that are equal. (See, Figure 5.3 - there are two shortest paths from k to any node in S_2). In this case, the shortest path from k to l is not affected by the decision of k to break or to retain link jk . However, if link ij is created then the shortest path from agent i to agent l decreases by 1. Thus, in such case there is a possibility that while agent k prefers to retain link, agent i might prefer not to create link ij . However, given that the cycle is empty consider any three agents i', k', j' such that $i'k'$ and $j'k'$ belong to the cycle. By supposition these agents prefer not to break these links. Then, following the arguments so far, it must be the case that either agent i' prefers to create link $i'j'$ or there is another empty cycle such that $i'k'$ does not belong on the new cycle but $j'k'$ does. The proof of the lemma is completed with the observation that the size of the connected graph is finite. If the original cycle is not empty then the arguments used in part (i) still hold and agent i would prefer to link with agent j . \square

The proof of the Proposition follows from the above two results. \square



Note: S_1 and S_2 denote subsets of the subgraph

Figure 5.3: Proof of Lemma 5 (cii)

5.4. Proof of Proposition 3

The expected payoff of an agent i belonging to one of the complete subgraphs of size m is given by (A1). Subtracting $-\frac{\theta}{n}c$ and dividing by $m - 1$ we get $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})b - \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c$ which is equal to each agent's net expected payoff from each node. We need to consider two cases:

(a) $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})b - \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c \geq 0$: Consider any other connected subgraph of cardinality m that is not complete. From each directly linked node an agent gets exactly the same expected payoff as the one derived from being a member of a complete subgraph. The expected payoff derived from nodes not directly linked is negative due to connectivity. Thus the total payoff is maximized when the subgraph is complete.

(b) $(1 - \frac{m\theta}{n})b - \frac{\theta}{n}\delta c < 0$: In this case the net expected payoff received from each node of a complete graph is negative and clearly the payoffs of all agents would have been higher had they been isolated. \square

5.5. Proof of Corollary 3

As we argued above an agent cannot achieve a higher payoff by breaking a single link. It is also the case that an agent cannot achieve a higher payoff by forming a link. Suppose that this is not the case and can achieve a higher payoff by connecting with an isolated agent. But the new payoff would be exactly the same as the one that the agent would obtain from being in a complete subgraph of size $m + 1$. This would also be true for any other agent contradicting the assumption that the original network was efficient. \square

5.6. Proof of Lemma 2

Consider two isolated agents i and j . It suffices to consider the expected payoff of agent j from creating the link ij who suffers losses when any of the two agents is hit by a shock. The first term of the left-hand side of the inequality shows agent j 's expected payoff from creating the link in the absence of any shock. Agent j will lose the benefit of the link only when agent i is hit by a shock and, therefore, even when there is a shock on the network, with probability $\frac{\theta(n-1)}{n}$ the link remains intact and agent j obtains benefit b . The right hand side shows the net expected cost from creating the link conditional on one of the two agents is hit by a shock. Keep in mind that an isolated agent is also hit by a shock with probability $\frac{\theta}{n}$ and suffers a loss c . After the creation of the link this cost is still there, however, with probability $\frac{\theta}{n}$ agent i is hit by the shock and the expected loss to agent j equal to $\frac{\theta}{n}\delta c$. Thus, when the inequality holds both agents prefer to create the link. \square

5.7. Proof of Proposition 4

Consider three agents i, j, k and links ij and jk . The left-hand side of the inequality is equal to the expected payoff of agent k . Agent k will lose the benefit b from link jk when either agent i or agent j is hit by a shock (but not agent k). Thus, agent k will benefit from the link if either there is no shock (probability $1 - \theta$) or there is a shock but it does not affect the link (probability $\frac{\theta(n-2)}{n}$). The right-hand side of the inequality is equal to agent k 's net expected cost from keeping the link in which case suffers losses when either agent i or agent j is hit by a shock.

Lemma 6 *A directed cycle of three agents is not stable.*

Proof The expected net payoff of any agent who is part of a directed cycle of three agents is equal to

$$(1 - \theta) 2b + \frac{\theta(n-3)}{n} 2b - \frac{\theta}{n} (1 + \delta (1 + \delta)) c$$

Each agent benefits from two links as long as none of the three agents is hit by a shock. They suffer losses when any of the three agents is hit by a shock. Next, consider the benefit from breaking a link. Clearly, an agent who does that would break the incoming link. The expected payoff after the break of the link is given by

$$(1 - \theta) b + \frac{\theta(n-1)}{n} b - \frac{\theta}{n} c$$

As long as the agent is not hit by a shock the link remains intact. Moreover, there is a loss only when the agent is hit by a shock. Then, for the agent to prefer to keep the link the following inequality must hold:

$$(1 - \theta) b + \frac{\theta(n-5)}{n} b \geq \frac{\theta}{n} \delta (1 + \delta) c \tag{A4}$$

which by supposition is false. \square

Lemma 7 *All incomplete connected subgraphs are not stable.*

Proof Suppose that this is not the case. Consider an incomplete connected subgraph where there is no agent who prefers to sever a link. We will show that there exists at least one pair of agents that would like to form a link. From the above lemma we know that the only way to fully connect three agents together is by a complete order. We also know that we cannot have links ij and jk without also having link ik (if this is not the case then agent k would prefer to sever link jk). To complete the proof we need to demonstrate that any group of three agents is fully connected by a complete order. We need to examine two cases:

- (a) Consider three agents i, j, k and links ij and kj . Thus, both links are directed to agent j . Without any loss of generality, consider the creation of link ij . Agent j should agree to form the link unless there is another agent l and link li , but not link lj , in which case agent j will end up at the end of the path created by links li and ij . (Given that, by supposition, k did not prefer to sever the link ik this also implies the existence of link lk). But then consider the formation of the link lj . The only reason that agent j would prefer not to form this link is because there is another agent m and link ml . Given that the subgraph has a finite size we conclude that there is always a link that agent j would like to form and given that the proposed links are directed to agent j we have a contradiction.
- (b) Consider three agents i, j, k and links ij and ik . Thus, both links are directed from agent i . Without any loss of generality, consider the creation of link jk . Agent k should agree to form the link unless there is another agent l and link lj , but not link lk , in which case agent k will end up at the end of the path created by links lj and jk . But then consider the formation of the link lk . The only reason that agent k would prefer not to form this link is because there is another agent m and link ml . Given that the subgraph has a finite size we conclude that there is always a link that agent k would like to form and given that the proposed links are directed to agent k we have a contradiction.

The above results imply that any group of three agents in the subgraph form a complete order and thus the subgraph must be complete. \square

Harary and Moser (1966) have shown that any complete graph that does not have a three-agent cycle is a complete order. This implies that there is one agent who is critical for the subgraph. In order to complete the proof we are going to show that any complete subgraph of size less than n is not stable. There are two cases to consider:

(a) Isolated agents: Suppose that there exists an isolated agent and a complete order subgraph. A link directed from the isolated agent to the critical agent would increase the expected payoff of both agents.

(b) A disconnected group of complete order subgraphs: A link, in any direction, between the two critical agents would increase the expected payoff of both agents.

Thus, the only stable network is a complete order tournament. \square

5.8. Proof of Proposition 5

Inequality (b) states that the net expected payoff corresponding to a node at the end of a directed path of length two is positive. Inequality (c) states that the net expected payoff corresponding to a node at the end of a directed path of length three is negative. From Lemma 6 we know that inequality (b) is not sufficient for the existence of cycles of length three. Lemma 6 also identifies (A4) as a necessary condition for such cycles. Then as long as inequalities (c) and (A4) are jointly satisfied then cycles of length three are stable. This will be the case when inequality (d) holds. We will prove the proposition by construction:

(a) n is odd: Consider the complete directed network (tournament) where the in-degrees and the out-degrees of all nodes are equal to $\frac{n-1}{2}$. The adjacency matrix is given by

	1	2	3	...	$\frac{n-1}{2}$	$\frac{n-1}{2} + 1$	$\frac{n-1}{2} + 2$...	$n - 2$	$n - 1$	n
1	0	1	1	...	1	1	0	...	0	0	0
2	0	0	1	...	1	1	1	...	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	...	1	1	1	...	0	0	0
...
$\frac{n-1}{2}$	0	0	0	...	0	1	1	...	1	1	0
$\frac{n-1}{2} + 1$	0	0	0	...	0	0	1	...	1	1	1
$\frac{n-1}{2} + 2$	1	0	0	...	0	0	0	...	1	1	1
...
$n - 2$	1	1	1	...	0	0	0	...	0	1	1
$n - 1$	1	1	1	...	0	0	0	...	0	0	1
n	1	1	1	...	1	0	0	...	0	0	0

Thus, if we arrange the agents around a circle, there are links from each agent to the next $\frac{n-1}{2}$ agents. There are also links directed to each agent from the previous $\frac{n-1}{2}$. Given that, moving clockwise, there exists a link directed from each agent to the next one there is at least one Hamiltonian cycle (there are many). We also need to show that the shortest path between any two agents i and j does not exceed two. Consider the shortest path from j to i . There are two possibilities: If the link is ji then the shortest path is equal to one; if the link is ij then, by construction, there exists an agent l and links jl and li , so that the shortest path is equal to two.

(b) n is even: Consider any set of $n - 1$ agents and construct a completed subgraph as above. Next, create links directed from each agent in the subgraph to the isolated agent.

The only agent who is not critical is the agent who was isolated. This completes the proof. \square

5.9. Proof of Proposition 6

Any complete directed network has a Hamiltonian path (see Leighton and Dijk, 2010). Consider the expression $(1 - \theta)(n - 1)b - \frac{\theta}{n}c(n) \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \delta^i$. The first term is equal to the expected benefit derived by each agent in the complete network. The second term is equal to the lowest possible cost of an agent at the end of a Hamiltonian path (for some agents there might be alternative paths that are shorter and therefore the cost would be higher).

Thus, the expression shows the highest possible expected payoff of an agent at the end of the Hamiltonian path. The expression is decreasing in n which completes the proof. \square

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