Should Egalitarians Expropriate Philanthropists?

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Abstract
Wealthy individuals often voluntarily provide public goods that the poor also consume. Such philanthropy is perceived as legitimizing one’s wealth. Governments routinely exempt the rich from taxation on grounds of their charitable expenditure. We examine the normative logic of this exemption. We show that, rather than reducing it, philanthropy may aggravate absolute inequality in welfare achievement, while leaving the change in relative inequality ambiguous. Additionally, philanthropic preferences may increase the effectiveness of policies to redistribute income, instead of weakening them. Consequently, the general normative case for exempting the wealthy from expropriation, on grounds of their public goods contributions, appears dubious.

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Outline

1. Introduction
2. The Model
3. Inequality
4. Real Effects of Nominal Redistribution
5. Extensions
6. Conclusion

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1. INTRODUCTION

Andrew Mellon had been accused of being tardy in his tax payments. In 1937, Mellon decided to build the National Gallery of Art in Washington D.C., donating his private art collection to it. The Roosevelt administration lowered its tax demands. Should it instead have forced Mellon to pay up, and distributed the consequent tax revenue among the poor?¹

This normative question is general. Rich individuals often voluntarily contribute large amounts towards the provision of public goods that are intrinsically important for the well-being of poor individuals, but have limited impact on their incomes. Examples of such public goods that routinely acquire rich patrons include places of worship, ethnic festivals, literary and cultural activities, sports clubs, civic/neighborhood amenities (including parks, museums, theatres, community halls, libraries), facilities for scientific research, etc. Poor individuals often benefit from these public goods without having to incur any major expenditure, while rich donors claim large tax deductions on grounds of their contribution. These tax deductions in turn reduce the resources available for direct redistribution.

Facing a particular income distribution, suppose one agreed, for some normative reason, to support redistribution from the rich, provided they spend all their earnings on private consumption. Should one then oppose redistribution from equally wealthy individuals who spend part of their earnings on public consumption instead? There appears to be a surprising degree of consensus that one should. An important strand of conservative political thought seeks to legitimize large inequalities in income or wealth by emphasizing public functions performed by private wealth. At ethical, programmatic and propagandist levels, political formations on the right counter-pose ‘duty’ to ‘justice’, or private charity to large-scale redistribution.² Even governments on the left routinely provide large tax deductions for charitable contributions. Thus, even avowed egalitarians reveal a preference for compromise with inequality, conditional on the willingness of the rich to compromise their selfishness.

In recent years, this policy thrust has also become prominent in many developing countries. The earlier emphasis on state-organized redistribution of income and wealth has largely been supplanted by attempts to encourage the rich to voluntarily contribute to local public goods. While tax rates have been brought down and land reforms abandoned, private and corporate sponsorship for the provision and maintenance of local public goods is being increasingly encouraged. The explosive proliferation of charity intermediation professionals in developing countries is in part a reflection of this process.

¹ It is widely suggested that a deal was struck. Since then, Federal and State governments in the U.S. have come to encourage the wealthy to donate art to reduce tax liability as a matter of policy. See D’Arcy (2002).
² Benjamin Disraeli, the leading Conservative ideologue of 19th century Britain, argued that “the tenure of property should be the fulfilment of duty” (Scruton (2001, p.109)). Thus, Disraeli’s position, which echoed a core ethical principle of feudalism, justified wealth inequality provided the rich performed social functions, i.e., generated public goods in a broad sense, but not otherwise. A similar idea underlies the Gandhian view of property-ownership as trusteeship, as well as much of Catholic and Islamic social thought. Traditional political hierarchies in many countries base much of their ideological appeal on such notions of public function.
What, then, are the exact normative grounds for accepting philanthropy (in the sense of voluntary public goods provision) by the rich as a substitute for direct income redistribution?

Even in an unequal private consumption society, an egalitarian need not view redistribution as costless. Perverse incentive effects and bureaucratic waste can conceivably make some forms of redistribution excessive, in the sense of being inefficient, and Pareto efficiency can reasonably be considered a constraint that even egalitarians should satisfy. Additionally, an egalitarian may wish to balance the claims of other normative principles and objectives, such as ownership rights, procedural justice and social stability, against the claim of equality. Consequently, facing a significantly unequal distribution of income/wealth, an egalitarian need not advocate complete equalization. However, she is likely to argue that the set of efficient redistributive interventions that are consistent with an acceptable degree of satisfaction of other normative concerns is non-empty. Suppose an egalitarian recommended a certain amount of efficient redistribution from all rich individuals in a private consumption society. Suppose now that, ceteris paribus, some rich individuals in this society came to acquire philanthropic preferences. Should the egalitarian now recommend lower redistribution from such rich individuals? Notice that the costs of redistribution, in terms of perverse disincentive effects, bureaucratic waste, trade-offs with other normative objectives, etc., do not vary between the two situations; therefore these considerations do not have any bearing on our question. The only consideration that this thought experiment isolates is the effect of philanthropy by the rich.

The concrete policy context in which we pose our question involves a tax deduction for charitable contributions to public goods. The standard, Pigouvian, case for such a tax deduction is based on the idea that a balanced-budget tax-subsidy intervention can provide a corrective to the insufficiently low level of voluntary provision. The tax deduction on public contributions (in essence a subsidy) is to be funded by a lump-sum tax or a higher tax on income, wealth or private consumption. Consequently, the tax deduction will have no income effect, only a pure substitution effect. This substitution effect will increase private provision of public goods, making everybody better off.3

This text-book, pure substitution effect, case, only tells us that, given a normative decision to leave a certain amount of income with the rich, and redistribute the rest to the poor, Pareto efficiency dictates subsidizing the public expenditure of the rich via a tax on their wealth or private expenditure. It says nothing about whether the redistributive burden on the philanthropic rich should be greater than, equal to, or less than that on the selfish ones. In reality, tax deductions for public contributions typically make this redistributive component of the tax burden lighter for the former than the latter, since identically wealthy selfish and philanthropic individuals face identical tax rates on income or

3 Diamond (2006) shows that subsidizing donations may also mitigate the incentive problems associated with income taxation, thereby allowing the government to achieve higher redistribution. Our formal focus on lump-sum redistribution of exogenously given wealth will abstract from this issue. Intuitively, our analysis thus relates to a situation where the incentive-compatibility constraint is not binding for the wealthy, unlike in Diamond (2006). Blumkin and Sadka (2007a, b) have offered arguments against the substitution-effect case.
private consumption. It is thus the income effect of tax deductions for public contributions that we are concerned with, in contrast to the standard focus on the substitution effect.

In our formal analysis, we shall analyze the normative case for greater lump-sum taxation of philanthropists to provide lump-sum income transfers to the poor. Our case, naturally, would not negate the Pigouvian, pure substitution effect, efficiency rationale for providing a balanced-budget tax deduction for charitable contributions. However, in practice, it may be that additional redistributive taxation of rich philanthropists can only be implemented through taxation of their charitable contributions, since greater taxation of their income or private consumption, relative to that of their selfish but equally wealthy counterparts, is likely to be difficult, perhaps impossible. If so, the policy shift we shall advocate would entail both income and substitution effects. The substitution effect, by itself, will reduce the provision of the public good, and thereby, typically, make everybody worse off. However, the income effect is more complicated. It will reduce the welfare of the poor by reducing the provision of the public good. Yet, it will also provide them additional private consumption. As is intuitively clear, and as we shall formally show in section 4, the latter effect may dominate the former. Additionally, it may do so by a magnitude large enough to compensate for the negative consequence of the substitution effect as well, so that, overall, the poor are better off. Of course, the overall effect in specific policy contexts might also make the poor worse off. If this were indeed so, a rational egalitarian should, arguably, abjure redistribution in the philanthropic society, even though she would support it in its private consumption counterpart. However, there does not appear to be any compelling reason, whether theoretical or empirical, why this should necessarily be the case.\footnote{See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007), Cornes and Sandler (2000), and Nozick (1974, pp. 265-268) for related discussions of why greater inequality is not necessarily Pareto-improving. Furthermore, unlike the typical assumption of costless donation in the formal literature, charitable fund-raising is actually an expensive business in reality (Andreoni and Paine, 2003). These deadweight costs have to be balanced against the costs of additional redistribution, when carrying out efficiency calculations in any given policy context.}

Suppose therefore that some redistribution that the egalitarian supports in a given private consumption society would continue to be efficient if, ceteris paribus, the rich came to acquire philanthropic preferences. Why should she then change her mind and reject it in favor of a lower one?

Itaya et al. (1997) show that, given a social welfare function that is symmetric and concave in utilities and a pure public good, social optimality necessitates a level of income/wealth inequality that generates a single provider of the public good in the Nash equilibrium of a Cournot game of voluntary provision. Thus, in their setting, given identical preferences, absolute equality does not maximize social welfare in a society with voluntary provision of public goods. Evidently, given identical preferences and their social welfare function, and assuming that the indirect utility function is strictly concave in wealth, maximization of social welfare would necessitate absolute equalization of incomes in a private consumption society. Thus, their analysis provides an interesting case for tolerating some inequality in the presence of philanthropy by the rich, even by one who would demand absolute equality in a society where all consumption is private. However, the case appears special, and thus,
weak. Their analysis does not imply social optimality for every arbitrary degree of inequality. In fact, with suitable preferences and sufficiently high inequality aversion (i.e. sufficient concavity of the social welfare function), the degree of wealth inequality their analysis can tolerate turns out to be negligible.\(^5\) An egalitarian may be willing to tolerate such low levels of inequality even in a private consumption society, due to the costs associated with redistribution. Thus, it is not self-evident that, even in the pure public good case, an egalitarian need consider the Itaya et al. (1997) analysis of major policy import. Perhaps even more crucially, their case collapses in the more realistic setting where the public good is impure, i.e., when public provision also generates some private benefit - a ‘warm glow’, for the donor. Maximization of social welfare in their sense then ceases to demand inequality.\(^6\) Thus, the case that Itaya et al. (1997) make for permitting significantly greater inequality when the rich provide public goods, as compared to when they do not, appears somewhat unpersuasive.

One may however offer the two following considerations. Standard measurement of inequality concentrates on the distribution of consumption expenditure. If the rich spend part of their income on public goods that are also consumed by the poor, would standard inequality measures\(^7\) overstate inequality in the distribution of welfare? If so, the case for prioritizing income equality over other (conflicting) objectives may indeed become normatively less compelling. The normative case for direct income redistribution would also appear less persuasive if it turns out that the direct income gain the poor make from a given redistribution is largely negated by the consequent reduction in public good provision by the rich. The observed reduction in standard measures of income inequality would then significantly overstate the fall in welfare inequality. Philanthropy would reduce the marginal gain from redistribution (in terms of reduction of welfare inequality), to below its marginal cost.\(^7\)

\(^5\) Consider a two person society where preferences are given by 
\[ u_i = \left[ x_i \lambda^{i} \left( y_i + \lambda^{-1} \right)^{-\lambda} \right]^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}, \quad x_i, \ y_i, \]

\[ y_{-i}, \] denoting, respectively, private consumption by individual \(i\), the amount of the (pure) public good provided by \(i\), and the amount provided by the other person; \(0 < \lambda < 1, \ i \in \{1,2\}\). The two individuals play a Cournot game of voluntary contributions to the public good, as in Itaya et al. (1997). Suppose the social welfare function is 
\[ u_1^{\gamma} + u_2^{\gamma} \] \(\gamma \in (0,1)\). It can be checked that any arbitrary magnitude of wealth inequality turns out to be socially excessive when \(\lambda\) is sufficiently close to 1 and \(\gamma\) is sufficiently close to 0.

\(^6\) Consider a two-person society where preferences are given by 
\[ \left[ x_i \left( y_i + \theta y_{-i} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}}, \] the variables being defined as in footnote 5; \(\theta \in (0,1)\). It can be checked that maximization of the social welfare function used by Itaya et al. (1997) now requires exact equalization of wealth, given their setting of voluntary contributions.

\(^7\) “The egalitarian … will defend taking from some to give to others, … on grounds of ‘justice’. At this point, equality comes sharply into conflict with freedom; one must choose” Friedman (1974, p.195). Nevertheless, the rate at which a pragmatic egalitarian would choose to trade away freedom for equality can reasonably be expected to depend on her assessment of the relative mix of freedom and equality in the status quo, and of the marginal impact of redistribution on equality. More formally, we think of the egalitarian’s problem as the maximization of a separable social welfare function which exhibits positive but diminishing returns from reductions in welfare inequality, alongside positive and increasing costs of income redistribution.
Our purpose is to examine these two issues.\(^8\) The thrust of the literature on voluntary provision of public goods has been on investigating how (income) inequality affects provision.\(^9\) Our focus is on addressing the exact opposite question: how voluntary provision affects (welfare) inequality.

We consider a game of voluntary contributions to a public good, among agents with identical preferences, who vary in terms of their personal income. In the Nash equilibrium, all rich agents contribute to the public good, while all non-rich individuals completely free-ride. As in standard measurement of inequality, we wish to focus on a money-metric measure of welfare achievement. However, since individuals can freely access the public good contributions of others, their personal earnings can no longer provide such a measure. Instead, we utilize the standard notion of equivalent variation to develop a money-metric measure of welfare achievement that incorporates the benefits from the public good. Inequality in welfare achievement is then measured in terms of pair-wise gaps in such ‘real’, or ‘equivalent’ income, instead of differences in personal income. Aggregation of absolute gaps leads to absolute measures of inequality, while aggregation of the gaps normalized by the average or the maximum of the income distribution leads to relative measures of inequality.

We show that, under standard restrictions on preferences, the following must be true. The mediation of philanthropy makes the absolute difference in real income (or welfare achievement) between two non-rich individuals larger than that in their nominal incomes. Thus, philanthropy magnifies the welfare consequences of income inequality among the non-rich. If the non-rich are sufficiently poorer than the rich, or if the rich are sufficiently numerous, this is true of the gap between rich and non-rich individuals as well. Hence, according to absolute measures of inequality, the community may in fact be made more unequal, rather than less, by philanthropy. The result with relative inequality measures is ambiguous — even here, there can be no guarantee that philanthropy reduces inequality. Our conclusion is driven essentially by the fact that any given amount of the public good is worth less to the poorer individual. Thus, while each rich individual benefits every non-rich individual through her spending on the public good, she also benefits more than the latter from the spending by other rich individuals on the public good. These two effects contradict one another in terms of their impact on welfare inequality. When the second effect dominates, absolute welfare inequality between the rich and others exceeds the corresponding nominal inequality. Thus, our results suggest that one may maintain an attitude of skepticism vis-à-vis the claim of equality-enhancement via philanthropy. Rich philanthropists certainly benefit the poor through their contributions to public goods, but they may also benefit one another more through such contributions.

We proceed to address the issue of effectiveness of nominal redistribution in reducing welfare inequality. We show that a given, efficient, redistribution of monetary income may reduce absolute inequality in real incomes (i.e. welfare achievements) more, rather than less, when the rich contribute

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\(^8\) Voluntary contributions to local, or community-specific, ‘club’ goods is also likely to have important implications for distributive conflicts among economic classes and identity groups, as well as for organizing measures to combat poverty. On these themes, see, respectively, Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007, 2005a, 2005b).

\(^9\) See Cornes and Sandler (1996) for an overview.
the public good. The same may also hold for relative inequality. As before, two contradictory
effects turn out to be at play. A nominal redistribution reduces the supply of the public good from the
rich. However, the presence of the public good also makes a dollar of private income more valuable to
poorer individuals, compared to a private consumption society. Real inequality would fall by a greater
magnitude than nominal inequality when the second effect dominates.

Section 2 lays out the basic model. Section 3 presents our results regarding the relationship
between inequality in personal incomes and inequality in welfare outcomes. We discuss the effects of
nominal redistribution on welfare inequality in Section 4. Section 5 discusses some extensions.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

2. THE MODEL

Our first step is to model the provision of the public good. Let a community consist of \( n \geq 3 \)
individuals. The set of individuals is \( N = \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Each individual consumes a private good and a
public good. For any \( i \in N \), \( x_i \) is the amount of the private good consumed, \( y_i \) is the amount of the
public good provided by \( i \) herself, whereas \( y_{-i} \) is the amount of the public good provided by all other
agents. Preferences are given by a strictly quasi-concave and twice continuously differentiable utility
function \( u(x_i, B_i) \), where \( B_i = y_i + \theta y_{-i} \), \( \theta \in (0,1] \). Thus, agents may be concerned only with the
total amount of the public good. This possibility, the so-called ‘pure’ public good (Cornes and
Sandler, 1996; Bergstrom et al., 1986) case, implies \( \theta = 1 \). The public good may also be ‘impure’-
agents may derive greater utility from an additional unit of the public good if they themselves provide
it (Andreoni, 1990; Cornes and Sandler, 1994), perhaps because of the ‘warm glow’ from the act of
giving. In this case \( 0 < \theta < 1 \).\(^\text{10}\) We assume agents have identical preferences.

Agent \( i \in N \) has own money (or nominal) income, \( I_i \in (0, I_C] \). Thus, the highest income in the
community is \( I_C \in \mathbb{R}_{++} \). Let \( C = \{i \in N | I_i = I_C\} \), \( n > |C| = n_C \). Thus, \( C \) is the set of rich
members of the community; who all earn \( I_C \); the community contains \( n_C \) such individuals. The
community also contains some non-rich individuals, who earn less than \( I_C \). Define \( P = [N \setminus C] \), and
let \( \bar{I}_P = \max\{I_i | i \in P\} \). Thus, \( P \) is the set of non-rich individuals, i.e., all individuals who earn less
than \( I_C \); \( \bar{I}_P \) is the second-highest income level in the community.

\(^{10}\) The lower the value of \( \theta \), the stronger the marginal ‘warm glow’ benefit from giving. Preferences can
also be equivalently represented by \( U(x_i, y_i, y) \), where \( y \) is the total amount of the public good, and \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial y} \)
is some non-negative constant, this term being \( \theta \) for the pure public good case. Lower values of \( \theta \) evidently
correspond to higher values of \( \frac{\partial U}{\partial y_i} / \frac{\partial U}{\partial y} \).
Agents simultaneously choose the allocation of their expenditure between the two goods.\textsuperscript{11} For notational simplicity, we shall assume that all prices are unity. Thus, incomes in our analysis are all implicitly price-deflated. A community member’s maximization problem then is the following.

\[ \text{Max } u(x_i, B_i) \text{ subject to:} \]
\[ x_i + B_i = I_i + \theta y_{-i}, \quad (2.1) \]
\[ B_i \geq \theta y_{-i}. \quad (2.2) \]

The solution to the maximization problem, subject to the budget constraint (2.1) alone, yields, in the standard way, the unrestricted demand functions: \[ B_i = g(I_i + \theta y_{-i}) \], and \[ x_i = h(I_i + \theta y_{-i}) \].

Our main assumptions regarding preferences are the following.

\textbf{A1.} \( g', h' > 0 \).

\textbf{A2.} \( \lim_{|I_i + \theta y_{-i}| \to \infty} h(I_i + \theta y_{-i}) = \infty \).

\textbf{A3.} \( \lim_{x_i \to 0} u(x_i, B_i) = \lim_{x_i \to 0} u(x_i, 0) \).

A1 is the assumption that all goods are normal. By A1, there must exist a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium in the voluntary contributions game.\textsuperscript{12} In any Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that:

\[ B_i = \max[\theta y_{-i}, g(I_i + \theta y_{-i})] \text{ for all } i \in N. \quad (2.3) \]

A2 implies that demand function for the private good is unbounded from above, i.e., one can generate any arbitrary level of demand for the private good by suitably choosing the nominal income level.\textsuperscript{13} A3 is the assumption that the public good is worthless when one has no private consumption.\textsuperscript{14}

Agent \( i \) is \textit{non-contributory} in a Nash equilibrium if, in that Nash equilibrium, \( [\theta y_{-i} > g(I_i + \theta y_{-i})] \), and \textit{contributory} otherwise. By a non-contributory agent, we thus mean one who, given total contribution by others, would prefer to convert some of the public good contributions by others into her own private consumption. Since she cannot do so (2.2), a non-contributory agent spends nothing on the public good. Given total contribution by others, contributory agents would not wish to reduce their spending on the public good. Given any \( \theta y_{-i} > 0 \), by A1, \( [\theta y_{-i} > g(\theta y_{-i})] \); thus, agents with income sufficiently close to 0 must be non-contributory.

As discussed earlier, our interest lies in a situation where, in the Nash equilibrium, the rich contribute to the public good, whereas the non-rich free-ride. We ensure this by assuming

\textsuperscript{11} Individuals sometimes contribute time, rather than money, towards public goods. So long as time contributions can be substituted by purchased inputs, including labour, such contributions are formally equivalent to monetary contributions. See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005b).

\textsuperscript{12} See Bergstrom \textit{et al.} (1986) and Andreoni (1990).

\textsuperscript{13} For convenience of exposition: we only need the upper bound on \( h \) to be greater than \( I_C \).

\textsuperscript{14} Intuitively, this captures the idea that, at the edge of survival, the public good has a negligible impact on the individual’s well-being. Multiplicative functional forms such as the Cobb-Douglas imply this property.
Intuitively, this implies all non-rich agents earn so much less than the rich that the former are all non-contributory even when there is only one rich individual in the community. Given A1, this suffices to ensure that only the rich, i.e. agents belonging to the set $C$, will ever be contributory in the Nash equilibrium, regardless of the number of rich individuals. We shall denote the contribution of a rich individual by $y_C$; thus, in the Nash equilibrium, $y = n_C y_C$.

If $i \in N$ did not have access to public good contribution by others, her welfare would be given by:

$$[V(I_i) = \text{Max } u(I_i - y, y)]$$

where $V$ is the indirect utility function. However, in our community, due to philanthropy on part of the rich, $i$ acquires consumption access to $y_{-i}$ amount of the community’s public good. A natural way to measure the monetary value of this gain is in terms of the standard notion of equivalent variation, i.e., in terms of the additional money she would need to achieve the same utility, if she did not have this access.\(^{15}\) Let the real income of agent $i$ in a Nash equilibrium, where she consumes $(x_i, B_i)$, be defined implicitly by $[V(r_i) = u(x_i, B_i)]$, so that

$$[r(x_i, B_i) = V^{-1}(u(x_i, B_i))]$$

$V$ being the indirect utility function. Thus, if all consumption were somehow privatized, $i$ would be as well off as before only if she is given $[r(x_i, B_i) - I_i]$ dollars over her own nominal income $I_i$. Evidently, an agent would be better off in one Nash equilibrium rather than another, if, and only if, her real income is higher in the former. We define:

$$f(I_i, y_{-i}, \theta) \equiv \theta^{-1}[(I_i + \theta y_{-i}) - r(x_i, B_i)].$$

The function $f$ provides the monetary equivalent of the welfare loss generated by the in-kind, rather than cash, nature of philanthropy. When all others together spend $y_{-i}$ on the public good, it is as if $i$ receives a transfer, in kind, of that amount of the public good. When $i$ is contributory, the public good contribution by all others is evidently equivalent, in terms of its effect on $i$’s welfare, to a cash transfer of $\theta y_{-i}$. In this case, the marginal utility of private consumption is identical to that of public consumption at the equilibrium for $i$. The equivalent variation is therefore simply $\theta y_{-i}$. However, when $i$ is non-contributory, the in-kind nature of the transfer generates a welfare loss: the marginal utility of private consumption is greater than that of public consumption at the equilibrium. The equivalent variation in this case is consequently less than $\theta y_{-i}$. Recall that an agent is non-contributory in the Nash equilibrium if and only if $I_i < \bar{I}_p$. Thus, money value of the individual gain from philanthropy in the Nash equilibrium is the equivalent variation $\theta[y_{-i} - f(\cdot)]$; where:

$$f(\cdot) = 0 \text{ if } I_i = I_C, \text{ and } f(\cdot) \in (0, y_{-i}) \text{ if } I_i \in (0, \bar{I}_p].$$

\(^{15}\) For a related approach to measuring individual gains from public good provision, see Cornes (1996). The questions we address are however quite different.
Figure 1 below illustrates the Nash equilibrium real income for both C and P agents, in the special case of a pure public good ($\theta = 1$). The Nash equilibrium level of public good provision is denoted by $y^*$.

**Insert Figure 1**

Consider now a non-rich (and thus, non-contributory, i.e. free-riding) agent. For such an agent, how does the gain from philanthropy, i.e., the equivalent variation, change with changes in (a) the agent’s own (nominal) income, and (b) the magnitude of public good provision by rich agents?

**Lemma 2.1** (Dasgupta and Kanbur, 2007) Given $A1$, if $I_i \in (0, I_P]$, then: (i) $f_{y_i} \in (0,1)$, (ii) $f_{y_i} < 0$, and (iii) $f_{y_i} < 0, f_{I_i} > 0$.

By Lemma 3.1, an additional dollar of public good provision is worth a positive amount, but less than $\theta$, of cash income to non-rich individuals. Their valuation of a given amount of the public good, and of an additional dollar of it, both rise with their cash income. The former rises at a decreasing rate.

Lastly, the total amount of the public good must increase as the rich become more numerous. However, individual contributions must fall as the number of rich agents increases.

**Lemma 2.2.** Given $A1$-$A2$, the Nash equilibrium level of the public good, $y$, is increasing in $n_C$, while $y_C$ is decreasing in $n_C$, with $\lim_{n_C \to \infty} y_C = 0$.

**Proof:** See the Appendix.

*An example:*
It is useful to illustrate our benchmark model by via a simple example. Let preferences be given by the symmetric Cobb-Douglas form $x_i y$. Such preferences satisfy $A1$, $A2$ and $A3$; they also imply that the public good is pure. We assume $\frac{I_C}{2} > I_P$; then $A1$ implies, regardless of the value of $n_C$, all $P$ agents must be non-contributory in equilibrium. It is easy to check that, in the Nash equilibrium,

$$y = x_C = \frac{n_C I_C}{n_C + 1}; \tag{2.6}$$

for all $i \in C$, $r_i = I_C + \left(\frac{n_C - 1}{n_C}\right)y = \left[\frac{2}{1 + n_C^{-1}}\right]I_C; \tag{2.7}$

for all $i \in P$, $r_i = 2\sqrt{I_i y} = [I_i + y] - \left[\sqrt{I_i} - \sqrt{y}\right]. \tag{2.8}$
Notice that the function \( f \) defined in (2.4) takes the form \( \sqrt{I_i} - \sqrt{y^*} \) for all \( i \in P \) in our example. It can also be checked from (2.6)-(2.8) that the claims made in Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 hold.

3. INEQUALITY

In our community, the rich provide collective goods, whereas the non-rich free-ride. Does this imply one should consider the distribution of real income less unequal than that of nominal income? To address this question, one needs to first choose a measure of inequality. Which class of inequality measures should one opt for? The presence of the public good, in effect, generates some additional income. There are two common views in the literature on what distribution of such increments would leave inequality unchanged (see Kolm, 1976). From one normative point of view, inequality remains unchanged if and only if this additional income is divided equally. Thus, one should opt for absolute inequality measures, i.e., inequality measures that aggregate absolute income gaps. Standard examples are the variance and the Kolm absolute measure.\(^{16}\) From the other normative point of view, inequality is unchanged if the increment is divided in proportion to current income. This perspective leads to relative inequality measures, i.e., inequality measures that aggregate relative income gaps — specifically, income gaps normalized by either the average or the maximum of the distribution. Standard examples of relative measures include the Gini measure of inequality.

Let the real income gap between individuals \( j \) and \( l \) in the Nash equilibrium be denoted by \( R_{jl} \), and let \( M_{jl} \) denote the corresponding nominal income gap. Using (2.4), we can write:

\[
R_{jl} = M_{jl} + \theta(y_l - y_j) + \theta\left[ f\left(y_{l-}, y_{j-}\right) - f\left(y_j, y_{j-}\right)\right],
\]

(3.1)

where \( y_j \) denotes the Nash equilibrium contribution by \( j \) and \( y_{j-} \equiv y - y_j \) denotes total Nash equilibrium contribution by all agents other than \( j; \ y_l, y_{l-} \) being defined analogously.

**Proposition 3.1.** Let A1 hold. Then the following must be true.

(i) For all \((j,l) \in P \times P \) such that \( M_{jl} > 0, [R_{jl} > M_{jl}] \).

(ii) Given A2, there exists \( n^* (I_C, I_P) \in \{1, 2, \ldots\} \) such that \( [R_{jl} > M_{jl}] \) for all \((j,l) \in C \times P \) when \( n_C > n^* \).

(iii) Given A3 and \( n_C \geq 2 \), there exists \( I^* (I_C, n_C) > 0 \) such that \( [R_{jl} > M_{jl}] \) for all \((j,l) \in C \times P \) when \( I_P < I^* \).

**Proof:** See the Appendix.

\(^{16}\) Chakravarty and Tyagarupananda (1998) show that these two are the only absolute decomposable inequality measures that satisfy some other standard properties.
First consider the non-rich segment of the community. By Proposition 3.1(i), the real gap between every pair of individuals belonging to this segment is higher than the corresponding nominal gap. Intuitively, this happens because the public good is worth more to wealthier individuals (Lemma 2.1). Thus, the presence of the public good magnifies the welfare consequence of nominal differences within the non-rich section of the community. Note that only A1 is required for this result.

How do nominal and real gaps compare between the rich and the others? Contradictory effects are at work here. A rich individual, say \( k \), benefits all non-rich individuals through her spending on the public good. Since the latter do not contribute, the nominal gap will necessarily overstate the real income gap between \( k \) and any non-rich individual if \( k \) is the only rich person in the community. However, when there are other rich individuals, \( k \) also benefits more than the non-rich from public spending by such individuals. Proposition 3.1(ii) implies that, above some threshold number of rich individuals, the second effect will dominate the first. Thus, whenever the number of rich individuals is sufficiently large, the nominal income gap will understate the magnitude of differences in real income between the rich and all others.\(^{17}\) Note that only A1 and A2 are required for this claim to hold. If, alternatively, A1 and A3 hold, such understatement must occur in every community with at least two rich individuals whenever non-rich incomes are sufficiently low (Proposition 3.1(iii)).

An example:
Consider the example specified in section 2 above. Together, (2.6)-(2.8) and (3.1) yield the following:

For all \((j,l) \in P \times P\), \( R_{jl} = M_{jl} + \left[ \sqrt{I_j} - \sqrt{y} \right] - \left[ \sqrt{I_l} - \sqrt{y} \right] \),

(3.2)

For all \((j,l) \in C \times P\):

\[
R_{jl} = M_{jl} + \left[ \sqrt{I_j} - \sqrt{y} \right] - \frac{y}{n_C} = M_{jl} + \left[ \sqrt{I_j} - \frac{I_C}{1 + n_C^{-1}} \right] - \left[ \frac{I_C}{1 + n_C} \right].
\]

(3.3)

Since \( P \) agents are non-contributory, for all \( i \in P, I_i < y \); hence \( \sqrt{I_j} - \sqrt{y} \) is decreasing in \( I_j \).

Then, from (3.2), \( R_{jl} > M_{jl} \) if \( I_j > I_l \), \( j \in P \), as claimed in Proposition 3.1(i). Now, from (3.3):

\[
\text{for all } (j,l) \in C \times P : R_{jl} = M_{jl} \iff \left[ \sqrt{n_C} - \sqrt{\psi_l (1 + n_C)} - 1 \right] = 0; \]

(3.4)

where \( \psi_l \equiv \frac{I_l}{I_C} < \frac{1}{2} \) by assumption.

\(^{17}\) The basic point is that, Bill Gates, for example, attains a larger hike in real income from the $31 billion donation to the Gates Foundation by Warren Buffet, than the average American who values the Gates-Buffet objective of poverty alleviation in developing countries, but not enough to contribute. Consequently, Buffet’s donation may make real inequality between Gates and this average American higher than the nominal inequality.
Notice that, at \( n_C = 1 \), (3.4) implies \( R_{jl} < M_{jl} \). Furthermore, noting \( I_l < y \), it is evident from (3.3) that \( R_{jl} \) is increasing in \( n_C \), with:

\[
\lim_{n_C \to \infty} R_{jl} = M_{jl} + \left[ \sqrt{I_l} - \sqrt{I_C} \right]^2 > M_{jl}.
\]

Hence, given \( I_C \) and \( \bar{T}_p \leq \frac{I_C}{2} \), there exists \( n^* \in \{1, 2, \ldots\} \) such that \( R_{jl} > M_{jl} \) for all \( n_C > n^* \), as claimed in Proposition 3.1(ii). For example, by (3.4), \( R_{jl} > M_{jl} \) for all \( (j, l) \in C \times P \) when \( n_C \geq 16 \). It is also clear from (3.4) that, given \( n_C \geq 2 \), \( R_{jl} > M_{jl} \) whenever \( \bar{T}_p \) is sufficiently close to 0, as claimed in Proposition 3.1(iii). For example, recalling that \( R_{jl} \) is increasing in \( n_C \), it follows from (3.4) that, given any \( n_C \geq 2 \), \( R_{jl} > M_{jl} \) for all \( (j, l) \in C \times P \) when \( \bar{T}_p < \frac{(\sqrt{2} - 1)^2 I_C}{3} \). ♦

Since \( \frac{\sum_l \sum_j (z_j - z_l)^2}{2n^2} = Var(z_j) \), Proposition 3.1 immediately yields the following.

**Corollary 3.2.** Let A1, A2 and A3 hold. Then there exists \( n^* \in \{1, 2, \ldots\} \) such that, if the community contains more than \( n^* \) rich individuals, the distribution of nominal income will exhibit a lower variance than that of real income. The same is true for any community with at least two rich individuals whenever non-rich incomes are sufficiently low.

Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 contest the view that voluntary public spending by the rich necessarily compensates for prior inequalities in income. Our results show that, in general, wealthier individuals are likely to benefit more from such contributions. Thus, the distribution of real income within the community may be more (absolutely) unequal than that of nominal income, rather than less.

Absolute measures of inequality violate the property of scale invariance. Scale invariance requires equal-proportion changes in all incomes to leave the inequality measure invariant. Both normative and pragmatic considerations are invoked to justify this property. The normative a priori position appears to contradict egalitarian intuition. The pragmatic justification is that inequality rankings should not change when all incomes are measured in a different unit, say pounds rather than dollars. Since our analysis is based on price-deflated incomes, this consideration is not germane to our conclusions. Note nevertheless that the variance is ‘unit consistent’: inequality rankings between different distributions are unaffected by equal-proportion changes in all incomes (Zheng, 2007). Thus, our claim, that the real distribution may be more unequal than the nominal one (Corollary 3.2), is unaffected by the additional restriction that the inequality measure also satisfy unit consistency.
Relative measures incorporate the property of scale invariance. Depending on preferences, pairwise real inequality between the rich and the non-rich may or may not be less than the corresponding nominal inequality under such measures. Intermediate measures have also been proposed (Bossert and Pfingsten, 1990). Our conclusions will hold for particular parameterizations of such measures.

4. REAL EFFECTS OF NOMINAL REDISTRIBUTION

A marginal redistribution of nominal income from the rich to others will induce the former to reduce their spending on the public good. Thus, the redistribution will directly increase real incomes of the non-rich, but the cutback in public good provision by the rich will reduce them. What would be the net effect on inequality? Does philanthropy by the rich necessarily make redistribution of nominal income less effective in reducing inequality? We now show that there should not be a general presumption in favor of this view. Depending on preferences and the initial nominal distribution, a marginal redistribution may in fact turn out to have a greater inequality-reducing impact on the real distribution than the nominal one, in addition to making the non-rich better off.

We establish our claim via the example specified in section 2. Let preferences be given by the symmetric Cobb-Douglas form \( x_i, y \), and, additionally, suppose \( |P| = n_C \geq 2 \). Thus, the number of rich individuals is identical to that of non-rich individuals. Recall that our specification of preferences satisfies A1, A2 and A3. As before, we assume \( \frac{I_C}{2} > \bar{I}_P \); so that, by A1, all \( P \) agents must be non-contributory in the initial Nash equilibrium (regardless of the value of \( n_C \)).

Consider a marginal redistribution of nominal income: each rich individual loses one dollar, while every non-rich individual gains this amount. Public good provision must fall subsequent to the redistribution, and the rich must necessarily become worse off. The tax-transfer policy will reduce the nominal income gap between a rich and a non-rich individual by $2, while the nominal income gap between any two non-rich individuals will stay invariant. What happens to real income gaps?

First consider any pair of non-rich individuals with dissimilar nominal incomes. By Lemma 2.1, the real income gap between these individuals must fall, even though the nominal gap stays invariant.

\[ B_i \]

18 Suppose \( B_i \) does not increase along the income expansion path. Homothetic preferences are a special case of this restriction. Then, as can be easily checked, for every \( (j, l) \in C \times P \), \( \left[ \frac{r_l}{r_j} > \frac{I_l}{I_j} \right] \). This in turn yields: \( \left[ \frac{r_l}{r_j + r_j} > \frac{I_l}{I_i + l_j} \right] \). Thus, expressed as a proportion of a rich person’s income, or as a proportion of mean income, pair-wise nominal inequality between the rich and others is always greater than the corresponding real inequality. This conclusion need not hold when \( B_i \) increases along the income expansion path.
Thus, the marginal redistribution must necessarily reduce real inequality within the non-rich segment of the population. What happens to real inequality between the rich and others?

Proposition 4.1. Suppose every C individual loses $1, while every P individual gains this amount. Suppose further that all P individuals remain non-contributory in the post-redistribution Nash equilibrium. Then, in the post-redistribution Nash equilibrium,

(i) all P individuals must be better off, and
(ii) there exists \( \alpha(n_C) \in \left(0, \frac{1}{2}\right) \) such that, if \( T_P < \alpha I_C \), then, for all \( (j, l) \in C \times P \), \( R_{jl} \)

must fall by more than $2.

Proof: See the Appendix.

By Proposition 4.1, our example has the following properties. First, the redistribution will benefit the non-rich, despite the fall in public good provision. Second, if the rich are sufficiently richer than the others, the redistribution must reduce the real income gap between a rich and a non-rich individual by more than $2. Hence, in this case, the redistribution will reduce the real income gap between any arbitrary pair of individuals with dissimilar nominal incomes by an amount greater than the reduction in the corresponding nominal income gap. It follows that the fall in aggregate (absolute) real inequality (as measured by the variance) must be greater than that in aggregate nominal inequality.

It can also be checked that, if the rich are sufficiently richer than the non-rich, the redistribution must increase total real income in the community, despite the fall in public good provision. Thus, a rich person’s real income must fall when expressed as a proportion of total (or mean) real income in the community. It follows that in this case the relative income gap between the rich and the poor must also fall, leading to a fall in measures of relative inequality of real income. Furthermore, when non-rich incomes are sufficiently low, the redistribution also increases the real income of a non-rich person, expressed as a proportion of the real income of a rich person, by more than the corresponding change in nominal income. It follows that, even when inequality is measured in relative terms, redistribution may reduce real equality more than it reduces nominal inequality.

This example shows that philanthropic preferences on part of the rich need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of redistributive measures at the margin. Indeed, such preferences may actually make nominal redistribution more effective, rather than less. This conclusion holds irrespective of whether inequality is measured in absolute or relative terms.

5. EXTENSIONS

(i) Preference heterogeneity

We have assumed that preferences are identical across community members. This is primarily for convenience of exposition. We can generalize the analysis to the case where all rich individuals have
identical preferences, as do all non-rich individuals, but the preferences of the rich differ from those of
the non-rich. Our conclusions, as summarized in Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, will continue to
hold for this extension. Counterparts of the example presented in sections 2-4 can also be constructed.
If all rich individuals have identical preferences, but preferences vary within the non-rich section, then
part (i) of Proposition 3.1 need not hold. However, our conclusions regarding pair-wise inequality
between the rich and the non-rich (Proposition 3.1 ((ii) and (iii)) will remain unaffected.

(ii) Inferior public goods:
Our conclusions are essentially driven by the assumption that the public good is normal. If it is
inferior, then, evidently, poorer individuals will benefit more from public good provision by the rich.
Hence, philanthropy by the rich would reduce (absolute) real inequality. However, if the public good
is inferior, it appears unlikely that the rich would contribute towards its provision in the first place. An
exception might arise if ability to spend on the public good, on part of the poor, is significantly less
than their willingness, say due to labor or credit market imperfections. But major labor or credit
market imperfections would in turn intuitively appear to strengthen the case for improving the private
asset base of poor individuals, (i.e., in effect, provide monetary transfers), not weaken it.

(iii) Private consumption augmenting public goods:
We have focused on voluntary provision of public goods that directly improve well-being, but do not
have major income (or private consumption) consequences for non-rich individuals. Religious
edifices (e.g. churches and temples), cultural goods (museums, concert halls, theatres, artistic
performances), ethnic festivals, parks, promenades, community centers, sports clubs, sports facilities,
etc. all appear to fall in this category. So does aid to foreigners, when one considers the community to
consist only of residents of the donors’ own country. Rich philanthropists however often also provide
public goods that have a significant positive impact on the private earnings of non-rich individuals, or,
more generally, increase their private consumption. Cash donations, soup kitchens, homeless shelters,
donation of clothing or medicine, all provide obvious examples of philanthropy that directly add to the
private consumption of the poor. Charitable provision of hospitals, educational institutions, water
supply, sanitation, irrigation, security, medical research, etc. may all significantly increase the earning
capacity of the non-rich. If the positive private consumption effect of such philanthropy is larger for
poorer individuals, then this may counteract the inequality augmenting effect we have highlighted.
However, some of these private income/consumption effects may also further increase inequality. The
extremely poor are unlikely to study at Oxford on Rhodes Scholarships, crop research, irrigation and
local security may all benefit landowners much more than the landless, medical facilities may be more
effective for those who can afford more food. Thus, the impact on inequality appears ambiguous,
depending critically on the size and distribution of private benefits that flow from the public good.

(iv) Multiple private goods and in-kind redistribution:
In our formal analysis, we have considered a single private good, so that a dollar transferred by the
state to a poor person has same impact on her welfare, regardless of whether this payment is made in
cash or in terms of some privately consumed commodity. In practice, governments often implement redistribution via in-kind transfers. Typical examples include free or subsidized health, housing, education and food. The in-kind nature of the transfer may however impose a welfare loss for the recipient, compared to an equivalent cash transfer. Standard analysis implies that such a welfare loss must necessarily occur when the recipient is at a corner solution vis-à-vis the commodity transferred, say \( x \), so that she would prefer to shift expenditure from \( x \) to other commodities, but is constrained from doing so by the non-fungible nature of the commodity transfer. When a large proportion of the recipients are at such a constrained equilibrium, in-kind redistribution need not necessarily dominate, in terms of inequality reduction, philanthropic provision of public goods with negligible impact on private consumption of the poor. Note that, for identical reasons, private charity that offers in-kind supplements to the private consumption of the poor need not necessarily dominate private provision of public goods that do not. The key empirical issue therefore is whether, in practice, the amount of the commodity transferred by the state is, typically, significantly above what the poor themselves would choose, if they were paid the market value of the transfer in cash instead. This appears unlikely for many, perhaps most, common forms of commodity transfers, in most countries of the world.\(^{19}\) In any case, the central policy thrust of our argument is on augmenting cash earnings of the poor, not on greater provision of commodity transfers \textit{per se}.

**(v) Multi-class philanthropy:**

For analytical simplicity, we have assumed that philanthropists, ‘the rich’, are identical in terms of wealth. In reality, of course, while large-scale philanthropy is largely confined to the upper classes, these classes do exhibit some heterogeneity in terms of wealth. Thus, often, it is not only the very richest individuals, but also large numbers of the ‘merely’ rich, who donate significant amounts to cathedrals, temples, museums, art galleries, opera houses, esoteric research, elite educational institutions, etc. Assuming identical preferences, the pair-wise real income gap must then be \textit{lower} than the nominal income gap among contributors.\(^{20}\) Thus, intuitively, philanthropy in our sense: (i) \textit{equalizes} among the various strata of the rich, (ii) exacerbates inequality among the various strata of the poor, and (iii) can possibly cause real income gaps between the rich and the poor to widen beyond their nominal counterparts. Note that, given A1-A2, only the richest individuals will contribute when that class is sufficiently numerous, and the merely rich must always contribute less than the richest

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\(^{19}\) For example, empirical studies of the US Food Stamps program find that an overwhelming proportion of recipients are unconstrained, in that their food expenditure is significantly above their food stamp receipts. See Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) for a discussion of this issue. State provision of health and housing in the US is almost universally considered inadequate. Poor households in developing countries are typically found to spend significant amounts on education, food and health, despite in-kind transfers of these commodities.

\(^{20}\) The real income gap between two contributors is zero when the public good is pure. This follows as a direct consequence of the well-known neutrality property of Cournot games of voluntary contributions to pure public goods, whereby equilibrium individual consumption bundles are invariant with respect to redistributions that do not change the set of contributors (see Bergstrom \textit{et al}., 1986; Itaya \textit{et al}., 1997). The neutrality result breaks down when the public good is impure (\( \theta < 1 \)). However, it can be easily checked that, while no longer 0, the real income gap between any two contributors continues to be less than the nominal income gap.
individuals. Formally, it can be checked that the following, more general, version of Proposition 3.1 must hold. Consider any income level $\bar{I}$ such that agents owning $\bar{I}$ are contributory, and let $A1$ be satisfied. Evidently, all non-contributory agents must earn less than $\bar{I}$, though some agents earning less than this amount may possibly be contributory; all agents earning at least $\bar{I}$ must be contributory. The real income gap between any pair of agents with differential earnings, who both earn at least $\bar{I}$, must be less than the corresponding nominal gap. Conversely, the real income gap between any two non-contributory agents with differential earnings must be greater than their nominal gap. Given $A1$-$A2$, if the number of agents earning at least $\bar{I}$ is sufficiently large, the nominal gap must also understate the real gap for every pair $j, l$ such that $\bar{I} \geq I_j > I_l$. If at least two agents earn $\bar{I}$ or more, given $A1$ and $A3$, such understatement must occur if the highest income level below $\bar{I}$ is sufficiently low. It is self-evident that Proposition 3.1 constitutes a special case of this, more general, result, where all agents except the richest are assumed to be non-contributory. A counterpart of the example used to establish Proposition 4.1 can also be constructed for the general case.

6. CONCLUSION

Rich people are frequently advised by thoughtful conservatives to spend their wealth on collective goods that benefit sections of the poor. Bill Gates and Warren Buffett are merely the latest in a long line of wealthy individuals to actually end up doing so. Even politicians on the left typically allow large tax incentives for charitable contributions. In so doing, they also appear to endorse the claim that one should consider philanthropy a substitute for direct income redistribution.

Why should one do so? It is well known that, even with public goods provision by the rich, there are no a priori grounds for expecting redistribution to necessarily make the poor worse off. Is it then the case that philanthropy itself is likely to significantly enhance equality? Or is it that philanthropy is likely to reduce the effectiveness of income-equalizing interventions? Answers to these questions would appear to be of considerable interest in clarifying the trade-offs facing policy-makers.

This paper has argued that both answers may be negative. Using measures of both absolute and relative inequality, we have shown that philanthropy may actually exacerbate inequality, instead of reducing it. Thus, one should reject the claim that philanthropy is necessarily equality enhancing. Nor should one admit the presumption that philanthropy reduces the efficacy of income redistribution. Our analysis appears to weaken the normative case for permitting wealthy philanthropists to opt out of efficient redistribution schemes. Equality-enhancing claims of specific acts of philanthropy need to be individually established – there should not be any indiscriminate presumption in their favor.

In particular, as a broad criterion, what appears to be of critical importance in assessing such claims is the magnitude of their direct impact on the private asset base of poorer individuals, i.e., on their private consumption. Philanthropic contributions to basic health, education, housing and
sanitation facilities, medical research into diseases that disproportionately affect the poor, and to
technologies that improve demand for low-skilled labor, seem to generally fall in this category. Such
contributions reach the non-rich, directly or indirectly, largely in the form of a significant increment in
private consumption, and can hence be reasonably perceived as a substitute for direct redistribution of
private income. Our analysis suggests that, in contrast, philanthropic provision of public goods that
are intrinsically valuable, but have negligible income-augmenting effects on the non-rich, may be
reasonably viewed as complementary to a policy of redistribution. Thus, from an egalitarian
perspective, the case for exempting donations to, say, churches, temples, museums, art galleries, opera
houses, sports clubs, community centers, public parks, universities, elite private schools, private
hospitals etc., from taxation appears questionable. Automatic presumption of public benefit from all
types of charities, a presumption common in Western countries both in law and in the public discourse,
with its concomitant tax implications, appears open to challenge. This is especially so when one’s
prior normative intuition regarding inequality leads one to adopt absolute measures. Our analysis
points to the need for further empirical evaluation of this issue in specific policy contexts.

If the general normative case for exempting rich philanthropists from expropriation is indeed as
caveat-riddled as we suggest, why do even political parties with egalitarian credentials so commonly
accept it as a matter of course? Political-economic compulsions of electoral coalition-building may
provide a partial explanation. Elsewhere (Dasgupta and Kanbur, 2007) we have examined some
aspects of this issue. Further exploration of this theme appears to constitute a useful line of inquiry.

21 Thus, the publicized priorities of the Gates-Buffet project, or those of George Soros, would appear to be
broadly in accord when considered globally, but not self-evidently so when considered in the restricted context
of American society. Few Americans are likely to experience a significant rise in their private consumption from
improvements in malaria medicines. Whether private foundations generally meet these objectives more
efficiently than public agencies is a different question, one on which evidence appears ambiguous.

22 As discussed in section 1, the negative consequences of the substitution effect need to be balanced against
the possible income effect gains from redistribution that we have highlighted. Charity policy in the U.K., for
example, is going through such a rethink. The U.K. has recently sought to remove the automatic presumption of
public benefit, requiring charities instead to register with a regulator, the Charity Commission, which must, in
turn, apply an independent test of public benefit. Scotland passed such a law in 2005. The debate, of course, is
over exactly what constitutes ‘public benefit’ that is adequate to merit tax concessions (Leigh, 2006).
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 2.2.

That \( y \) is increasing, and \( y_C \) decreasing, in \( n_C \) follow directly from A1. Suppose

\[
\lim_{n_C \to \infty} y_C \in \mathbb{R}^+.
\]

Then, \( \lim_{n_C \to \infty} \left[ I_C + \theta(y - y_C) \right] = \infty \). In light of A1-A2, this implies

\[
\lim_{n_C \to \infty} x_C = I_C, \text{ a contradiction. Hence } \lim_{n_C \to \infty} y_C = 0.
\]

\( \Box \)

Proof of Proposition 3.1.

(i) Since \( j \) and \( l \) are both non-contributory, (3.1) reduces to:

\[
R_{jl} = M_{jl} + \theta \left[ f(I_l, y) - f(I_j, y) \right].
\]

Since \( I_j > I_1, \theta > 0 \), part (i) follows from Lemma 2.1(ii).

(ii) Since \( l \) is non-contributory, using (3.1) we get:

\[
\left[ R_{jl} - M_{jl} \right] = \theta \left[ f(I_l, y) - y_C \right].
\]

Let \( \theta \left[ f(I_l, y) - y_C \right] = \Gamma(n_C) \). By Lemma 2.1(i) and Lemma 2.2, \( \Gamma(n_C) \) is increasing in \( n_C \), with \( \Gamma(1) < 0 \) and \( \lim_{n_C \to \infty} \Gamma(n_C) > 0 \). The claim follows.

(iii) By A3, \( \lim_{l_i \to 0} f(I_l, y) = y \). Hence, \( \lim_{l_i \to 0} \theta \left[ f(I_l, y) - y_C \right] = \theta(n_C - 1)y_C > 0 \) for \( n_C \geq 2 \).

Noting the continuity of \( f \), Lemma 2.1(ii) yields part (iii).

\( \Box \)

Proof of Proposition 4.1.

Recall the Nash equilibrium expressions for public good provision and real income (2.6)-(2.8). By (2.8), the impact of a marginal tax-transfer policy on the real income of a P individual is given by:

\[
\text{for all } i \in P, \quad \left[ \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_i} - \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_C} \right] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + n_{C}^{-1}}} \left[ \frac{I_C - I_i}{\sqrt{I_i I_C}} \right] > 0.
\]

\((X1)\) yields part (i). Now let \( I_i = \lambda_i I_C \) for \( i \in P \). Then we can rewrite \((X1)\) as:

\[
\text{for all } i \in P, \quad \left[ \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_i} - \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_C} \right] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + n_{C}^{-1}}} \left[ \frac{(1 - \lambda_i)}{\sqrt{\lambda_i}} \right].
\]

\((X2)\) Since the RHS in \((X2)\) is decreasing in \( \lambda_i \), and approaches infinity as \( \lambda_i \) approaches 0, it follows that:

\[
\text{there must exist } \lambda(n_C) > 0 \text{ such that } \left[ \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_i} - \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_C} \right] > 1 \text{ iff } \lambda_i < \lambda(n_C).
\]

\((X3)\) Noting that, since \( n_C \geq 2 \) by assumption, (2.7) implies \( \frac{\partial r_i}{\partial I_C} > 1 \) for all \( i \in C \), part (ii) follows.
REFERENCES


Note: \( r_C = I_C + \frac{(n_C - 1)y^e}{n_C} \); \( r_p = I_p + y^e - f_p \).