CHAPTER THREE

MAKING PELOPONNESIANS: SPARTA'S ALLIES AND THEIR REGIONAL IDENTITIES[1]

MARIA PRETZLER

Classical historical texts have a lot to say about Peloponnesians: there is no doubt that outsiders found such a regional label useful. But what about the inhabitants of the peninsula themselves? Did they ever think of themselves as Peloponnesians? Regional identities in Greece were typically linked to tribal/ethnic groups, which meant that all inhabitants of an area laid claim to the same mythical roots. The Peloponnese, however, was exceptional in this respect: any feelings of a common identity would have to be based on the mere fact that the peninsula is a distinct geographical entity; there was no myth of common descent that would have included all its inhabitants. At the same time the Peloponnese was home to many well-developed *poleis* and a number of substantial tribes. For individuals or particular communities in ancient Greece the significance of their region or tribe could vary, depending on relations within the region and historical circumstances.[2] Moreover, for many Greeks the decision to associate themselves with their *polis* or *ethnos* could apparently depend on the context of a specific conversation and the perceived expectations of a particular audience.[3] Peloponnesian identity therefore merely represented an additional option on a list of overlapping identities. Under which circumstances would Peloponnesians feel inclined to identify themselves with this particular geographical unit, rather than their *polis* or tribe? This article investigates the factors that may have inspired a 'peninsular' common identity, with a particular focus on the pan-Peloponnesian aspirations of Sparta's Peloponnesian League and its impact on perceptions of the peninsula as a whole.

The Peloponnese as a geographical unit appears in Greek texts from the Archaic period onwards, even if the name is not mentioned in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*: the name first appears as *Pelopos nēsos* (*Πέλοπος νῆσος*)– literally 'Island of Pelops'– in the seventh century, namely in the *Cypria* and in Tyrtaeus.[4] The earliest use of the name *Peloponnesos* (*Πελοπόννεσος*) as one word occurs in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, where the Peloponnese, 'Europe' and the islands represent the constituent parts of

[1] My gratitude is due to the organisers of this conference for initiating this debate and to the participants for many stimulating suggestions. I would also like to thank the editors for their patience.

[2] Hall 1997, esp. 34-51, McInerney 1999, 8-39; cf. Nielsen 1999, Nielsen 2002, 45-88 on Arcadia.

[3] See Roy 1972.

[4] *Cypria* fr. 9 (Kinkel), Tyrtaeus fr. 2.4. (Strabo 8.4.10); cf. Alcaeus 34.1 L.-P.

Greece.[5] In these texts the Peloponnese is perceived as a distinct geographical entity, and later sources stress its clearly defined boundaries and outline which set it apart from the mainland of central Greece.[6]

The Isthmus was a particularly important defining feature of the Peloponnese, because in spite of being a major communication line it also represents a clear boundary. In fact, the Isthmus is so narrow in relation to the size of the whole landmass of the Peloponnese that it was possible to think of the region as the Island (*νῆσος*) of Pelops rather than a peninsula (*χερσόνησος*). At the same time, however, it also sets the Peloponnese apart from all (other) islands, by making it a part of the mainland after all, and Pausanias at least considered the idea of turning the peninsula into an artificial island by digging a canal through the Isthmus as an unnatural and perhaps even sacrilegious act.[7] The importance of the Isthmus as a liminal zone between the mainland and the 'Island of Pelops' is emphasised by a tradition that there had once been a stele which marked the boundary between 'Ionia' (Attica and the Megarid before the Dorian Migration) and the Peloponnese.[8] The importance of the Isthmus was, however, not merely imaginary or symbolic: it was seen as crucial for the defence of the whole region. Herodotus, for example, takes it for granted that the Peloponnesians almost instinctively respond to the threat of a foreign invasion by organising a defence on the Isthmus of Corinth, rather than contemplating the risk of defensive action further north.[9]

Apart from the Isthmus the topography of the Peloponnese is not exactly conducive to fostering a common identity: not only is the peninsula comparatively large for close regional interaction between different tribes and communities, it is also traversed by high mountain ranges.[10] Moreover, in the north, especially in Achaea, communications across the sea to the mainland are actually easier than with neighbouring Peloponnesian regions. It seems likely that the topography contributed significantly to the distinctive identities of several regions within the peninsula which lasted well beyond the classical period.

Where identities are concerned, merely physical barriers might be overcome by establishing strong mythical links between different communities, but rather than offering a means of unification, the mythical past of the different regional/tribal groups in the Peloponnese presented profound obstacles to a common supraregional identity. A significant part of the peninsula claimed Dorian ancestry, but there were

[5] *Hom. Hymn Apollo* 250-1, 290-1; 419-31 describes part of the west coast of the peninsula; note similarities with the *Catalogue of Ships* in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* – Janko 1982, 129-30.
[6] Baladié 1980, 1-2; cf. 283-5: Peloponnese as 'Acropolis of Greece', cf. Strabo 8.1.3.
[7] Paus. 2.1.5.
[8] Strabo 3.5.5, cf. 9.1.6; Plut, *Thes*. 25.3.
[9] Hdt 8.49, 8.56-63, 8.40, 9.7-9. Note 8.74.1: Peloponnesian sailors at Salamis fear 'less for themselves than for the Peloponnese'.
[10] Baladié 1980, 117-35.

important exceptions, most notably Arcadia and Achaea, whose inhabitants prided themselves in their pre-Dorian (and emphatically non-Dorian) background.[11] A common tribal ancestry for all regions was therefore never established. The 'mythical history' of the Peloponnese knew some moments in the distant past when the whole peninsula was united, but we always see a region of many heterogeneous groups which occasionally consent to co-operate either to achieve a vital common goal, or because a strong leader manages to extend his control over the whole area. For example, contingents from all parts of the peninsula are included in the *Catalogue of Ships*, but they present a highly fragmented ethnic landscape. Concerted Peloponnesian action against outside invaders plays a role in the myths about the return of the Heraclidae. A first attack led by Hyllus, son of Heracles, was repelled by Atreus and a coalition of Peloponnesians; the conflict was decided when Echemus, king of Tegea, defeated Hyllus in single combat.[12] Mythical tradition also represents the whole peninsula as unified for two generations after the Trojan War, under the last Tantalid kings Orestes and Tisamenus. At this stage the Heraclidae, and with them the Dorians, finally managed to settle in the Peloponnese, and the stories about their invasion define the tribal landscape of the classical Peloponnese: a situation very different from that described in the *Iliad*, but no less fragmented.[13]

The imaginary past reflected the situation in the historical Peloponnese: ultimately it was difficult to unite so many communities for no better reason than the fact that they all happened to live 'inside the Isthmus'. In the archaic period the contest between Sparta and Argos for influence in the Peloponnese would have offered ideal preconditions for the exploration of myths and symbols that could serve the claims of both sides, and for the development of (two opposing versions of?) a pan-Peloponnesian rhetoric. In any case, Sparta's efforts to manipulate myths for her own ends left traces in the written record. For example, the connection between the traditions about the return of the Heraclidae and the ancestral myths of the Dorian communities served Sparta well when she started to expand her influence, and she managed to establish herself as a leading Dorian power.[14] Some non-Dorian areas were integrated into the myth of the Heraclidae, most notably Elis, which came to be seen as the land given to Oxylus, an Aetolian who acted as a guide for the invaders.[15]

Not all Peloponnesian tribes could, however, fit into a Dorian Peloponnese. The Arcadians, for example, remained proud to be autochthons who had been there long before the Dorians, and the Achaeans claimed descent from the people who had

[11] Paus. 7.1.1-9, 6.1.1-3; 8.1.4-8.5.6.

[12] Apollod. 2.8.2, Diod. 4.58.1-4, Hdt. 9.26.2-5, Paus. 1.41.2, 1.44.10, 8.5.1, 8.45.3, 8.53.10.

[13] Apollod. 2.8.4, Diod. 7.9.1, Pindar *Pyth*. 5.70, Paus. 2.18.6-7, 4.3.3-6; See Hall 1997, 56-99.

[14] Hall 1997, 56-66, Hall 2002, 82-9, Malkin 1994, 38-43.

[15] Strabo 8.3.30, Paus. 5.3.; See Hall 2002, 80-1 (with additional examples).

inhabited the Argolid and Laconia before the Dorians had arrived on the scene.[16] In fact, some groups may well have become more inclined to describe themselves as distinctly non-Dorian as they faced growing Spartan pressure. Sparta apparently tried to deal with this problem by forging connections with the pre-Dorian past. Herodotus reports that the Spartans took the bones of Orestes from Tegea to seal their victory over the Arcadian city. Pausanias reports a further similar incident, when the bones of Tisamenus, son of Orestes, were taken from Helice in Achaea.[17] These activities allowed Sparta to align herself with the last two kings who had ruled the whole peninsula, figures with whom all Peloponnesians, and particularly those who claimed pre-Dorian roots, could be expected to identify. Herodotus rates the transfer of Orestes' bones to Sparta as a success, because it allowed Sparta to gain an upper hand over Tegea and to impose a treaty of alliance, the first in a series of similar alliances which were to become the Peloponnesian League.[18]

These early attempts to manipulate pre-Dorian myths did not, however, result in a lasting symbolic foundation for a Spartan-led Peloponnese. Orestes never became a unifying hero for Sparta's league, and any pan-Peloponnesian feelings were never strong enough to compete with, let alone supersede, traditional tribal/regional identities.[19] It seems that Sparta therefore soon became resigned to leading a league of states without clearly defined mythical links. This is remarkable because in other contexts ancestral relationships remained a preferred way of underpinning interstate relations, even those on a grand scale. The Peloponnesian league therefore represents a kind of experiment: Sparta managed to ensure a long-lasting co-operation of states which as a whole group could not claim any special ancestral links.

Sparta may not have been able to change the past, but her activities did change the way in which outsiders saw the Peloponnese and its inhabitants. As we have already seen, in archaic literature the Peloponnese generally appears as a geographical entity. By the fifth century, however, the name had acquired distinct political connotations. For example, Herodotus reports that in ca. 506 BC Cleomenes I recruited an army 'from the whole Peloponnese' (*ἐκ πάσης Πελοποννήσου*).[20] In this context it is impossible that the 'whole Peloponnese' is actually meant to be the whole geographical area, because a number of states remained outside the league

[16] Achaea: Paus. 7.1.7; Arcadia: Paus. 8.1.4-6, see also 2.14.4; cf. Ephorus *FGrHist.* 70 F113 in Strabo 5.2.4, Hdt. 1.146; Dowden 1992, 80-3.

[17] Orestes: Hdt. 1.67-8; Paus. 8.54.4, 3.3.6, tomb in Sparta: 3.11.10; Tisamenus: Paus. 7.1.8. See also Leahy 1955, Ste Croix 1972, 96, Dowden 1992, 91, Tausend 1992, 24, 172-3.

[18] Wickert 1961, 12, Kagan 1969, 10-12, Ste Croix 1972, 97, Sealey 1976, 253-4. See Plut. *Mor.* 277b-c, 292b = Arist. F.591-2 Rose.

[19] On the contrary, the league seemed to have contributed to a consolidation of regional identities. See Luraghi & Funke forthcoming.

[20] Hdt. 5.74.

and some, particularly Argos, were hostile to Sparta.[21] Herodotus is clearly thinking of the area included in the Peloponnesian League, and his matter-of-fact reference to 'the whole Peloponnese' in this context suggests that this association had become commonplace. Herodotus also offers the earliest references to Peloponnesians (*Πελοποννήσιοι*).[22] This represents an important step: what had merely been a geographical feature has become a defining characteristic for a particular group of people.

It is difficult to determine when Herodotus wrote the passages in question, but it seems likely that the term was well-established before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Athens and Sparta had been in conflict since the late 460s at least, and there was plenty of time to adapt the Greek language to the growing divide between the two great power blocks before the situation finally escalated into a major conflict. Thucydides demonstrates that it remained possible to think of the Peloponnese as a precise geographical category which was distinct from the area included in the Peloponnesian League,[23] but he, too, generally refers to Peloponnesians as shorthand for the Spartans and their allies. At the same time, however, it seems that the term 'Peloponnesian' never became a universal label for all supporters of Sparta no matter where they were located. When Thucydides reports Peloponnesian speeches he carefully distinguishes different modes of address depending on the audience: league members living inside the Isthmus are called 'Peloponnesians', but the address becomes 'Peloponnesians and allies' (*ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι*) when allied states from outside the peninsula are present.[24]

Once the Peloponnesian War was under way, there was a particular need to conflate complex categories into simple labels, and, as Herodotus shows, even in its early phase the conflict had become 'the war of the Athenians and Peloponnesians'.[25] The term 'Peloponnesian War' (*Πελοποννησιακὸς πόλεμος*), is, however, later and first appears in Diodorus.[26] This is not exactly surprising, since Sparta and her allies would hardly have found the term appropriate. In fact, Thucydides carefully varies his terminology depending on the context, with Athenians referring to the War against the Peloponnesians or the 'Doric War', and

[21] Thuc. 5.77 (treaty between Argos and Sparta of 418 BC) is a notable exception.

[22] E.g. Hdt. 2.171; Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F115.3 is also an early example which could predate Thucydides.

[23] Thuc. 1.13.5, 2.9.2.

[24] Thuc. 2.11.1; see also 5.77 (treaty between Sparta and Argos). References to Peloponnesian allies alone: Thuc. 1.71.7 (Corinthians speaking), 1.82.5. (Archidamus speaking).

[25] Hdt. 7.137, 9.73, Thuc. 1.1.1.

[26] E.g. Diod. 12.37.2, 13.107.5; possibly based on fourth-century sources (Ephorus)? See Hornblower 1995, 60 with n.65, Ste Croix 1972, 294-5.

the Spartans and their allies speaking of the War against the Athenians and even the 'Attic War'.[27]

Since by the late fifth century the label 'Peloponnesians' was so clearly connected with conflict between Sparta's alliance and outside enemies its mere existence cannot not tell us much about the attitude of the peninsula's inhabitants themselves, unless we can identify instances where the term is clearly used from an insider's perspective. It seems clear that a general association between 'the Lacedaemonians and their allies' and the whole Peloponnese would have suited Sparta, since it reflected her aspirations to control the whole peninsula, particularly in opposition to Argos. Apparently Sparta referred to her allies in geographical terms as early as in the period just after the Persian Wars. Herodotus quotes the epigrams inscribed on the monuments at Thermopylae, and the four thousand Spartan allies who fought there are simply labelled as 'from the Peloponnese' (*ἐκ Πελοποννάσου*).[28] They are not yet 'Peloponnesians' proper, but the epigram acknowledges that simply referring to the allies as coming from the Peloponnese was already the most convenient way of describing them all, a lowest common denominator which steered clear of the issue of tribal affiliations or ancestral connections, particularly the rift between Dorian and non-Dorian allies in the league.

This example illustrates why for the allies, too, 'Peloponnesian-ness' could offer an advantage. It allowed them to have something in common with other communities in Sparta's alliance without having to deny their own tribal identities. The Peloponnesian League provides a context where such a strictly regional identity could indeed become useful at times, at least alongside the more usual tribal and *polis* affiliations. In this context we need to appreciate the longevity of the Peloponnesian League: the general consensus is that Sparta started to build alliances with neighbouring states around 550 BC,[29] and by the end of the century the league included most or all of Arcadia and stretched as far as Corinth, Sparta's most important and influential ally.[30] The greatest extent of the league was reached sometime during the Peloponnesian War, when only Argos and a part of the Argolid remained outside.[31] After the war Corinth left the alliance,[32] but Sparta's grip on most of the peninsula remained firm until its unexpected and devastating defeat at Leuctra in 371 BC. The Peloponnesian League therefore survived for about 180 years, an impressive time span, especially in the context of historical developments in Greece during the late Archaic and Classical periods.

---

[27] Athenian point of view: e.g. 1.44.2, 2.54.2; Peloponnesian point of view: 8.18.2, 8.37.4, Attic War: 5.28.2, 5.31.3.

[28] Hdt. 7.228.1.

[29] Ste Croix 1972, 97, Sealey 1976, 253-4, Nielsen 2002, 188-90.

[30] Hdt. 1.68.6, 5.74-6. For Corinth see Salmon 1984, 247-51.

[31] Sparta's allies in 431: Thuc. 2.9; Achaeans: Thuc. 5.82.1. See Ste Croix 1972, 123-4.

[32] Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19, 2.4.30, 3.2.25, 3.5.5,

Many of the allies went through phases of doubtful loyalty to Sparta, and there were times when Peloponnesian states openly opposed their *hegemon*. Member states also went to war against each other, and some even managed to build up their own systems of alliances.[33] It seems that Sparta was willing to condone such conflicts, at least as long as they did not threaten to destabilise the whole region.[34] It is clear that cohesion within the league was by no means stable, but even those states which attempted to maintain some independence always remained in the orbit of Sparta. In spite of these moments of internal conflict most allied communities were involved in league activities for generations. I would like to argue that this co-operation within Sparta's alliance had long-term consequences on the way in which Peloponnesians saw themselves as a group.

The most conspicuous duty of the league members was to contribute troops for allied campaigns. At least from the mid-fifth century onwards the league was on campaign every few years, and in times of war the allied army would be called to arms annually, with some campaigns lasting through the winter. This means that many men from Peloponnesian *poleis*, especially the smaller states which rarely engaged in war by themselves, would have seen most of their active service in the context of large, allied armies. It seems likely that this would have led to increased personal contacts between Peloponnesians, not just among leaders, but also among common hoplites.[35] Moreover, while allied armies in the Greek world could be a liability because they found it difficult to create and maintain the cohesion necessary for success,[36] Peloponnesian troops were comparatively good at acting in concert, even if they found themselves surprised by the enemy.[37] This would suggest that there was a 'Peloponnesian' way of conducting campaigns, presumably a routine strongly influenced by Spartan practice. This might explain why Peloponnesian

[33] Hdt. 9.35.2 with Andrewes 1952; Mantinea: Thuc. 5.28.3-29.2, 5.33.1-3, 5.67.2, 5.81.1; Mantinea vs. Tegea: Thuc. 4.134, Nielsen 2002, 142-5, 364-74; Elis: Hdt. 4.148, Thuc. 5.31.1-5, Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-31, Roy 1997.

[34] E.g. Thuc. 1.103.4, 4.134, 5.29.1, 5.33, Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.36. See Ste Croix 1972, 120-2, Cartledge 1987, 248-9, 257-9.

[35] Pretzler forthcoming, Berent 2000, Smith 1986, 78-9, Hanson 1989, 117-21.

[36] Pritchett 1974, 190-3, 206; e.g. Hdt. 9.52-7 (Plataea), Thuc 8.25 (Miletus), Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18-23 (Nemea), 4.3.17-19 (Coronea), 4.4.10 (Corinth, 392 BC), Paus. 9.13.8 (Leuctra: Epaminondas sends the Thespians away to avoid problems). See also Thuc. 7.44, *cf.* 7.57-8 (problems with cultural differences in Sicily).

[37] E.g. Thuc. 5.64-74 (battle of Mantinea in 418 BC): note Thucydides' emphasis on Spartan drill; the Arcadian allies in the Spartan phalanx were apparently able to keep up; see also Nemea (394 BC): Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.13-23.

mercenaries had such a good reputation, as we see especially in Xenophon's account of how Cyrus recruited the Ten Thousand.[38]

On a political level, there is also an increase in co-operation between Peloponnesian states, and an involvement by members of many small poleis in political decisions that affected the whole peninsula. The Peloponnesian League was a set of bilateral agreements between Sparta and individual states, with no requirement for multilateral agreements between all member states, which allowed Sparta to call up allied troops for her campaigns. Sparta soon found, however, that she needed to consult her allies on major initiatives to avoid disagreements on campaign.[39] Initially this may have been done by informal consultation of important allies, but by the 430s at the latest there were formal league councils in which the allies could vote on Sparta's proposals of particular policies or campaigns. Every member state had a vote, and majority decisions would be binding for all.[40] Some issues seem to have inspired lively debates among the allies, and this is not surprising, because anyone seeking to achieve a particular decision could attempt to assemble a coalition of likeminded states. The one-member-one-vote system ensured that very small communities could also play a role, and would not be forgotten in negotiations to secure majorities. All of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies therefore had to consider matters of regional policy: no member state could ignore the activities and interests of the league, no matter whether they agreed with Sparta's plans or whether they were planning to oppose her proposals. In short, the allies had to learn how to 'think Peloponnesian', if they wanted to make the best of their membership in Sparta's alliance.

Sparta clearly played a crucial role in fostering increased interaction between her Peloponnesian allies, but the effects of co-operation within the league were not fully within her control. I would like to argue that while Sparta's allies learned to be Peloponnesians under the guidance of their *hegemon*, they also realised that they could use their regional perspective for their own ends, which did not always coincide with Sparta's interests. This is, in fact, a crucial step which suggests that there was such a thing as Peloponnesian identity beyond the immediate political context of Sparta's league. The earliest example is the reaction of the Peloponnesians to the threat of the Persian invasion on 480/79 BC. Herodotus suggests several times that they would have preferred to defend the Isthmus of Corinth and to leave central Greece to its fate.[41] This suggests a clear recognition of a distinct Peloponnesian

[38] Xen *Anab.* 1.1.6; most were presumably from the hoplite class of Sparta's allies, see Roy 2004, 267-76; possibly veterans of the Peloponnesian war: Diod. 14.34.4, Marinoviç 1988, 136, Tourraix 1999, 205.

[39] E.g. in 506 BC: Hdt. 5.74-5; Salmon 1984, 247-51.

[40] Thuc. 5.30.3 (binding on all members). See also Thuc. 1.67-8, 1.87.4, 1.120.2. League councils: Larsen 1932, 131-50, Larsen 1933, 257-76, Ste Croix 1972, 115-8.

[41] Hdt 8.49, 8.56-63, 8.40, 9.7-9.

agenda which was in stark contrast to the common Greek cause. What is more, it seems that Sparta found her allies reluctant to give up this position even after she had committed herself to contribute to the defence of central Greece.

A particularly curious example of Peloponnesian pride appears in Herodotus' report of the debate about the order of the Greek phalanx at Plataea. The Tegeans use an account of Echemus' victory over Hyllus to establish their position as Sparta's most distinguished ally.[42] They present themselves as competent defenders of the Peloponnese: the story therefore reflects a pan-Peloponnesian stance, but also a firmly pre-Dorian (or even anti-Dorian) one, since Echemus' victory kept the Dorians, including the mythical ancestors of the Spartans, from invading the peninsula for another three generations. Herodotus' account may be influenced by an interpretation of this tradition which would be more appropriate for a period in the 470s and 460s when Tegea was prominent in a coalition of Arcadians and other Peloponnesians against Sparta.[43] In any case, the story illustrates that some communities could engage in a form of pan-Peloponnesian rhetoric that did not take Spartan leadership for granted.

The Arcadians and Achaeans among the Ten Thousand in Xenophon's Anabasis united and protested that it was shameful for them as Peloponnesians to be led by an Athenian, namely Xenophon. In this case, Peloponnesian identity is appropriately invoked against an outsider, but it should be noted that this group speaks of 'Peloponnesians and Lacedaemonians' as if they were separate groups and also refuses to be led by the Spartan Cheirisophus.[44] It seems that the two groups, Achaeans and Arcadians, had united to pursue a common agenda, and found their shared Peloponnesian identity useful for particular arguments in their debate with the rest of the Greek army and its commanders.

The resilience of Peloponnesian identity was properly put to the test after the collapse of Sparta's alliance in 371 BC, when many of her allies, particularly the Arcadians, became allies of Thebes and adopted an anti-Spartan stance. But Peloponnesian arguments soon became useful again when the new Arcadian federal state split in two factions. Xenophon reports this as a conflict between a pro-Theban party and 'those concerned about the Peloponnese' who did not want it to be enslaved by outsiders (i.e. the Thebans).[45] This anti-Theban party, led by Mantinea, soon made a new alliance with Sparta. In this context a pan-Peloponnesian rhetoric offered a good diplomatic compromise: an emphasis on common Peloponnesian interests could accommodate the pan-Arcadian rhetoric which dominated regional

[42] Hdt. 9.26; cf. Pausanias 8.45.3, 47.2, 47.4, 48.4-5, 53.10, 54.4. Pretzler 1999, 109-11, 114-18; see also Pretzler 2007, 152-3.

[43] Pretzler forthcoming, Hdt. 9.35, Nielsen 2002, 142-5, 366-7; cf. Andrewes 1952.

[44] Xen. *Anab.* 6.2.9-12.

[45] Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.1.

politics, and it also made it easier for Mantinea to reverse its emphatically anti-Spartan stance.

There are few instances where Peloponnesian identity appears to be invoked independently from Sparta's interests, but these examples are significant. It seems clear that beyond Sparta's alliance pan-Peloponnesian rhetoric was an exception rather than the norm, and examples documented in the ancient sources are therefore relatively rare. 'Peloponnesian-ness' remained available when none of the many other possible group identities (tribes, regions) would serve to accommodate different states in search of common ground, and it remained sufficiently vague to accommodate various groups of communities and diverse political ideas, as long as they originated 'within the Isthmus'. An ethnically neutral geographical label was useful to facilitate co-operation within a region with a complex tribal landscape where the traditional channels of mythical relationships could present obstacles rather than connections. The idea that all inhabitants of the peninsula could claim that they had something in common was therefore not forgotten for a long time: Polybius demonstrates that pan-Peloponnesian arguments were still useful to the Achaean League of the third and second centuries BC.[46] The fact that the concept of 'Peloponnesian-ness' developed a life of its own, independently from the organisation which created it, shows how significant it had become to the Peloponnesians themselves. The idea of the Peloponnese as more than just a geographical unit was one of Sparta's lasting legacies.

REFERENCES

Andrewes, A. 1952. Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century. *Phoenix* 6:1-5.

Baladié, R. 1980. *Le Péloponnèse de Strabon*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

Berent, M. 2000. Anthropology and the Classics: War, violence and the stateless *polis*. *Classical Quarterly* 50:257-89.

Cartledge, P. 1987. *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Dowden, K. 1992. *The Uses of Greek Mythology*. London: Routledge.

Hall, J.M. 1997. *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——. 2002. *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hanson, V.D. 1989. *The Western Way of War*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[46] Polyb. 2.37.9-11.

Hornblower, S. 1995. The Fourth Century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 115:47-68.

Janko, R. 1982. *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns. Diachronic Development in Epic Diction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kagan, D. 1969. *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Larsen, J.A.O. 1932. Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: A study of Spartan foreign policy and the genesis of the Peloponnesian League. *Classical Philology* 27:131-50.

———. 1933. The constitution of the Peloponnesian League. *Classical Philology* 28:257-76.

Leahy, M. 1955. The bones of Tisamenus. *Historia* 4:26-38.

Luraghi, N. and Funke, P. (eds.). Forthcoming. *The Politics of Ethnicity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McInerney, J. 1999. *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and ethnicity in ancient Phokis*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Malkin, I. 1994. *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marinoviç, L. P. 1988. *Le mercenariat grec au IVe siècle av. notre ère et la crise de la polis*. Paris: Belles Lettres.

Nielsen T.H. 1999, The Concept of Arkadia: The people, their land, and their organisation. In *Defining Ancient Arkadia*, edited by T.H. Nielsen and J. Roy: 16-79. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

———. 2002, *Arkadia and its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Pretzler, M. 1999. Myth and History at Tegea: Local tradition and community identity. In *Defining Ancient Arkadia*, edited by T.H. Nielsen and J. Roy: 89-129. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

———. 2007. *Pausanias. Travel Writing in Ancient Greece*. London: Duckworth.

———. Forthcoming. Arcadia: Ethnicity and Politics in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries. In *The Politics of Ethnicity*, edited by N. Luraghi and P. Funke. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pritchett, W.K. 1974. *The Greek State at War II*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Roy, J. 1972. Arcadian Nationality as seen in Xenophon's *Anabasis. Mnemosyne* 25: 129-36.

———. 1997. The *Perioikoi* of Elis. In *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as Political Community*, edited by M.H. Hansen: 282-320. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

———. 2004. The Ambitions of a Mercenary. In *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, edited by R. Lane Fox: 264-88. New Haven: Yale University Press.

de Ste Croix, G.E.M. 1972. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. London: Duckworth.

Salmon, J.B. 1984. *Wealthy Corinth: A history of the city to 338 BC*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sealey, R. 1976. *A History of the Greek City-States 700-323 BC*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Smith, A. 1986. *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tausend, K. 1992. *Amphiktyonie und Symmachie. Formen zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen im archaischen Griechenland* (*Historia* Einzelschriften 73). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Tourraix, A. 1999. Les mercenaires grecs au service des chéménides. In *Guerres et sociétés dans les mondes grecs (490-322)*, P. Brun (ed.): 201-16. Paris: Ed. du Temps.

Wickert, K. 1961. *Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges*. Erlangen: n.p.