

American Foreign Economic Policy and the Internationalist Coalition: Legislative Coalitions Supporting Internationalism in American Trade and Aid Policy

By

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Abstract

Since 1945, American foreign economic policy has been oriented toward engagement with the international system. Given the changes in world politics and economics as well as American domestic politics over the past twenty years, many scholars have wondered whether American foreign economic policy might change. What groups have supported this internationalist policy since the late 1970s, and has this coalition changed over this period? We examine legislative voting in the US House of Representatives from the 96th to the 108th Congress (1979-2004) on trade and aid issues. We ask whether a stable, bipartisan coalition has persisted supporting trade and aid, what groups are represented by this coalition, and whether these coalitions are similar in the two areas. We show that these two coalitions differ in some important ways. Most interestingly, labor and liberal Democrats remain part of the coalition supporting aid, while they no longer do on trade.

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I. Introduction

Since 1945, American foreign economic policy has been oriented toward engagement with the international system. This internationalist policy orientation meant that American trade policy favored openness and lowering barriers to trade in goods and services, and that the US pursued a relatively generous program of giving foreign assistance to other countries. Prior to 1945, US policy was much more isolationist. Protection of the American market took pride of place in trade policy, and little, if any, foreign aid was ever given. Given the changes in world politics and economics as well as in American domestic politics over the past twenty years, many scholars have wondered whether American foreign policy might change (Ikenberry 2005). Would the internationalist policy be replaced by a more isolationist one?² This question reflects concerns about the stability of the bipartisan coalition that has supported this internationalist policy.

American foreign economic policy was designed for a world driven by the Cold War and by a serious North-South divide. Further, globalization was very limited until 1980s when developing countries joined the world trading system in large numbers and many countries opened their capital markets. Finally, American domestic politics has changed much in the past twenty years with the Republican takeover of the Congress and increasing polarization of party politics (McCarty, Poole et al. 2006). These internal and external changes could well have disrupted the bipartisan coalition that supported American international economic engagement since 1945. Our central questions follow from this concern: what groups have supported an internationalist policy since the late 1970s, and has this coalition changed over this period? Further, we seek to understand whether the same groups support international engagement via trade as through foreign aid.

We examine legislative voting in the US House of Representatives from the 96th to the 108th Congress (1979-2004) on trade and aid issues. We ask whether a stable, bipartisan coalition has persisted supporting trade and aid, and whether these coalitions are similar in the two areas. We show that each area does seem to have a supporting

² A second dimension of US foreign policy concerns unilateralism versus multilateralism. We address this dimension elsewhere.

coalition that has been remarkably stable over the past 25 years and that can be systematically predicted given the characteristics of legislator's districts and their ideologies. However, we show that these two coalitions differ in some important ways. Most interestingly, labor and liberal Democrats remain part of the coalition supporting aid where they no longer do on trade. Overall, Democrats have become much less supportive of trade than they once were, while they remain the major bulwark supporting aid. Our research is some of the first to study these coalitions and to compare trade and aid policy.

II. Theories of American Foreign Economic Policy

Most theories that address questions about the nature of foreign policy focus on one of three sets of factors. Some tend to look at a country's place in the international system and predict policy given that relative global position (see for example (Elman 1995; Haas 2007)). This approach is less helpful here since it seems to suggest that unanimous support for policy should be evident at home since all actors in the country share the country's same global position. Others focus most attention on the executive branch and on the preferences and beliefs of the executive (prime minister or president and cabinet)(Howell and Pevehouse 2007). Others pay more attention to domestic economic and social factors; for instance, those that explore trade policy emphasize often the economic characteristics of political actors' constituencies (e.g., (Hiscox 1999; Ladewig 2006)). Our approach uses the last two set of theories to explore the nature of the coalitions supporting and opposing aid and trade policy in the US.

Unlike most other studies of foreign policy, we focus our attention on the legislature and in particular the House. We think that legislators in the House closely reflect the interests, ideas, and concerns of their constituents. They have the shortest (re)election periods, the smallest constituencies, and higher turnover rates (Collier and Munger 1994). Hence they may well represent the groups that support and oppose trade and aid policy.

Furthermore, while the president in the US controls foreign policy, in trade and aid the president needs the assent of Congress to implement his policies. In trade, the Constitution gives the Congress explicit control over most trade policy, largely since it is


a matter of taxes. For the president to lower trade barriers or sign agreements with other countries requires that he receive congressional assent. Presidents thus must bargain with Congress for trade negotiating authority in which the President can lower US barriers by certain amounts in exchange for foreign concessions and the international deal returns to Congress for majority votes in both houses with no amendments. We examine both types of bills below: presidential authorization to negotiate and final passage of trade agreements. In foreign aid, the president also needs congressional approval since this involves taxing and spending. Congress must agree to his proposals to appropriate and allocate funds for foreign aid each year. Unlike in trade, aid spending authority is usually part of a much larger foreign operations bill. Committees amend the president's proposals and it is votes on these amendments that we examine. Hence, although the exact processes differ, the president requires congressional majorities to implement his foreign policies in both of these areas. He must build coalitions in congress to support his policies (and defeat those of his opponents). Thus, an analysis of the nature of these legislative coalitions that support and oppose aid and trade can tell us much about the underlying sources of support in the US for an internationalist policy.

The President proposes most foreign policy initiatives, such as trade liberalization agreements, and presents budgets to Congress for foreign aid giving. Majorities in Congress must approve his proposals before they can be implemented. Who are these majorities, and what groups do they represent? Why would legislators support an internationalist policy of generous aid and trade liberalization? The former involves giving American taxpayers' money to people who live outside the US and do not vote there; and the second involves letting imports from foreign countries potentially displace domestic production and jobs in goods and service industries. A first hypothesis that must be entertained, our null hypothesis, is that legislators simply vote idiosyncratically on these issues. Both issue areas may seem arcane and distant from the domestic concerns of their constituents; they may also be seen as unimportant, having few, if any, consequences for their constituents. In this view, no stable coalition of legislators should appear in support of aid and trade. No set of factors should be able to systematically explain legislators' votes on trade and aid policy, since they (and their constituents) either do not have preferences or do not know them in these areas.

How important are trade and aid policy to the US? American trade dependence has grown much since the 1970s. By 2000, roughly 25% of the US economy was exposed to trade; that is, exports and imports accounted for a quarter of GDP. Imports since 2000 have been well over \$1 trillion per year, and exports from the US close to \$1 trillion (WTO, 2006: table II.4). Trade has become an increasingly salient part of the US economy; one in four jobs now relate to trade. Aid has been a less salient part of the US economy, but not an insignificant one. Aid has been less than 1% of US GDP since the Marshall Plan ended. Nevertheless, the US is the largest absolute donor of aid in the world since its GDP is so large. As shown in figure 1, the amount of aid is also similar in many years of our sample to the amount of direct government spending on agricultural supports, an area that has received considerable scholarly attention (Poole and Daniels 1985; Hansen 1991). Undoubtedly, aid is a smaller economic factor than trade, but it is certainly not insignificant. The fact that much foreign aid is tied to domestic suppliers suggests that legislators and domestic groups see aid as valuable; an estimated 72% of US aid in 2006, according to experts in the field, remains tied (CenterForGlobalDevelopment 2007). Furthermore, aid involves a tax on the American public that is redistributed to groups outside the US, whereas free trade does not. Hence one might even expect aid to be more visible and controversial than trade policy, even though trade has a broader impact.³

Figure 1: Aid vs. Agricultural Support

³ Note that non-military aid is no longer primarily directed toward Israel and Egypt. In 1998, a deal was struck to end all non-military aid to Israel and to halve all non-military aid to Egypt in ten years. In the FY08 budget proposed, Israel no longer gets any non-military aid and Egypt gets less than half of what it got in the 90s—less than \$400 million.



Source (GPO 2004; OECD/DAC 2007)

What factors might shape legislators' votes on trade and aid policy? Our null hypothesis is that they vote idiosyncratically and that no variables should systematically account for their choices. A milder version of this view is that legislators follow the president's lead. Presidents propose foreign policy and legislators vote in favor of it if they come from the president's party and against it if they are from the opposition party (Howell and Pevehouse 2007). In this version, legislators (and their constituents) take cues from the President and following party loyalty vote in accord with the president. Legislators thus have no preferences regarding trade and aid and/or no incentives to find them out. This argument suggests no stable coalition of legislators supporting aid and trade policy should exist; rather, the coalitions will change as the president's party and his interests change. We also test this presidential dominance hypothesis.

If legislators do not vote idiosyncratically, or are guided by forces other than the President, what might explain the way they vote? We think that two sets of factors may systematically explain legislators' votes on aid and trade: their economic interests and their ideological predispositions. Legislators have to balance a number of factors in their decision making on how to vote. They desire most of all to remain in office as long as they can. Such an office seeking motivation leads them to pay attention to their constituents. These voters, however, need not know much about policy nor pay much

attention to issues and their preferences over them. But they do often vote legislative incumbents out of office when bad outcomes arise for them. Such punishment of incumbents and the fear of it motivate legislators to develop preferences about all sorts of policies that could affect outcomes in their districts.

Avoiding such bad outcomes (and sometimes being rewarded for good ones) means that legislators may vote according to the distributional consequences that policies are expected to have for their constituents. These distributional consequences in turn depend on the economic characteristics of their districts. Trade and aid, according to various theories, have distributional consequences, and different districts because of their different economic compositions will experience the costs and benefits of aid and trade flows differently. Thus we anticipate that the district level economic consequences that legislators expect to follow from aid and trade policies shape their preferences about trade and aid policy. Given that these economic characteristics should be slow to change, we expect that these district level factors may produce a fairly stable coalition even as a district's representative changes.

Legislators may also have ideas and beliefs about the value of aid and trade not directly related to their economic consequences. These beliefs, which we call ideology, may relate to how they view their moral obligations to the rest of the world, how they view charity and individual effort, or how they view government intervention in the economy. Furthermore, these beliefs may be ones that legislators hold individually, or they may represent the beliefs that legislators feel that their constituents hold. If legislators expect that publics do not care about aid or trade policy and that these have negligible effects on their district, legislators may vote their own ideological preferences. On the other hand, if they expect that their constituents (or at least some of them) will demand an explanation for their votes, then giving them one that fits with their constituents' own beliefs may be optimal. The main ideological arguments that we test rely on legislators trying to satisfy the ideological predispositions of their district. In this latter case, a stable coalition of internationalist supporters based on constituent ideologies may be created even if legislators change.

III. Theory and Hypotheses about Economic Interests.

We examine whether legislators vote to support foreign aid and trade liberalization based on their potential district level effects. When aid or trade increases political support for legislators in their districts, they tend to vote in favor of it; or more conservatively, when the prospect of greater aid giving or greater trade flows does not erode their political support, legislators may vote in favor of it. We focus on three basic elements that affect their political support for foreign economic policy: 1) the economic composition of their districts and 2) the activities of interest groups like labor unions and capital associations, and 3) legislators' party affiliations. To be reelected, legislators must respond to the interests of their constituents, and districts vary in their constituents' interests because their constituents differ. International economic policy may not directly engage voters, but it can have domestic distributional consequences that do affect voters' lives. Legislators anticipate how these influences will affect their district and vote accordingly.

Two well-established, but competing theoretical models, the Ricardo-Viner (RV) and Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorems, make predictions about who the winners and losers will be from international economic integration (Rogowski 1989). Many have shown that these theorems accurately predict congressional voting patterns on US trade policy (e.g., (Baldwin and McGee 2000; Beaulieu 2002; Fleck 2002; Ladewig 2006). We extend these well-known results to foreign aid because international foreign aid patterns are closely related to other international economic flows (Husain 1993; Alesina and Dollar 2000). Each of these models leads us to predictions about the role of three factors in legislative voting: the economic characteristics of districts, interest groups pressures, and party affiliation (Hiscox 2002).

The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which assumes that factors can easily move across industries, predicts that the distributional consequences of international economic policies will vary by factors of production. That is, those who own more capital and those who own only their own labor will differ in their preferences over these policies since they will differentially gain (and lose) from them. This model sees the primary cleavage as one between capital and labor on many issues, especially trade. In advanced industrial countries, which are abundant in capital, the relatively scarce factor, labor—especially unskilled labor—will lose from policies that open the economy to the world and its

poorer economies. Increasing trade leads to changes in the relative prices of commodities that negatively affect real returns to low skilled workers in the rich country. Hence in rich countries constituencies that are relatively abundant in capital and high skilled workers will gain from trade openness, whereas districts abundant in unskilled labor will lose.

In addition, the Stolper-Samuelson framework predicts that overarching interest groups which represent either capital or labor should be active players, lobbying and pressuring legislators to adopt their favored position. These groups should be internally united on their preferences toward trade; thus, it predicts that PAC support to legislators by capital and labor groups should be an important component of legislators' decisions (Hiscox 2002). Labor groups should contribute to legislators who vote against bills to liberalize trade, while capital groups should actively support such bills. We are not arguing here that PAC contributions are necessarily causal; instead we want to see which groups contribute to which side of the debate since we seek to identify who supports and opposes aid and trade. Finally, party affiliation in the US should also matter. If Democrats reflect the interests of labor and Republicans reflect the interests of capital, broadly speaking, then each party should have a unified view on trade, with Republicans supporting it and Democrats opposing it. This model then generates a series of predictions that are distinct from those of our null hypothesis.

The Ricardo-Viner theorem, or specific factors model, sees the major groups in the economy as those organized around different industries, and not factors of production. Since factors of production are not mobile but specific to an industry in this model, groups like capital and labor that work in the same industry face the same distributional consequences from international economic policies. If an industry gains (loses) from foreign trade or aid, all factors of production (i.e., capital and labor) in that industry should support (oppose) policies that promote trade or aid. The Ricardo-Viner model then focuses on the district level characteristics associated with trade flows: in particular, export oriented versus import competing industries. It predicts that districts with a very high percentage of industries that compete against imports will be disadvantaged by free trade compared to districts that have a high number of export competing industries. The relative composition of industry in terms of its external orientation (import competing

and export oriented) determines whether the district gains or loses on balance from greater global integration.

In addition, the specific factors model predicts that interest groups representing capital owners across the economy or labor generally should be unable to form a unified position on trade; they will be divided in their policy preferences by their sectoral characteristics. Groups representing capital, for instance, will be divided in their preferences between those who are mainly exporters and want freer trade and those who face important competition and desire protectionism. Hence one expects overarching labor and capital groups to be unimportant players in trade policy (Hiscox 2002, pgs. 38-40). Capital and labor PACs should not be significantly associated with any side in the debates over aid and trade. Further, specific factors models imply that party affiliation should not be an important predictor either. Since the American party system reflects strongly a class cleavage between labor in the Democratic party and capital in the Republican party, these parties, like capital and labor themselves, should be highly internally divided on trade. Neither party should be significantly associated with one side or the other in the debate over trade and aid. The specific factors model then sets forth predictions for these three sets of influences on legislators, ones which differ from the SS model and our null hypothesis.

How do these models apply to foreign aid? Foreign aid is usually a transfer from a rich, capital abundant country to a poor, unskilled labor abundant one. The economic consequences of such transfers have been debated for the last century since Leontieff (1936) identified possible ways in which such transfers could immiserize the recipient country and Samuelson (1954) showed the general conditions under which they would always help a poor recipient. Theory and empirical research since then have pointed out that the economic consequences of aid may vary substantially depending on the recipient's political and economic situation ((Burnside and Dollar 2000), though see (Easterly 2003)).

The literature on aid usually argues that aid benefits recipients, often increasing their growth, investment, and exports (Chenery and Strout 1966; Brakman and Marrewijk 1998; Crosswell 1998; Morrissey 2001). Foreign aid tends to go to countries with lower labor costs with the goal of developing their economies and turning them into trading

partners with donor countries. Aid can be a way to increase the exports of the recipient country, as it increases the productivity of labor (e.g., through better education, access to productive technologies) and/or lowers transport costs (e.g., building a port). Aid—if effective—can create and foster industries in developing countries that will engage labor, including the many low skill workers residing in recipient countries. Production costs will be lower, allowing competitive exports to the donor country that will compete with its domestic low skill industries. On the other hand, donor country exporters are a frequently cited beneficiary of foreign aid, both due to direct aid contracts, future recipient country needs for US wares, and market liberalization in poor countries.

According to this view of the consequences of aid, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Ricardo-Viner model predict the same coalitions for aid as for trade in the rich donor countries. For Stolper-Samuelson, aid will advantage districts well endowed with capital and high skilled labor and harm those abundant with unskilled labor. Interest groups that represent capital generally should favor aid. For example, following Broz, we hypothesize that private financial institutions serving international credit markets—so-called money centered banks—should favor foreign aid. A potential implication of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is that (unskilled) labor in rich donor countries will oppose foreign aid. Several other studies of foreign aid have noted the role of labor in foreign aid, but none have systematically analyzed why they would support or oppose foreign aid (O'Leary 1967; Morrissey, Smith et al. 1992; Morrissey 1996). Following the Stolper-Samuelson theorem we begin with the hypothesis that labor will oppose aid. Furthermore, the Stolper-Samuelson model predicts that parties that represent capital should favor aid, and those that represent labor, especially unskilled labor, should oppose it.

For the Ricardo-Viner theorem, capital and labor in districts dominated by import competing industries should oppose aid since it lowers their returns. Conversely, capital and labor in export-oriented districts should support aid since it buoys their returns.⁴ And

⁴ Other research has shown that under certain conditions aid does not work to advantage the recipient and rather harms it to the benefit of the donor country (Ovaska 2003; Economides, Kalyvitis et al. March 2004). Aid induces a form of Dutch Disease in the poor country (Corden 1984; Rajan and Subramanian 2005; Arellano, Bulíř et al. June 2005), which leads to exchange rate appreciation, the increased consumption of nontradable goods, and a decline in exports and tradables generally (though see (Nkusu 2004)). It also induces an increase in the exports of donor countries to the recipient through these same channels. In this

interest groups that represent broad associations of capital or labor should not matter since they will be too divided in their preferences to take an active stance. The same dilemma will face the Republican and Democratic parties; the specific factors model suggests that they will be so internally divided over aid that they will be unable to take a unified party position on it.

These two theorems generate different predictions about the underlying bases of support for and opposition to trade and aid policies. A number of studies have asked which of these two theorems provides the better explanation for trade (e.g., (Beaulieu 2002; Ladewig 2006)). That is not our intent here. We think that both of these theorems could find support since the main difference between them lies in their assumption about labor and capital mobility domestically. The US economy is large and diverse enough that such mobility probably varies across industries and regions as well as over time, meaning that we could find support in the data for both theories. We simply ask whether either of these models can help explain the coalitions that have formed in support of aid and trade. We contrast both of these models and their predictions with our null hypothesis and the presidential dominance one.

IV. Three Notions of Ideology and Hypotheses about their Influence.

A long debate has occurred over the relative role of ideology and interests in legislative voting (e.g., (Kalt and Zupan 1993)). We think that it is important to try to distinguish these two factors, but that they both are likely to matter for legislators. Both ideology and economic interest could form the basis of a stable coalition of internationalist supporters. Ideology is harder to define than economic interests. We can think of at least three sets of values that might lead legislators to favor international engagement by the US with the rest of the world. As noted above, legislators themselves may hold these views, or legislators may think that their constituents (the majority of them) hold these beliefs and thus act on their behalf.

view, aid has consequences distinct from those of increased trade in the donor country. Aid may reduce the exports of the labor rich recipient economy and may increase its demand for exports from the donor country, thus benefiting both capital and labor and exporters and importers in the donor country. In this case, we would not expect the distinctions hypothesized by the Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher Ohlin models between factors and sectors to matter.

A first set of beliefs we label ‘cosmopolitanism’. This ideology is usually associated with a belief that all humans are equal and equally deserving of human rights, and that national borders do not make a difference to the kinds of transactions that should occur (e.g., (Kant; Beitz 1979, pg. 181-182; Barry 1989; Appiah 2006)). It includes the notion that there is one global political community to which all humans belong and have obligations. Cosmopolitanism is often associated with open-mindedness, tolerance and secular rationalism, all of which supposedly come from broad knowledge of the world and its diversity. Cosmopolitans, we argue, should favor aid and free trade since they are mechanisms of exchange with the rest of the world that are common domestically. We would expect districts and legislators that are more cosmopolitan to be the backbone of support for an internationalist coalition.

A second source of ideological influence might come from association with religious groups. Deep religiosity of whatever form may lead individuals to have greater sympathy with the poor and greater support for charity internationally as well as domestically. Identification with groups sharing one’s religion across borders may also create beliefs favorable to foreign aid and perhaps even foreign trade. Note that many suspect that cosmopolitanism and religiosity are antitheses, and hence very different ideologies may create support for internationalism. Certain religions may also be more favorable to foreign aid and trade than others. Districts with significant proportions of deeply religious groups or with high concentrations of particular religious groups may be more likely to support aid; we have less reason to suspect any relation to their views on free trade.

Finally, our traditional left-right ideology may help explain views toward aid and trade. The left-right political spectrum often identifies the left with beliefs about the importance of government intervention in the economy, especially to deal with redistribution of wealth to the poor (Bobbio 1996; McCarty, Poole et al. 2006). The right on this spectrum is associated with beliefs about the value of individual effort and the value of the market above all as means of wealth distribution; government intervention is often seen as inefficient and ineffective, as well as morally undesirable. Given these beliefs, one would expect individuals holding left values to favor aid and to be opposed to free trade; on the other hand, those holding right-wing values should favor free trade and

oppose aid as a form of government intervention to redistribute wealth globally. We would expect districts (or legislators) with more left wing views to support aid and oppose free trade, while more right wing ones should support trade and oppose aid. Ideology defined as a left-right scale would split the internationalist coalition over the value of aid versus trade. A president valuing both might have to construct an ideological coalition of opposites to garner support for both elements of internationalism.

Our hypotheses are:

1. SS: The greater the concentration of capital (human or physical) in a district, the higher the probability that the legislator votes in favor of trade liberalization and foreign aid.
2. SS: The larger the contributions and activities of interest groups representing capital (labor), the higher (lower) the probability that the legislator votes in favor of trade liberalization and foreign aid.
3. SS: Republican legislators should be more likely to vote in favor of trade liberalization and foreign aid.
4. RV: The more export oriented industry relative to import competing sectors in a district, the higher the probability that the legislator votes in favor of trade liberalization and foreign aid.
5. Ideology: The more cosmopolitan ideology the members of a district hold, the greater the likelihood that the legislator votes in favor of trade liberalization and foreign aid.
7. Ideology: The greater the percentage of religious believers valuing charity in a district, the higher the probability that the legislator votes in favor of trade liberalization and foreign aid.
8. Ideology: The more left leaning the members of a district is, the greater the probability that the legislator votes in favor of foreign aid but the less likely the legislator votes in favor of trade liberalization.

V. Empirical Evaluation of the Hypotheses

Research Design

Our analysis focuses on legislative voting in the US House of Representatives from the 96th-108th Congress. We seek to tap legislators' general sentiments toward trade and foreign aid. Our dependent variable is the probability that a legislators votes in favor

of trade and foreign aid. To identify the proper population of votes relating to aid and trade policy, we utilized the Voteworld program, various publications by the Congressional Quarterly, and the Congressional Record. With this population of votes (itself a subset of all House votes) we selected a sample of votes that met certain criteria set out *a priori* that identify the votes that most saliently tapped legislator positions on aid and trade. Votes in the sub-sample are considered ‘high saliency’ and form the core dependent variable in the analysis below. We also sampled a set of votes that were not as salient, and discuss how our empirical findings change if we include these votes as well. As any scholar of Congress surely knows, identifying this sample required examining considerable legislative detail to make sure that the votes included concern the issues we ascribe to them in our analysis.

We include aid votes that satisfied the following criteria. First, we identified the universe of amendments related to foreign aid that received roll call votes in the House between 1979-2004 (96th-108th Congress). Second, we selected a subset that had a clear legislative consequence of increasing or decreasing foreign aid funding, such that they could be unambiguously coded. This requires that we exclude procedural, conference report, and final passage votes; and it means that most of our votes involve amendments to final passage bills. While we are interested in separately analyzing the universe of final passage votes, our reading of the Congressional Record is that these votes concern a wide range of foreign operations issues, many of which are often orthogonal to foreign aid. Third, we do not consider amendments that involved specific countries or programs that primarily support specific countries (like the Economic Support Fund). Such votes tap geopolitical and country specific issues not related to general sentiments toward aid. Fourth, we excluded amendments that dealt with ‘hot-button’ issues, like abortion and AIDS, because these votes also tap a very different set of political issues. Fifth, we exclude votes on two specific, and important, types of foreign aid: food aid (PL480: Food for Peace program) and export promotion (Import Bank or the Overseas Private Investment Corporation). These programs definitely represent an important means of international engagement. We expect that if economic interests influence voting in our current sample, then they would be salient for votes on these programs. We are currently examining Congressional action on each of these programs, and look forward to giving

them a more detailed treatment than space allows here. Our selection process was designed to tap salient, yet still general, preferences for and against foreign aid.

We pursue a similar strategy with regard to trade votes. We include trade votes that 1) had clear consequences for US trade policy (e.g., were not procedural votes or ‘sense of Congress’ votes), 2) did not deal with individual products unless those products dealt with major US industries (e.g., steel, automobiles, textiles, sugar), and 3) had been used by previous scholars in roll call vote analysis and that further review indicated that the votes were sufficiently trade oriented.⁵ Most of our trade votes are final passage votes, as preceding floor votes on a particular trade bill—if they happened—tended to be procedural. Aid bills are appropriations bills, and tend to undergo a substantively important amendment process.

We chose our sample of Congress from the 96th-108th Congress primarily because this period covers a broad span of American political history that has witnessed many changes domestically and internationally. This sample also gives us variation on the party of the President, divided government, and the state of the US economy. We intend our votes to tap general preferences about foreign aid or trade. Thus we exclude votes that focus on single countries or single issues besides aid or trade. Our votes are similar enough to get at this general preference, but not so similar that they merely inflate our number of observations without adding new information. We are currently building a similar sample for the Senate.

Our dependent variables then are two: a legislator’s vote on aid bills and his/her vote on trade bills. Votes were recoded so that a 1 equaled support for aid and trade liberalization, while a 0 indicated opposition. We estimate the probability that a legislator votes in favor of aid or trade given a series of characteristics about his or her district.

Empirical Analysis.

We begin our discussion of the empirical results with a series of graphs that illustrate interesting differences between voting on aid and trade. These graphs only

⁵ Some votes used by other scholars involve issues that, upon detailed inspection of the Congressional Record, were rather tangential to actual trade policy.

distinguish legislators by their party affiliation and DW-Nominate score. We later perform a series of multivariate statistical analyses that incorporate variables suggested by the models of political economy discussed above.

Figure 2 charts the average DW-Nominate scores of Republicans and Democrats by their position on aid and trade. DW-Nominate scores are a commonly used measure of legislator ideology, usually thought of as arrayed along the liberal-conservative (Left/Right) dimension with a higher number being more conservative. The scores are derived from extracting a common dimension from voting over all bills within a Congressional session.⁶ For each vote, we took the average DW-Nominate score of legislators in each party by whether they supported or opposed foreign aid or trade liberalization. The horizontal axis arrays the votes along Congressional sessions, while the vertical axis shows the calculated average DW-Nominate score for each group.

Two interesting patterns emerge. First, the coalition of aid supporters when arrayed along the DW-Nominate dimension is a ‘non-connected’ coalition. Support for foreign aid comes from moderate Republicans and liberal Democrats; opponents are conservative Republicans and conservative Democrats. This coalition is quite stable throughout our sample of aid votes. Support for trade policy, on the other hand, has less consistently come from particular sections of the ideological space over time. Prior to the 1990’s support for free trade came from moderate Democrats and conservative Republicans. While moderate Democrats tended to maintain their support for free trade, more conservative Republicans started to oppose free trade. Increasingly from 1992 onward, liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats formed the core of support for freer trade, which could be titled the “Ross Perot effect.” Thus, preliminary evidence suggests that while the coalition supporting foreign aid (liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans) has maintained itself, the coalition around free trade may not have been as stable.

The second observation is that the differences within parties tend to be much higher for aid than they are for aid. This can be more directly seen in figure 3, which plots the within party differences in average DW-Nominate score for each of our votes

⁶ Unfamiliar readers may wish to consult <http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm>, or (Poole and Rosenthal 2006)

along with the aggregate DW-Nominate score across parties. The within party differences for aid *tend* to be higher than they are for trade. Ideological differences also seem to split Democrats much more than Republican for aid votes, while this is less true for trade votes. These graphs suggest that ideology is a better predictor of legislator voting on aid votes than on trade votes. We will examine this possibility more directly in our multivariate analyses below.

Figure 2





Figure 3



Multivariate Analysis

While the preceding analyses highlight some interesting differences between who supports foreign aid and who supports foreign trade, they do not test predictions deduced from the political economy models discussed in our theoretical section. Put differently, the above analyses treat party and DW-Nominate as the only things we need to know in order to understand the coalitions around aid and trade. The next section subjects a series of hypotheses to multivariate regression analysis. This allows us to see how various candidate specific and district level variables drive pro-aid or pro-free trade coalitions, and then to make some rough comparisons across issue areas.

Our dependent variable is dichotomous and our data is collected in a panel format (legislator-vote is the unit of analysis). To estimate the relationship between our independent and dependent variables, we estimated a series of panel probit models using our set of votes for each issue area. This allows us to examine the effect of individual variables on how legislators vote, while also taking into account the fact that the same legislator can appear multiple times in our data set at different points in time.

Our model specification includes vote fixed effects to control for any unmodeled heterogeneity across votes and sessions. Here we present results from a marginal effects specification ('population averaged') (Neuhaus, Kalbfleisch et al. 1991; Liang and Zeger 1993), which uses a GEE estimator with a probit link and an exchangeable within group correlation structure. Thus, slope coefficients indicate the influence on a population of legislators, not individual legislators per se; put differently, they examine the average impact on an average legislator. Heterogeneity across legislators is modeled by calculating robust standard errors. Our results do not change if we use a random effects specification, which relaxes the assumption that the error structure for particular legislators is identical across votes. Because of the relatively small number of observations per legislator, we do not use legislator fixed effects. The panel specification means that we are combining votes within and across Congressional sessions. We graphically report the results of running separate probit regressions on each vote in

appendix 2, though we stress that this ignores information about how legislators have voted in other sessions.

Before presenting our results, we briefly describe our independent variables; a more thorough discussion is in appendix 1. We test predictions made by SS by measuring capital concentration at the district level; SS proposes that the greater the amount of capital used in the district (relative to unskilled labor), the more likely is a vote in favor of aid and trade. Following other scholars (Beaulieu 2002; Beaulieu 2002; Broz 2005; Broz and Hawes 2006), we measure this by the percentage of people working in high skill jobs (*% High Skill Workers*). We expect this to positively relate to support for aid and free-trade. SS also suggest that districts abundant in agriculture should favor both aid and trade. We measure this by calculating a district's total livestock and crop value (*AgProduction: Market Value*). We operationalize RV type dynamics by measuring the percentage of people in a district identified as being in net export oriented industries relative to those in import competing (*Export/Import ratio*)(Baldwin and McGee 2000). We expect districts with higher export orientations to be more likely to support both aid and trade.

PAC contributions, from corporate sources (*% PAC from Corp PAC*), labor groups (*% PAC from Lab PAC*), and money-center banks (*Bank PAC % PAC*), are operationalized as a percentage of total PAC contributions.⁷ While RV predicts that labor and capital groups will be internally divided, SS predicts that corporate PAC's, including money-center banks, will support aid and free trade, while labor groups will be in opposition. Likewise, while RV predicts that parties will be internally divided along these issue areas, SS predicts that the traditionally pro-capital Republican party will favor aid and free trade, and pro-labor Democrats will be opposed. Since Party is a dichotomous variable, equal to 1 for Republicans and 0 for Democrats (*(Party)* we exclude independents from our analysis), SS predicts that this relationship should be positive for aid and trade.

⁷ Readers should not that we are *not* using PAC contributions to argue that PAC money buys votes. We address those issues more thoroughly elsewhere by using different statistical procedures that try to get around the obvious endogeneity problems this involves. Instead, we use PAC contributions as a way to measure the affinity of different groups in society to different types of policies. Ultimately we would love to use an appropriate instrument that would help us get around the various problems that plague the analysis of PAC contributions, and we invite reader to make concrete suggestions to this end.

Ideologically based theories suggest that legislators from more conservative districts will support free-trade but oppose foreign aid, while legislators from more liberal will have opposite preferences. Following scholars in American politics, we measure district ideology as the percentage of the two party vote for the President that goes to the Republican candidate. We also consider briefly multivariate results from measuring legislator specific ideology by using DW-Nominate scores (*dwnom_1_*) (see above), and expect that higher (more conservative) scores will positively relate to free trade but negatively relate to aid. We proxy cosmopolitan explanations by including regional variables. The cosmopolitan ideological perspective suggests that legislators in districts with more international exposure, namely the Northeast and West, will favor both free trade and aid (**region dummy*).⁸ Religiously based ideological preferences may also relate to support for international policy. Religious data was obtained through the Association of Religious Data Archives at the county level, and then transformed to the district level using geographic concordance software. Measures of district religiosity (**%*) are predicted to positively relate to support for both aid and free trade.

If the Presidential hypothesis is right, then all that should matter are Presidential/party dynamics. Thus we created a Presidential variable using data from David Rohde, coded as a 1 if the President was of the legislator’s same party and the President supported aid or trade liberalization, and 0 otherwise (Rohde 2004). If the Presidential hypothesis is right, this variable should be positive for both aid and trade. Finally, demographic variables are primarily taken from the US Census, and obtained through Scott Adler’s data up to the 105th Congress (Adler), and directly from the Census for subsequent years. A more complete discussion of these variables is in appendix 1.

Table 1: Predicted Relationships (Aid/Trade)

	Null	President	SS	RV	Ideological
% High Skill Workers	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(0/0)
<i>Export/Import ratio</i>	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)
Bank PAC % PAC	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(0/0)
% PAC from Corp PAC	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(0/0)
% PAC from Lab PAC	(0/0)	(0/0)	(-/-)	(0/0)	(0/0)
party	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(-/+)

⁸ We invite suggestions from readers for alternative, district level, measures of cosmopolitanism. We are currently assembling data on magazine subscriptions to potentially ‘cosmopolitan’ magazines, namely the Economist and the New Yorker.

% unionized	(0/0)	(0/0)	(-/-)	(0/0)	(0/0)
PrezSuppSamePty	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)
%RepPresVote	(0/0)	(0/0)	(/)	(/)	(-/+)
AgProduction: Market Value	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(0/0)
Wdummy	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)
MWdummy	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(-/-)
southdummy	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(-/-)
catholic%	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)
jewish%	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)
mainline%	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)
evangelical%	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)
dwnom_1_	(0/0)	(0/0)	(+/+)	(0/0)	(-/+)

We present five different multivariate models in tables 2 (aid panel) and 3 (trade panel). We wish to avoid both criticisms of omitted variables and ‘garbage can’ regressions (Achen 2002), and thus we move from relatively simple regressions to more complicated ones. Our first regression contains our core political economy variables. The second two regressions add a party or ideological measures and demographic variables. The final set of regressions includes regional and religious variables.

Our results strongly suggest that the null hypothesis of idiosyncratic votes by legislators can be rejected. Further, the presidential dominance hypothesis receives no support in the aid case and only limited support in the trade one. Our economic interest and ideological variables predict votes well and suggest that some stable coalition of legislators for an internationalist policy exists. Both of our political economy models (SS and RV) receive support in aid and trade. Our measure of capital concentration (*% High Skill Workers*) is highly significant and positive for *both* aid and trade votes, indicating that legislators from districts with high capital concentration are more likely to vote in favor of foreign aid and free-trade. This is consistent with the predictions of the SS model. Districts with a high percentage of manufacturing in net exporting industries (*Export/Import ratio*) were significantly more likely to support free trade in all of our models, but there was no significant relationship on foreign aid votes. The results for trade are consistent with the predictions made by RV, but our measure of export orientation does not suggest that RV type effects are present in aid policy.

Political party (*Party*) is highly significant for both our aid and trade votes. Yet while Republicans are more likely to vote in favor of free trade, they are less likely to vote in favor of foreign aid. While Democrats were more likely to vote against free trade, they generally favored foreign aid. Thus, SS predictions for party find support in the trade arena, but not in the aid one. RV based prediction fare even worse, for parties should be internally divided within each issue area. But there exist clear patterns of support or opposition within each issue area.

The role of organized labor follows a similar pattern: labor PAC contributions (*% PAC from Lab PAC*) tend to go to legislators that supported foreign aid and opposed free trade, even when we control for party. Labor PAC's remain negative for trade votes when legislator DW-Nominate scores are included, but the significant effect for aid votes is eliminated. A companion paper documents the positive relationship between labor and foreign aid much more thoroughly using archival material from the AFL-CIO (Milner and Tingley 2007). While money-center bank PAC contributions (*Bank PAC % PAC*) tend to make up a higher percentage of total PAC contributions for legislators voting in favor of foreign aid, this relationship is not significant for trade votes. Controlling for legislator party or ideology, corporate PAC contributions (*% PAC from Corp PAC*) make up a lower percentage of legislator PAC receipts for free trade supporters and aid supporters. Our Corporate PAC result is somewhat surprising for trade.⁹ Taken together, the same mixed support for SS we saw for party carries over to our PAC variables. One area we are pushing our PAC analysis is by constructing a PAC variable that measures contributions from firms with high international exposure (Nollen and Quinn 1994). District agricultural production (*AgProduction: Market Value*) is not significantly related to the set of foreign aid votes in our sample,¹⁰ but highly agricultural districts tend to be more free trade oriented. As we control for region, we do not believe this is picking up

⁹ This measure of capital PAC correlates negatively with free-trade support in the early 1980's, but then trends positively. We note that both our capital and labor PAC measures aggregate across organizations, possibly obscuring more fine-grained dynamics. We obtain similar results if we restrict our attention to contributions by the AFL-CIO, and we are currently constructing a PAC measure beyond money-center banks that considers firms with an internationalist orientation.

¹⁰ Not surprisingly, when we look at the set of votes on PL 480: Food for Peace, legislators from districts with high agricultural production significantly favor foreign aid. We discuss these results in a separate paper.

regional effects. This result is consistent with SS predictions on trade, which view the US's relative abundance in land favoring trade liberalization.

One important criticism of models 1 and 2 might be that our economic measures do not pick up on the ideological orientation of congressional districts, and thus suffer omitted variable bias. It is possible, if not likely, that many of our economic and demographic variables correlate with the aggregate district ideological orientation. Thus including district level measures of ideology may decrease the impact of our economic variables. Nevertheless, we re-estimate our models to include district ideological variables. Our liberal-conservative measure, the percentage of the district's two party vote that is for the Republican Presidential candidate (*PrezVotePercRepub*), is negative and significant for aid, while positive and significant for trade. Model 3 includes regional variables to tap potential cosmopolitan sources of ideology. The negative disposition of Southern legislators to foreign aid disappears when we include measures of religiosity. Including a measure of total religiosity, measured as the percentage of the district population having a religious affiliation, was negative and significant (t ratio=-1.85) for aid (model available from authors) and insignificant for trade. Given this potentially curious result for aid, we disaggregated this variable and report results for the four main religious affiliations. Legislators from districts with high percentage of Evangelicals (*evangelical%*) are significantly opposed to foreign aid.¹¹ Regional variables are not significant for our aid votes, though the southern variable is significant if we do not include religious variables. Legislators from the West (*Wdummy*) and Midwest (*MWdummy*) are more likely to vote in favor of free trade (compared to Northeastern legislators), as are legislators from districts with high Jewish populations (*Jewish%*). Thus, we find very little systematic support for either the cosmopolitan or religiously based ideological theories.

It is also common for scholars to include a legislator specific ideological variable. While we are more interested in evaluating the influence of district level economic and variables, our results largely do not change if we include legislator DW-Nominate scores.

¹¹ Recent work argues that Evangelical Christians have started to warm up to foreign aid. Our analysis pools over time, and thus we do not directly explore this question. Nevertheless, it should be clear that this warming must be a very recent phenomenon. Unfortunately, so few aid votes qualified for our sample in recent years. This is an issue we will be able to look at more directly in future work that includes aid votes satisfying a different set of sample requirements.

Interested readers may request these statistical models from the author. However, we do take a moment to comment on results from using legislator specific ideological variables instead of district level measures of liberal-conservatism. As we saw in figures 2 and 3, more ‘conservative’ legislators are more likely to oppose foreign aid and support free trade, while more liberal legislators are the reverse. As the critical reader may have observed there, DW-Nominate scores do a better job sorting out voting behavior over foreign aid than for foreign trade. Not surprisingly, when we estimate the coefficient on legislators DW-Nominate scores, the magnitude of the coefficients is almost four times as large for aid than for trade. This difference in simulated effect, calculated by increasing DW-Nominate from its mean by a single standard deviation, leads to a (.52→.17) .35 change in predicted probability of voting for *foreign aid*. For *trade* votes this change results in a (.6→.7) .1 change. Marginal effects results similar those reported in table 5 suggest this difference is statistically significant. Separate regressions by party easily demonstrate this difference identified in figure 1, as do within vote and party difference of means tests.¹² Controlling for a range of other factors, legislator ideology appears to matter much more for foreign aid than it does for trade.¹³

We also consider several district level demographic variables that may related to support for aid and free trade. Legislators from districts with high foreign-born population (*% Foreign Born*) are likely to vote in favor of foreign aid in several of our models, though this appears to matter much less for trade policy. Consistent with evidence that the African-American lobby supports foreign aid, legislators from districts with high African-American populations (*% African-American*) are more likely to favor foreign aid. No consistent relationship holds for trade votes. Districts with high unemployment rate (*% Unemployed*) tend to oppose foreign aid, while this is not significant for trade voting. There is no consistent relationship between (the log of) median income (*log median income*) and either trade or aid voting. Some have used

¹² Multivariate results conducted separately by party are available from the authors for interested readers. Our political economy and *other* ideological models do not suggest that there should be across party differences in the ways these variables relate to voting. The liberal/conservative dimension clearly suggests such a difference, even within parties. We note that regressions done separately by party use variable distributions that have different supports from models estimated in tables 2 and 3, and thus should be compared with caution.

¹³ We report a full set of marginal effects for models 2 and 5 in table 5.

income as a measure of altruism, suggesting that richer districts should provide more support for aid (and perhaps trade)(Krueger 1996); we do not find this result.

The preceding discussion focused on district and legislator preferences as predicted by political economy models and those emphasizing ideology. As discussed in our literature review, an alternative (though complimentary) way to explain legislative behavior is to more formally consider the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branch. The Executive clearly plays a key role in shaping both aid and trade policy, and thus the Executive may be able to influence legislative voting by taking particular positions on the bills.

Our multivariate results show that the effect of having a President of the same party issue a statement in support of aid or free trade, versus not taking a position, is positive and significant for trade, but negative and insignificant for aid (*PrezSuppSamePty*). There is also some evidence the impact of the President taking a position is less than changes in some of our other economic variables.¹⁴ To see why there is a difference between aid and trade, we can look at this relationship using simple cross-tabulations. In our sample of 10 high saliency votes the President took a pro-aid position on 6 votes, and no position on the 4 others. In our sample of 20 high saliency trade votes, the President took a pro-trade position on 16 votes, and no position on 4 others. Consistent with previous work, the President—from no matter which party—tends to have a strong preference for foreign aid and increasing free trade. The question that interests us here, however, is whether the President’s position taking actually has an influence on legislative voting.

Figure 5 suggests that the influence of the President on aid voting is very different from his influence in trade policy. Where as the President’s decision to take a position on trade legislation results in more legislators voting in favor of trade, this is not the case for aid votes. In fact, legislators who are of the same party as the President are *less* likely to vote in favor of the President’s position.

¹⁴ Furthermore, the marginal effect of our Presidential variable is several orders of magnitude smaller than the marginal impact of several of our economic variables (table 5, models 3 and 4). The marginal effect is the tangent line to the predicted probability function at a given value of the independent variable, usually the mean. For dichotomous variables like Presidential support, this is calculated as a discrete change in predicted probability.

Figure 5: Presidential Support

Aid	No Pres Position		Pres Supports	
	% voting pro-aid	% voting anti-aid	% voting pro-aid	% voting anti-aid
Democrats with Dem President	81	19	64	36
Democrats with Rep President	83	17	55	45
Republicans with Rep President	51	49	19	81
Republicans with Dem President	24	76	32	68

Trade	No Pres Position		Pres Supports	
	% voting pro-trade	% voting anti-trade	% voting pro-trade	% voting anti-trade
Democrats with Dem President	19	81	56	44
Democrats with Rep President	9	91	28	72
Republicans with Rep President	62	38	79	21
Republicans with Dem President	65	35	63	37

To summarize, there are interesting similarities and differences between legislator voting on foreign aid and trade policy. Similarities suggest that there are underlying forces that keep together—or prevent the breakdown of—a broad internationalist coalition. Our measure of district skill levels, which measures capital concentration relative to unskilled labor, correlates positively for both foreign aid and free trade support. The population of legislators coming from districts with relatively high levels of capital is more likely to support *both* foreign aid and free trade. Legislators from districts that have greater concentrations of export oriented industry relative to import competing ones are more supportive of both foreign aid and free trade.

Differences in support for the two issue areas suggest ways that the international coalition is weaker in one area as opposed to the other. Organized labor’s opposition to free trade, and support for foreign aid, is perhaps the most interesting difference. Elsewhere we document labor’s relationship to foreign aid more closely by using records from the AFL-CIO memorial archives. While it is clear that umbrella organizations like the AFL-CIO, which have a high profile overseas, are generally supportive of foreign aid, it is less clear what other non-affiliated union organizations prefer (if they have salient preferences at all). Labor’s opposition to free trade has been extensively documented elsewhere. Money-center banks appear to be strong supporters of foreign aid, most likely

because of the complementary role of aid for private finance. They do not appear to play a role in keeping together a coalition for, or against, free trade.

There is a range of potential explanations for these differences. In general, trade has larger distributional consequences for districts than does aid. Elsewhere, we have argued that these distributional consequences play an important role in explaining the domestic politics of foreign aid (Milner and Tingley 2007). These results suggest that distributional consequences matter for both aid and trade, but that the effect of ideology for trade votes is less. A simple explanation is that district economic characteristics become more salient and ideological preferences less as the distributional consequences of a policy increase. The empirical evidence is less clear. The substantive effect of increasing the skill variable by a single standard deviation (using model 6 from tables 2 and 3) is very similar across the two issue areas: for trade the difference is (.6→.67) .7, while for aid the difference is (.53→.61) .8.

A different explanation for why ideology plays a less salient role in trade might focus on the differences in legislative procedures for the two areas. If there is a greater ‘gatekeeper’ dynamic for trade votes, compared to aid votes, then the less ideologically divisive nature of trade votes might be an artifact of the legislative process. Or, potentially, log-rolling dynamics might be different across the different issue areas. These are all open questions in the legislative studies tradition, and as such we provide our analyses as one area scholars might investigate these dynamics more closely.

Robustness

Our models correctly predict a very high percentage of actual votes by legislators: between 71%-74% for trade and 74%- 76% for aid. The accuracy of our model does not appear to be driven by our estimation strategy or other potential misspecifications. As mentioned, our results do not change if we use a random effects specification. However, our results might be biased by including legislators with heterogeneous electoral incentives. Legislators with particularly secure electoral prospects might respond to district level factors differently compared to legislators elected by very close margins. To address this, we reran our model 6 from tables 2 and 3 and excluded legislators winning by more than a certain percentage. Our results, presented in table 4, change little and, if

anything, become stronger for several of our key variables. Finally, we estimated our models including votes that we classified as being ‘low saliency’. These votes satisfied most of our selection criteria, but were not as salient in tapping preferences for aid or trade policy. Our results barely change by including these additional votes. Our Corporate PAC variable is no longer negative for trade, though it is insignificant. Our import and export variables retain their negative/positive signs for aid, but are more consistently significant across our models. Our Presidential variable for aid becomes positive and significant, though its substantive effect is still smaller than for trade. None of these changes suggests that our sampling strategy systematically biases our results or interpretation. Overall, our results are quite robust.

Conclusion and future research

In this paper we have taken a first step toward identifying the political coalitions that support American internationalism in foreign policy. Trade and foreign aid are two key dimensions of American foreign economic policy, and as such play important roles in engaging the US with the rest of the world. We show that in both areas legislators do not vote idiosyncratically or simply on the basis of the president’s position. Legislators appear to calculate the effects of trade and aid policies on their districts and on their political support within them, and vote accordingly. The distributional consequences of aid and trade as reflected in the economic characteristics of their districts seem to affect their preferences. And their votes may be shaped by ideological factors that their constituents hold.

In each area one can identify a fairly stable coalition that supports engagement through trade and aid. In both cases these coalitions are bipartisan; most of these bills supporting trade and aid require votes from both parties to succeed, given the within party disagreements. In aid this coalition includes liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats who come from districts that export significantly and that have relatively high levels of capital (especially human capital); labor supports this coalition as does the international banking community. Opposition is centered in conservative Republicans and conservative Democrats especially from areas with high levels of import competition and large concentrations of Evangelicals. For trade, the coalition involves conservative

Democrats and increasingly liberal Republicans who come from districts with high concentrations of (human) capital, low levels of import competition, high levels of agricultural production, and locations in the Midwest and West. Opposition includes primarily import competing areas, liberal Democrats, Northeastern legislators, labor organizations and their PACs, and, increasingly, conservative Republicans. Support from presidents of a legislator's party also helps to bend legislators away from opposing freer trade.

Besides the changes within the Republican Party over trade in the early/mid 1990s, the groups supporting and opposing trade seem to have been fairly stable over this 25 year period (1979-2004). While the focus of our multivariate analysis was not on coalitional change over time, we do note that un-pooling our data and looking at our most recent vote in the 108th Congress yields a very similar story to our pooled analyses (see appendix 2). This stability is rather remarkable given the momentous changes in world and American politics. The end of the Cold War, globalization, the war on terror (although just starting as we end), the polarization of American politics, and the increasing Republican control of Congress all mark this period and could have dramatically changed these coalitions. Our data suggest that they did not. We hope to focus more on the question about stability/change over time in future research.

The coalitions around foreign aid and free trade have important, and interesting, similarities and differences. While economic factors appear to weigh on legislators in both issue areas (something that is consistent with what legislators, Treasury Secretaries, etc. say), ideology appears to play a stronger role for foreign aid than for trade. Given the weaker distributional consequences of aid, this result might not be surprising. Overall, ideology seems to play a strong role through the general left-right spectrum focusing on the government's proper role in the economy. Other measures of ideological predisposition such as religion and cosmopolitanism do not seem to matter systematically for legislators' decisions on aid and trade.

One potential implication of our analysis is that the coalition around foreign aid would be significantly compromised if labor began to oppose aid, just as it did with trade beginning in the early 1970's. While coalitions can shift, as evidenced by the broadening support for trade amongst liberal Republicans, labor appears to continue to play an

important role in support for foreign aid. This suggests that while scholars have become increasingly interested in the influence of Evangelical Christian groups on foreign aid, scholars—and pro-aid politicians—should not marginalize underlying support from powerful groups like the AFL-CIO.

Another implication of our comparison of voting on aid and trade is that the interaction between the Executive and Legislative branches can differ depending on the issue area. Thus, scholars that make broad claims about the role of the President versus Congress in foreign policy (Canes-Wrone, Howell et al. 2006; Howell and Pevehouse 2007) may miss important heterogeneity across issue areas. Foreign policy comprises a number of interconnected policy areas. The politics of international engagement are not monolithic across these areas. While the President undoubtedly plays a crucial role in the conduct of foreign policy, the Congress matters in important ways for matters beyond military and trade issues.

Further work remains to be done to identify the internationalist coalition in the US. We are currently in the process of extending our analysis to the Senate, where we will be able to use our district level data to produce both state level data as well as measures of state heterogeneity that may influence Senate behavior (Bailey and Brady 1998). We are also constructing a PAC variable that will more directly consider the preferences of firms that have a high degree of international exposure. Finally, we are working towards a more systematic project that includes a broader range of aid votes and other types of ways the US can engage internationally. These include direct consideration of food aid votes, Export-Import Bank/Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and military engagement. All of these efforts will help give us a more thorough perspective on the politics of the internationalist coalition. Nevertheless, we have taken the most systematic steps so far towards analyzing the Congressional politics around two important areas of international engagement.

Appendix 1: Variable Descriptions

Votes

All roll call votes were obtained using the Voteworld program

(http://ucdata.berkeley.edu:7101/new_web/VoteWorld/voteworld/). A vote in favor of foreign aid or free-trade was coded as a 1, a vote in opposition coded as a 0.

Money-center Bank PAC Percent

The percentage of Political Action Committee campaign contributions made to a candidate by a money-center bank in the previous election cycle. Money center banks are classified by the FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council) report 'Country Exposure Lending Survey' on a yearly basis. Data obtained from the FEC (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC>) using the 'Contributions from Committees to Candidates' files ('pas'). For the 96th Congress we used data obtained directly through the FEC or manually inputted from paper bound FEC publications. Previous scholars have not used the FEC's 96th Congress campaign contribution data.

Labor PAC Percent

The percentage of Political Action Committee campaign contributions made by FEC classified 'Labor' organizations. Data obtained from Federal Election Commission through <ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC> using the candidate summary files ('cansum').

Corporate PAC Percent

The percentage of Political Action Committee campaign contributions made by FEC classified 'Labor' organizations. Data obtained from Federal Election Commission through <ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC> using the candidate summary files ('cansum').

Skill

% of district of working age (16+) in executive, managerial, administrative, and professional occupations. Data obtained from US Census and Broz. Working age persons defined by the US Census as the civilian workforce plus military population.

Export-Import Ratio

We recalculate and extend a measure used by Baldwin and Magee, and others, across our entire panel. This district level measure is the ratio of manufacturing workers in net exporting industries

divided by manufacturing workers in net importing industries. The external orientation of industries is calculated using data from the Center for International Data (<http://www.internationaldata.org/>). For each four digit SIC industry we calculate total US exports and divided them by total US imports from each country dyad in the data set. Industries with more imports than exports are classified as net importing, and vice versa. We then use employment data at the four digit SIC level from the US Census County Business Patterns series available through the Census department and the ICPSR (www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/download/cbpdownload.html). This county level data was then translated to the Congressional District level for counties that do not exactly map on to districts using geographic concordance software.¹⁵ Finally, we sum employment for each sector identified as net exporting, and each sector as net importing, to create our district level measure for each Congressional session in our sample.

Union

% of workers unionized in the representative's state. For 96th, 97th, 98th, 103rd, and 104th Congresses data is from (Adler). Estimated district level data for 103rd from (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold et al. 1997). Data for the 106th-108th Congresses is drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics 2005).

Agricultural Production

Market value of agricultural products (livestock and crops) taken from county level data collected by the 1978, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002 Census of Agriculture. Converted into 2000

¹⁵ When a county straddles two Congressional districts, the percentage of the county's population residing in each district is estimated using geographic correspondence software available at (<http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html>) for the 108th Congress, (<http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr90.shtml>) for the 98th-104th Congresses, and <http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/cgi-bin/uexplore?/pub/data/marf2> for the 95th through 97th Congress (special thanks to John Blodgett for help with these earlier Congresses).

constant dollars. For counties that straddle Congressional Districts we use the geographic concordance procedure described above.

Party

Political party; 0=Democrat 1=Republican; Legislators with an independent affiliation are coded as missing.

Percentage of Two Party Presidential Vote Republican

We take the total vote for the Republican Presidential candidate and divide it by the total vote for either the Republican or Democratic parties. Data for the 95th-106th Congresses obtained from Joshua Clinton. Data for the 107th and 108th Congresses from www.polidata.org.

Foreign Born Percent

% of total population born in a foreign country. Data obtained from (Adler) and 108th Congressional District Summary Files, Census of Population and Housing DVD-ROM.

Unemployed Percent

% of working age person identifying as unemployed; Data obtained from (Adler) and 108th Congressional District Summary Files, Census of Population and Housing DVD-ROM.

District Median Income

Median household income obtained from (Adler) and 108th Congressional District Summary Files, Census of Population and Housing DVD-ROM. Specifications in the reported models use the natural logarithm (ln) of this variable.

Religious Data

Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1980 and 1990. Glenmary Research Center, Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2000. Accessed at <http://www.thearda.com/Archive/ChCounty.asp>. All data is in county format and translated to Congressional District using the procedure used for sectoral employment data.

President Support & Same Party

Coded as a 1 if the President took a pro-aid or pro-trade position and the legislator was of the President's party. In our sample, the President never opposed aid or trade liberalization. Thus a 0 corresponds to the President not taking a position and/or the legislator being of the opposite party.

Table 2: Aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	rc vote	rc vote	rc vote	rc vote	rc vote	rc vote
% High Skill Workers	2.133**	3.973**	3.973**	3.688**	3.578**	3.350**
	(0.517)	(0.830)	(0.867)	(0.890)	(0.867)	(0.886)
Export/Import ratio	-0.052	-0.037	-0.029	-0.008	-0.023	-0.005
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Bank PAC % PAC	5.273**	4.951**	5.426**	5.514**	5.258**	5.280**
	(1.780)	(1.637)	(1.681)	(1.761)	(1.721)	(1.810)
% PAC from Corp PAC	0.036	0.206	0.308	0.253	0.303	0.240
	(0.240)	(0.249)	(0.250)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.249)
% PAC from Lab PAC	2.470**	1.342**	1.329**	2.194**	1.255**	2.159**
	(0.196)	(0.224)	(0.226)	(0.210)	(0.231)	(0.214)
party		-0.826**	-0.851**		-0.863**	
		(0.087)	(0.087)		(0.089)	
PrezVotePercRepub				-2.083**		-1.883**
				(0.412)		(0.422)
PrezSuppSamePty		-0.076	-0.081	-0.030	-0.086	-0.034
		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.062)
% unionized		0.026**	0.016**	0.012*	0.017**	0.013*
		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Wdummy			-0.209+	-0.101	-0.108	-0.027
			(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.143)	(0.143)
MWdummy			-0.125	-0.045	0.033	0.065
			(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.116)
southdummy			-0.413**	-0.210+	-0.050	0.059
			(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.147)	(0.143)
AgProduction: Market Value					0.000	0.000
					(0.000)	(0.000)
catholic%					0.463	0.449
					(0.346)	(0.348)
jewish%					0.179	-0.255
					(1.327)	(1.333)
mainline%					-0.682	-0.706
					(0.794)	(0.784)
evangelical%					-1.296**	-0.914*
					(0.391)	(0.368)
% Unemployed		-0.094	-0.379	-1.287	-1.175	-2.031
		(2.037)	(2.088)	(2.280)	(2.224)	(2.409)
Log-median income		-0.198	-0.283	-0.342	-0.454+	-0.467+
		(0.230)	(0.237)	(0.240)	(0.246)	(0.246)
% Foreign Born		2.358**	2.399**	2.047**	1.503**	1.405*
		(0.504)	(0.509)	(0.544)	(0.565)	(0.600)
% African-American		1.325**	1.505**	1.094**	1.527**	1.223**
		(0.270)	(0.289)	(0.353)	(0.323)	(0.381)
Constant	-1.533**	-0.291	1.047	3.496	2.984	3.501
	(0.178)	(2.216)	(2.313)	(2.417)	(2.442)	(2.449)
Observations	3950	3942	3942	3947	3939	3944

Robust standard errors in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3: Trade

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	rc_vote	rc_vote	rc_vote	rc_vote	rc_vote	rc_vote
% High Skill Workers	3.301**	2.611**	2.984**	3.047**	2.878**	2.928**
	(0.432)	(0.629)	(0.637)	(0.623)	(0.643)	(0.630)
Export/Import ratio	0.096**	0.115**	0.097**	0.097**	0.101**	0.100**
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Bank PAC % PAC	-0.021	0.650	0.824	0.710	0.764	0.640
	(0.724)	(1.143)	(1.528)	(1.328)	(1.374)	(1.177)
% PAC from Corp PAC	-0.405*	-0.448*	-0.386+	-0.387+	-0.290	-0.291
	(0.196)	(0.209)	(0.212)	(0.208)	(0.213)	(0.209)
% PAC from Lab PAC	-2.392**	-1.678**	-1.642**	-2.125**	-1.586**	-2.068**
	(0.161)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.183)	(0.207)	(0.183)
party		0.422**	0.428**		0.427**	
		(0.074)	(0.073)		(0.073)	
PrezVotePercRepub				0.765*		0.823*
				(0.313)		(0.331)
PrezSuppSamePty		0.646**	0.656**	0.675**	0.653**	0.673**
		(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.038)
% unionized		-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Wdummy			0.557**	0.500**	0.641**	0.594**
			(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.115)	(0.112)
MWdummy			0.330**	0.292**	0.344**	0.316**
			(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.084)
southdummy			0.119	0.019	0.277*	0.199+
			(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.120)	(0.117)
AgProduction: Market Value					0.000**	0.000**
					(0.000)	(0.000)
catholic%					0.107	0.111
					(0.253)	(0.252)
jewish%					1.940*	2.037*
					(0.823)	(0.827)
mainline%					0.215	0.298
					(0.553)	(0.561)
evangelical%					-0.497+	-0.599*
					(0.288)	(0.282)
% Unemployed		-0.422	-1.380	-0.897	-0.728	-0.248
		(1.341)	(1.382)	(1.362)	(1.436)	(1.406)
Log-median income		-0.116	-0.202	-0.160	-0.067	-0.046
		(0.182)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.197)	(0.201)
% Foreign Born		0.762*	0.584+	0.732*	0.355	0.486
		(0.323)	(0.338)	(0.349)	(0.404)	(0.397)
% African-American		-0.409*	-0.111	0.051	0.038	0.216
		(0.185)	(0.198)	(0.235)	(0.206)	(0.237)
Constant	-0.751**	0.704	1.312	0.614	-0.334	-0.727
	(0.154)	(1.822)	(1.890)	(1.832)	(2.035)	(1.986)
Observations	9779	9747	9747	9770	9747	9770

Robust standard errors in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4: Models by Vote Percent

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Trade All	Trade Vote<70%	Trade Vote<60%	Aid All	Aid Vote<70%	Aid Vote<60%
% High Skill Workers	2.928**	4.207**	4.232**	3.350**	3.565**	4.986**
	(0.630)	(0.741)	(0.988)	(0.886)	(1.018)	(1.270)
Export/Import ratio	0.100**	0.117**	0.166**	-0.005	-0.013	0.003
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Bank PAC % PAC	0.640	0.314	1.157	5.280**	5.081+	8.815**
	(1.177)	(1.066)	(1.948)	(1.810)	(2.603)	(2.555)
% PAC from Corp PAC	-0.291	0.072	0.236	0.240	0.319	0.305
	(0.209)	(0.250)	(0.364)	(0.249)	(0.334)	(0.480)
% PAC from Lab PAC	-2.068**	-1.884**	-1.899**	2.159**	2.410**	2.508**
	(0.183)	(0.201)	(0.258)	(0.214)	(0.264)	(0.326)
PrezVotePercRepub	0.823*	0.702	0.274	-1.883**	-1.727**	-1.985**
	(0.331)	(0.433)	(0.565)	(0.422)	(0.550)	(0.738)
PrezSuppSamePty	0.673**	0.709**	0.738**	-0.034	-0.150+	-0.194
	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.121)
% unionized	-0.005	-0.001	-0.007	0.013*	0.010	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
AgProduction: Market Value	0.000**	0.000*	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wdummy	0.594**	0.606**	0.474**	-0.027	-0.074	-0.267
	(0.112)	(0.130)	(0.172)	(0.143)	(0.163)	(0.222)
MWdummy	0.316**	0.372**	0.354**	0.065	0.033	-0.277
	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.130)	(0.116)	(0.131)	(0.178)
southdummy	0.199+	0.303*	0.172	0.059	0.054	-0.291
	(0.117)	(0.136)	(0.184)	(0.143)	(0.172)	(0.242)
% Unemployed	-0.248	-0.174	-0.991	-2.031	-1.628	-3.671
	(1.406)	(1.802)	(2.361)	(2.409)	(2.889)	(3.548)
Log-median income	-0.046	-0.349	-0.313	-0.467+	-0.491	-0.531
	(0.201)	(0.262)	(0.342)	(0.246)	(0.304)	(0.409)
% Foreign Born	0.486	0.744	0.664	1.405*	1.132	2.789*
	(0.397)	(0.473)	(0.626)	(0.600)	(0.700)	(1.094)
% African- American	0.216	-0.347	-0.299	1.223**	1.563**	2.329**
	(0.237)	(0.342)	(0.467)	(0.381)	(0.582)	(0.615)
catholic%	0.111	-0.036	-0.348	0.449	0.488	-0.055
	(0.252)	(0.291)	(0.415)	(0.348)	(0.436)	(0.596)
jewish%	2.037*	3.494**	6.101**	-0.255	0.359	-3.251
	(0.827)	(0.990)	(1.333)	(1.333)	(1.658)	(2.051)
mainline%	0.298	0.918	0.028	-0.706	-0.658	-0.023
	(0.561)	(0.635)	(0.810)	(0.784)	(0.850)	(1.185)
evangelical%	-0.599*	-0.493	-0.596	-0.914*	-0.856+	-0.914
	(0.282)	(0.345)	(0.473)	(0.368)	(0.470)	(0.693)
Constant	-0.727	1.757	2.140	3.501	4.972	4.151
	(1.986)	(2.616)	(3.478)	(2.449)	(3.108)	(4.067)
Observations	9770	6176	2925	3944	2506	1311

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 5: Marginal Effects
Marginal Effects



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Aid Model 2	Aid Model 5	Trade Model 2	Trade Model 5
% High Skill Workers	1.571** (0.328)	1.323** (0.349)	1.039** (0.250)	1.166** (0.251)
Export/Import ratio	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.046** (0.014)	0.040** (0.014)
Bank PAC % PAC	1.957** (0.647)	2.085** (0.715)	0.259 (0.455)	0.255 (0.469)
% PAC from Corp PAC	0.081 (0.098)	0.095 (0.098)	-0.178* (0.083)	-0.116 (0.083)
% PAC from Lab PAC	0.530** (0.088)	0.853** (0.084)	-0.668** (0.080)	-0.824** (0.073)
party	-0.319** (0.032)		0.167** (0.029)	
PrezSuppSamePty	-0.030 (0.027)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.251** (0.015)	0.261** (0.014)
% unionized	0.010** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
% Unemployed	-0.037 (0.805)	-0.802 (0.952)	-0.168 (0.534)	-0.099 (0.560)
Log-median income	-0.078 (0.091)	-0.184+ (0.097)	-0.046 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.080)
% Foreign Born	0.932** (0.199)	0.555* (0.237)	0.303* (0.129)	0.194 (0.158)
% African-American	0.524** (0.107)	0.483** (0.150)	-0.163* (0.074)	0.086 (0.094)
PrezVotePercRepub		-0.744** (0.166)		0.328* (0.132)
AgProduction: Market Value		0.000 (0.000)		0.000** (0.000)
Wdummy		-0.011 (0.056)		0.227** (0.040)
MWdummy		0.026 (0.046)		0.124** (0.033)
southdummy		0.023 (0.056)		0.079+ (0.046)
catholic%		0.177 (0.137)		0.044 (0.100)
jewish%		-0.101 (0.526)		0.811* (0.329)
mainline%		-0.279 (0.310)		0.119 (0.223)
evangelical%		-0.361* (0.310)		-0.239* (0.223)
Observations	3942	3944	9747	9770



Robust standard errors in parentheses; Marginal effects calculated with the mfx2 command in STATA



+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Coefficients are interpreted as the value of the tangent line to the predicted probability function at the mean level of the variable (for continuous variables) or for a discrete change in dichotomous variables. Thus, it is possible to have coefficients greater than 1, even if the function itself is bounded along [0,1]. Marginal effects should nevertheless be interpreted with caution.

Appendix 2: Results of probit regressions on individual votes (95th % confidence intervals reported)







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