

Does Trade Foster Contract Enforcement?*

James E. Anderson
Boston College and NBER

May 21, 2007

Abstract

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development.

JEL Classification: F10, O17, K42.

Contact information: James E. Anderson, Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA.

*To be presented to the GEP Conference on 'New Directions in International Trade Theory', 8th and 9th June, 2007. An earlier version of this paper under another title was presented to the American Economic Association meetings, January 2004.

Mainstream trade theory abstracts from the institutions that support trade, with the exception of a few papers too recent to be codified. The omission has long been noticed,¹ but recently has become glaring because of suggestions that trade may cause institutions as well as the other way round. Contemporary empirical work applying the gravity model emphasizes the importance of implicit trade costs associated with institutions and their variation across countries (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Rauch and Trindade, 1999, 2002) and time (Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). The first paper provides results which suggest that more open economies in the policy sense have better institutions.² The last paper shows that the trade liberalization, transport improvements and other developments of the last 50 years leave unexplained a large positive residual growth in world trade. Both patterns are suggestive of positive knock-on effects traveling from trade to institutions.

Historically, the Scottish school of liberal political economy was optimistic about positive knock-on. Here is Adam Smith (1976) in the *Wealth of Nations*,³ crediting Hume: "...commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived in almost a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency on their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects."

But in contrast, recent experience with trade liberalizations suggests that some episodes exhibit far less trade expansion than anticipated based on the application of standard trade models. See Schiff and Winters (2003) for a review of 9 episodes of developing country regional agreements, of which 2 decreased trade and 2 others increased trade very modestly. Other episodes exhibit far more trade expansion than anticipated, in conformity with liberal optimism.

These observations suggest the usefulness of formal models in which either positive or negative knock-on from trade to institutions is possible. Such a model is provided in this paper. It focuses on the demand for contract enforcement because the cross country variation of enforcement quality is

¹Edgeworth famously noted that "International trade meaning in plain English commerce among nations, it is not surprising that in Political Economy it means something entirely different."

²This pattern is pointed out in Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004.

³Book III, Chapter IV. The whole chapter is exhilarating reading.

not well explained by by considerations of the cost of enforcement. For example, Anderson and Marouiller (2002) present cross-country evidence on variation in the quality of institutions of contract enforcement and extortion that cannot be explained by variation in the capacity to enforce alone.⁴

The model builds on that of Anderson and Young (2006). Imperfect contract enforcement is modeled as a parametric probability that a ‘court’ will enforce a contract in default. The setting is a stylized international marketplace in which it is natural to think of foreigners receiving treatment determined by ‘rules’ enforced by a ‘court’. The rules and court processes are to some degree malleable in a preliminary stage during which the traders commit to the ‘rules’ and their enforcement by a ‘court’. ‘Rules’ and ‘courts’ are understood to include both formal law processes and informal customs backed by social sanctions. Contract enforcement is assumed to be costless for simplicity, keeping the focus on the demand for enforcement.

In the model, victims of default have the opportunity to search for partners in a matching ‘spot’ market as an alternative to renegotiation with the defaulter. All victims do this in equilibrium because they receive a better expected price. Successful matches trade at bargained prices that are a convex combination of the outside options of the parties. Non-defaulted or enforced contracts are executed at the contract price. Trade is inefficient in such a setting because unmatched spot traders go home without exchanging goods but having incurred sunk costs which *ex ante* were covered in expected value. Anderson and Young show that the excess side of the market will prefer less than perfect enforcement. The theory of endogenous enforcement in this paper takes the analysis further by examining the comparative statics of enforcement, extended further by considering two interdependent markets in which the traders choose enforcement strategies.

The essence of the enforcement choice problem for excess side traders is the congestion externality on the spot market which accompanies imperfectly enforced forward contracts. Better enforcement worsens the congestion externality directly by removing partners from the spot market (as fewer would-be defaulters get away with it), but better enforcement lessens the congestion externality indirectly by inducing more scarce side partners to enter trade in the first place by raising their expected gains from trade. The optimal en-

⁴Enforcement cost plays an obvious role: richer countries have better institutions on average because they can afford it. But the correlation of institutional quality and income per capita is very far from perfect.

enforcement choice balances the two forces. The main business of this paper is to analyze the effect of changes in key parameters on the optimal enforcement level.

Classical liberal optimism is valid if trade-increasing changes in parameters have a positive knock-on effect of improving the enforcement of contracts. The trade-increasing changes include increases in importers' willingness-to-pay, reductions in exporters' procurement costs, reductions in trade costs and reductions in the dispersion of the shocks to outside options which induce default on the excess side of the market. Optimism is justified if the elasticity of response from the scarce side of the market is sufficiently large relative to the elasticity of response from the excess side of the market.

Trade costs divide into those which are paid upon the execution of trade, such as tariffs and other costs associated with policy barriers, and those which are sunk at the time of exchange. The latter motivate contract in the first place and are apparently much larger than policy costs (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004). The channels through which the two types of costs operate are quite different in the model, but the qualitative conclusion about their effect on the optimal enforcement choice is the same.

The paper goes on to bring a rival market into competition with the first, allowing the contract enforceability offered to international traders to be determined by political pressure from local traders. Since the markets compete indirectly for scarce side traders through the enforceability of contracts they offer, the analysis of the rule setting game focuses on a Nash equilibrium. Optimism about the benefit of competition between markets is valid if contract enforcement parameters are strategic complements. In this case, adding new markets, such as arises with globalization, will improve the enforcement of contracts on old markets. In contrast, when enforcement parameters are strategic substitutes, globalization worsens contract enforcement on old markets. Institutional regress of this sort due to globalization may correspond to what some anti-globalization critics have in mind.

The same basic structure illuminates the desirability of international cooperation on enforcement: with strategic complementarity, cooperation will improve enforcement still more while with strategic substitutability, cooperation will worsen enforcement. Cooperation being achieved more readily through a unitary government, the results suggest insights into commercial empires of past and present.

The liberal hypothesis of civilizing commerce is part of a wider literature on trade and insecurity, and the institutions which ameliorate insecurity. The

most directly related work is Dixit (2003), in which costly perfect contract enforcement is contrasted with informal enforcement sustained by reputation, a process that breaks down as markets grow large. See McLaren and Newman (2003) for analysis of the effect of trade on risk sharing institutions in labor markets. See Rodrik (1997) for a broader informal statement of the effect of trade on breaking down security of employment. In turn this literature is part of a much wider literature on endogenous institutions and economic development.

Section 1 reviews the model of Anderson and Young (2006); check the full paper for details of the model’s motivation, development and technical properties. Section 2 deploys the model to examine the liberal hypothesis in an isolated market where ‘home’ traders organize their trading system rules to optimally interact with a set of non-strategic foreign traders. Section 3 introduces a second market with ‘foreign’ traders who also design their rules optimally, both strategically playing Nash against each other in a setting where the rest of the world plays passively in terms of rules affecting its traders. Section 4 analyzes commercial rivalry in this setting. Section 5 concludes.

1 The Basic Setup

Risk neutral buyers and sellers meet to exchange a good in a trading zone which they enter at a deterministic cost that generally differs from trader to trader. The trading cost schedules determine the ex ante demand and supply schedules, as further explained below. Each buyer buys one unit of the good, which accounts for an infinitesimal share of the market. A buyer anticipates his willingness-to-pay based on re-selling the purchased unit back in his home market at a price $b + \mu$; a seller anticipates procuring the good in his home market at a price $c - \nu$. Here, b and c are fixed numbers; μ, ν are random disturbances with zero means, unknown at the time that the traders have to sink their costs of entering the trading zone, but realized immediately afterward. The disturbances $\mu(\nu)$ for the various buyers (sellers) are identically distributed and all disturbances are pairwise independent. A buyer who enters and executes a deal at price p receives payoff $b + \mu - p$; a buyer who enters, but executes no deal, returns home to buy and re-sell the good at $b + \mu$ and receives zero payoff. A seller who enters and executes a deal receives payoff $p - c + \nu$; a seller who enters, but does not execute,

returns home to resell the good at $c - \nu$ and receives zero payoff.

Before sinking trading costs, each trader can enter into a contract to deliver the good. The market mechanism for such contracts costlessly determines a market-clearing price. Once he learns his own benefit/cost disturbance, each party to a contract must decide whether or not to repudiate it, knowing the probability distributions of disturbances of all traders, but not the disturbance suffered by his counter-party. The victim appeals to a court, which, however, enforces only a parametric proportion $\theta \in [0, 1]$ of the repudiated contracts.

The victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract must choose between (i) renegotiating with the repudiator, (ii) returning to his home market or (iii) entering the spot market. Anderson and Young show that under mild conditions, an equilibrium in this setup has these properties:

(a) The victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract enters the spot market, i.e., he neither renegotiates with the repudiator nor goes home.

(b) Traders who would be on the scarce side of the spot market never repudiate a contract.

On the spot market, any trader has but one chance of being matched with a counter-party, then bargains one-on-one with common information about each other's valuations. The spot market contains all parties to non-executed contracts, but will also contain traders who enter without previously having contracted, based on expected returns which cover their trade costs. Thus the spot market typically has a mismatch between supply and demand. We assume that all scarce side traders match, but on the excess side, some must return home without trading. Excess side traders shift ex ante between the spot and the forward markets (i.e. between not contracting and contracting) until their expected return is the same in both. Their equilibrating movement determines the contract price. In a rational expectations equilibrium, excess side traders' subjective beliefs about the probability that they will match on the spot market equal the objective probability. The expected price received from the compound of all the possibilities results in a buyers' price p^b and a sellers' price p^s , derived below. The heterogenous trade costs of buyers and sellers are described by the functions $t^b(q^b)$ and $t^s(q^s)$, and the equilibrium volume of potential trade on each side is given by competitive entry based on expected payoffs and risk neutral behavior:


$$p^b = b + t^b(q^b) \tag{1}$$

$$p^s = c + t^s(q^s). \tag{2}$$

1.1 Buyers

Buyers can contract or enter the spot market directly where they seek a match with sellers. The various possibilities and their payoffs are summarized in Figure 1. It is very helpful in learning the model to work back and forth from the text to Figure 1.

Figure 1. Decision Tree of Excess Demand Traders



All matches result in asymmetric Nash bargaining, where the threat points are the zero net payoffs the traders receive if they return home. Bargaining ends in the price:

$$\omega(b + \mu) + (1 - \omega)(c - \nu)$$

where $\omega \in (0, 1)$ indexes the seller's bargaining power. Conditional on a match, spot buyers expect to pay:

$$p^* \equiv E[\omega(b + \mu) + (1 - \omega)(c - \nu)] = \omega b + (1 - \omega)c. \quad (3)$$

Conditional on a failure to match, they expect to pay b . Therefore, a buyer who directly enters the spot market expects to pay:

$$p^b = \pi p^* + (1 - \pi)b. \quad (4)$$

where π is the probability of matching, to be determined in equilibrium.

Let p^C be the price that would be paid by contracting buyers who execute, including those who repudiate their contracts but find them enforced nevertheless. After contracts have been signed, both parties sink the cost of entering the trading zone. Each buyer then learns the price $b + \mu$ at which he can sell the good in his home market; each (foreign) seller learns the price $c - \nu$ at which he can procure the good in his home market. Traders then decide whether or not to repudiate their contracts; under our properties (a) and (b), repudiators who evade enforcement and their victims then enter the spot market.

A buyer who suffers disturbance μ expects to negotiate a price $p^* + \omega\mu$ on the spot market if he matches; otherwise, he expects to pay $b + \mu$ on his home market. Therefore, a buyer who fails to execute his contract expects to pay $\pi(p^* + \omega\mu) + (1 - \pi)(b + \mu)$. The disturbance at which this equals the contract price p^C is:

$$\mu^* = \frac{p^C - p^b}{\pi\omega + 1 - \pi}. \quad (5)$$

A buyer expects to pay less than the contract price on the spot market if and only if he realizes a disturbance $\mu < \mu^*$. Thus, across the buyer population, the probability of repudiation is:

$$F(\mu^*) \equiv \int_{\underline{\mu}}^{\mu^*} f(\mu) d\mu,$$

where $f(\mu)$ is the marginal probability (density) function of μ , assumed to be piecewise continuous over its support $[\underline{\mu}, \bar{\mu}]$.

We now compute the buyer's ex ante gross benefits from a contract, taking account of his option to default. Given a rate of enforcement $\theta \in [0, 1]$, contracts are executed at rate:

$$\beta = 1 - F + \theta F \quad (6)$$

A buyer who does not execute his contract must have chosen to repudiate it. The expected price effect of the disturbances which induce repudiation is the expected value of those disturbances that are less than μ^* times the probability of receiving a disturbance below the critical value:

$$m(\mu^*) \equiv \int_{\underline{\mu}}^{\mu^*} \mu f(\mu) d\mu$$

$m(\mu^*)$ is negative, being less than the zero mean of the distribution of μ . The buyer expects to pay $p^* + \omega m(\mu^*)$ if he matches on the spot market; $b + \omega m(\mu^*)$ if he fails to match and returns home. Thus, by (4), conditional on non-execution, the buyer on the contract market expects to pay:

$$\pi[p^* + \omega m(\mu^*)] + (1 - \pi)[b + m(\mu^*)] = p^b + (\pi\omega + 1 - \pi)m(\mu^*).$$

Overall, the buyer who contracts expects to pay:

$$\beta p^C + (1 - \beta)[p^b + (\pi\omega + 1 - \pi)m(\mu^*)].$$

Buyers shift between the contract and the spot markets until this equals the price that they expect on the spot market if they enter it directly, i.e., until:

$$p^C - p^b = -m(\mu^*)(\pi\omega + 1 - \pi)(1 - \beta)/\beta, \quad \beta < 1. \quad (7)$$

(7) is the premium over the expected spot price that buyers are willing to pay for a contract, because if they suffer an unfavorable benefit disturbance, then they have the option to repudiate the contract and seek a lower spot price. Eliminating p^C between (5) and (7), we conclude that equilibrium between the contract and the spot markets requires that:

$$-\frac{\mu^*}{m(\mu^*)} = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}. \quad (8)$$

This determines the critical value $\mu^* = \mu(\beta)$ compatible with equilibrium, given an execution rate $\beta \in [0, 1]$.

We can solve for the contract price as a function of θ by noting that, in equilibrium, the rate of execution β must generate a repudiation rate $F(\mu(\beta))$ via (8) that confirms (6), i.e.: (2.9)

$$1 - \beta = (1 - \theta)F(\mu(\beta)) \quad (9)$$

Anderson and Young show that there exists a unique $\mu(\beta)$ satisfying (8) and a unique $\beta(\theta)$ satisfying (9). This implies that the critical disturbance compatible with equilibrium depends only on the distribution of disturbances μ and the parametric rate of enforcement; it does not depend on the probability π of a match nor on the bargaining power parameter ω . Then $\mu(\beta(\theta))$ determines the equilibrium values for F and m . Henceforth μ^* , F and m shall be understood to take these equilibrium values unless other arguments of these functions are specified. Given buyer beliefs about π , p^C is then determined by (7) and (4).

1.2 Sellers

The above calculation allows for excess demand in the spot market ($\pi < 1$) as well as excess supply ($\pi = 1$). A symmetrical derivation is possible for sellers. Below, we present the sellers' decisions only for the case where the spot market equilibrium exhibits excess demand. We can show that sellers then always sign contracts, never default and never renegotiate if faced with a defaulter.

The proportion of buyers in the spot market who have defaulted on contracts equals the ratio of seller victims of default to total buyers in the spot market. The result that traders who would be on the short side of the spot market never repudiate contracts implies that this ratio equals the buyer's probability of matching on the spot market. Defaulting buyers suffer a benefit disturbance of $m < 0$ on average, so the impact of their disturbances on the spot price that sellers expect to negotiate is $\pi\omega m$. Seller victims of default expect to receive $p^* + \pi\omega m$, so sellers with a contract expect to receive:

$$p^s = \beta p^C + (1 - \beta)(p^* + \pi\omega m). \quad (10)$$

Solving (7) for p^C and substituting into (10):

$$p^s = \beta p^b + (1 - \beta)p^* - m(1 - \beta)(1 - \pi). \quad (11)$$

By (4):

$$p^b = p^s + (1 - \beta)(1 - \pi)(b + m - p^*). \quad (12)$$

In the last term in (12), $b + m - p^*$ equals the premium over the spot price expected by buyers who avoid executing their contracts, fail to match and therefore pay their home price, which they expect to be $b + m$. $(1 - \beta)(1 - \pi)$ is

the joint probability of the latter two events. Thus, $(1 - \beta)(1 - \pi)(b + m - p^*)$ is the additional amount that buyers expect to pay over what sellers expect to receive because buyers can end up purchasing at home rather than from sellers.

In an excess demand equilibrium, sellers always sign contracts because their expected price with a contract exceeds the price that they expect if they enter the spot market uncovered. This can be seen from (11), (3), (4) and (8), which imply that:

$$p^s - p^* - \pi\omega m = \beta(1 - \pi)(1 - \omega)(b - c) + \mu^*\beta[(1 - \pi) + \pi\omega/(1 - \beta)] > 0. \quad (13)$$

1.3 Equilibrium

To determine equilibrium, we specify the structure of demand and supply in more detail. Risk neutral buyers demand the good (enter the trading zone) at price p if their trading cost is weakly less than the gain $b - p$ that they expect. Risk neutral sellers supply the good (enter the trading zone) at price p if their trading cost is weakly less than the gain $p - c$ that they expect. Ordering buyers and sellers by increasing trading cost, let $t^d(q)$ be the trading cost of the marginal buyer when the total quantity bought is q ; let $t^s(q)$ be the trading cost of the marginal seller when the quantity sold is q . The ex ante demand at price p is the $d = d(p)$ such that the marginal buyer is indifferent between trading or not trading, i.e., $t^d(d) + b = p$. The ex ante supply at price p is the $s = s(p)$ such that the marginal seller is indifferent between trading or not trading, i.e., $t^s(s) + c = p$.

The expected outcome of bargaining on the spot market is the p^* specified in (3). If $d(p^*) > (= / <) s(p^*)$, then, absent a contract market, the spot market would exhibit excess demand (equilibrium/ excess supply). We shall show that this conclusion remains valid after the introduction of the contract market. For concreteness, we focus on the excess demand case where $d(p^*) > s(p^*)$; the excess supply case follows from symmetry.

In a rational expectations equilibrium, the ex ante subjective probability of a match for the excess side and of a match with a defaulter for the scarce side must equal the ex post objective probability. Thus, the equilibrium π satisfies:

$$\pi = h(\pi, \beta) = \frac{(1 - \beta)s(p^s)}{d(p^b) - \beta s(p^s)}. \quad (14)$$

The numerator on the right side equals the number of sellers who are in the spot market because their contracts were repudiated. The denominator equals the number of buyers in the spot market, i.e., the total number committed to trade, less those whose contracts are executed. Anderson and Young show that for each $\beta \in [0, 1]$, (14) has a unique solution $\beta \in (0, 1)$. The π determined above defines an excess demand equilibrium. The model is closed by specifying conditions under which the only defaulters are on the excess side and non-negotiation by all victims of repudiation is indeed in their interests; see Anderson and Young for details. The condition needed is to make the disturbances on the scarce side of the market sufficiently small compared to those on the excess side of the market.

We analyzed the equilibrium by determining the endogenous variables as functions of the rate of contract execution β , then determined β as a function of the enforcement rate θ . Similarly, we analyze the impact of θ on the endogenous variables via β . A subscript indicates partial differentiation with respect to the corresponding variable; for functions with only one argument (such as $\mu(\beta(\theta))$, $m(\mu(\beta))$ or $F(\mu(\beta))$), a subscript indicates total differentiation. Anderson and Young show that $\mu_\beta < 0$, $m_\beta < 0$ and $F_\beta < 0$. Thus, key endogenous variables are monotonic in β . While β itself need not be monotonic in θ , Young and Anderson provide a sufficient condition, essentially requiring that the cumulative density function not be too elastic. For the uniform distribution case, $\beta = \sqrt{\theta}$. This paper will assume that β is everywhere increasing in θ .

Anderson and Young show that sellers' profits always rise with the execution rate. (The proof is not trivial but inessential for present purposes so we omit it.) Buyers' profits, in contrast, respond to the execution rate according to

$$-\frac{dp^b}{d\beta} = (b - p^*) \frac{d\pi}{d\beta}.$$

Here, the response of π to β can have either sign, and indeed buyers' profits and the match probability need not be well behaved in β . Anderson and Young present a full global analysis of these implicit functions. For present purposes, it is only necessary to note that an interior maximum for buyer profits, if there is one, requires a local maximum of the probability of matching; that is $d\pi/d\beta = 0$ at a point where $d^2\pi/d\beta^2 < 0$.

2 Is Commerce Civilizing?

The terms of commerce are governed by rules of behavior toward outsiders which are to some degree malleable. These rules include both formal law court procedures and the customs and mores of the individual market. The latter are typically given great weight in formal judicial procedures as well. The traders on the excess side of the market are competitive individual actors in their trading decisions, but act collectively in evolving their customs. It is natural to model this process with the assumption that excess side traders collectively adopt rules which serve their interests. Thus we assume that the rules are chosen to maximize π in a stage which is logically prior to their trading decisions.

We analyze one market in isolation in this section. This partial equilibrium structure is for analytic clarity and convenience, but is at least somewhat realistic and can be defended as follows. (1) Most trading institutions have their own idiosyncratic details which form the customary understanding of what a contract means. Undoubtedly there are common elements across markets which evolve from national characteristics and rationalizing law courts, but the idiosyncratic elements justify a model which abstracts from aggregating the interests of disparate groups of traders in different markets. (2) The feedback between practices the international market and the domestic market which may be linked to it deserves a full development in a separate paper. For some international markets this linkage is probably quite weak, as when the importers sell directly to final consumers. (3) See the next section for analysis of linkage of markets across countries. It brings in a set of new issues but does not vitiate the analysis of this section.

The classical liberal optimist believed that exogenous changes in trade conditions which increased the volume of trade would in addition stimulate an endogenous improvement in the institutions of trade, interpreted here as an increase in the enforcement probability θ which raises the execution probability β . The formal analysis of this hypothesis characterizes the sign of the change in the optimal β with respect to changes in the parameters which govern the volume of trade, b , c and the parameters of trade costs, both the sunk cost portion and the dispersion of the zero mean shocks to outside options. We examine technological progress in trade with reductions τ^i in the sunk cost functions $t^i(q^i)/\tau^i$. The dispersion of shocks σ matters only on the excess side where it affects the probability of default and the expected value of the outside option of defaulting buyers. The analysis begins with

the equilibrium condition

$$\Pi(\beta; b, c, \tau^s, \tau^d, \sigma) = \pi : \pi - h(\pi, \beta; b, c, \tau^b, \tau^s, \sigma) = 0 \quad (15)$$

where

$$h(\pi, \beta; b, c, \tau^b, \tau^s, \sigma) = \frac{(1 - \beta)s(\tau^s p^s)}{d(\tau^b p^b) - \beta s(\tau^s p^s)}$$

and p^s, p^b are given by previous steps as

$$\begin{aligned} p^b &= \pi p^* + (1 - \pi)b \\ p^s &= \beta p^b + (1 - \beta)p^* - m(\beta, \sigma)(1 - \beta)(1 - \pi). \end{aligned}$$

Maximizing π with respect to β requires $\Pi_\beta = 0$ at a point where $\Pi_{\beta\beta} < 0$. Let $z = (b, c, \tau^s, \tau^b, \sigma)$, the parameter vector. The comparative statics of endogenous enforcement are given by $d\beta/dz$, which is signed by $\Pi_{\beta z} = h_{\beta z} + h_{\beta\pi}\Pi_z$ at the point where $\Pi_\beta = 0$. $\Pi_\beta = 0$ is equivalent to $h_\beta = 0$, or

$$-\frac{(s/d)(1 - s/d)}{(1 - \beta s/d)^2} + \frac{s/d}{1 - \beta s/d} \frac{\partial \ln s/d}{\partial \beta} = 0.$$

The right hand side simplifies to

$$g[\beta, \Pi(\beta, z), z] = -p^s + \varepsilon^s(b - p^* + m) = 0 \quad (16)$$

where ε^s is the supply elasticity $\tau^s p^s s'/s$, p^s is given by (10), and $m = m[\mu^*(\beta)]$. The remainder of this section will evaluate the sign of $d\beta/dz$ by signing

$$g_z + g_\pi \Pi_z.$$

Note that $g_\pi = [\beta(b - p^*) - m(1 - \beta)][1 - (b - p^* + m)\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s] > 0$ for $\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s \leq 0$. We assume $\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s \leq 0$, hence $g_\pi > 0$ in what follows. The condition holds, for example, in the constant trade cost elasticity case. Π_z is signed by $h_z = \pi \partial \ln(s/d)/\partial z$.

2.1 Increases in the Arbitrage Margin

Rises in the arbitrage margin $b - c$ come either through increases in willingness to pay b or decreases in procurement cost c .

Focusing on b , $d\beta/db$ is signed by $g_b + g_\pi \Pi_b$. Π_b is signed by $h_b = \pi \partial \ln(s/d)/\partial b$. A one unit increase in b raises $b - p^b$ by $\pi(1 - \omega)$ so it raises

d while it also raises s by increasing p^s by $[\beta(1 - \pi) + \omega(1 - \beta + \beta\pi)] \in [0, 1]$. The effect on the match probability depends on the relative strength of these opposing forces. $\Pi_b > 0$ as the elasticity of supply is large relative to the elasticity of demand or as the bargaining power of sellers ω is large. The first term can be positive or negative:

$$g_b = \varepsilon^s + [-1 + (b - p^* + m)\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s] \partial p^s / \partial b$$

where

$$\frac{\partial p^s}{\partial b} = \beta(1 - \pi) + \omega(\beta\pi + 1 - \beta) \in [0, 1].$$

For sufficiently large supply elasticity, $g_b > 0$, guaranteeing $d\beta/db > 0$. For very small supply and demand elasticities, h_b is small and $g_b < 0$, hence $d\beta/db < 0$.

Reductions in c affect β according to the sign of $g_c + g_\pi \Pi_c$. The net effect on the match probability, Π_c depends on the relative strength of the same two effects as with b . A one unit reduction in c increases supply because it raises $p^s - c$, by $\omega + (1 - \omega)\beta(1 - \pi)$. However it also raises demand because it reduces p_b by $\pi(1 - \omega)$. $\Pi_c > 0$ as the elasticity of supply is large relative to the elasticity of demand and as the sellers' bargaining power ω is large. As for $g_c = -(1 - \omega)(1 - \beta + \beta\pi) - \varepsilon^s(1 - \omega) + (b - p^* + m)(\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s)(1 - \omega)(1 - \beta + \beta\pi) < 0$ for $\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s \leq 0$. Thus reductions in c will increase β whenever the supply elasticity is sufficiently large relative to the elasticity of demand or as the bargaining power of sellers is large, both acting to make $\Pi_c > 0$.

2.2 Reductions in Trade Costs

Technological progress in trading lowers t^i multiplicatively, effectively raising $\tau^b(b - p)$ on the buyers' side and $\tau^s(p - c)$ on the sellers' side. Neutral technological progress $\tau^b = \tau^s = \tau$ illustrates the principles involved and is a convenient benchmark. A rise in τ will shift the ratio s/d unless the elasticities of demand and supply with respect to gross gains $b - p$ and $p - c$ respectively are the same. $\Pi_\tau > 0$ as the elasticity of supply is large relative to the elasticity of demand or as the bargaining power of sellers is large (so p approaches p). As for direct effects, $g_\tau > 0$ since $\varepsilon^s = \tau^s p^s s' / s$ is raised by the rise in τ . Thus $d\beta/d\tau > 0$ when the elasticity of supply is sufficiently large relative to the elasticity of demand.

2.3 Reductions in Dispersion

The distribution of shocks to the outside options of buyers affects the equilibrium of the model via two channels, a direct effect on β and an effect on m . The effect of σ on β is implicitly assumed to be offset by a change in θ such that β is an instrument in (16). Thus the further effect changes in σ on altering the optimal β comes via the effect of the change in m . Obviously, $m_\sigma < 0$, greater dispersion reduces still further the negative expected value of shocks below the critical value times the probability of such shocks. The key factor is that increases in dispersion reduce the supply price and hence supply:

$$\frac{\partial p^s}{\partial \sigma} = m_\sigma(1 - \beta)(1 - \pi) < 0.$$

This implies $\Pi_\sigma < 0$. Moreover

$$g_\sigma = [-1 + (b - p^* + m)\partial\varepsilon^s/\partial p^s] \frac{\partial p^s}{\partial \sigma} + \varepsilon^s m_\sigma$$

For sufficiently large supply elasticity, $g_\sigma < 0$. Thus for sufficiently large supply elasticity, $d\beta/d\sigma < 0$; reductions in dispersion induce better enforcement of contracts.

2.4 Summary of Implications

Factors which stimulate international trade — increases in the arbitrage margin, reductions in trade costs and reductions in the probability of favorable outside options leading to default — all lead to an improvement in enforcement of contracts whenever the supply elasticity is large relative to the demand elasticity. Under this condition, the exogenous shifts which favor trade act to reduce the congestion externality facing traders on the excess side of the market, and the analysis shows that this stimulates the offer of better terms to the scarce side of the market.

The foregoing suggests testable implications for enforceability across markets. Contract enforcement is a complex process of responding to unforeseen contingencies and necessarily incomplete terms. It therefore is understood by lawyers as a blend of customary practices and formal adjudication, the latter codifying the former to some extent. While formal process is common across markets, the details of response to particular contingencies are likely to be particular to individual markets. Application of the model to enforceability would ideally be based on analysis of the outcome of many contracts

within and across markets using a logit or probit econometric model. Data limitations may preclude such an ambitious method, and potential data sets would face a very significant censoring problem in the contracts which get enforced but do not appear in the formal system resulting in records visible to the investigator. An alternative procedure links imperfect enforcement to ‘trade costs’ measured with gravity models (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). The model of this paper suggests that it should be fruitful to explain the cross section variation of enforcement-linked trade costs in terms of the determinants of enforcement.

3 Market Rivalry

An important feature of international economic history is commercial rivalry: Genoa vs. Venice, London vs. Amsterdam, and more recently Hong Kong vs. Singapore. The classical liberal hypothesis is also optimistic about rivalry between markets, rejecting actively managed trade by mercantilistic states. The civilizing commerce hypothesis can be understood to imply positive knock-on effects of intensified rivalry in enforcement between entrepôts.

The model is readily adapted to analyze this hypothesis. Simply introduce a second market, also in excess demand, to which supply flows in competition with the first market. We deal with two rivals only, but the insights extend straightforwardly to more than two. The structure of default and the expected prices of the various actions are exactly the same in form in the two markets. The linkage of the markets comes through interdependence in the number of scarce supply side traders. For simplicity the number of excess side traders in the two markets remains independent. The interdependence of supply side traders induces interdependence in the match probabilities on the two markets.

In the multimarket setting, the optimal enforcement parameter depends on the enforcement of other markets. In the most natural game setting, the enforcement parameters are chosen simultaneously. The optimal enforcement level in Nash play is that which maximizes the probability of a match, given the enforcement parameter chosen in the rival market. All the analysis of the preceding section applies, but for given rival enforcement. The simultaneous choice of optimal strategies gives the Nash equilibrium of enforcement.

Based on the preceding sections, the home market setup is duplicated alongside a foreign market with the foreign market variables being denoted

with *'s. There is one small exception: the spot market expected bargained price now becomes \bar{p} in the home market and \bar{p}^* in the foreign market.

3.1 Two Market Setup

The link between the two markets comes through interdependent trading costs of suppliers on the two markets. The basic idea is that traders differ in aptitude both between themselves (some know more than others) and between markets (some know one market better than another). Formally, the home and foreign trade cost functions are given by $t^s(q, q^*)$, $t^{*s}(q, q^*)$ where all the first derivatives are positive (the perfect substitutes special case being $t^s(q + q^*) = t^{*s}$). We also assume, plausibly, that the second derivatives are nonnegative (convex unit costs). This assumption is sufficient for our key result, so we examine it again below. The trade cost functions give rise to the supply functions on the two markets:

$$[s(p^s, p^{*s}), s^*(p^s, p^{*s})] = [q, q^*] : p^s = c + t^s(q, q^*), p^{*s} = c^* + t^{*s}(q, q^*).$$

Under the assumptions on trade costs, $s_p > 0$, $s_{p^*} < 0$, $s_p^* < 0$, $s_{p^*}^* > 0$.

The objective probability of matching is given by $[(1 - \beta)s]/[d - \beta s]$ and similarly for the foreign market. Rational expectations equilibrium requires that the subjective probability be equal to the objective probability:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &= \frac{(1 - \beta)s(p^s, p^{*s})}{d(p^b) - \beta s(p^s, p^{*s})} \\ \pi^* &= \frac{(1 - \beta^*)s^*(p^s, p^{*s})}{d^*(p^{*b}) - \beta^* s^*(p^s, p^{*s})}. \end{aligned}$$

To solve, we must substitute in the expressions for the various buyer and seller expected prices on the right hand side to obtain functions of the two match probabilities (π, π^*) and the two execution probabilities (β, β^*) . It is convenient to analyze the existence and uniqueness of a solution to this system in two steps. First, consider solving the first equation for π given π^*, β, β^* . This is exactly the procedure in Anderson and Young, who show that there always exists a unique solution. The same procedure gives a solution for π^* given π, β, β^* . Next, we can show that there is a unique solution for the pair π, π^* given β, β^* .

Lemma 1 *There is a unique solution for match probabilities π, π^* and thus for buyer and seller expected prices for any value of the execution probabilities.*

Proof: Let the objective home match probability be written as a function $f(\pi, \pi^*, \beta, \beta^*)$ and let the foreign objective match probability be written as the function $g(\pi, \pi^*, \beta, \beta^*)$. The conditional solution functions are $\Pi(\pi^*, \beta, \beta^*) \equiv \{\pi | \pi - f(\pi, \pi^*, \beta, \beta^*) = 0\}$ for the home match probability and similarly for the foreign match probability. The Lemma is proved if these functions cross in the unit box once only. First we note that they are confined to the interior of the unit box by their construction, except possibly at the point $(1, 1)$. Second, $\Pi_{\pi^*} = f_{\pi^*}/(1 - f_{\pi^*}) \in (0, 1)$ since $0 < f_{\pi^*} < -f_{\pi}$ under our assumptions on trade costs, hence supply derivatives. By the same reasoning, $\Pi_{\pi} \in (0, 1)$, hence $0 < \Pi_{\pi^*} < 1/\Pi_{\pi}^*$. Thus the two functions must cross once only. ||

On the excess side of the market the traders are presumed able to design rules which effectively set β or β^* prior to the onset of trade in order to achieve a desirable level of surplus. As in Anderson and Young, their surplus-maximizing policy boils down to maximizing the match probability. Since the markets are interdependent, however, they face a Prisoner's Dilemma type of structure. Let the solution values of the match probabilities be denoted $\pi(\beta, \beta^*)$ and $\pi^*(\beta, \beta^*)$. These are defined as

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(\beta, \beta^*) &= \{\pi : \pi = \Pi[\Pi^*(\pi, \beta, \beta^*), \beta, \beta^*]\} \\ \pi^*(\beta, \beta^*) &= \{\pi^* : \pi^* = \Pi^*[\Pi(\pi^*, \beta, \beta^*), \beta, \beta^*]\}.\end{aligned}$$

In playing Nash against each other, it is very plausible that the groups of traders should take the match probability in the other market as given. Thus the Nash equilibrium in noncooperative enforcement is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_{\beta}(\pi^*, \beta, \beta^*) &= 0 \\ \Pi_{\beta^*}^*(\pi, \beta, \beta^*) &= 0.\end{aligned}$$

The second order condition for surplus maximization for each set of traders implies that $\Pi_{\beta\beta} < 0$, $\Pi_{\beta^*\beta^*}^* < 0$. The stability condition implies that $\pi_{\beta\beta}\pi_{\beta^*\beta^*}^* - \pi_{\beta\beta^*}\pi_{\beta^*\beta}^* > 0$. The key issue of the paper is the sign of

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\Pi_{\beta}}{d\beta^*} &= \Pi_{\beta\beta^*} + \Pi_{\beta\pi^*}\pi_{\beta^*}^* \\ \frac{d\Pi_{\beta^*}^*}{d\beta} &= \Pi_{\beta^*\beta}^* + \Pi_{\beta^*\pi}^*\pi_{\beta}.\end{aligned}$$

If these are positive then enforcement strategies are strategic complements. If negative, enforcement strategies are strategic substitutes.

To analyze the issue of complementarity/substitutability, note first that

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_\beta &= (\Pi_\beta + \Pi_{\pi^*}\Pi_\beta^*)/(1 - \Pi_{\pi^*}\Pi_\pi) = \Pi_\beta^* \frac{\Pi_{\pi^*}}{1 - \Pi_{\pi^*}\Pi_\pi} < 0 \\ \pi_{\beta^*}^* &= \Pi_{\beta^*}^* \frac{\Pi_\pi^*}{1 - \Pi_{\pi^*}\Pi_\pi} < 0.\end{aligned}$$

The ratios are positive, by Lemma 1, while it is apparent that the cross effects $\Pi_{\beta^*} = f_{\beta^*}/(1 - f_\pi)$ are negative because sellers are attracted to the other market by better execution probabilities there, lowering the chance of a match in the own market. Next, consider the second derivative terms:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi_\beta &= \frac{f_\beta}{1 - f_\pi} = 0 \\ \Pi_{\beta\beta^*} &= \frac{f_{\beta\beta^*}}{1 - f_\pi} \text{ given } f_\beta = 0 \\ \Pi_{\beta\pi^*} &= \frac{f_{\beta\pi^*}}{1 - f_\pi}.\end{aligned}$$

Evaluating $f_{\beta\beta^*}$ and $f_{\beta\pi^*}$ we have

$$\begin{aligned}f_\beta &= -\frac{f(1-f)}{1-\beta} - \frac{f^2}{1-\beta} \frac{\partial(d/s)}{\beta} = 0 \\ f_{\beta\beta^*} &= \frac{2f-1}{1-\beta} f_{\beta^*} - \frac{2f-1}{1-\beta} \frac{\partial(d/s)}{\beta} f_{\beta^*} - \frac{f^2}{1-\beta} \frac{\partial^2(d/s)}{\partial\beta\partial\beta^*} \\ &= \frac{f_{\beta^*}}{1-\beta} - \frac{f^2}{1-\beta} \frac{\partial^2(d/s)}{\partial\beta\partial\beta^*} \\ f_{\beta\pi^*} &= \frac{f_{\pi^*}}{1-f_\pi} - \frac{f^2}{1-\beta} \frac{\partial^2(d/s)}{\partial\beta\partial\pi^*}.\end{aligned}$$

Evaluating the first terms of $f_{\beta\beta^*}$ and $f_{\beta\pi^*}$ we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}f_{\beta^*} &= -\frac{1-\beta}{(d/s-\beta)^2} \frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\beta^*} & f_{\pi^*} &= -\frac{1-\beta}{(d/s-\beta)^2} \frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\pi^*} \\ \frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\beta^*} &= -\frac{d}{s^2} s_{p^*} \frac{\partial p^{*s}}{\partial\beta^*} > 0 & \frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\pi^*} &= -\frac{d}{s^2} s_{p^*} \frac{\partial p^{*s}}{\partial\pi^*} < 0.\end{aligned}$$

Evaluating the second terms of $f_{\beta\beta^*}$ and $f_{\beta\pi^*}$ and using $\partial p^s/\partial\beta > 0$, $\partial p^{*s}/\partial\pi^* < 0$:

$$\frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\beta} = -\frac{d}{s^2} s_p \frac{\partial p^s}{\partial\beta} < 0$$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial^2(d/s)}{\partial\beta\partial\beta^*} &= \frac{d}{s^2}s_p\frac{\partial p^s}{\partial\beta}\frac{\partial p^{*s}}{\partial\beta^*}\left[\frac{2s_{p^*}}{s}-s_{pp^*}\right] \\ \frac{\partial^2(d/s)}{\partial\beta\partial\pi^*} &= \frac{d}{s^2}s_p\frac{\partial p^s}{\partial\beta}\frac{\partial p^{*s}}{\partial\pi^*}\left[\frac{2s_{p^*}}{s}-s_{pp^*}\right].\end{aligned}$$

Collecting terms and substituting


$$\begin{aligned}f_{\beta\beta^*} &= \left(\frac{f}{1-\beta}\right)^2\frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\beta^*}\left[-1+(1-\beta)s_p\frac{\partial p^s}{\partial\beta}\left(\frac{2}{s}-\frac{s_{pp^*}}{s_{p^*}}\right)\right] \\ f_{\beta\pi^*} &= \left(\frac{f}{1-\beta}\right)^2\frac{\partial(d/s)}{\partial\pi^*}\left[-1+(1-\beta)s_p\frac{\partial p^s}{\partial\beta}\left(\frac{2}{s}-\frac{s_{pp^*}}{s_{p^*}}\right)\right].\end{aligned}$$

Examining $f_{\beta\beta^*}$, the term outside the square bracket is positive while the analogous term outside the square bracket for $f_{\beta\pi^*}$ is negative. Thus the sign of $d\Pi_\beta/d\beta^*$ is that of the square bracket term. Inside the square bracket, the second term is positive for linear unit costs (implying $s_{pp^*} = 0$) and can dominate the negative first term as the elasticity of supply is large. This effect is reinforced as $s_{pp^*} > 0$, unit trade costs are convex. We now collect results and the implications:

Lemma 2 *For sufficiently elastic supply of traders and weakly convex unit costs, enforcement strategies are strategic complements.*


The implications are well-known in a technical sense but their application to enforcement rivalry is worth reviewing in some detail. Figure 2 presents the case where enforcement strategies are complements while Figure 3 depicts the case where strategies are substitutes.

Figure 2. Strategic Complements



In Figure 2, point N gives the Nash equilibrium strategies, point M gives the home monopoly strategy. Notice that the inception of trade in the foreign market induces an improvement in enforcement in both markets. Essentially, both markets compete for scarce side traders by offering better terms. By Lemma 2, such optimistic predictions about the civilizing aspects of the

spread of commerce are justified when the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic.



In contrast, Figure 3 presents the case of strategic substitutes. Point N once again gives the Nash equilibrium strategies, point M the home monopoly strategy. In this case, the inception of trade in the foreign market, by draw-

ing off traders from the home market, makes it optimal to reduce the level of enforcement to more effectively exploit those traders who remain. This pessimistic outcome may provide insight into the effect of the inception of European long distance commercial ties on regional markets in Asia.

Cooperation in enforcement is represented by point J on Figures 2 and 3. Point J depicts the joint surplus maximizing strategies. Cooperation induces an improvement in enforcement over Nash strategies when complementarity obtains. In contrast, when strategic substitutability obtains, joint surplus maximization involves reducing enforcement below the Nash level. Cooperation is more plausible if a single government takes over control of enforcement in both markets. The analysis thus implies that ‘rational’ imperialism leads to improved enforcement only under the special conditions of strategic complementarity. Could British imperialism in North America be interpreted as a case of complementarity while British imperialism in Asia and Africa is interpreted as a case of substitutability?

4 Globalization

Globalization arises in part from a fall in effective trade costs. Does globalization in this sense raise or lower enforcement in Nash equilibrium?

We can model a single homogeneous trade cost reduction, or an asymmetric one. Globalization understood as a technological improvement is consistent with a homogeneous trade cost reduction: $t^s(q, q^*, \tau) = T^s(q, q^*)/\tau$, $t^{*s}(q, q^*, \tau) = T^{*s}(q, q^*)/\tau$, whereby a rise in τ shrinks the base trade costs uniformly. Alternatively, reductions in trade costs in a single country are consistent with national deregulation, tariff cuts or the effects of factor price changes.

In the case of global technological progress, the supply schedules are functions of the willingness-to-pay for shipping in each market, $\tau(p^s - c)$ and $\tau(p^{*s} - c^*)$. The effect of a rise in shipping efficiency on supply is given by

$$s_\tau = s_p(p^s - c)/\tau + s_{p^*}(p^{*s} - c^*)/\tau > 0.$$

Here we use the (plausible) dominance of own effects over cross effects in trade costs to sign the net effect. Similarly, $s_\tau^* > 0$. Thus a rise in shipping efficiency reduces the negative congestion externality in excess demand markets. What is the effect on the optimal level of enforcement?

If enforcement levels are strategic complements, then globalization is contagious, a uniform fall in trade costs will induce a further reduction in trade

costs associated with imperfect contract enforcement in both countries. If enforcement levels are strategic substitutes, this reduces the positive knock-on effect as compared to the complementarity case, but the effect of a trade cost reduction is still positive.

Trade cost reductions understood as trade liberalization or deregulation tend to occur in one country only. Contract enforcement improves in the country which experiences the cost reduction. The other country has an incentive to reduce its contract enforcement under strategic substitutes but to improve its enforcement under strategic complements. Thus resolving the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity is crucial to comparative static predictions.

5 Conclusion

The theme of this conference is “New Directions in Trade Theory”. One such direction is the endogenization of the institutional foundation of trade. This paper and its predecessor take a small step in that direction by analyzing the comparative statics of a model of the demand for contract enforcement by traders. While the basic model is complex, Anderson and Young (2006) argue that it contains the minimal structure needed to address the subject. The present paper indicates that the model is a platform capable of supporting extensions. The model and its extension yields several useful insights and may yield more, as suggested below.

Still, other approaches may ultimately be more fruitful. An interesting alternative is offered in Dixit (2003), in which reputation sustains informal enforcement when markets are small, but breaks down to be replaced by costly formal enforcement when markets are large. What does seem firmly established is that the direction (of endogenous institutions of trade) is an important one on which progress can be made.

A highly speculative use of the model may make sense of world economic history. Joel Mokyr poses a key question in *The Lever of Riches*: why did China, with a clear lead in all relevant technologies in 1500 CE, fall decisively behind in the next 300 years of economic development? One answer suggested here (not his answer) is that the decentralized political structure of Europe permitted the rise of a number of competing entrepots while China was controlled by a single government. Suppose, as is plausible, that the elasticity of supply of traders was low during this period in both Europe

and China. Entrepot competition under strategic substitutability, all else equal, would have forced traders in each location to evolve laws and customs which treated foreigners and outsiders more fairly and transparently than in China. Over time (acting outside the model), the returns to trade in Europe may have drawn ever more resources into supporting trade, consequently raising elasticities to flip strategic interaction over into complementarity and inducing further improvements in enforcement.

The model may also help make sense of modern developments in third world and transition economies. Despite a rapid decline in effective trade costs, there has been no general dramatic improvement in the security of contract. Parts of South Asia appear to have reached European levels. There appears to be a recognition that it is useful for the major entrepots to emulate good practices elsewhere. In terms of the model, the ‘outsiders’ who act on the excess side of the market represent trading cultures which may be associated with high elasticity of supply, tending to satisfy the sufficient condition for the positive knock-on effect. In contrast, in Africa the conditions appear to be reversed and globalization may be worsening the security of trade.

These speculations suggest future empirical work to see if the theoretical model makes sense of patterns of institutional development in contract enforcement.

In the line of theoretical development, the model suggests several fruitful lines. First, the model makes no distinction between formal and informal enforcement. It might be useful to consider a setup where both types are active, on the suspicion that the two may be complements or substitutes, depending on details of the model. Anderson and Young (2006) review a model of contract specificity due to Caballero and Hammour (1998) that might be taken to represent formal enforcement while θ represents informal enforcement in the model. Second, the supply side of enforcement from the government is not modeled in this paper. It might be useful to set up a model of the government, describing its objectives and the constraints it faces in setting up enforcement and collecting the taxes to pay for it. Such a model might provide the basis for an examination of the optimal or efficient number of jurisdictions.

6 References

Anderson, James E. and Douglas Marcouiller, “Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation”, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84(2), 345-52.

Anderson, James E. and Leslie Young (2006), “Trade and Contract Enforcement”, *Contributions to Economic Analysis Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Article 30; <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol5/iss1/art30>, 1-33.

Anderson, James E. and Eric van Wincoop (2004), “Trade Costs”, Boston College, www2.bc.edu/~anderson/TradeCosts.pdf.

Baier, Scott L. and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand (2001), “The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs, Transport Costs and Income Similarity”, *Journal of International Economics*, 53, 1-27.

Caballero, Ricardo J. and Hammour, Mohamad .L. (1998) Macroeconomic Specificity *Journal of Political Economy*, 106, 724-67.

Dixit, Avinash K. (2003), *Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance*, Princeton University Press.

McLaren, John and Andrew Newman (2003), “Globalization and Insecurity”, University of Virginia, www.people.virginia.edu/~jem6x/mclaren_newman.pdf.

Rauch, James E. and Vitor Trindade (1999), “Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade”, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84, 116-30.

Rauch, James E. and Vitor Trindade (2002), “Information, International Substitutability, and Globalization,” working paper, University of California, San Diego, *American Economic Review*, forthcoming.

Rodrik, Dani (1997) *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?*, Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Smith, Adam (1976), *The Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.