

Superstar Firms and Trade

Nottingham Lectures in International Economics 2012

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Plan of Lectures

- 1 Motivation
- 2 Empirical Evidence
- 3 Theoretical Background

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 - Evidence that adjustment in short run is at intensive, not extensive margin

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- I prefer to try “putting the grains into granularity”

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