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The political consequences of mass repatriation

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The Political Consequences of Mass Repatriation [*]

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Abstract

What happens when the electorate of a country is suddenly increased by hundreds of thousands of new potential voters? How do parties adjust their strategies in response to such an event? To address these questions I exploit a quasi-experiment represented by the arrival in France of about 1 million repatriates from Algeria, the so-called *pieds noirs*, which happened in 1962. To study the causal impact of the *pieds noirs* on voting, I instrument their location choice based on the average temperature by department. I find that the arrival of the *pieds noirs* increased turnout and the vote share of far-right parties while it decreased the vote share of center-right parties in both legislative and presidential elections between 1962 and 1974. I then analyse how this shock affected the political strategies of the different French parties by looking at more than 10,000 political manifestos issued by candidates in the legislative elections during the same period. I show that far-right parties behaved as a political entrepreneur and started to discuss issues associated with the *pieds noirs* already in 1962. The other parties subsequently adapted their manifestos using the same words of the far-right. These findings shed light on how radical parties can affect mainstream ones by pushing new issues in their agenda.

1 Introduction

What happens when the electorate of a country is suddenly increased by hundreds of thousands of new potential voters? How do parties adjust their strategies in response to such an event? Several studies investigate how shocks to the electorate of a country impact a political system focusing, for example on the effect of the extension of the franchise.[1] The extension of the franchise is often the final outcome of decades of political activism in favour of voting rights by the excluded population. Parties thus often already have a historical position on the issues associated with the new electorate and they may also have time to adjust their political strategy to the new political landscape.

In this paper, I leverage a different mechanism that allows me to overcome some of these limitations. I exploit a quasi-experiment represented by the arrival in France of almost 1 million repatriates from Algeria. These people were not born in France but were French citizens and were entitled to vote in the French elections. Hence, their arrival in France represents an exogenous and unexpected increase in the size of the electorate which can be used to answer several questions. In this paper, I show how the electoral outcomes and party strategy were affected by the arrival of this new group of voters. I find an increase in turnout and in the vote share of far-right parties but also a decrease in the share of center-right parties in the areas of larger exposure to the arrival of the repatriates. I also observe that far-right parties were the first ones to include issues associated with the repatriates, the other parties were then forced to adopt a similar strategy in later elections.

The arrival of the French repatriates from Algeria, which started in the aftermath of the 1962 French Évian Accords referendum, marks an important event in the history of France. The relevance of the event is evident by looking at the growth rate of the French population, as shown in figure 1. The spike immediately after 1961, when the population growth hits almost 2.5%, shows the increase of the population in the aftermath of the repatriates exodus. Between March 1962 and January 1968 around 1 million people left Algeria to move to France.

[1]For an overview, see Berlinski and Dewan (2011).

Figure 1: French population growth rate 1951-2012.

Several studies have analysed how the arrival of the repatriates affected economic outcomes.[2] To the best of my knowledge no study has instead looked at the causal impact of the *pieds noirs* on political outcomes.

Since the majority of the repatriates were French citizens, they could immediately vote and manifest their grievances to the French political system. In particular, two important political issues were associated with the repatriates: compensation for the property they lost when they left Algeria and the amnesty for the crimes committed during the Algerian War of Independence. Given the significant numbers of repatriates with common interests, the question arises of whether their arrivals had a direct effect on relevant political outcomes.

Historians and social scientists (Cohen (1980, 2003), Davies (2002), Shields (2007) and Veugelers (2019)), have long claimed that the repatriates manifested an ideological bias in favour of far-right parties already during the Algerian War of Independence and that on French soil they helped to shape the political geography of France. The areas more affected by their arrival started, in fact, to vote in favour of far-right parties in the '60s and are still more likely to support the Front-National nowadays. Despite these historical accounts, there is still no systematic causal evidence on this question. Hence,

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[2]In her pioneering paper, Hunt (1992) looked at the repatriates impact on labour market outcomes at the department level, showing that it led to a 0.3% increase in the unemployment rate and to a decrease in the annual salaries (in 1967) of around 1.3%, at most. The results were then confirmed by Clemens and Hunt (2019). Similarly, but using variation at the regional level, Edo (2019) finds a temporary decrease in the native population's wages between 1962 and 1968, with full recovery taking up to 15 years.

the aim of this paper is to fill this gap and show how the arrival of the repatriates from Algeria influenced French political life.

In the first part of the paper, I study the political consequences of the arrival of the repatriates focusing on the electoral results. To causally isolate the effect of the repatriates' arrival, in line with many of the studies in the Political Economy of migration, I instrument the repatriates' location. Repatriates, similar to immigrants, can, in fact, distribute in a way to willingly avoid settling in areas with specific political ideas. Or, more generally, according to unobservable characteristics which may affect the voting outcome. In other words, the distribution of the repatriates is endogenous to voting and thus requires an instrumental variable strategy to minimise the sources of bias. To account for the endogenous distribution of the repatriates I exploit an instrumental variable, which has already been used in Hunt (1992) and Clemens and Hunt (2019). In particular, Hunt (1992) shows that the distribution of the repatriates from Algeria was strongly correlated with the weather conditions of the different French departments. The repatriates in fact settled massively in the south of France where the climate was similar to the Algerian one. As in Hunt (1992) and Clemens and Hunt (2019) I thus use the average temperature by department as an instrument for the endogenous distribution of the repatriates across departments.

To show how the arrival of the repatriates affected voting, I focus on the first round of both legislative and presidential elections held between 1962 and 1974. First, I show evidence in favour of the direct participation of the repatriates in the electoral process. In particular, I find that a 1% increase in the share of repatriates, causes an increase in the turnout of 0.58% in legislative elections and of 0.55% in presidential elections. I show that this result is likely to be driven by the electoral participation of the repatriates rather than by a mobilisation effect of native citizens. Second, analysing the pattern of votes for political parties, I find that the same inflow of repatriates also causes an increase in the vote share for the far-right of around 0.3% in legislative elections and around 0.7% in the presidential elections. Additionally, I find a decrease in the vote share for center-right parties of around 1.8% in legislative elections and 1.3% in presidential elections in the same period. These results are in line with the historians' accounts of the repatriates mindset. The repatriates had in fact an established political link with the far-right movements that started already during the Algerian War of independence.

They also never forgave De Gaulle for his decision to abandon Algeria in 1962.

In the second part of the paper, I shift my focus to the political strategies of the different parties by looking at how the arrival of the repatriates affected the political behaviour in electoral campaigns. I use text analysis on 10,745 individual candidates' political manifestos issued in the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973. I find that far-right parties devote, on average, a larger proportion of their political manifestos to the issues associated with the repatriates. This happens immediately with the first election after their arrival. After the 1962 election, the other parties also started to increase the space of their manifestos devoted to the repatriates, mimicking in this way the strategy adopted by the far-right. Far-right parties thus behave similarly to a *political entrepreneur* who knows before the others the preferences of the electorate and exploits the informational advantage for her own political goal. The other parties are then forced to move to the right and use a language similar to that deployed in the far-right manifestos as a way to appeal to the same new electorate. This mechanism is similar to the one highlighted in more recent elections when far-right parties in Europe exploited the issues related to the arrival of immigrants and forced the other parties to move to the right and show more anti-immigrant stances. Additionally, I also show that, in the areas of larger exposure to the arrival of the repatriates, parties, independently from their own political ideology, tend to devote a larger space of their manifestos to the issues associated with them. Hence, while shedding light on the consequences of an important historical event, this paper also provides evidence of a more general mechanism at play. An exogenous increase in the voting population and the increased salience of the issues related to this new electorate causes parties to adjust their political strategy. Some parties can exploit these issues before all others. The other parties could then be forced to mimic this behaviour. In the end, issues associated with niche parties can become mainstream.

The arrival of the repatriates from Algeria presents some similarities with the inflow of immigrants from other countries. This paper thus contributes to the growing litera-ture in Political Economy that studies how the arrival of immigrants in a country affects voting. Many of these studies tend to find a causal effect of immigration on voting for radical-right parties. Otto and Steinhardt (2014) shows that the arrival of immigrants and asylum seekers in Hamburg led to an increase in far-right parties' vote share in the

local elections. Similarly Barone et al. (2016) finds that Italian municipalities more exposed to immigration saw an increase in the vote share of center-right coalition parties in the national elections. Halla et al. (2017) shows that the arrival of immigrants in Austria increased the vote share of the far-right movement FPO. Edo et al. (2019) finds that the increase in immigration from Northern African countries caused an increase in Le Pen's vote share in the French Presidential elections between 1988 and 2012. Also, using historical data, Tabellini (2020) shows that, during the age of mass migration in the US, the increased number of immigrants caused the election of more anti-immigrant and conservative legislators and higher support for anti-immigration legislation.

Although the number of studies finding a causal link between immigration and far-right voting is constantly growing, other studies find that the effect of immigrants and asylum seekers on radical-right voting is heterogeneous and depends on several factors. Mayda et al. (2022), looking at US election outcomes at the county level, shows that an increase in low-skilled immigration causes an increase in the vote share of the Republican party, while an increase in the high-skilled immigration decreases it. Dustmann et al. (2019) finds that an increase in the exogenous allocation of refugees in Danish municipalities led to an increase, in all but the most urban municipalities, of the vote share of anti-immigrant parties. In addition, some studies even find an opposite effect of immigration on radical right parties. As an example, Steinmayr (2021), studying the Austrian case, finds mixed results: The arrival of refugees passing the borders increased the vote-share for far-right parties, while sustained contact between refugees and native citizens reduced it. As argued by Alesina and Tabellini (2021), studies that find a negative effect of immigration on the vote for radical-right parties usually require a long exposure and interaction between immigrants and natives citizens, and are in line with the theoretical predictions of the "Contact theory" by Allport (1954).

Despite the similarities with the arrival of immigrants in a country, there is a fundamental feature of this study that distinguishes it from the canonical studies of the political economy of migration. In fact, all these studies tend to observe that the effect on political outcomes is not a direct cause of the newly arrived individuals but crucially depends on the backlash of native citizens who react against the increased level of immigration. As an example, the increase in the vote share for far-right parties can be explained by the backlash of native citizens against immigrants, but cannot be

a direct effect of the newly arrived immigrants themselves since they don't have the right to vote. Mayda et al. (2022), for example, finds that the effect of non-naturalized immigrants on the vote for the Republican party dominates the effect of naturalized immigrants, meaning that the political effect of immigration on voting is indirect.

This study instead, leverages a different mechanism. In the specific case of the repatriates from Algeria, the electoral effect is likely to be also driven by the repatriates themselves, who are in fact eligible voters already when they arrived on French soil, and vote in accordance with their ideology and interests. Hence, this study shares similarities with the literature that looks at the effects of the extension of the franchise.

Several studies, such as Husted and Kenny (1997), Lott and Kenny (1999), Aidt et al. (2006), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Miller (2008) and Cascio and Washington (2013) among others, looked at how the extension of the franchise affected public spending, finding that the latter increased in the areas more strongly affected by the franchise extension. After the extension of the franchise vote-seeking parties are thus more likely to implement policies in such a way to appeal to the new electorate to gain an electoral advantage. The literature on the effect of the franchise extension on electoral outcomes is instead scanter. Berlinski and Dewan (2011) and Larcinese (2011) studied how the extension of the franchise affected voting and party competition respectively in the United Kingdom and Italy. One important identification challenge in isolating the effect of a new group of voters on political outcomes is that the franchise is often the final outcome of decades of political activism in favour of voting rights by the excluded population. In the case of the repatriates from Algeria instead, the change in the electorate is due to an unexpected inflow of migrants who are entitled to vote. Hence, by exploiting a unique natural experiment, my work builds a bridge between the literature on the extension of the franchise and that on the political effects of migration, while providing causal evidence on an important historical event with long-lasting political consequences.

2   Historical background and hypotheses

In this section, I describe the main historical events that characterised the French dominion of Algeria whose legacy will be important to understand the political institutions

in France and the electoral behaviour of the repatriates. In particular, I focus on the colonial relationship between France and Algeria and the consequences of the civil war on the French political system.

2.1 The colonial past

The French invasion of Algeria, at the time part of the Ottoman empire, started in 1830 as a consequence of a diplomatic incident between the two countries. The increased Algerian financial needs during the 1820s led, as a consequence, to the official request to France to repay the debt contracted during the Napoleonic Wars. The negative answer by the French government led to a diplomatic clash. The initial French response was the establishment of a blockade against Algeria and then, in 1830, the final act was the invasion and the complete conquest of the territory.

From 1830 until the Evian's agreement, in 1962, Algeria will be an integral part of the French empire and will even be integrated into the administrative structure of the French republic in 1881. The colonisation process and the strong demographic growth of the native population led to an enduring imbalance in Algeria's political life. Though the settlers were a small fraction of the total population the key administrative positions, and the rights accorded by the law, were all in favour of the settlers. Only a small fraction[3] of the population was able to vote for the elections. The Muslim population was in fact disproportionately under-represented in the Algerian political system. The institutional design adopted in Algeria was thus the driver of the creation of a very strongly segregated society. The increased segregation of the Algerian society, even after the demographic boom of the Muslim population, and the emergence of an Algerian National sentiment, were the main triggers of the Algerian Civil War which started in 1954 and ended in 1962.

2.2 Civil War

The Algerian Civil war started in November 1954 with the coordinated attacks against French targets by an Algerian armed force called *Front de Libèration National* (FLN). In the same year, France had already lost Indochina, and the other North-African colonies

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[3]This included: the French settlers; the Jewish population after the Cremieux's Law in 1870; and also the Foreign settlers from 1889.

were pushing to get independence. The French government, unwilling to accept any other defeat, decided to act to maintain the colonial possession in Algeria. As Francois Mitterand, the French Ministry of Interior at the time said: "Algeria is France. And who amongst you, mesdames and messieurs, would hesitate to employ all methods to preserve France?" Evans (2011, p. 124). After the "Philippeville Massacre" (20 August 1955), when the FLN killed more than 100 European citizens, the French government decided to recall the reservists and started a war in Algeria. The failure of the French government[4] in dealing with the Algerian war and the increasing military spending without results led to a political crisis. Scared by a possible coup[5] by the French army the figure of general De Gaulle emerged as the man of order and on 1st of June 1958 his government was installed.

One of the first moves by De Gaulle was to travel to Algeria on the 4 of June. The first words of his speech to the crowd were: "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you), words that were read by the French settlers in Algeria as a clear expression of support for the existence and preservation of the "Algerie Francaise".[6] In order to stabilise the French political system, and increase the government power, De Gaulle announced a series of reforms to the French constitution to be voted in a referendum on the 28 September. The referendum was won with 66% of the votes in France and with an overwhelming 96% in Algeria. With this reform, France adopted a semi-presidential system and entered the political period called the "French Fifth Republic".

One of the first acts of the new government was to announce the "Constantine Plan", a development plan for Algeria designed with the aim to provide financial help and education to the Muslim population. The European population of Algeria did not support the plan, which they considered to be a major gift to the population with whom they were fighting a civil war. In addition to the plan, on 16 September 1959, in a speech to the French people, De Gaulle opened to the possibility of the self-determination of Algeria. After this speech, members of the French army in Algeria, and the European settlers, felt betrayed and gave birth to an insurrectionary group called *French National*

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[4]After the 1956 elections the new Prime minister of the French government was Guy Mollet, his government, the longest-lasting government of the fourth republic, will last only 14 months.

[5]Some generals of the French army, Massau and Salan among others, threatened the French government with a possible coup in order to install De Gaulle as prime minister.

[6]The correct interpretation of De Gaulle's words in that circumstance is still debated. De Gaulle seemed to suggest that Algeria with its 10 million people was still an integral part of France but in his speech, he never used any expression that could be easily associated with the term "Algerie Francaise".

Front (FNF), whose symbol was the Celtic cross, the same symbol of the French far-right group *Jeune Nation*.[7] In order to manifest their opposition to De Gaulle's policy the FNF occupied the university of Algiers on the 23 of January by creating barricades. The day after they were joined by thousands of supporters who created a series of barricades in the streets.[8] When the *gendarmerie* was sent to dismantle the barricades, the clash with the crowd resulted in many victims on both sides. After this event, De Gaulle reacted with a speech to the nation attacking the members of the FNF and asking for the support of the French people. The day after the speech, the barricades were dismantled and the FNF dissolved.

Given the still strong support for the FNL by the Algerian people, the increasing cost of the war with thousands of French troops on Algerian soil, and the mounting pressure from international institutions, the only solution left to De Gaulle was to accept the self-determination of Algeria. Hence, On the 8 of January 1961, the French people were asked to express their opinion on the self-determination of Algeria in a referendum. The 76% voted in favour of De Gaulle's proposal thus giving to the Algerian people the possibility to vote for their independence. A group of supporters of the *Algerie Francaise*, unable to accept the outcome of the referendum, decided to create the *Organisation de l'Armee Secrete* (OAS), a terrorist organisation with the specific goal of stopping any possible negotiations in favour of the Algerian independence. On 21 April 1961 French paratroopers linked to the OAS announced to have taken control of Algiers to protect French Algeria. The streets of Algiers became crowded with European settlers who manifested in favour of the putsch. General De Gaulle reacted on 23 April with a strong speech to the nation: "In the name of France, I order that all methods, I say all methods, are used to block the path of these men." Evans (2011, p. 297). Given the weak support by the French army, and the lack of any plan on how to support their military operation, the putsch failed. The OAS then tried again to stop the negotiations with a killing attempt against De Gaulle, who was able to safely escape from a bombing. The bombings by OAS members continued in Paris and targeted the politicians and intellectuals who were manifestly against French Algeria. In a climate

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[7]Jeune Nation was "The most prominent French neo-fascist movement of the 1950s" Shields (2007, p. 124). This group wanted to exploit the Algerian crisis to suppress elections and political parties in France.

[8]The week from the 23 January to the 1 of February when these events took place is called the "Week of the Barricades".

of terror on the 18 of March De Gaulle announced to have found an agreement with the provisional government of Algeria on how to organize the process of self-determination of the Algerian people.[9] Despite the terrorist attacks by the OAS and the protest of the European settlers, on the 8 of April Evian agreements were ratified with a referendum that saw a victory for independence. The independence won with 90.8% of the votes in France and then, on the 1 of July, with the 99.7% of the votes in Algeria. On the 5 of July Algeria declared its official independence from France.

2.3 Pieds-noirs' Exodus

After the April referendum the European settlers, which during the Algerian war started to define themselves as *pieds noirs* (black foot), started to leave Algeria mainly by boat, some of them by flight. The *pieds noirs* were allowed to bring with them only the objects that could fit two suitcases per person, they had to leave all the rest in Algeria. The mass repatriation was an unexpected event for both the *pieds noirs* and the government. Before April the government had, in fact, only one liner to move the *pieds noirs* to France Evans (2011, p. 320). In addition, the Evian agreements were regulating the rights of French citizens in Algeria and the French government was thus convinced that the majority of the *pieds noirs* would have stayed in Algeria. The government predicted a maximum inflow of 100,000 people per year to move to France in the first years (Cohen, 1980; Shepard, 2008; Horne, 2011).

Despite the government predictions, around 700,000 *pieds noirs* arrived in France from April to December 1962. The number of arrivals decreased already from 1963 and then stopped in 1968 when the total number of repatriates who settled in France had touched almost 1 million. The wave of *pieds noirs* represented an increase of the French population of almost 2% in less than 7 years. The spatial distribution of repatriates across different French departments was very heterogeneous. The majority of them disproportionately settled in the southern departments of France because the climate was mild and Mediterranean, similar to the Algerian one Horne (2011, p. 631). As a pieds noir recalled in a newspaper interview: "We were told: "Come to Provence, there is the same climate" (Sallon, 2012). By looking at figure 2, the average temperature

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[9]The round of discussions between the French Government and the Algerian provisional government took place in the city of Evian, the documents that allowed Algeria self-determination are therefore named the Evian agreements.

by department seems indeed to be a good predictor of the location choices of the repatriates.

Figure 2: Distribution of *pieds noirs* and average temperature by department

Given the high number of repatriates, especially in some areas, it is not surprising that they represented an important electoral force in the areas where they settled. Two important issues started to be associated with the *pieds noirs* after their arrival: the compensation for the property they lost in Algeria and the amnesty for the crimes committed during the Algerian Civil War. The government was in fact unprepared to compensate such a huge and unexpected number of people Cohen (1980). The far-right, in particular, tried to exploit the unresolved grievances of the Algerian independence and the sense of loss that the repatriates experienced during the '60s. The relationship between the *pieds noirs* and the far-right did not come as a surprise given the *pieds noirs*' rejection of the Evian's agreement and their support for some of the OAS actions back in Algeria. In the next section I thus briefly discuss the relationship between the repatriates and the far-right parties in France.

2.4 Pieds noirs and the far-right

The Algerian war marked a very important step for the development of the far-right ideology. It gave the far-right an important theme to exploit in a moment when, after the second world war, the fascist ideology was out of fashion. For the far-right French Algeria represented a crusade against the Muslim people ("*les Arabs*"), it represented the fight between the western Christian civilization and the Muslims (Shields, 2007). It gave the far-right new vigour. It led to the creation of movements and associations fighting to maintain the *Algerie Francaise* such as Jeune Nation, the OAS, student associations like *Federation of National Students* (FEN) and *Front National pour l'Algerie Francaise* (FNAF) founded by Jean Marie Le Pen, the future leader of the Front National, and by Jean Tixier-Vignancour who will be the presidential candidate for the far-right in the 1965 presidential election. This election, in particular, represented the best hope for the far-right before the success of Le Pen in the '80s. Against these hopes, Tixier-Vignancour was able to win only the 5.2% of the votes at the national level, well distant from his predictions of 25% in the first round of the elections. The poor result at the national level does hide the spatial distribution of the votes for Tixier-Vignancour, who was able to gain as much as the 15% of the vote in some of the Southern departments most affected by the *pieds noirs*' arrival. The arrival of the repatriates marked an important event in the electoral geography of France since the areas more willing to vote for the far-right were different from the ones that voted in favour of the Poujadist party[10] in the 1958 election.

The Southern departments from this moment on will be associated with the vote for the far-right and will be the stronghold of Jean Marie Le Pen from the second half of the '80s on. The relationship between Jean Marie Le Pen and the *pieds noirs* has been documented by Veugelers et al. (2015) and by Veugelers (2019) who interviewed *pieds noirs* communities in Toulon but also by Fourquet and Pratviel (2012) according to whom, those who identify themselves as *pieds noir*, are 8.5% points more likely to vote for the Front National. Though many years have passed from the end of the Algerian war and the Algerian independence, the legacy of the *pieds noirs* and the *Algerie Francaise* is still an important topic. This can be is illustrated by several monuments [11] erected to

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[10]The Poujadist party took its name from its leader Pierre Poujade. It was a populist party in favour of the small property and against the political elites of the time, see Goodliffe (2012).

[11]Histoire coloniale et postcoloniale (2011) shows a (partial) list of monuments devoted to the *pieds*

remember the *Algerie Francaise.* But also by the 2005 French law on colonialism[12] which stated in the article 4: "The schools programs should acknowledge and recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa, and should give the right historical place to the fighters of the French army issued in that place".[13] The Law was then repealed in 2006 and article 4 completely changed under the pressure of international institutions, historians and civil associations.

2.5 Testable hypotheses

From the historical facts presented in the previous sections it is thus possible to draw some testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *Areas more exposed to the arrival of the pieds noirs experience an increase in turnout.*

The *pieds noirs*, being eligible voters, could use the elections as a way to publicly manifest their grievances and to push in favour of their interests. I thus expect to observe an increase in the turnout in the areas of higher *pieds noirs*' concentration.

Hypothesis 2: *Far-right parties show a higher vote share in the areas more exposed to the arrival of the pieds noirs.*

Since the connection between far-right movements and the *pieds noirs* was already established during the Algerian war[14], I expect to observe a higher vote share for far-right parties in the areas where the *pieds noirs* settled.

Hypothesis 3: *There is a decline in the vote share of center-right parties in areas of higher exposure to the pieds noirs' arrival.*

Since the *pieds noirs* were forced to leave Algeria because of De Gaulle's decision and because they considered him a traitor, I expect them not to cast votes for center-right parties. This means that, given the increase in the electorate without an increase in the number of votes for center-right parties, their vote share is likely to decrease.

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noirs with their specific inauguration year and locations.

[12]Loi n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés

[13]"Les programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord et accordent à l'histoire et aux sacrifices des combattants de l'armée française issus de ces territoires la place éminente à laquelle ils ont droit".

[14]Davies (2002) argues that the *pieds noirs* and the far-right shared similar goals and similar attitudes. Veugelers (2019) defines "Elective Affinity" the mutual attraction between the *pieds noirs* and the far-right.

3   Data description

In order to identify the political impact of the *pieds noirs* I exploit two main data sources: the record of the elections of the French Fifth Republic that is provided by the French Ministry of the interior and all the French censuses between 1962 and 2012.

Elections.   From 1958, when De Gaulle won the constitutional referendum, the French political system has been characterised by a system of government defined as "semi-presidentialism" (Duverger, 1980).   This system combines a President of the Republic who is elected by universal suffrage with a prime minister who is able to stay in office if the parliament is not opposed to it.   In France, there are two important elections that characterize the political system: presidential and legislative elections. Before the year 2000, the candidate winning the presidential election was elected for 7 years.[15].   The presidential election is a two-round system.   The candidate who is able to win the absolute majority in the first round wins, otherwise, the two candidates with the higher vote shares go to the second round.   In this case, the president is the candidate who gets more votes than the other.   The prime minister is appointed by the president and usually requires the confidence of the national assembly.   The national assembly is composed of 577 MPs, elected through a two-round system.   Each MP is elected by a single constituency (*Circonscription*) if she has the absolute majority of votes and at least the vote of a quarter of the registered electorate after the first round. Otherwise, all the candidates that are voted by at least one-eighth of the eligible voters are admitted to the second round.   In the second round, the candidate who gets more votes is elected to the National Assembly.

The Ministry of interior provides information on all the legislative and presidential elections between 1958 and 2012 at the electoral district level.   My analysis focuses in particular on the first wave of elections when the effect of the *pieds noirs* should be supposedly stronger.   I thus examine all national elections (presidential or legislative) that took place between 1962 and 1974. I then look at possible long-run effects by examining the election outcomes between 1986 and 2012.   In order to match the geographical level of the census, I aggregate the information at a higher geographical level: the depart-

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[15]The constitutional reform in 2000 reduced the years of mandate of the president from 7 to 5 years. This was a way to reduce the risk of cohabitation, a particular condition under which the president and prime minister belong to two different opposite parties. The only example of cohabitation happened in 1997 when the French president, the socialist Mitterand, had to govern with Jacques Chirac who, despite being a member of the largest center-right party, had been nominated Prime minister.

ment *Departement*. The French departments were created in 1790 during the period of the French Revolution with the intent to give France stronger institutional stability.[16] Despite new territorial acquisitions and reforms the French departments remained almost the same over the past two centuries. After excluding Corse from the dataset and aggregating the new departments created in 1968 I have a total of 88 departments that are consistent over time.[17] France is also divided into higher geographical units called regions. France comprised 21 regions when the Pieds Noirs arrived and settled in France.

Pieds noirs. In order to construct a measure of exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival I exploit the rich set of information provided by the French Census in 1968, the first census which allows collecting information on the number of repatriates who entered the country after the Algerian Independence. [18].

I consider being a repatriate any individual who was resident in Algeria on January 1st 1962 and entered France between March 1962 and December 1968.[19] I then consider among these individuals only those who are French citizens (excluding the French Muslims) and then exploit the year of entry to construct a time-varying measure of the *pieds noirs*' arrival in France between 1962 and 1968. I then divide the number of *pieds noirs* arrived in each different year in the different French departments by the 1962 department population. The measure is thus defined as:

$$pieds\ noirs_{jrs} = \frac{\text{N}\ pieds\ noirs_{jrs}}{\text{Population}_{jr1962}}$$

where j represents the French departments, r represents the French regions and s varies between March 1962 to December 1968.

The *pieds noirs* identified from the census represent around 950,000 individuals. The vast majority of them (nearly 70%) arrived in 1962 after the referendum on the Algerian independence. Their distribution shows a large spatial variation which ranges from around 0.3% of the 1962 population in Cotes-d'Armor department to almost 10% in

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[16]Maier (2016)

[17]The departments of Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne, Val-d'Oise and Yvellines have been aggregated with the department of Paris in order to have a consistent geographical unit over time.

[18]The 1968 census covers a fourth of the French population, around 12.5 million individuals.

[19]I start to include the repatriates from March 1962, excluding the ones entered between January and February, because from that date on they are more likely to move because of the Algerian independence and not for other possible reasons such as better economic conditions. In the Appendix C table C.4 I show that even including the *pieds noirs* arrived between February and March 1962 the results are unaltered.

the Var. Around 70% of *pieds noirs* were born in Algeria and represent the heirs of the original French settlers who moved from France to Algeria after it was colonised in 1830. Almost half of them work in the public sector. They are disproportionally concentrated in the public administration and the army. They are also, on average, better educated than the general French population.[20]

Socio-economic characteristics. In order to adjust for possible confounders that can affect both the distribution of the *pieds noirs* and the voting outcomes I exploit the 1962 census to obtain information on the pre-arrival department characteristics.[21] In particular, I collect information on the 1962 employment share in different sectors. [22] I also include the Education level in 1962, measured as the share of the population in the department with the high school diploma (*Baccalaureat*), and the share of the non-French population in 1962, which proxies for the pre-existing exposure to immigration.

I also exploit the 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2011 censuses to collect information on immigrants, from different source countries, who arrived in France at different points in time. This information is used as an alternative explanation for the long-run effect of the *pieds noirs* on the far-right parties' vote share.

Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the variables used in this paper.

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[20]See figure 10 and figure 11 in the Appendix A.

[21]The 1962 census data were collected in March 1962 so it can be used as the last census before the arrival of the repatriates.

[22]the sectors are: tertiary, construction, transportation, public, agriculture, industry and commerce sector

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Obs	Min.	Max.
Elections					
Right share-Legislative elections	0.34	0.13	1057	0.00	0.76
Far-right voteshare-Legislative elections	0.06	0.07	1057	0.00	0.30
Turnout-Legislative elections	0.73	0.08	1056	0.52	0.88
Right voteshare-Presidential elections	0.33	0.11	792	0.15	0.70
Far-right voteshare-Presidential elections	0.12	0.07	616	0.00	0.30
Turnout-Presidential elections	0.82	0.04	792	0.68	0.90
Census					
Pieds Noirs share 1962-1968	0.02	0.02	1496	0.00	0.09
Education	0.04	0.01	1496	0.02	0.09
Employed in agriculture 1962	0.30	0.14	1496	0.01	0.64
Employed in industry 1962	0.24	0.10	1496	0.08	0.53
Employed in transportation 1962	0.03	0.02	1496	0.01	0.11
Employed in construction 1962	0.09	0.02	1496	0.06	0.19
Employed in banking 1962	0.13	0.03	1496	0.08	0.25
Employed in tertiary 1962	0.09	0.02	1496	0.05	0.16
Employed in public sector 1962	0.10	0.03	1496	0.06	0.21
Foreign born population 1962	0.05	0.04	1496	0.00	0.20
Average temperature	11.32	1.36	1496	9.30	15.20
Immigrant population Maghreb 1962-1968 (share)	0.0002	0.0005	1496	0	0.003
Immigrant population from Maghreb 1962 (share)	0.01	0.01	1496	0	0.03
Immigrants inflow (1982-2012) Immigrants inflow	0.000	0.007	440	−0.03	0.02
Manifestos					
Word Algerie share	0.00054	0.00096	1490	0	0.00984
Word Rapatrie share	0.00048	0.00086	1490	0	0.00929
Word Indemnisation share	0.00034	0.00070	1490	0	0.00523
Word Amnistie share	0.00029	0.00072	1490	0	0.00616
Word Algerie share 1958	0.00274	0.00212	1548	0	0.01208
Word Rapatrie share 1958	0.00008	0.00034	1548	0	0.00350
Word Amnistie share 1958	0.00005	0.00028	1548	0	0.00256
Word Indemnisation share 1958	0.00007	0.00035	1548	0	0.00417

Summary statistics. Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum and Observations showed in the table

4 Identification strategy

To study the political impact of the *pieds noirs* between 1962 and 1974 I estimate the following model:

$$\text{Voteshare}_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \sum_{s=1962}^{1968} \text{pieds noirs}_{jrs} + \beta_2 \text{Voteshare}_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ijrt}$$

(1)

The outcome variable $Voteshare_{ijrt}$ captures the share of votes for the different parties i (or overall elections turnout), in each department j, located in a region r, at time t. t ranges from 1962, the first election after the first wave of arrival of the *pieds noirs*, to 1974. As the different parties considered are not constant for the whole period,

instead of looking at the vote share for every single party, I recode them according to their prevalent political ideology. Hence, my main outcome variable represents the vote share for center-right, far-right, as well as the election turnout.[23] The elections considered are the legislative elections of 1962, 1967, 1968 and 1973, while the presidential elections are the ones of 1965, 1969 and 1974.

In each single regression, I always control for the vote share for the same ideology i in the 1958 election, the first election of the French Fifth Republic and the last one before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. The share of votes in the 1958 election captures the pre-existing political preference in the different areas.

The main variable of interest which captures the shock in each department j, region r, at time s is *pieds noirs*$_{jrs}$. I sum this variable in order to have, for each election, the share of *pieds noirs* who have settled in the area at the time of the election. In the Appendix C I also use two alternative measures of the shock: I restrict the measure only to the *pieds noirs* arrived between March to December 1962, or I look at the *pieds noirs* arrived between March 1962 to December 1968 who are in their legal voting age (at least 21) at the time of the elections.

In order to adjust for possible confounders, I include a set of controls that captures the socio-economic characteristics of the different areas (X_{jr62}). The impact of the repatriates on the different socio-economic characteristics of the departments can be a source of concern. Hence, the controls are fixed at their 1962 value, their pre-treatment levels. To capture time-specific trends and time-invariant characteristics at the regional level I also include a set of year dummies δ_t and a set of region fixed effects θ_r. Standard errors are clustered at the department level, the main geographical unit of analysis.

The parameter of interest (β_1) thus captures the average additional vote share, compared to that obtained in 1958, which can be causally attributed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs*.

4.1   Instrumental variable

The arrival of the *pieds noirs* is conceptually similar to the arrival of immigrants in a country. Hence, the main source of concern for identification is the potentially

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[23]The French ministry of interior provides a label that helps to identify the different parties according to their specific political ideology. The codification of every single party and president according to the ideology is shown in the Appendix E.

endogenous distribution of the repatriates across space. In particular, unobserved characteristics of the different departments could affect both the distribution of the *pieds noirs* as well as voting outcomes. In order to address this concern, I use an instrumental variable approach. Since the *pieds noirs* settled in the south of France where the climate is similar to the one they were used back in Algeria, I can use the average temperature by department as an instrumental variable. This is not a novel instrument since it has been already used in Hunt (1992) and Clemens and Hunt (2019) to study the economic impact of the arrival of the repatriates. Figure 2 represents the distribution of *pieds noirs* and average temperature by department. The two maps show a significant degree of correlation, thus corroborating the relevance of the instrument.


Figure 3: predicted *pieds noirs* and share of *pieds noirs*

Additionally, figure 3 illustrates the relation between the predicted and the actual share of *pieds noirs*. The two measures are strongly correlated.

Table 2: First stage regression

	(1) Base	(2) Controls	(3) Fe-year	(4) Full
average temperature	0.009***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	616	616	616	616
Controls	no	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	no	yes	yes
Region FE	no	no	no	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 and year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Also, Table 2 shows the first stage regression which captures the effect of the average temperature on the *pieds noirs'* distribution during the period 1962-1974. The first column is the simple correlation between temperature and the share of *pieds noirs*. In Column 2 I add different socio-economic controls, in column 3 I add year fixed effects and in the last column, I also add region fixed effects.

The coefficient is always statistically significant and positive, meaning that an increase in the average temperature in an area is associated with an increase in the share of the *pieds noirs* in the same area. The first stage thus shows that the instrument is relevant. In the following tables, I will always report the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for weak instruments to show the validity of the instrument.

4.2 Identifying assumption

The key identifying assumption behind the instrument is that average temperature should influence the vote share only through the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. This means that departments with a higher average temperature should not show significant differences in terms of political outcomes. This can happen if average temperature affects the voting outcomes or if, department-specific characteristics associated with average temperature affect the election outcomes after the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. The exclu-

sion restriction assumption cannot be tested. Nonetheless, I try to bring some pieces of evidence to support the validity of this assumption.

First, in Appendix B table 8, I show that average temperature is not associated with the political outcomes of interest in several elections before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. This means that warmer areas do not show higher turnout or higher vote-shares for center-right, far-right in the 1951, 1956 and 1958 legislative elections. To show that the average temperature is not associated with the pre-arrival political outcomes may not be enough since it may still be that warmer areas were already on different trends before the arrival of the repatriates. Hence, in Appendix B table 9, I show that average temperature is also not associated with the change in political outcomes between the 1951, 1956 and 1958 elections.[24] These two pieces of evidence suggests that average temperature did not directly affect the voting outcomes.

Second, in appendix B tables 10 and 11, I augment my specification by interacting controls, possibly correlated with average temperature, with year dummies, thus allowing for their evolution over time. This exercise is used to check if departments characteristics can have persistent effects on political outcomes. The results of this exercise leave the effect of the *pieds noirs* unaffected, suggesting that these characteristics were less likely to play a role in shaping the electoral outcomes after the arrival of the repatriates. These exercises reduce possible concerns over indirect links between average temperature and voting outcomes.

5   Results

In this section, I present the results of the analysis of the political impact of the *pieds noirs*. In order to minimize the concern over strategic voting by the electorate, I study the effect of the *pieds noirs*' arrival on the first round of both presidential and legislative elections. The first round should provide a more truthful representation of the preferences of the electorate. I first look at the short-run effect of the *pieds noirs*' arrival (1962-1974) and then move to the persistence of political voting (1986-2012).

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[24]A note of caution should be made on the possibility of using elections before 1958 since previous elections used a different electoral system. Only from 1958, France will undergo a constitutional reform and the start of the French "Fifth Republic".

5.1 Short-run

In this section, I test the empirical hypothesis stated in section 2.5. I look at legislative and presidential elections separately. This is because the two elections have different purposes. With legislative elections, the electorate elects a single MP to the national assembly. Differently, in presidential elections, each candidate is voted in a single different electoral district.

Table 3: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and *pieds noirs*.

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.103	0.586**	−1.204*	−1.844**	0.238***	0.292***
	(0.184)	(0.251)	(0.628)	(0.719)	(0.056)	(0.101)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		46.3		46.6		44.8

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 3 presents estimates of the causal impact of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973. For each different ideology, the first column shows the results of the OLS regression while the second presents the result of the 2SLS regression. The first outcome of interest is the turnout. If the *pieds noirs'* voted in the elections I should observe an increase in turnout with respect to the 1958 election. Looking at the 2SLS result, A 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* causes an increase in the turnout by around 0.58%. This result points in favour of the direct electoral participation of the *pieds noirs*. If the *pieds noirs* voted is likely that they also had noticeable effects in terms of vote shares for different parties.

Consistent with the hypothesis that the *pieds noirs* will not vote in favour of center-right/Gaullists candidates I observe that a 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* causes

a decrease of the vote shares of 1.808%. I then look at the effect on far-right candidates. A 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* leads to an increase in the far-right vote share by around 0.3%. In all cases the F-stat is high, thus showing that the instrument is relevant.

Table 4 shows the causal impact of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the presidential elections held between 1965 and 1974. The results are in line with the ones found for the legislative elections: A 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* increases the turnout by around 0.56%, it also decreases the vote shares of center-right presidential candidates by 1.3%, and increases the far-right vote share by around 0.7%.

Table 4: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and *pieds noirs*

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.232	0.562**	−0.470	−1.301**	0.509***	0.735***
	(0.166)	(0.247)	(0.451)	(0.659)	(0.083)	(0.092)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		44.1		44.3		39.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Both tables show OLS coefficients relative to center-right parties and turnout that are strongly downward biased. One possible explanation for this downward bias can be specifically related to the location choice of the repatriates. The repatriates likely settled in areas where they felt more welcomed and where people shared some of their beliefs on the Algerian issue. Those areas could be areas more dissatisfied with the government's decision to concede independence to Algeria.

The empirical analysis provides support for the hypothesis. The areas which were more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* saw: an increase in turnout, a decrease

in the vote share for center-right parties, and an increase in the vote share for far-right parties.

Before studying the persistence of political preferences, one issue needs further discussion. It is possible that the French government's decision to concede independence to Algeria led to mounting dissatisfaction against the government in some areas of France. This dissatisfaction could have led to a potential mobilisation of native citizens against the government, and in favour of the far-right, already before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. Does this possible mobilisation effect rule out any causal effect of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the political outcomes? It is not possible to answer unequivocally this question, given the non-availability of enough detailed opinion surveys and because the individual vote cannot be observed. Notwithstanding, I bring some pieces of evidence in favour of the political impact of the *pieds noirs*. The first thing to notice is that the electoral participation of the *pieds noirs* has been claimed by historians and has been documented in newspaper articles of the time (Palacio, 1965). Additionally, the analysis of the political manifestos in the second part of this paper shows a political manifesto of a candidate of an association of repatriates ("*Le Rassemblement National des Francais Rapatries*") directly running in the 1962 legislative election in a coalition with a far-right party (the Pojuadist party). These anecdotal examples point in the direction of the political participation of the *pieds noirs*.

To the previous anecdotal examples, I also add a quantitative one. I perform a falsification test to verify if turnout was already increasing before the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. In particular, I use the referendum on the Algerian independence (8 April 1962) to observe the possible mobilisation effects of native citizens on that issue. This referendum was held immediately before the arrival of the *pieds noirs* and should thus capture natives' mobilisation on the Algerian issue, net of the *pieds noirs'* effect. In Appendix C table 13 I show that the areas which will be more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* did not see an increase in votes and turnout between the 1958 legislative election and the 8 April 1962 referendum on the Algerian independence. At the same time, as I have shown in this section, the arrival of the *pieds noirs* did cause an increase in turnout in the elections 1962-1974. These two results combined point in favour of the participation of the *pieds noirs* in the electoral process and thus in favour of the direct political effect of the *pieds noirs* on the electoral outcomes. It is still important to notice

that this does not rule out possible spillover/contagion effects of the *pieds noirs* who could potentially have influenced the electoral behaviour of the natives in favour of the Far-right. In this case the electoral results I observe in the areas more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* would be a function of both the direct vote of the *pieds noirs* and of the natives.

5.2 Long-Run

The previous section showed the immediate impact of the *pieds noirs'* arrival on the French elections. In this section, I look at the possible persistence of political voting. The long-run persistence of the vote for the far-right in the areas most affected by the arrival of the *pieds noirs* is not a completely new topic of discussion. In fact, Veugelers et al. (2015) and Veugelers (2019) showed that in the city of Toulon the *Front National* enjoyed the disproportionate support of the repatriates' communities in both presidential and legislative elections between 2002 and 2012. Similarly, Fourquet and Pratviel (2012), found that the *pieds noirs*, and their descendants (around 3 million potential voters), were significantly more likely to vote for the 2012 far-right presidential candidate. The monuments to the repatriates and to the Algerian war built in the 1980s also testify the saliency of the issue of the repatriates in the south of France decades after their arrival.

In order to study the long-run effect of the *pieds noirs'* arrival, I deploy the same strategy used to estimate the short-run effect. This time I use it for the elections held between 1982 and 2012. The main concern that arises, in this case, is represented by the presence of an omitted variable bias. In fact, as Edo (2019) showed, the arrival of (non-French) immigrants in France from the '80s causally explains the increase in the vote share of far-right parties. Therefore, in order to claim that the *pieds noirs* had a persistent effect on the voting behaviour, I have to show that this effect is robust to the inclusion of a variable capturing the inflow of immigrants from other source countries starting from the '80s. Hence, I use all the censuses between 1982 and 2011 to construct a measure of the immigrant population[25] as the share of the overall department population in each census wave. I then calculate the immigration inflow as the change in the share of immigrants between two consecutive census waves and match each election with a

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[25]I consider as immigrants individuals who are not French. In this way, I am able to exclude the *pieds noirs* from this measure.

census wave. In this way, I have, for each election, a measure of the inflow of immigrants at the time. Since the inflow of immigrants could generate endogeneity concerns, along the lines of Edo (2019), I construct a shift-share instrumental variable for the inflow of immigrants.[26] I use this measure in all the following regressions as an additional control.

In the following tables, for each different party, the first column shows the result of the OLS analysis if I control for the share of *pieds noirs'* and the inflow of immigrants. In the second column, the share of repatriates is instrumented using the average temperature and, in the third one, I also instrument the inflow of immigrants using a shift-share instrumental variable. In the third column, I always report the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage F statistics for each individual instrument.

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[26]In the Appendix C, sectionsC.10 I provide the details on how I constructed the dataset and the instrumental variable

Table 5: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs* and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs (standardized)	−0.064**	−0.025	−0.037	−0.039	−0.187	−0.189	0.457***	0.456***	0.422***
	(0.026)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Immigrants inflow	0.013	0.017	−0.018	0.003	−0.015	−0.019	−0.006	−0.006	−0.110
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.085)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.072)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		43.7			38.9			41.3	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			49.8			37.8			39.9
SW F-stat immigrants			49.0			51.5			50.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, inflow of immigrants, year fixed effects and region fixed effects. The coefficients are standardized.

Table 6: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs* and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs (standardized)	−0.034	0.016	0.041	0.052	0.016	0.051	0.364***	0.216**	0.198*
	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.109)	(0.114)	(0.062)	(0.095)	(0.102)
Immigrants inflow	0.036*	0.042**	0.111*	0.015	0.010	0.109	−0.037	−0.056**	−0.109
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.069)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.085)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
KP F-stat		42.6			37.6			40.2	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			62.7			48.3			50.7
SW F-stat immigrants			76.9			79.4			77.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, inflow of immigrants, year fixed effects and region fixed effects. The coefficients are standardized.

Tables 5 and 6 show that, in the long-run, there is a persistent effect of the *pieds noirs* on the vote share of far-right parties, even after controlling for the predicted inflow of immigrants. In particular, one standard deviation in the share of *pieds noirs* is associated with an increase in the vote share of far-right parties by around 0.4% in the legislative elections and by 0.197% in the presidential elections, though this result is less significant. The other results found in the short-run (higher turnout and lower vote share for the center-right parties) are not persistent.

A possible channel explaining the persistence of far-right voting in the areas historically more exposed to the arrival of the *pieds noirs* can be offered by Fourquet and Pratviel (2012). According to this study there 1.2 million electors in 2012 who still consider themsleves *pieds noirs* and more importantly a total of 3.2 million potential voters who have *pieds noirs* heritage and are more likely to vote for the Far-right.

This section showed the impact of the *pieds noirs* on the vote share of the different parties both in the short and the long run. In the next sections, I look at how the arrival of the *pieds noirs* influenced political strategies in the short-run. In particular, I show that, in areas of larger exposure to the arrival of the repatriates, parties devote a larger share of their political manifestos to the issues associated with the *pieds noirs*.

6 Party strategy and Pieds Noirs

Spatial models of elections as developed by Downs (1957) predict that parties adjust their political strategies and electoral programmes in response to shifts in public opinion as well as to successful shifts in their competitor's strategies.

Many studies have analysed how party strategy and policy is affected by shocks to the electorate. For example, the political science literature Adams et al. (2004) and Adams et al. (2006) show how and when parties respond to changes in public opinion with a change in their strategy.[27] Adopting the same spatial framework of party competition also allowed authors to study how party strategy changes in response to changes in the strategy of their competitors. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009), by looking at the comparative manifesto data for twenty-five countries, shows that parties tend to shift their policy positions in the same direction in which their opponents had shifted in the previous election. A related study, Han (2015) shows how the electoral positions of the radical right parties influenced the right-wing parties' position on multiculturalism.

One limitation of standard spatial models of party competition is that they tend to assume that parties compete over an exogenous set of fixed issues (Meguid, 2005). Differently, Carmines and Stimson (1986), Petrocik (1996), De Vries and Hobolt (2012); De Vries and Hobolt (2020), Aragonès et al. (2015) and Hobolt and De Vries (2015) among others, start from the assumption that issues are not always exogenous but their saliency can be manipulated by parties to gain electoral advantage. Political parties can behave as *political entrepreneurs*[28] pushing in the public debate political issues on which they can capitalise. One possible consequence of issue entrepreneurship is that the other parties will be forced to respond to this strategy by adopting similar political stances (Meguid, 2008; De Vries and Hobolt, 2020). Examples of this behaviour can be found in Abou-Chadi (2016) and Abou-Chadi and Krause (2018) who show how the success of radical right positions on immigration affected the policy positions of the other parties. They show that radical right parties behaved as political entrepreneurs exploiting the ignored issue of immigration to gain electoral advantage. As a consequence of this strategy, the mainstream parties were then forced to develop more anti-immigrant

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[27] Adams (2012) provides a survey of studies both theoretical and empirical that look at the same topic.

[28] According to Hobolt and De Vries (2015): "Issue entrepreneurship refers to a strategy by which parties mobilize issues that have been largely ignored in party competition and adopt a policy position on the issue that is substantially different from the mainstream status quo."

stances as shown by their political manifestos.

These studies, which use parties' political manifestos to analyse party strategy, can help to shed light on a possible mechanism that is triggered by the arrival of the *pieds noirs* on French soil. The *pieds noirs* arrive in 1962 and constitute a new group of potential voters. This generates a shift in the political preferences of the electorate. I should then expect an adjustment in the strategy by the different parties in order to win the votes of the newly arrived electorate. If the connection between far-right parties and the *pieds noirs* was already active during the Algerian War, I should also expect the far-right to know better than other parties the *pieds noirs*' grievances. Far-right parties thus have an informational advantage to exploit. It is thus rational for the far-right to adopt a strategy that takes into account the needs of the *pieds noirs* and exploits this topic for political advantage in advance of other parties. The far-right thus behaves as a political entrepreneur. Hence, I expect far-right parties to devote more space to the topic in their political manifestos than their competitors, especially in the first years after the arrival of the *pieds noirs*. The increased salience of the issue and its national importance of it could potentially lead to convergence on this issue by the dominant parties who could mimic the strategy of the far-right, trying in this way to take advantage of the new electorate. It is also important to emphasize that since a change in the political strategy does not go without cost, it is also reasonable to expect that the parties will react to the new strategy of the far-right in a heterogeneous way. They will try to exploit the issues related to the *pieds noirs* where they can maximize their votes. As a consequence, it is more likely that the increase in the space of the political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* will be larger in the areas of larger exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival.

From the above-stated mechanism three hypotheses arise:

Hypothesis 4: *Far-right parties devote more space of their political manifestos than other parties to the pieds noirs, especially in 1962.*

Given the existence of a connection between far-right parties and the *pieds noirs*, they may be more aware of the *pieds noirs*' grievances. I expect then to observe a larger share of the political manifestos of far-right parties devoted to the *pieds noirs*, especially in 1962, the first election after the first wave of arrival of the *pieds noirs*. Far-right parties behave as a political entrepreneur by exploiting, before other parties, the issues linked

to the *pieds noirs*.

Hypothesis 5: *The other parties mimic the strategy of the far-right and thus start to devote more space in the political manifestos to the pieds noirs in later elections.*

Since the far-right is able to gain from the arrival of the *pieds noirs*, the other parties have to adjust their political strategy in order to exploit the issue. As a consequence, their political manifestos must see an increase in the space devoted to the *pieds noirs*. This implies that, over time, the difference in the space devoted to the *pieds noirs*, between the far-right and the other parties, tend to decrease.

Hypothesis 6: *The arrival of pieds noirs causes a shift in the strategy of the different parties. This shift is stronger, the larger the share of pieds noirs in the area.*

Since political manifestos have limited space, any word included in a manifesto is costly. As a consequence, it is rational to use more frequently the words linked with the *pieds noirs*' grievances in the areas where the issue is more salient. It is thus rational to expect a higher usage of these words in the areas where it is possible to observe a more significant presence of the repatriates. Hence, the inflow of the repatriates forces parties to adopt a strategy that is a function of the exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival.

To test these hypotheses I look at the content of the political manifestos of the period. It is standard in the literature to look at party positions by studying the manifestos' scores on different issues as provided by the Manifesto Project Database (CMP/MARPOR).[29] Since there is no detailed information on the *pieds noirs*' issue I have to opt for an alternative solution. Hence, I directly extract data from the text of the original manifestos. Examples of this process can be found in Laver et al. (2003), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2019), Enke (2020) among others.[30] One study, in particular, has already applied text mining techniques to the French political manifestos: Le Pennec-Çaldichoury (2020) used text analysis to show how candidates' campaign communication changes between the first and second round of the French legislative elections.

In the next section, I describe the dataset I use and the process used to extract data from the French Political manifestos.

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[29]Volkens et al. (2019)

[30]Gentzkow et al. (2019) offers an overview of the statistical methods used and the different applications of text analysis.

6.1 Data

My analysis focuses on the manifestos issued by each different political candidate in the first round of the legislative elections between 1958 and 1973. Each candidate for the National Assembly issued a manifesto before the elections that showed her political intent. Manifestos are usually two pages long and contain a description of the candidate's political platform. They contain both national and local policy proposals and thus represent a fundamental source to study any shift in party strategy. Manifestos were collected by the Centre d'Étude de la Vie Politique Française (CEVIPOF) and are freely available in a digitalized form from the *Archives Electorales du CEVIPOF*[31] (Gaultier-Voituriez, 2015, 2016).[32] The dataset contains a total of 10,745 single manifestos and covers almost all the manifestos issued by candidates to the legislative elections in the considered period.[33] For each single document I remove French stop-words, special characters as well as numbers. In this way, I obtain a dataset with tokens represented by single words in each document. I then apply a stemming algorithm to obtain the final dataset.[34]

For each single document I then compute the term frequency defined as:

$$\omega = \frac{\text{N word}}{\text{N non-stop words}}$$

In order to match the level of the analysis (the department), I need to aggregate the results. Hence, I take the average of ω for each single party i by *circonscription*[35] in a department j and I thus obtain ω_{ijrt}, which represents the term frequency for each single party i, in each single department j, in a region r, at the time of the election t. This measure captures how parties used their political manifestos to accommodate for the *pieds noirs*' needs, and represent a proxy for the different electoral strategies.

In particular, my focus is on the words that are directly linked with the *pieds noirs*. The first set of words captures geographical origin and status. I thus focus on the use of the words "*Algerie*" and "*Rapatrie*" or "*Refugie*". These words capture the extent to

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[31]https://archive.org/details/archiveselectoralesducevipof/

[32]See Appendix D for a more detailed description of the dataset

[33]Unfortunately the majority of the political manifestos for the UNR-UDT, De Gaulle's party in 1962, are missing.

[34]In this way words with the same root are grouped together. E.G. the words *Algerie* and *Algerienne* become the single word *Alger*.

[35]The *circonscription* (electoral district) were 465 from 1958 to 1967, when, after the reform of the Paris region, became 473. Each department comprises on average 5 electoral districts.

which the arrival of the repatriates from Algeria is a salient issue in the political debate. I then look at two other words that are directly linked with the *pieds noirs*' grievances: "*Indemnisation*" and "*Amnistie*". Since the *pieds noirs* left all their possession in Algeria they started to pretend the compensation for their losses as soon as they arrived in France. The word "*Indemnisation*" thus captures the extent to which the different parties try to exploit this issue by promising compensation for the *pieds noirs*' losses. The word "*Amnistie*" is related to the *pieds noirs*' activity during the war. Since many *pieds noirs* were members of the army and were involved in the Algerian war, one of their requests was the amnesty for the possible crimes committed during the war.

In the next section, I show how far-right parties used the terms linked with the *pieds noirs* with higher frequency than the other parties. This highlights, once again, the existence of a connection between the *pieds noirs* and the far-right. I also show that the other parties, after 1962, the first election after the arrival of the *pieds noirs*, mimic the strategy of far-right parties and start to use the same terms used by the far-right more frequently.

6.2   Political entrepreneurship

In the previous sections I have assumed the existence of a connection between the *pieds noirs* and far-right parties and I then showed that this connection manifests its effect in the elections' outcome. A possible way to visualize the existence of this connection is represented by the share of the manifestos that each party devoted to the *pieds noirs* in 1962. If this connection is real I should expect the far-right to know better than other parties the issues linked with the *pieds noirs*. Hence, I should also expect to see these issues more frequently mentioned in the manifestos of far-right parties.

Figure 4: Words in political manifestos 1962, by party.

By looking at figure 4 it is clear that far-right parties devoted more space (than the majority of the competitors) of their political manifestos to the *pieds noirs*' issue in 1962. This evidence points again in favour of the previously stated connection between far-right movements and the *pieds noirs*.

What is also interesting to observe is the dynamics of party strategy. The existence of a connection between far-right movements and the *pieds noirs* gives an informational advantage to the far-right. This means that far-right parties can exploit this advantage to gain votes at the expense of others. If the far-right acts as a political entrepreneur I should observe the far-right to be the party that exploits the issues associated with the repatriates before other parties. Given the saliency and the importance of the issue, this can then potentially lead to a convergence of the other parties in later elections. I should then observe the other parties catch up and increase the space of their manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* in later elections.

Words by year and party

Figure 5: Words by parties in the political manifestos 1958-1973.

Figure 5 points in this direction with an increase of the space of the manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* that increases in 1962[36] for the far-right and a catch up by the other parties in 1967. One noticeable exception is the word "Algerie" which follows a decreasing pattern. This behaviour can be easily explained by the fact that the Algerian war was an already important topic in the 1958 election when the French army was fighting the war. After the independence in 1962, the destiny of the Algerian nation was not as interesting for the French politicians as the French citizens who arrived after the end of the war.

A simple way to show that far-right parties behaved as a political entrepreneur is to estimate:

$$\omega_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \text{Far-Right}_{ijt} \times \delta_t + \theta_j + \epsilon_{ijrt} \tag{2}$$

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[36]The word 'Amnistie" seems to follow the same pattern but with a lag of one period. This probably can be explained by the fact that the issue became salient with a delay. The first law in favour of the amnesty was voted in 1964 and then in 1966. Then in June 1968 a law specifically targeted the crimes committed in Algeria (*Loi n°68-697 du 31 juillet 1968 Portant amnistie Algerie)*) was passed. This explains the descending trend after 1967 and the loss of interest in this topic after 1968.

Far-Right represents a dummy that takes a value of 1 for the manifestos of far-right parties. δ_t represents election fixed effects and θ_j represents department fixed effects. β_1 is the coefficient of interest and captures the differential behaviour of far-right parties with respect to the other parties within the same departments. I expect the coefficient to be significant and positive in 1962. This implies that far-right parties are the first ones to devote more space to the issue related to the *pieds noirs*. I then expect the coefficient to be reduced in magnitude and significance if the other parties mimic the strategy of the far-right and increase, in this way, the space of their political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs*.

Figure 6: Use of words by far-right parties vs others. Political manifestos 1958-1973.

Plot 6 points in this direction with the coefficient that is significant in 1962 and then decreases in the following elections. According to these results, hypotheses 4 and 5 are vindicated by the data. Far-right were the first parties to exploit the issue related to the *pieds noirs*, thus behaving as a political entrepreneur. The other parties, made aware of the topical new issues brought by the repatriates, mimicked the strategy of the far-right

in order to appeal to the new electorate.

6.3 *Pieds noirs'* exposure and political manifestos

In the previous section, I looked at the strategy of the different parties over time without looking at the causal effect of the exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival. It is thus rational to ask if parties devoted a larger space of their manifestos, especially in areas where more *pieds noirs* have settled. According to hypothesis 6, I should observe a larger space of the political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs* in areas with a higher share of *pieds noirs*.

Figure 7: Inflow of *pieds noirs* and words in the political manifestos 1962-1973.

Figure 7 suggests that all parties tend to use the words more frequently in areas with higher exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival[37]. To study more in detail this relation I adapt the empirical strategy used to estimate the impact of the *pieds noirs* on the vote share. This time I also include a set of party fixed effects Ω_i to capture ideology specific characteristics that do not vary over time. I thus estimate:

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[37]"Low" means below the median while "high" above the median exposure to the share of *pieds noirs*.

$$\omega_{ijrt} = \beta_1 \sum_{t=1962}^{1968} \widehat{\text{pieds noirs}}_{jrs} + \beta_2 \omega_{ijr1958} + \beta_3 X_{jr62} + \theta_r + \delta_t + \Omega_i + \epsilon_{ijrt} \qquad (3)$$

The coefficient of interest is β_1, which captures the differential use of the words related to the *pieds noirs* as a function of the exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival. I expect the coefficient to be significant and positive, meaning that, increasing the share of *pieds noirs* also increases the space of the political manifestos devoted to the issue linked with the *pieds noirs*. For each word, the first column presents the OLS results while the second column shows the result of the 2SLS. In both regressions, I always include the set of controls used throughout the paper and I also add year, region and party fixed effects.

In table 7, the coefficient of interest is always significant and positive. Looking at the 2SLS estimates, a 1% increase in the share of *pieds noirs* increases the term frequency by 0.011% for the word "Algerie", by 0.013% for the word "Rapatrie", by 0.019% for the word "Indemnisation" and by 0.015% for the word "Amnistie".

Table 7: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and *pieds noirs*

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Pieds noirs	0.010***	0.009**	0.014***	0.010**	0.019***	0.014***	0.014***	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.2		44.7		45.6		45.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

As expected, the arrival of the *pieds noirs* causes a shift in the strategy of the different parties. Hence, parties adopt a strategy that depends on the magnitude of the exposure to the *pieds noirs*' arrival. Since the space of a manifesto and also the attention of a reader is limited, any word used in a political manifesto is costly. Hence, It is rational to target the electorate depending on the issue that can maximize the number of votes at the local level. This means that it is rational to use more frequently the words linked with the *pieds noirs* in the areas where the issue is more salient, the areas with a larger *pieds noirs*' concentration.

7 Robustness tests

In the Appendix C I show that the results are unaltered if I look at different definitions of the shock. In particular, I show that results do not significantly change if I look at the *pieds noirs* arrived only in 1962 (section C.2), if I look at the *pieds noirs* arrived between February 1962 to December 1968 (section C.4) or, if I look only at the *pieds noirs* who are older than the voting age in each election (section C.3).

Since in the same years of the *pieds noirs*' arrival also other Northern African countries became independent from France, I perform a placebo analysis exploiting this event (section C.6). In light of the recent literature on the political impact of immigrants on the vote for the far-right, instead of looking at the arrival of *pieds noirs*, I look at the arrival of immigrants from Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) between 1962 and 1975. In order to avoid overlapping with the *pieds noirs*, I only consider immigrants from Algeria that are not French citizens. To account for endogeneity concerns over the distribution of immigrants I look at both the actual and the predicted share of immigrants from the Maghreb. I thus instrument the share of immigrants from the Maghreb using a shift-share instrumental variable. In both presidential and legislative elections, the arrival of immigrants from the Maghreb cannot explain any of the results obtained by looking at the *pieds noirs*. The 2SLS does not show any significant relation between the arrival of immigrants from the Maghreb and the increase in both the far-right vote share and turnout. I do find evidence of an effect on the decrease of vote share for center-right parties. As an additional robustness test, I thus look at the effect of the *pieds noirs*' arrival controlling for both the actual and predicted arrival of

immigrants from Maghreb (section C.7). Even controlling for the predicted arrival of immigrants from the Maghreb the share of *pieds noirs* delivers the same effects found in section 5.1.

Since distance can affect the location choice of the pieds noirs and also outcomes, as an additional test, I control for the distance between the capital of each French department to Algiers (the capital of Algeria). The results are unaltered (section C.5). Additionally, since labour market considerations can influence voting I control for the unemployment share in 1962. The results are still robust. In order to rule out that the results are driven by influential observations, I replicate the analysis of section 5.1 with a winsorised version of the shock. The results hold the same. In section C.1 of the Appendix C I show that, in the areas of larger exposure to the *pieds noirs'* arrival, both the number of votes and turnout did not increase between the 1958 legislative elections and the 1962 referendum on the Algerian independence. At the same time, I show that turnout and the number of votes increased in the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973, thus pointing in favour of the direct participation of the *pieds noirs* in the electoral process. Additionally, I use Conley standard errors (Conley, 1999) to account for possible spatial correlation (section C.9).

I then look at the robustness of the persistence effects. I show that the results presented in section 5.2 are unaltered if I use the distribution of the *pieds noirs* constructed from the 1975 census (section C.12) and if I use a winsorised version of the shock (section C.11). Additionally, since persistence could be driven by spatial instead of temporal persistence, as argued by Kelly (2019), as a robustness check I follow Kelly (2020) and I add the departments' latitude and longitude as additional controls (section C.13). I also winsorise both *pieds noirs* and the immigrants' inflow in order to show that the results are not driven by influential observations. In both cases the results are robust, indicating that temporal persistence, instead of spatial correlation, seems to be a more likely explanation of the results.

In the Appendix D, I perform several robustness tests on the analysis of the manifestos. I replicate the analysis of section 6.3 using the *pieds noirs* older than the voting age in each elections (section D.5) or a winsorised version of the shock (section D.3). Additionally, I perform the same placebo test used for the electoral outcomes on the manifestos. The actual or predicted share of immigrants from the Maghreb does not

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explain any of the manifestos' outcomes.

8 Conclusion

This article studied the impact of an exogenous change in the voting population on election outcomes and on the strategies pursued by parties to mobilize voters. I exploited the exogenous variation in the arrival of about 1 million French repatriates from Algeria in 1962 (the so-called *pieds noirs*). I find that the arrival of the *pieds noirs* increased the elections turnout and the vote share of far-right parties while it decreased the vote share of the center-right parties in both legislative and presidential elections between 1962 and 1974. I also analysed how this shock affected the political strategies of different parties by examining more than 10,000 political manifestos issued in the legislative elections between 1962 and 1973. I documented that far-right parties behaved as a political entrepreneur and started to devote space of their political manifestos to the issues historically associated with the *pieds noirs* already from 1962. The other parties were then forced to adopt the same strategy in the following elections. I also showed that the larger the exposure to the repatriates' arrival, the larger the share of the political manifestos devoted to the *pieds noirs*. These findings, and the mechanism highlighted in this paper, could still be relevant in explaining current parties' behaviour. As in the case of the *pieds noirs*, ignored issues may still be captured by radical parties and used in electoral competition to gain votes. As a consequence, the mainstream parties could be dragged towards more radical positions.

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Appendices

A Descriptive statistics and historical background

A.1 Descriptive statistics

Figure 8: Pieds noirs departing from Algeria after the Algerian independence (Month of August 1962).
Source: Evans (2011)

Figure 9: Pieds noirs' arrival, in thousands. Source: French Census 1968

Figure 10: Economic activities and pieds noirs. Source: French Census 1968

.

Figure 11: Education level. Source: French Census 1968

B IV identifying assumptions

B.1 Effect on pre-treatment outcome variables, level and change

Table 8: Vote share in legislative elections 1958 and average temperature

	Turnout			Right			Far Right	
	(1) 1958	(2) 1956	(3) 1951	(4) 1958	(5) 1956	(6) 1951	(7) 1958	(8) 1956
temp	0.002	0.004	0.003	−0.020	−0.022	−0.011	0.003	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Observations	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 9: Change in vote share in legislative elections 1951-1958 and average temperature

	Turnout		Right		Far Right
	(1) 1956-58	(2) 1951-56	(3) 1956-58	(4) 1951-56	(5) 1956-58
temp	−0.003	0.002	0.002	−0.011	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.008)
Observations	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

B.2 Using controls interacted with year dummies

Table 10: Vote share in legislative elections
1962-1973 and pieds noirs, controls interacted

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pieds noirs	0.586**	−1.844**	0.292***
	(0.251)	(0.719)	(0.101)
Observations	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Controls X year	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	41.9	42.2	40.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The controls at their 1962 levels are also interacted with year dummies. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 11: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs, controls interacted

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pieds noirs	0.562**	−1.301**	0.735***
	(0.247)	(0.659)	(0.092)
Observations	264	264	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Controls X year	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	40.3	40.4	37.2

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. $*$ $p < .10$, $**$ $p < .05$, $***$ $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The controls at their 1962 levels are also interacted with year dummies. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 12: Use of words in manifesto and pieds noirs. Controls interacted

	ALgerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Pieds noirs	0.009**	0.009**	0.010**	0.010**	0.014***	0.014***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls X year	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	45.2	45.2	44.7	44.8	45.6	45.8	45.1	45.3

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. $*$ $p < .10$, $**$ $p < .05$, $***$ $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The controls at their 1962 levels are also interacted with year dummies. The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.

C Robustness

C.1 Change in votes/turnout 1958-1962 referendum

Table 13: Change in turnout 1958-1962 referendum and pieds noirs

	(1) OLS	(2) IV
Pieds noirs	0.356	−0.385
	(0.387)	(0.535)
Observations	88	88
Controls	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes
KP F-stat		
Fstat		34.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962. The specification also contains region fixed effects

Change in the number of votes 1958-1962 referendum. Votes 1962-1973 controlling for 1958 results.

C.2 Using pieds noirs in 1962

Table 14: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.144	0.808**	−1.488*	−2.541**	0.378***	0.404***
	(0.277)	(0.343)	(0.865)	(0.988)	(0.074)	(0.138)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		48.7		50.3		47.0

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 15: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.307	0.831**	−0.726	−1.921**	0.904***	1.078***
	(0.245)	(0.359)	(0.651)	(0.956)	(0.106)	(0.131)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		47.2		48.7		42.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.3 Using pieds noirs able to vote

Table 16: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and eligible voters pieds noirs

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.100	0.959**	−1.961*	−2.997**	0.403***	0.476***
	(0.321)	(0.419)	(1.043)	(1.164)	(0.090)	(0.164)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.9		47.9		45.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 17: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and eligible voters pieds noirs

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.288	0.918**	−0.766	−2.110**	0.953***	1.190***
	(0.283)	(0.411)	(0.751)	(1.076)	(0.120)	(0.155)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		43.6		45.4		40.6

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.4 Using also pieds noirs February-March 1962

Table 18: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.105	0.580**	−1.182*	−1.823**	0.235***	0.289***
	(0.181)	(0.248)	(0.624)	(0.711)	(0.055)	(0.100)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		47.4		47.9		45.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 19: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs in 1962

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.232	0.556**	−0.462	−1.287**	0.506***	0.727***
	(0.164)	(0.244)	(0.446)	(0.651)	(0.082)	(0.091)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.1		45.4		40.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.5 Controlling for the distance from Algiers and unemployment

Table 20: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs

	Turnout				Right				Far Right			
	(1) Distance	(2) Distance X year	(3) Unemployed	(4) Unemployed X year	(5) Distance	(6) Distance X year	(7) Unemployed	(8) Unemployed X year	(9) Distance	(10) Distance X year	(11) Unemployed	(12) Unemployed X year
Pieds noirs	1.154***	1.154***	0.576*	0.576*	−3.072***	−3.072***	−2.152**	−2.152**	0.363**	0.363**	0.350***	0.350***
	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(1.054)	(1.054)	(0.912)	(0.912)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	33.5	33.2	46.4	45.9	33.6	33.3	48.5	48.0	32.1	31.8	43.5	43.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 21: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs

	Turnout				Right				Far Right			
	(1) Distance	(2) Distance X year	(3) Unemployed	(4) Unemployed X year	(5) Distance	(6) Distance X year	(7) Unemployed	(8) Unemployed X year	(9) Distance	(10) Distance X year	(11) Unemployed	(12) Unemployed X year
Pieds noirs	1.095***	1.095***	0.666**	0.666**	−1.941**	−1.941**	−1.342*	−1.342*	0.732***	0.732***	0.756***	0.756***
	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.917)	(0.917)	(0.743)	(0.743)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Observations	264	264	264	264	264	264	264	264	176	176	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat	32.5	32.2	44.1	43.7	32.6	32.3	46.1	45.7	29.0	28.8	38.6	38.4

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.6 Placebo Maghreb immigrants

Table 22: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Inflow Maghreb	0.050	−0.101	−1.893***	−2.446***	0.059	0.107
	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.576)	(0.587)	(0.081)	(0.097)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		159.3		160.9		157.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 23: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Inflow Maghreb	−0.132	−0.359*	0.199	0.362	−0.779***	−0.986***
	(0.135)	(0.214)	(0.361)	(0.536)	(0.268)	(0.320)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		65.1		72.5		82.0

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.7 Pieds noirs plus controlling for Maghreb immigrants

Table 24: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds Noirs	0.102	0.597**	−0.999	−1.674**	0.235***	0.286***
	(0.184)	(0.253)	(0.637)	(0.723)	(0.059)	(0.100)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW F-stat pieds noirs		62.7		66.3		61.4
SW F-stat immigrants		162.2		160.7		162.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 25: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and immigrants from Maghreb

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds Noirs	0.270	0.627**	−0.532	−1.367**	0.652***	0.878***
	(0.170)	(0.247)	(0.461)	(0.651)	(0.094)	(0.108)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
SW F-stat pieds noirs		54.9		56.4		50.2
SW F-stat immigrants		118.4		112.7		122.4

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in 1962 in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962 and the share of non-French population in 1962 , Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.8   Tables-pieds noirs winsorization

Table 26: Vote share in legislative elections 1962-1973 and pieds noirs, winsorised

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.573**	1.100***	−2.459**	−3.502**	0.212*	0.559***
	(0.227)	(0.379)	(1.059)	(1.511)	(0.120)	(0.210)
Observations	352	352	352	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		30.2		27.8		25.4

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 27: Vote share in presidential elections 1965-1974 and pieds noirs, winsorised

	Turnout		Right		Far Right	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV
Pieds noirs	0.866***	1.125***	−2.506***	−2.637**	0.963***	1.479***
	(0.219)	(0.388)	(0.573)	(1.089)	(0.118)	(0.275)
Observations	264	264	264	264	176	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		24.8		22.9		20.0

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.9 Conley Spatial Correlation

Table 28: Legislative elections-Conley corrected standard errors

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV	IV	IV
Pieds noirs	0.586***	−1.844*	0.292**
	(0.186)	(1.062)	(0.132)
Observations	352	352	352
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 29: Presidential elections-Conley corrected
standard errors

	Turnout	Right	Far Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV	IV	IV
Pieds noirs	0.562***	−1.301**	0.735***
	(0.204)	(0.541)	(0.255)
Observations	264	264	176
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department.In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962 The specification also contains Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.10 long-run: Shift-share

In order to minimize possible concerns regarding the presence of an omitted variable bias, in the long-run analysis, I always control for the inflow of immigrants in each census wave between 1982 and 2011. I exploit the censuses in 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2011 to construct a measure of the inflow of immigrants, calculated as the share of the previous census population. I consider immigrants the citizens in each French department without French citizenship. I do not exploit information on the country of birth since the *pieds noirs* were born in Algeria and I don't want these two variables to overlap. I match each single census wave with the different elections in order to have one election per census wave: the 1982 census is used for the 1986 legislative election and 1988 presidential election; the 1990 election is used for the 1993 and 1997 legislative elections and the 1995 presidential elections; the 1999 census is used for the 2002 legislative and presidential elections; the 2006 census is used for the 2007 legislative and presidential elections and the 2011 census is used for the 2012 legislative and presidential elections.

Similarly to Edo (2019)[38], in order to instrument for the inflow of immigrants arriving in France at each census wave I use a shift-share instrumental variable. I use immigrants with citizenship from the following countries: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Romania, Finland, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and the rest of the world. I then divide immigrants from these countries in 4 groups: Europe (Germany, Finland, Poland, Romania), Latin (Spain, Italy, Portugal), Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and the rest of the world (all the other countries excluding the forehead mentioned). I start by constructing the instrument for each k country-group and then summing across k:

$$\Delta\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt} = \sum_{k=1}^{k} \frac{N_{jk1968}}{N_{k1968}} * (\text{immi}_{kt} - \text{immi}_{kt-1}),$$

I then calculate the predicted immigration in location j at time t:

$$\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt} = \text{immi}_{jt-1} + \Delta\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt},$$

I follow the same strategy to calculate the predicted share of French citizens in

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[38]Edo (2019) also uses the variable "Other African countries" to create the variable. Another difference is that I am not using the information on the different skill-level of the immigrants.

location j at time t:

$$\Delta \widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt} = \frac{N_{j1968}}{N_{1968}} * (\text{Natives}_t - \text{Natives}_{t-1}),$$

$$\widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt} = \text{Natives}_{jt-1} + \Delta \widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt},$$

I then calculate the predicted population in location j at time t:

$$\widehat{\text{Population}}_{jt} = \widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt} + \widehat{\text{Natives}}_{jt},$$

and so I obtain:

$$\widehat{\text{share immi}}_{jt} = \frac{\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt}}{\widehat{\text{population}}_{jt}},$$

and then take the first-difference with lagged value in order to calculate the inflow, as a share of the population, for each location j and period t.

The variable that controls for the inflow of immigrants at each point in time is, therefore:

$$\widehat{\text{immigrants inflow}}_{jt} = \widehat{\text{share immi}}_{jt} - \widehat{\text{share immi}}_{jt-1} = \frac{\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt}}{\widehat{\text{population}}_{jt}} - \frac{\widehat{\text{immi}}_{jt-1}}{\widehat{\text{population}}_{jt-1}},$$

C.11 Long-run winsorised

Table 30: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs*, winsorised

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	−0.044	−0.056	−0.076	−0.166	−0.365	−0.393*	0.777***	0.918***	0.883***
	(0.056)	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.143)	(0.222)	(0.238)	(0.101)	(0.172)	(0.192)
Immigrants inflow	0.015	0.014	−0.035	0.020	0.009	−0.058	−0.040	−0.032	−0.120
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.144)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.126)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		29.6			26.1			23.9	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			28.4			23.1			22.2
SW F-stat immigrants			31.9			33.0			33.2

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.

Table 31: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs*, winsorised

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	0.033	0.018	0.111	−0.150	0.049	0.136	0.625***	0.426**	0.391*
	(0.053)	(0.094)	(0.119)	(0.096)	(0.222)	(0.266)	(0.117)	(0.176)	(0.207)
Immigrants inflow	0.033	0.032	0.232*	0.038	0.051	0.227	−0.097**	−0.110***	−0.186
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.136)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.149)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.176)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		28.7			25.2			23.1	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			36.8			28.5			28.5
SW F-stat immigrants			22.7			23.4			23.1

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.12 Long-run using pieds noirs in 1975

Table 32: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs 75	−0.078***	−0.027	−0.039	−0.029	−0.200	−0.199	0.491***	0.484***	0.444***
	(0.027)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.062)	(0.089)	(0.100)
Immigrants inflow	0.011	0.017	−0.018	0.004	−0.016	−0.015	−0.003	−0.004	−0.119*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.083)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.070)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		48.0			43.1			44.9	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			54.0			41.8			44.6
SW F-stat immigrants			49.6			52.5			51.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

Table 33: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs 75	−0.048	0.017	0.043	0.078	0.017	0.053	0.390***	0.228**	0.206*
	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.100)	(0.106)
Immigrants inflow	0.034	0.042**	0.110*	0.018	0.010	0.108	−0.035	−0.055*	−0.115
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.083)
Observations	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0	440.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		46.5			41.5			43.4	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			63.1			50.5			54.6
SW F-stat immigrants			77.9			80.7			79.3

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects

C.13 Long-run controlling for latitude and longitude

Table 34: Vote share in legislative elections 1986-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	−0.064*	−0.043	−0.054	−0.003	−0.198	−0.199	0.535***	0.623***	0.592***
	(0.033)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.087)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.074)	(0.108)	(0.116)
Immigrants inflow	0.010	0.011	−0.027	0.001	−0.013	−0.015	−0.010	−0.004	−0.129*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.083)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.068)
Observations	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		27.4			22.5			22.8	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			27.5			20.6			20.9
SW F-stat immigrants			47.2			49.1			47.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects. I also add latitude and longitude as additional controls.

Table 35: Vote share in presidential elections 1988-2012 and *pieds noirs* (1975) and immigrants

	Turnout			Right			Far Right		
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) 2IV	(4) OLS	(5) IV	(6) 2IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV	(9) 2IV
Pieds noirs	−0.046	−0.003	0.018	0.013	−0.054	−0.024	0.461***	0.407***	0.388***
	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.107)
Immigrants inflow	0.036*	0.038*	0.112*	0.020	0.015	0.131*	−0.040	−0.044*	−0.122
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.061)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.075)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.081)
Observations	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440	440
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		26.7			21.9			22.3	
SW F-stat pieds noirs			32.2			23.0			23.2
SW F-stat immigrants			76.5			77.0			73.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: Vote share in 1958 legislative election employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the inflow of immigrants calculated with respect to the immigrant population in 1975, Year fixed effects and region fixed effects.I also add latitude and longitude as additional controls.

D   Manifesto

The electoral manifestos (*professions de foi*) of the considered period are collected by the CEVIPOF and Sciences PO and are available at the *Archives Electorales du CEVIPOF*[39]. Manifestos are, for the vast majority, documents of two pages that contains the candidates' political stances. Their size is regulated by the electoral law (R29) which states that they cannot weight more then 70 grams per square metre and cannot be bigger then 210 mm X 297 mm[40]

The main issue with the electoral manifestos in the *Archives Electorales du CEVIPOF* is that the pdf and txt file both contain the manifesto for all the different candidates in a *circonscription*. This means that it is not possible to immediately obtain information on the manifesto of single candidates. The only way to get information by candidates is to split the text in different parts and manually link them to each single specific candidate. Once this is done then it is possible to obtain the manifestos of all the candidates to the legislative elections in the different *circonscription*. This gives me a dataset of 10,745 single manifestos that is ready to be used. In order to extract information from the manifestos, I perform different pre-processing steps. For each single document, I remove French stop-words, special characters as well as numbers. In this way, I obtain a dataset with tokens represented by single words in each document. I then apply a stemming algorithm to get the final dataset. The final dataset is composed of tokens (single words) for each specific document. In this way, I have all the single words used in each candidate's manifesto. This enables me to compute the term frequency for each single word in a document, calculated as:

$$\omega = \frac{\text{N word}}{\text{N non-stop words}}$$

Since the level of analysis is not the electoral district but the department I aggregate the results by taking the average of the term frequency for the different *circonscription* in a department. I then take the average of the obtained term frequency for all the parties that I have coded as Right, Far-right, Left, Far-left and Centrists. In this way

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[39]https://archive.org/details/archiveselectoralesducevipof/

[40]Chaque candidat, binôme de candidats ou liste de candidats ne peut faire adresser à chaque électeur, par la commission de propagande, qu'une seule circulaire d'un grammage de 70 grammes au mètre carré et d'un format de 210 mm x 297 mm..

for each single department, for each single party and for each single election I have the respective term frequency.

D.1 Example

Figure 12: Maifesto Poujadist candidate Pyrenees-Orientales 1962.

D.2 Graphical analysis


Figure 13: Manifesto words by exposure intensity.

Figure 14: Manifesto words by exposure intensity. Binscatter

D.3 Manifesto Winsorized

Table 36: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and pieds noirs. Winsorised

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Pieds noirs	0.011**	0.020**	0.018***	0.022**	0.019***	0.031***	0.016***	0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		19.0		18.7		18.6		18.7

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election manifestos, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

D.4 Manifesto Placebo

Table 37: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and Immigrants from Maghreb

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Inflow Maghreb	−0.004	−0.007*	0.001	−0.003	0.000	−0.001	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1370	1043	1043	1370	1370
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		182.2		180.8		181.5		180.5

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the share of immigrants from Maghreb in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election manifestos, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

D.5 Manifesto using eligible pieds noirs

Table 38: Electoral manifestos 1962-1973 and eligible pieds noirs

	Algerie		Rapatrie		Indemnisation		Amnistie	
	(1) OLS	(2) IV	(3) OLS	(4) IV	(5) OLS	(6) IV	(7) OLS	(8) IV
Pieds noirs 21	0.017***	0.015**	0.022***	0.016**	0.031***	0.023***	0.023***	0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Observations	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0	1370.0
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Region FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Party FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
KP F-stat		45.1		44.5		45.4		44.9

Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. In all the regressions the variable repatriates has been instrumented using the average temperature in each department. The controls included are: word share in 1958 legislative election manifestos, employment share in tertiary sector 1962, employment share in construction sector 1962, employment share in transportation sector 1962, employment share in public sector 1962, employment share in agriculture 1962, employment share in industry 1962, employment share in commerce sector in 1962, Education level in 1962, the share of non-French population in 1962, Year fixed effects, region fixed effects and party fixed effects

E Elections and parties

Table 39: Elections included in the dataset

Year	Election type	First round	Second round
1958	Legislative	23 November	30 November
1962	Legislative	18 November	25 November
1965	Presidential	5 December	19 December
1967	Legislative	5 March	12 March
1968	Legislative	23 June	30 June
1969	Presidential	1 June	15 June
1973	Legislative	4 March	11 March
1974	Presidential	5 May	19 May
1978	Legislative	12 March	19 March
1981	Legislative	14 June	21 June
	Presidential	26 April	10 May
1986	Legislative	16 March	

In 1986 only the first round of the legislative elections was held. In 1962 the departments of Lot, Manche and Meuse did not vote in the second round; in 1967 the department of Lozere did not vote in the second round; in 1968 Cantal, Lozere, Marne, Heute-Marne, Meuse, Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Deux Sevres and Vosges did not vote in the second round; in 1978 Cantal, Haute-Loire and Lozere did not vote in the second round; in 1981 the departments of Aude, Gers, Haute-Loire, Lot, Lozere, Maine-et-Loire, Mayenne and Deux Sevres did not vote in the second round of the legislative elections.

Table 40: right and far-right parties by election

year	right	far-right
1958	Union pour la Nouvelle Republique-UNR	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Centre Reformateur Republicain-CRR	
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Centre National des Independants-CNI	
1962	Union pour la nouvelle République-Union démocratique du travail-UNRUDT	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Republicains Independants-INDVREP	
	Centre National des Independants-CNI	
1967	Radicaux de droite-RADDROIT	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union des Democrates pour la V Republique-UD5	
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Republicains Independants-RI	
	Alliance republicaine-ALLREP	
1968	Radicaux de droite-RADDROIT	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union de Defense de la Republique-UDR	Alliance republicaine-EXD
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
	Republicains Independants-RI	
	Republicains Independants - Union de Defense de la Republique-RIUDR	
1973	Divers droite-DVD	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union Des Democrates pour la V Republique-Union des Republicains de Progres-UDRURP	
	Republicains Independants-Union des Republicains de Progres-RIURP	
	Divers Union des Republicains de Progres-DIVURP	
	Centre Democrate-Union des Republicains de Progres-CDPURP	
	Union de Defense de la Republique-UDR	
	Republicains Independants-RI	
	Divers gaullistes-DIVGAULL	
1978	Gaullistes d'opposition-GAULOPP	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR	
	Divers droite-DVD	
1981	Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR	Divers extreme droite-EXD
	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-Rassemblement Pour la Republique-UDFRPR	Front National-FRN
	Divers droite-DVD	
1986	Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR	Front National-FRN
	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-Rassemblement Pour la Republique-UDFRPR	
	Divers droite-DVD	

List of parties coded as right wing and far right parties by legislative elections.

Table 41: lef and far-left parties by election

year	left	far-left
1958	Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriare-SFIO Union des Forces Democratiques-UFD Radicaux socialistes-RADSOC Radicaux Union des Forces Democratiques-RADUFD Union Democratique et Socialiste de la Resistance-minoritaires-UDSRMIN	Parti communiste-COM
1962	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU Radicaux socialistes-RADSOC Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriare-SFIO	Parti communiste-COM Divers extreme gauche-EXG
1967	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU Divers extreme gauche-EXG Federation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste-FGDS Divers gauche-DVG	Parti communiste-COM Parti communiste-apparentes-COM
1968	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU Federation de la Gauche Democrate et Socialiste-FGDS Radicaux socialistes-RADSOC	Parti communiste-COM Parti communiste-apparentes-COM
1973	Parti Socialiste unified-PSU Parti Socialiste-SOC Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche-MRG Divers gauche-DVG	Parti communiste-COM Ligue Communiste Revolutionaire-LCR Lutte Ouvriere-LO Organisation Communiste Revolutionaire-OCI
1978	Parti Socialiste-Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche-PSMRG Divers gauche-DVG	Parti communiste-COM Divers extreme gauche-EXG Front Autogestionnaire-EXG
1981	Parti Socialiste-SOC Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche-MRG Divers gauche-DVG	Parti communiste-COM extreme gauche-EXG
1986	Parti Socialiste-SOC Divers gauche-DVG	Parti communiste-COM extreme gauche-EXG

List of parties coded as left wing and far left parties by legislative elections.

Table 42: centrists and other parties by election

year	centrists	others
1958	Radicaux centristes-RADCENT Mouvement Republicain Populaire-MRP Moderats-MOD	Poujadistes-POUJ Divers-DIV
1962	Radicaux centristes-RADCENT Mouvement reppublicain Populaire, V Republique-MRPVREP Mouvement Republicain Populaire-MRP Moderats-MOD	Poujadistes-POUJ Divers-DIV
1967	Centristes rallies-RALLIE Moderats-MOD Centre Democrate-CENTDEM	Divers-DIV
1968	Moderats-MOD Centre Progressiste et democratie moderne-CPDM	 Divers-DIV Technique et democratie-DIV Mouvement pour la reforme-DIV
1973	Divers Radicaux reformateurs-DIVREF Radicaux reformateurs-REFRAD Centre Democratie et Progres-CDP	
1978	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-UDF	Ecologistes-ECO
1981	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-UDF	Regionalistes-DIV Ecologistes-ECO
1986	Union pour la Democratie Francaise-UDF	Regionalistes-DIV Ecologistes-ECO

List of parties coded as centrists and other parties by legislative elections.

Table 43: Presidents by ideology and presidential election (1st round)

year right	far-right	left	far-left	centrists	others
1965 De Gaulle-Unr	Tixier-Vignancour-Exd	Mitterrand-Cir		Lecanuet-Mrp	Barbu-Div Marcilhacy-Dvd
1969 Pompidou-Udr		Rocard-Psu Defferre-Sfio	Krivine-Lcr Duclos-Pcf	Poher-Cd	Ducatel-Div
1974 Giscard-D'Estaing-Ri Chaban-Delmas-Udr Royer-Dvd	Le Pen-Fn	Mitterrand-Ps Muller-Mdsr Crepeau-Mrg	Laguiller-Lo Krivine-Lcr		Dumont-Eco Renouvin-Nar Heraud-Div Sebag-Div
1981 Chirac-Rpr Debre-Dvd Garaud-Dvd		Bouchardeau-Psu Mitterrand-Ps	Laguiller-Lo Marchais-Pcf	Giscard-D'Estaing-Udf	Lalonde-Eco

List of presidents by ideology and presidential elections

Table 44: Presidents by ideology and presidential election (2nd round)

year right	far-right left	far-left centrists	others
1965 De Gaulle-Unr	Mitterrand-Cir		
1969 Pompidou-Udr		Poher-Cd	
1974 Giscard-D'Estaing-Ri	Mitterrand-Ps		
1981	Mitterrand-Ps	Giscard-D'Estaing-Udf	

List of presidents by ideology and presidential elections