I joined Nottingham in 2007, having spent two years at the University of Leeds. Prior to that I completed a PhD on the metaphysics of time at Durham University, working with E.J. Lowe.
From 2013 to 2016 I was Chair of the Department. Since 2015 I have been the Head of Taught Postgraduate Courses in the Faculty of Arts.
Since I arrived in Nottingham I've taught a range of modules, including: Epistemology, Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Time, Metaphysics and Communicating Philosophy. In 2012 I won a… read more
I'm currently working on six main projects: three in traditional metaphysics, one in the philosophy of mathematics, one that concerns philosophical methodology and the role of intuitions, and one… read more
BARON, S. and TALLANT, J., 2016. Monism: The Islands of Plurality Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. BARON, S. and TALLANT, J., 2016. Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. LINA JANSSON and JONATHAN TALLANT, 2017. Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 68, 781-803
TALLANT, J., 2012. Quantitative parsimony and the metaphysics of time: motivating presentism Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. n/a(n/a), n/a
Since I arrived in Nottingham I've taught a range of modules, including: Epistemology, Logic, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Time, Metaphysics and Communicating Philosophy. In 2012 I won a Lord Dearing Award for 'outstanding performance....in enhancing the student learning experience'. I like exploring new ways of presenting material as well as new topics. If you're a current student with an idea for a new module, then let me know! I'd be happy to talk about it.
In 2016/17, I'll be on research leave. I expect to return to teaching duties in 2017/18 where I'm expecting to be teaching on the module "Appearance and Reality".
To find out much more about my teaching--past and present--take a look at my personal webpage: jonathantallant.com
I'm very happy to supervise undergraduate dissertations in any area of metaphysics and in any of the areas described in my 'research' tab.
I'm currently working on six main projects: three in traditional metaphysics, one in the philosophy of mathematics, one that concerns philosophical methodology and the role of intuitions, and one that looks at notions of trust. I'd be very happy to supervise PhD students working in any of these areas. I describe each in more detail, below:
1. I'm trying to motivate and defend a version of presentism--that I call 'Existence Presentism'. This involves discussions of temporal passage, successful reference to the past, change, and how we should understand the connection between philosophy and science.
2. I argue (in a few places) that that not all truths require ground. I'm now looking to do more on this, spelling out which truths do need ground, and defending my initial arguments from some recent attacks in the literature.
3. I'm interested in the idea that one thing might exist 'in virtue of' or 'because of' some others. So, for instance, a table might be said to exist 'in virtue of' its parts. How can we make sense of this claim? In this project I've been writing and thinking about the notions of priority, dependence, fundamentality and explanation.
4. I defend a kind of 'hard road' nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics. I'm currently doing more work spelling out the details of some of the nominalist moves that are required.
5. Like a lot of people, I'm interested in the role of intuition in inquiry. The route I'm pursuing is trying to locate the role of intuition in science and then seeing whether or not that can be connected back to the use of intuitions in philosophy. This project sees me drawing on resources outside philosophy, including corpus linguistics
6. People trust me to perform particular actions. Some others just trust me, without being committed to trusting me to do any particular things. I've recently been thinking a bit about these different notions of trust, how they're connected, and how we might analyse them.