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EDITORIAL

When we produced the first issue of NLC, we were aware of proceeding tentatively, in the uncertain hope that a public might exist for such a journal as we had in mind. If now, four months later, we find ourselves very much older in confidence, it is because of a heartening response to our first attempt. We are grateful to all who have expressed interest, and in particular we thank colleagues at European and American educational institutions who have written to encourage us, to place subscriptions, and in some instances to send us copies of their own journals. It cannot be often that a small campus magazine can claim readers in places as far apart as Bavaria and Western Michigan.

Readers nearer home have commended our attempts to balance the content of NLC, but in one or two cases have questioned our policy in restricting the length of contributions. Limited finances of course dictate the scope of our undertaking, and make the short paper on a well-defined topic the most acceptable form of contribution. Long articles, we feel, are for strong contenders, i.e. for established national and international journals. We remain convinced that there is a place and need for periodical compilations of notes and minor papers. We continue to experiment, however, with the possibility of producing the journal more economically, and may in due course be able to accept contributions a little longer than those we now publish. We have yet to prove our financial standing, and are currently reliant upon our subscribers and above all on the funds generously made available to us by the University of Nottingham Language Centre. For this support we are duly grateful.

We shall continue in our policy of a balanced content and an editorial policy of non-commitment. A glance at the Table of Contents will show that the abstracts and papers published in this issue arbitrate fairly between a number of linguistic interests.

One of our editorial advisers, Dr. Keightley, is leaving us shortly, to take the Chair of Spanish at Monash University. We should like to take this opportunity of congratulating him on his appointment, and of thanking him for all that he has done to promote the study of linguistics in Nottingham.

This issue will be circulated only among subscribers and members of the Nottingham Linguistic Circle. It is a small audience, and in view of that we would repeat here what we said in our first editorial, that the strength of a little magazine lies with its readership. At the moment we have no difficulty in securing contributions by invitation; but we shall only feel that our journal is established when we receive them without having to ask. We hope that our first two issues will have served to provide patterns and prescribe standards.

R. Hartmann   W. Nash

NOTICES AND PROSPECTS

(1) Forthcoming events of the Nottingham Linguistic Circle :

On Friday, MARCH 10th, at 7.30 p.m. in the University Language Centre,
Mr. Ken Albrow (until recently with the University College
London Linguistics and English Teaching project, now at the
University College of North Wales, Bangor), will give a talk
entitled Some Notes on the English Writing System.

On Monday, MAY 8th, at 7.30 p.m. in the University Language Centre,
Dr. David A. Reibel (of the University of York) will give a talk
entitled Language and Learning : Limitations of Linguistic
Explanation.

(2) Preparations for the BAAL Seminar on German Applied Linguistics at Nottingham
(March 24-26) are going well, and all 50 places have been filled. Further
information from Dr. R.R.K. Hartmann, University Language Centre, NG7 2RD.

(3) Other events of interest to linguists:

Spring Meeting of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain, York
4-6 April 1972, c/o Department of Language, YO1 5DD.

Second Symposium on the Use of Computers in Literary Research, Edinburgh
27-30 March 1972, c/o IASH, 12 Buccleuch Place, EH8 9LW.

Conference of the Irish Association of Teachers of English as a Second or
Other Language, Dublin 25 March - 1 April 1972, c/o ATESOL, 99 St. Stephen's
Green.

Second International Congress of Teachers of French, Grenoble 20-24 July 1972,
c/o FIPF/CIEP, 1 Avenue Léon-Journault, Sèvres, F-92.

Eleventh International Congress of FIPLV, Saarbrücken 4-7 April 1972,
c/o J. Schüssler, Rotenbühlweg 12, D-6600.

Seminar on Modern Language Teaching to Adults of ASLA/AIMAV, Stockholm 27-30 April
c/o MLT Seminar, Box 6701, S-11385.   1972

Third International Congress of Applied Linguistics, Copenhagen 21-26 August
1972, c/o DIS Congress Service, Skindergade 36, DK-1159.

Eleventh International Congress of Linguists, Bologna 27 August - 2 September
1972, c/o Istituto di Glottologia, Via Zamboni 38, I-40126.

Summer Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America, Chapel Hill 28-30 July 1972,
c/o University of North Carolina, USA-27515.

Second International Phonology Conference, Vienna 4-8 September 1972,
c/o Institut für Sprachwissenschaft, Dr. Karl-Lueger-Ring 1, A-1010.

Annual General Meeting of BAAL, Walsall 16-17 September 1972, c/o Mary Wilkes,
West Midlands College of Education, Gorway, Staffs.

(4) Corrections

The editors apologise for the inordinate number of misprints in the first issue
of NLC. We are particularly sorry about a factual error in Dr. Hartmann's
article 'American Linguistics 1971' in which the Center for Applied Linguistics
in Washington was referred to as 'government-financed'. The bulk of CAL's
finance in fact comes from private sources such as the Ford Foundation.

(5) Publications received (by Dr. Hartmann, University Language Centre):

The Informant, Department of Linguistics, Western Michigan University
at Kalamazoo, Vol. 3, No. 3 and Vol. 4, No. 1, 1971.

Mededelingen, Instituut voor Toegepaste Taalkunde, University of
    Nijmegen, No. 1, September 1971.

Newsletter, Literary and Linguistic Studies at the University of Manchester
    Regional Computer Centre, No. 3, November 1971 and No. 4, February 1972.

Rapport d'Activités 1970-1971, Institut de Phonétique, Université Libre de
    Bruxelles, January 1972.

Englisch, Eine Zeitschrift für den Englischlehrer. Cornelsen/Velhagen &
    Clasing, Berlin, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1972.

SOCIO-LINGUISTIC FIELD-WORK I

(The following 2 contributions are extracts from talks given to
the Nottingham Linguistic Circle. The first is based on a lecture
by Dr. N. Denison, on 11 November 1969, under the title "How to
tell whether the light is on or off when the refrigerator door is
closed," which was taken from a paper by Labov (1964).)

The implication of the title of this talk is the problem in field-work, not
only in sociolinguistics but also in many other kinds of linguistics and indeed in
other social sciences, of how to observe without influencing what is observed. (...)

The concern of sociolinguistics is the observation of social meaning through
language. (...) All languages, so far as we can see at present, (...) carry social
meaning in their structures at the same time as, and superimposed upon, the normal
information-conveying structure which linguists are normally concerned with in
their analyses. Anyone who has done elementary French knows that there are certain
situations in which a different pronoun is called for in addressing a single
individual; it is only when one tries to specify which situations call for which
pronoun that one runs into difficulties. There is nothing universal about the
requirement, clearly, since English does not have it; there is, however, something
universal about the necessity to show such things as social distance, formality,
informality, to distinguish ritual behaviour of a linguistic kind from non-ritual
behaviour, liturgical occasions from non-liturgical occasions, serious from joking
or playful situations, to mark irony as distinct from its absence, and so on. (...)

I would like to think of such 'register' distinctions in language as being just
as regular, just as conventional, just as 'arbitrary', as the more direct types of
signalling systems that one finds in the phonology, the morphology and the syntax.
Distinctions of this kind are present in both unilingual and plurilingual speech
communities. The usefulness of plurilingual situations for finding out what the
social levels of meaning in a community are is not so much a theoretical as a
methodological one: 'code-switching' is more easily observable.

What are the particular problems which arise in investigating such a plurilingual
community? I think there are 3 kinds: (1) What to observe? (2) How to observe it?
(3) What to do with it when you have observed it?

What one is trying to observe is natural situations. We have to try to get
inside the 'refrigerator' with a tape-recorder. What we do when we've got in is to
see in some detail what is peculiar about the linguistic behaviour, and then to try
to match this with the situation. It is not always possible to smuggle a tape-
recorder and microphone into a position which will pick up at least to some extent
what is going on at the time when it actually happens. So one has to supplement
this kind of method with others, realising that one is influencing the situation in
so doing, (...) e.g. by asking people to give monologues, or to act as if they were
in a particular situation. (...)

This means that one must transcribe whatever one has got immediately after making the recording and one must get the help of participants in the situation in making the transcription. (...) A worker in the field cannot go and make 3 hours of tapes daily for a week and then take them back home to transcribe. That's useless, sociolinguistically speaking. It is much more useful to make one 20-minute recording (or rather little bits of 2-minute recordings adding up to a total of about 20 minutes) and then get it transcribed without delay. The technical quality of the recording will often be in inverse ratio to its sociolinguistic interest. Hence the need for informant/participant-assisted transcription on the spot, with adequate notes on the non-linguistic context.

> N. Denison,
> London School of Economics

Reference

W. Labov (1964) "Phonological correlates of social stratification" in J. Gumperz and D. Hymes eds. The Ethnography of Communication, special issue of American Anthropologist vol. 66, part 2, No. 6.

SOCIO-LINGUISTIC FIELD-WORK II

(The second extract comes from a talk given by Christopher Candlin on "Field-methods in sociolinguistics" on 3 December 1971.)

(...) Any kind of field-method depends on having previously decided that you are looking for something, and this means that you have to organise in your own mind the theoretical point before you go out and try to look for it. (...)

Linguistic research has been excessively concerned with anonymous language descriptions or extrapolating to languages from ideolectal investigations. (...) This in a sense is absurd even in the history of linguistics, because it's been stressed ever since the beginning of this century that language was in some sense a social product, or that social variation was reflected in linguistic structure, that linguistics was a social science and so on. (...)

There is still a need for a linguistics of 'parole' (perhaps distinct from general linguistics proper), the study of speech as it actually occurs in society. (...) Linguistics cannot be concerned only with the questions of abstract 'competence', but that it is important to analyze the linguistics of 'performance'. And in doing so we may be able to say something about general linguistic theory. (...)

The kinds of social structures that one might want to look at would be groupings on a community basis, on an ethnic basis, or on a class basis. If one took, for instance, community groupings, then one immediately thinks of the realm of traditional dialect geography. But very few dialectological surveys were ever really concerned with the study of the social networks in which the informants were found. (...) What one needs really is, within the social network of a community, to contrast linguistic behaviour of different individuals or members within that community and then, if necessary in a rather macro-sociolinguistic way, to compare several communities as integral units of an even larger community. (...)

It is well-known that for the last 100 years or more the problem of variants has been very difficult to handle, in that people have noticed that there are variant usages. (...) If these variants are not haphazard, but structured in some way (and the increasing evidence from sociolinguistic investigation of performance will show that in fact they are not random) then in what sense can one say that these are not equally a part of what we define as the province of linguistic analysis? (...)

Sociolinguistic surveys ought to depend on prior sociological surveys, because they tell you something about the make-up of the community which you can then operate on. (...) Interviewing techniques will differ whether one is dealing with an individual or a group situation, they will differ in any case by the purpose for which one is having the interview, viz. whether one is interested in recording simply extensive, casual speech or whether one is asking somebody to respond to a set of questions on a questionnaire. (...)

How efficacious are different types of interview technique in eliciting information of one kind or another?

	INTERVIEW (1) SINGLE	(2) GROUP	RAPID AND ANONYMOUS	GROUP STUDIES	MONITORING
Recordability	+	+ -	+ -	- +	+ -
Demographic	++	++	-	+	-
Family Structure	(+)	(+)	-	++	1^-
Peer Group Structure	+	++	(+)	++	-
Social Attitudes - Aspirations	+	(+)	-	+	-
Phonology *Casual	(+)	+	+	+	$2.^+$
*Contrastive	+	(+)	-	-	-
Grammar	+	+	-?	+	$2.^{(+)}$
Semantics Lexical Choice	+	+	-?	-?	$2.^{-?}$
Narrative	+	+	-	+	$2.^+$
Reading Skills	+	+	-	-	$2.^{(+)}$

A - Social Information
B - Linguistic Information

1. e.g. sterotype family structure on T.V.
2. e.g. from Joking, Insults, Intimate talk, Reprimands etc.
 ＊ Contrastive Analysis
 ＊ Running record of casual speech

C. N. Candlin,
University of Lancaster

CAN A TG GRAMMAR PROVIDE A MODEL OF THE LITERARY PROCESS?

The marked failure of linguistics to contribute to literary studies anything
remotely resembling criticism may have its roots in a number of factors. On the
one hand 'linguistic' critics have committed themselves over-readily to the more
precise, objective, (even 'scientific') tasks of quantification and classification,
while at the other extreme others have been swept away by dubious claims that
linguistics can provide a metalanguage for the practice of criticism (cf. Fowler,
1971). No approach to a text which remains entirely descriptive can hope to be of
use unless it can overcome the major drawback of description: that of assigning
equal significance to all the data. Since literature functions by the highlighting
of language within a self-contained linguistic context, any descriptive model, to
be adequate for criticism, must be able to account for hierarchies of significance
within a text. As Geoffrey Leech (1970) has it:

> "...one can be 'precise' and 'objective' in a completely
> unhelpful way. Surely these two qualities, desirable
> though they may be, should be regarded as subservient
> to that of explanatory value, the ability to contribute
> to a deeper understanding of literature." (805)

Quite reasonably, the requirements of a literary grammar are precisely those
of the standard language grammar outlined by Chomsky in 1957: explanatory adequacy
based on 'linguistic levels', as well as descriptive adequacy. Linguistics, like
literary criticism, is mentalistic in that it deals with aspects of language which
cannot be exclusively related to what is observable in a text. It is this common
approach which has led to the investigation of linguistics as a possible model for
criticism. In this essay I shall limit myself to claims made for the Chomskyan
model.

The major obstacle to the direct application of a TG grammar to literature is
the fact of literary deviance. Yet deviant language is (nearly always)
interpretable. How can a grammar of competence account for what is basically a
performance skill, and how can a grammar which is established on criteria of
grammaticalness, distinguish between degrees and types of deviation? It was this
problem which Katz first discussed in 1964:

> "...the knowledge that enables a speaker to understand
> sentences - his knowledge of the rules of the grammar -
> must be identically the knowledge that enables him to
> understand semi-sentences, for semi-sentences are
> understood in terms of their well-formed parts. Moreover,
> the knowledge a speaker uses to recognise the respects
> in which a semi-sentence is ungrammatical is also his
> knowledge of grammaticality: knowledge of the grammatical
> rules is here employed to discover instances of their
> violation." (401)

A TG grammar can give an adequate account of a literary text provided that that
text does not deviate from the standard language. When it does the reader rescues
what structure he can from the deviant sentence and then relates it to a relevant
set of grammatical sentences. But the fact remains, as Fowler (1969) has argued,
that the act of interpretation is a performance skill, which, apart from vestigial
structure uses other non-grammatical techniques of interpretation. As in the
reading of literature our main source of help is a sense of context, this
discussion raises the central problem of the discontinuity of the standard and the
literary languages. If we insist on having one grammar to account for both, the
two main facts of literary language - stylistically optional syntactic characteristics
as well as deviant or figurative usage - will necessarily impose a great strain on
a TG model. If the grammar is 'fixed' to account for one deviant usage, it will

generate many unwanted, ungrammatical (and unobserved) sentences, and fail the test of descriptive adequacy. Fixed for one and only one deviant usage, it will fail the test of simplicity.

One way around this difficulty is to make a virtue out of the discontinuity of the two languages and propose that the literary text be considered as "a sample of a different language or a different dialect from Standard English." (Thorne, 1965: 51). In such a case the critic would write a grammar for the language manifested by the text, for purposes of comparison with the grammar of the standard language. For this to be possible the two grammars would have to be as nearly isomorphic as possible, and the grammar of the text language would have therefore to contain theoretical terms (i.e. no symbol could be a terminal symbol) to ensure comparability. The problem of constructing grammars from small bodies of data can be overcome by treating all the work of one author as one language (it will be apparent later why I prefer this approach). The grammar would, of course, by virtue of its generative nature, produce sentences of the text language over and above those actually observed; scrutiny of this excess could aid checking of the grammar. The advantages of this procedure are numerous: comparison of the text language with the standard language is simplified because more rigorous; because the categories of the grammar are not empirically discovered in the text but are set up on the basis of analyses discovered in the context, grammatical analysis is always a function of literary interpretation; a comparison of grammars would be a comparison of interpretations, and might allow critical disagreement, expressed as it would be in comparable terms, some degree of analysis and quantification. (cf. for example Levin 1962, Thorne 1965, and Fowler 1969 for contrasting analyses of cummings' poem Anyone lived in a pretty how town).

It will be seen that the argument so far attempts two things. Firstly it aims to specify exactly the way in which a TG grammar can describe the language of a literary text as opposed to that of any other sample. Secondly, by setting up a separate literary language, it formalises an assumption about the discontinuity of the standard and (individual) literary languages. By extending Thorne's (1965) implied suggestion that stylistic differences between writers are of the same type, if not the same order, as those of natural languages, we can be much more precise about the central activity of criticism - defining the relationship between an author's world-view and the structure of his (literary) language as formalised in his text grammar. What we have, in fact, is the Whorfian hypothesis about the relatedness of grammatical structure and Weltanschauung, in a literary context, but in a form and environment which makes independent confirmation quite possible. With literary language it is not only the grammatical facts themselves which can be produced as evidence for the author's distinct way of perceiving the world. The comparison of the literary language with the standard language from which it draws its lexis and phonology reveals a high degree of selectivity and formal organisation which in itself can be used to define contrastively those areas of experience which his language can convey but on which he chooses not to draw.

This point may be clarified if we think of the author in George Kelly's (1955) terms: as a man having a model of himself as a form producing process, imposing intelligible forms on the chaos around him and, so to speak, rehearsing situations he might meet in the world. From this viewpoint, the literary activity might be seen as fulfilling much the same function as the scientific theory - the investigation in representational terms of possibilities which might follow from facts were these not imprisoned within the cultural 'paradigm' (in Kuhn's 1962 sense) which produced them. The essential relationship between literary and standard languages might then be expressed as the relationship between their functions. As John Shotter (1970) puts it:

> "One of the important distinctions between a Weltanschauung
> and a scientific theory is that, while both reflect a
> conceptual system, the former is intuitively held, there
> being no way to reveal and characterize its nature, as

> alternative views with which to contrast it are
> (usually) unavailable, the latter however, <u>must</u>
> <u>be publicly expressable</u>, and furthermore, <u>if it</u>
> is to be properly tested, of a form amenable to
> comparison with alternatives" (231)

It is on this point of comparability that a TG grammar has most to offer the
critic. Like the scientist, the author produces a formal expression of his theory,
but in his case it is not necessarily true that the burden of his theory is to
be found in the content of his expression. In fact, for this purpose it will have
to be untrue; if we set the limits of the author's literary vision at the limits of
his expression then we cannot compare the language of one author with that of
another, since this would not be to compare like with like. To put it in simple
terms stylistic comparisons between authors are impossible since they can only
operate on semantically identical texts, and it is an observed fact that authors
never write about exactly the same things. If, however, we accept a correlation
between 'theory' (world-view) and grammatical structure on the one hand, and 'theory' and
formal reorganisation (restructuring the world in literary terms) on the other,
then stylistic comparison of texts becomes possible via the theoretical terms in
the grammars of the text languages to be compared. Richard Ohmann (1964) has
defined style as a different way of saying the same thing. To be able to say this
means that we must be able to draw some form of distinction between form and
content. The notion of their inseparability is a lazy critical commonplace which
is out of place in the initial, analytical, stage of criticism, especially since a
TG grammar can be so constructed as to include optional transformations generating
semantically identical terminal strings from a single constituent string (cf.
Piaget 1971: "transformations inherent in a structure never lead beyond the system
but always engender elements that belong to it and preserve its laws." (14)). A
comparison of the actual texts generated from the constituent strings with all the
other possibilities which remained virtual will permit a stylistic description of
a text wholly in terms of the optional transformations involved. Such a device,
apart from its descriptive possibilities, is the best method of handling
intuitions about sentence complexity and it embodies the best understanding of the
nature of stylistic choice and its relationship to content.

It may be objected that we have been concerned with the critical rather than
the literary process, but the foregoing analysis can provide a valuable point of
entry for the discussion of models of literary creativity. The major disadvantage
of a TG grammar, on whichever language it is made to operate, is that it cannot, in
its present form, handle the concept of text. Inasmuch as the semantic and
syntactic content of individual sentences is a function of the author's 'theory',
a TG grammar can formalize part of the relationship between form and point of view.
But, to coin a phrase, a novel is a set of sentences, and a literary form needs a
method of analysis which can handle the relationships between sentences within a
text. It is at this point that we see the real benefit of treating the text
language as a separate language, and of insisting on the distinction between form
and content in critical procedure (even though ultimately they may be treated
synthetically). As I suggested earlier, standard and literary languages may share
lexis and phonology and not share syntactic and semantic structure; the one may use
material from the other and place it in a completely alien context much as we might
build a church from the ruins of a castle. There is a very real sense in which
literary form has nothing to do with the standard language, even though the two
may seem to be coterminous. Other artistic forms are what they say, forms,
abstract relationships between mud, stone, paint or sound. Literature, perversely,
realises one structuring process - self-expression through formal relationships -
in terms of another - language. Or in Lévi-Strauss' (1968) terms, the interesting
thing about literary form, as with myth, is that its meaning resides not in the
compositional elements themselves, but in the way in which they are combined.
Literary language uses standard language as its 'gross constituent units', differing
from myth, or code, only in the relative level of its syntax.

It may be further objected that what we are offering as a model of 'literary rocess' is merely a TG grammar revamped to cope with 'new' data yet with no account : the selective constraints under which literature operates. The key issue here s the very complex question of the possible relationship between the language-earning schemata posited by Chomsky's theory and similar innate schemata underlying ier, non-linguistic,skills and competences. In 1968 Chomsky found that attempts ᵔᴊ extend concepts of linguistic structure to other cognitive systems" were "in ot too promising a state" (66). By 1971 his attitude was slightly more optimistic; i question was still open but it had been rephrased: are "systems of belief" (structed on the basis of "distinct innate schemata" (i.e. distinct from each ther and from those of language), or are there "over-riding characteristics of mind h t integrate and underlie these systems" (44)? This move towards considering the ᵉ ure rather than the existence of possible relationships has clearly been influenced y his reading of Jacques Monod (1971). Not only is it reasonable to suppose that snecific principles of language structure are a biological given" but Monod goes i ther and proposes a genetic relationship between linguistic capacity and other .spects of cognitive function. As yet Chomsky seems unwilling to go this far through .ack of evidence (though some work has been done on the neurology of some cognitive ᵊ)cesses, nothing is known as yet about the neurological aspects of language .quisition). In the light of this difficulty, we might do well to look at the case f literature, where, consistent with our previous outline, at least two cognitive i ctions overlap within the same structure. The way in which two or more : ressions of the "form-production process' are combined with that tight organisation e expect in literature may well provide a clue to the way in which other behavioural r terns are linked at a primitive level. No-one is going to claim that the innate ᵊ nciples underlying the literary structure are identically those which underly .anguage. The invariant properties of language which Chomsky attributes to properties f mind need not themselves circumscribe the scope and form of knowledge, but might ᵉ "special cases of more general principles of mind" (Chomsky 1971:41). But the act remains that it is difficult to see how a man can coordinate his various :ognitive systems (and literature is a particularly spectacular example of such ᵉ rdination) if the various schemata are not related. They may differ in their i der of complexity, but they should be generically related (cf. Shotter 1970:243).

It is clear at this point that literature and generative grammar have much to : er each other. If we posit a generative device for literary structure, closely elated to the language model, what follows? Firstly we should be able to express the ᵉ atedness of form and content in literature in terms of the selection of generically ᵉ ated preferred options in both processes - options which, each in its own sphere, re a function of an individual metagrammar - Chomsky's 'refinement through experience' ᵔ71:21)? Such a theory may thus help our understanding of the relationship between .: erary form and social experience (because the metagrammar of preferred options is iot innate but is acquired through experience) and, by extension, the study of genre which may be seen as an exact parallel of Kuhn's (1962) scientific paradigms - see iJ)ve).

The second consequence is at first sight less happy. One of the major : itributions of linguistics to criticism is the opportunity it offers to rethink i ic attitudes. I have already shown how it is not enough to state the relatedness f form and content; the critic has to demonstrate it. But if the scheme I have i lined can allow him to do this with some measure of precision, it makes, at the ᵊ ne time, t e question of evaluation that much more difficult. If we argue the ᵊelatedness ex hypothesi of form and content, no system of evaluation based on that ᵊᵊlatedness can stand and literature can no longer be judged great inasmuch as it ᵊ :cessfully unifies vision and expression. Linguistics has brought him a long way, jut from here on in the critic is on his own.

B. W. Ife,
Department of Spanish,
University of Nottingham

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CONDITIONS FOR A SEMANTIC THEORY

(On 26 January 1972, Miss R. M. Kempson addressed the Nottingham Linguistic Circle on the subject "What is Semantics?" Miss Kempson argued that the task of semantics is to analyse meaning in terms of distinctive lexical components rather than with reference to the total burden of information, overt or covert, carried by a speech-situation. In drawing a distinction between these two approaches to meaning, she reserved the term 'semantics' for the first, labelling the other 'pragmatics'. While not denying the interest and value of the latter, she nonetheless declared that "the study of meaning is not one and the same study as the study of information, and any attempt to incorporate one within the other leads to the intolerable consequence that meaning is not predictable and hence semantics is not an operable discipline". The first part of her paper was devoted to the definition and discussion of the conditions which make semantics 'an operable discipline'. We reproduce an extract. In the second part of her paper, she discussed the work of the American investigators Robin and George Lakoff (1971), as an example of study based on pragmatic assumptions.

At a subsequent meeting of the Circle, introduced by
Robert Kirk and David Evans, this paper provided a
useful point of departure for a forum discussion among
linguists, philosophers, and psychologists. We hope
to reproduce extracts from this discussion in a
later issue.)

Let us assume initially that there are four conditions a semantic theory must
satisfy:

(1) It must be able to predict the meaning of any sentence, and it must do so on
the basis of the meaning of the lexical items in that sentence and the syntactic
relations between those items. (How this prediction is carried out is not important
here.)

(2) I assume that the set of sentences for any language constitute an infinite set,
and therefore like any model of syntax, the semantic model must be predictive. It
cannot merely analyse an arbitrarily selected subset of this series.

(3) The model must separate semantically non-deviant sentences from those which are
deviant. Thus it should describe as sentences of the language only those which are
non-deviant. That is, it must block sentences which are anomalous or contradictory:

    (1) John ran but he didn't move
    (2) The man who was running was walking
    (3) The girl is a boy
    (4) Bachelors are married men
    (5) Green ideas sleep furiously
    (6) Ideas ran to catch the train
    (7) Safety likes to be treated gently
    (8) The boulders got married

None of these sentences is a grammatical sentence of the English language, and they
are ungrammatical (in the wide sense) by virtue of semantic rules of that language.

(4) The model must be able to predict meaning relations between sentences - e.g.
implication, contradiction and synonymy, since these relations hold because of the
meanings of sentences.' Thus

(9) John ran away implies (10) John went away
(11) John killed an actress last night implies (12) Someone killed an actress last
night, (13) An actress died last night and (14) A woman died last night but
contradicts (15) The actress did not die, (16) The actress is still alive and (17)
John did not kill a woman last night.
So we have four demands for any theory.

There is a theory which naturally fulfils these conditions, and that is a theory
which accepts as a basis that to state the meaning of a sentence is to state the
conditions which must exist in the world if that sentence is to describe the world
correctly - i.e. if that sentence is to be true. So in describing the meaning of a
sentence, one is in fact describing the conditions which would ensure that that
sentence was true. If you think for a moment, I think you will agree that this is
implicit in all analyses of meaning in terms of semantic components. If I describe
boy as 'male', 'not adult' and 'human' and I use it in a sentence to describe a fish
and say "I saw a boy in the water just now" the utterance of that sentence will be
false. So for example if we allow that semantic components can be complex as in
kill, we can describe the meaning of The man killed the boy in terms of its lexical
items and if these are amalgamated to form:

X caused Y to die & X is human & X is male & X is adult & Y is human & Y is male &
Y is not adult

then, ignoring tense and the problems of the articles, these conjoined components (or features) constitute the meaning, the set of truth-conditions, for that sentence.

How does this framework meet the four conditions specified? It predicts the meaning of sentences in terms of the meanings of lexical items, and the meaning of a lexical item is the systematic contribution it makes to sentences in which it occurs. Moreover, given a dictionary specifying the meanings of these and the syntactic structures of the language, this formulation is in principle capable of providing meaning-representations for an infinite set of sentences (I shall not go into the details of that here). It naturally separates the semantically deviant sentences - contradictions and anomalies. If you return to examples 1-8, the notable property that these have in common is that given the language does not alter and the meaning of words change, these sentences can never be true, they cannot describe situations in the world. Since the meaning representations of sentences state the set of conditions which must hold in the world if the sentence is true, these are barred by definition since there is no such situation. In formal terms, they contain components which are contradictory, and cannot both be fulfilled. For example, if in (8) the objects in question are correctly described as boulders, then they cannot also at the same time be correctly described as having got married. Hence the sentence is meaningless.(...)

There is, thus, apparently at least one form of theory which predicts meanings of sentences in terms of semantic components (in fact truth conditions), and these conditions on the one hand predict automatically the infinite set of grammatical sentences (delimiting them from the ungrammatical set), and on the other hand provide an explanation of such concepts as implication, contradiction, etc.

There is one important caveat to this. This result can only be achieved if it is assumed that meanings of lexical items are describable in terms of components, and that there is a distinction between one's linguistic knowledge of that word and other 'encyclopaedic' knowledge about the object to which that word refers. This distinction is I think in principle quite clear. It is part of our knowledge of the lexical item baby that it refers to a very young animal (human or not) but not that it is toothless or of human babies that they are illiterate. Unless we can justifiably make this distinction, all knowledge about objects of the world has to be included in the dictionary, and meaning becomes thereby indeterminate because whenever the world changes, the dictionary has also to change - a patently false correlation. The importance of this distinction and the consequences of giving it up will become clear later on.

Notice that this framework predicts the meaning of sentences entirely independent of the speech situation in which they occur - there is no reference to the relationship between speaker and hearer, or between speaker and the sentence uttered. Now this framework, or versions very similar to it, have been widely accepted for some little time now - cf. H. P. Grice (1966) and Bierwisch (1969), (1970).(...)

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ADJECTIVE ORDER IN ENGLISH NOUN PHRASES

(Mr. Barnaby's paper is the result of an assignment
proposed by R.R.K. Hartmann to students of linguistics
attending his Adult Education Class. The author was
interested in a remark by D. Crystal (1971) on the
unsatisfactory nature of formal descriptions of
modifying strings in English nominal groups. We feel
that in attempting to describe modifying structure in
terms of progressive semantic differentials, Mr.
Barnaby has put forward some useful and interesting
observations, which others may like to take up.)

The phrase the smallest brown goat will serve as a starting-point, and let
us note simply that goat is a singular, animate and countable noun. Of its three
modifiers, the and smallest have been adequately categorised by such writers as Owen
Thomas (1965) as 'determiners' and 'post-determiners'. The same writer also
distinguishes 'pre-determiners' from other modifers; pre-determiners are such
phrases as a lot of or all of, which are commonly found with plural-countable or
mass nouns.

The adjective brown however, represents a class of modifers which lie
awaiting experimental manipulation. Let us increase the number of adjectives which
occupy the same general position in the phrase as brown (i.e. between the post-
determiner and the noun itself) and see what kind of inter-relationships become
apparent. Any number of adjectives can be added. The starting-point is now
reduced to brown goat. Let us add an adjective indicative of nationality, say,
French, giving brown French goat. In a spontaneous utterance, the adjective of
nationality normally follows the adjective of 'colour'; compare blue Persian rug.

An adjective describing the goat's 'character', such as reliable would find its
place before the adjective of 'colour', e.g. reliable brown French goat or durable
blue Persian rug.

A pre-nominal modifier which, in other circumstances, serves as a noun or
pronoun, such as brick in brick wall or he in he-goat occupies the place immediately
before the nominal itself, giving reliable brown French he-goat. A phrase like
sensible black African girl reinforces the fact that the acceptable order of the
others, so far, is 1 character, 2 colour, 3 nationality. Any two adjectives from
either of the phrases must occur in the same order e.g. sensible African goat,
reliable brown girl, good black goat etc.

Let us add an adjective of 'dimension' and see what happens: big reliable brown
French goat, big sensible black African girl BUT good big brown French goat, good big
black African girl. The first two phrases have the established order: 1 dimension,
2 character, 3 colour, 4 nationality, which remains unchanged as long as good does
not occur. (Fierce or friendly can replace reliable/sensible with no effect on
word order). The word good apparently does not belong to the class of 'character'
adjectives; its position is at the beginning of an adjective-string and it forms
a class of its own.

The word bad, incidentally, does not behave like good. It belongs to the third
group of adjectives, among those listed under 'character'. This is by far the
largest group and the label 'character' is a very loose description of that group.

A small group of adjectives such as young and old find their place between
'character' and 'colour'. We can classify this group under the title 'age'. The
illustration phrase, as it gets longer, now reads: good big reliable old brown French
goat, but the point is best illustrated in such phrases as silly old woman or

fine young German where silly and fine are classified as 'character' and old and young as 'age'.

In addition to the 'dimension' class (represented here by big) there are those adjectives which indicate other 'physical attributes' of the nominal. Into this class go such words as strong, heavy, feeble, etc. This class finds its place after 'dimension' and before 'character'. Inserted into the ever-growing illustration, the word strong takes over third place: good big strong friendly old brown French goat.

There are words with an adjectival function which can precede good. Words such as different, other and certain do so, but these words may have a kind of dual purpose; they are adjectives but they have much in common with the determiners. The only adjective which invariably stands at the beginning of an adjective-string is usual. It may have to precede all other modifiers because it could be argued that usual modifies every other modifier as well as the nominal.

Any word that is not an adjective breaks the sequence of the string - this includes the word and. As soon as the string is broken, the precedence rules must be applied again from the beginning. The precedence rules, taken thus far, read as follows:

ORDER	CLASS	EXAMPLE
1	'usual'	usual
2	'good'	good
3	'dimension'	big
4	'other physical attribute'	strong
5	'character'	friendly
6	'age'	old
7	'colour'	brown
8	'nationality'	French
9	'noun'	he- (goat)

Although few sentences will contain all these classes at once, any combination of these adjectives will follow the sequence given above. Preceding the adjective-string, of course, are pre-, regular and post-determiners (cf. N. Francis 1967, 41).

It is important to note that where several adjectival modifiers of a single class occur in the same string, their positions are usually interchangeable.

Examples from other sources which appear to be governed by the above rules:

villainous giant skuas   Observer   2.1.72
      (character + noun - adjective)

Sydney Poitiers' increasingly goody-goody detective tangles
      (character + noun - adjective)   Observer   2.1.72

Old-fashioned, periphrastic style
      (same class; interchangeable)   Observer   2.1.72

claret-cheeked, pear-shaped, pop-eyed countenance
      (same class; interchangeable)   Observer   2.1.72

that red granite obelisk   Summoned by Bells
      (determiner + colour + noun - adjective)   John Betjeman

usual smiling farewell photograph
      (usual + character + noun - adjective)   Ditto

In the following extract from The War of the Worlds by H. G. Wells, the rules appear to apply in only two out of three cases:

"A little old man, with a grey military moustache and a filthy black frock coat."

The case of military moustache will be discussed in the next paragraph.

The commonest modifiers (good is the best example) and the frequently-occurring combinations (e.g. military moustache) are the ones most likely not to be governed by class rules; they seem to form their own class once they occur frequently enough. The phrase busy little, for example, is an acceptable one and yet breaks the 'dimension before character' rule. These two words, when separate, obey the rules. There seems to be a very general rule or tendency in language which states that the likelihood of a word or phrase to form its own class is in direct proportion to the frequency with which it occurs. This idea is reinforced by the parallel situation of the commonest verbs, which are all irregular.

The commonest modifiers (such as good or nice) also seem to acquire an extremely wide range of meaning, while many pairs of modifiers take on a meaning not obvious when used separately. Such pairs can become so closely attached that they can be regarded as single modifiers and, as such, do not break the rules anyway. Examples might be dirty old (man) and, of course, busy little (boy, man). It is interesting to note that the opposite of the collocation busy little is not busy big but big busy, and this last phrase fits the rules without difficulty.

Summarising briefly and bearing in mind that the word 'rule' is used strictly in a descriptive sense, one can deduce initially that the adjective precedence rule is a semantic and not a phonetic one, that adjectival collocations fit these rules if regarded as single adjectives, and that only a noun-adjective (e.g. he-) separates a noun-and-adjective collocation.

For examples of such adjectives used with a mass noun, simply add the word meat to the main example above, giving (adjectives) + he-goat meat, or, for a plural animate noun, read goats for goat.

<div align="right">
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PERSONAL VIEW:

CAN THE CURRENT DILEMMA OF LINGUISTICS EVER BE RESOLVED?

Language is manifested in many different ways in many different situations, but because there seems to be no way of determining all the possible situations in which it might appear, there seems to be no way of determining all its possible forms. Thus, as Walter Nash (1971) points out in NLC No. 1., when linguists attempt to

study language by scientific means they encounter a continuing dilemma: Should they be content to study language in particular situations for practical purposes, thus failing to account for what one feels is its essential systematic unity, or should they, in the face of its apparent indeterminacy, still try to satisfy the intellectual craving for complete explanatory theories. Intuition and expression cannot be adequately reconciled.

I want to propose in very brief outline that this dilemma might be resolved if there were radical changes in some of the very fundamental presuppositions thought necessary in the scientific study of language (or, indeed, in the scientific study of any aspect of human expression). Specifically, I want to propose that linguistic processes be thought of as taking place in organismic (open) systems rather than in mechanistic (closed) ones. The crucial difference between these two viewpoints lies in the introduction of intrinsic, and thus radically unobservable processes. The behaviour of organisms is a function of intrinsic processes acting under the selective influence of the environment, while the behaviour of machines is a function of external influences only.

For my formulation of the organismic viewpoint, I shall draw upon Piaget (Piaget, 1971, Furth, 1969) and von Bertalanffy (1952, 1968). But I shall make clear how close Chomsky (1972) has moved towards this position also.

Two kinds of physical system: organismic and mechanistic

In our investigations into the natural world we might hypothesize that not one but at least two distinct kinds of physical systems exist:(1) those constructed piece by piece from parts which in isolation or as parts of the system retain their character unchanged, and (2) systems which grow (under their own agency) from simple individuals into richly structured ones, and whose current parts owe both their character and indeed their very existence both to one another and to the parts of the system at some earlier point in time - such systems involve changing parts which although distinguishable are not in any sense separable. These two systems can be called, in this paper, mechanistic and organismic systems respectively.

Now a number of difficulties arise in the attempt to investigate organisms and organismic systems: Organisms live in a state of exchange with their environments and cannot realistically be considered in isolation from them (in isolation they die). Furthermore, their behaviour (or expression of their nature) does not just depend upon the relations between their component parts as in a machine, but also upon their relation to their environment. And to the extent that they may live in an indeterminate number of different environments they may express their natures in an indeterminate and indeterminable number of different ways. But more than just these difficulties, breaking down an organismic system in order to study the properties of its parts in isolation from one another destroys just those precise selective influences they exert in determining each others' functioning within the system; cast into another context (or in pure isolation, if that is at all conceivable) their functioning would be quite different. And besides the difficulties in investigating such systems, representing them by theoretical structures composed of isolated parts, built up bit by bit, and given a dynamic by arranging for the parts to simply take up new configurations, is also inappropriate. What is needed is a theoretical schematism which can, with the growth of knowledge, be developed by internal differentiation, and which owes its dynamic to reversible transformations (or "operations", to use Piaget's term) - complex, and hierarchically arranged processes of not just rearrangement, but of addition, deletion, and change of elements.

While it may be appropriate for the investigation of mechanistic systems, for organismic systems the reductive-analytic approach seems to suggest both an irrelevant mode of empirical investigation and an inappropriate manner of theoretical representation. What alternatives might there be?

Intrinsic processes of organization and the selective function of the environment

In order to clarify what modes of investigation and representation might be appropriate, let us explore the organismic conception further. Organisms which acquire their own knowledge of the world face an apparently paradoxical task: If they remain open to the world, which indeed they must if they are to live in it and progressively adapt themselves to it, as a result of the continually changing patterns of environmental influence their structure must tend towards increasing disorder. However, if they are not only to remain recognizably the same organisms from one moment to the next but are also to acquire knowledge about their environments, their structure must tend towards increasing order. As it is a fact that some organisms do both adapt to their circumstances and maintain their identity, we must ascribe to them intrinsic processes of self-organization or self-construction. Both Chomsky and Piaget do this: Chomsky (1972) talks of "intrinsic principles of mental organization (which) permit the construction of rich systems of knowledge and belief on the basis of scattered evidence" (p.45). While Piaget (1971) talks of processes of 'equilibration' which produce in man "structures(which) are his own, for they are not eternally predestined either from within or from without" (p.119); they (structures) are the equilibrated or organized resultant of environmentally produced disturbances or 'accommodations' in the organism. Possessing such structures allows the organism both to 'assimilate' its environment and to regulate its actions in their terms. It ceases simply to encounter its situation and begins to experience it, and in the process enlarges and articulates the sphere in which it can act intentionally (i.e. knowledgeably).

'Structure-dependent operations' and organismic processes

One of the invariant properties of language which Chomsky views as an innate[*] principle of universal grammar is the 'structure-dependence' of linguistic operations: "grammatical transformations are invariably structure-dependent in the sense that they apply to a string of words by virtue of the organization of these words into phrases" (1968, p.51). Or, to put it more exactly, the operations only apply to linguistic elements in terms of their assignment to reciprocally determined or mutually defined categories which together constitute larger linguistic wholes. But this is only another way of stating that the elements of a structure owe their character to the part they play under the influence of the parts the other elements play in constituting the functioning of the total system - which is one aspect of our organismic formulation. And in saying that such a form of organization is a product of intrinsic processes of organization, Chomsky contributes the other aspect of our formulation - the self-growing, self-organizing properties of the organism. Thus, very broadly, we can argue that Chomsky tends in his characterization of linguistic structures more towards an organismic than a mechanistic formulation.

The explanation of organismic processes

If we abandon the reductive-analytic approach, are there other avenues of rational investigation open to us than those of 'classical' science? To answer this question we must first clarify the possible goals of such investigations. Are we seeking technologies (manufacturing industries) or enhanced personal abilities?

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[*] In this particular case Chomsky is discussing a formal rather than a substantive linguistic universal, i.e., the form of a linguistic form rather than a linguistic form per se. Qualifying such forms as 'innate' is only not misleading if it is taken to mean that the principle in question is an essential aspect of organisms' nature rather than an aspect which simply happens to be genetically transmitted.

As human scientists, psychologists and linguists have believed their science to be just like other sciences, and have thus pursued the same kinds of goal as other sciences. Necessarily viewing the world as if it were constituted of separable and thus simply manipulable elements, they have sought the kind of knowledge an impartial and essentially asocial observer would require if he desired to rearrange the elements of his situation to suit his own ends. In other words, they have sought that knowledge whose social value is confirmed in a technology; they have tried, in Descartes' terms, to be the "master and possessor of Nature'.

The organismic approach suggests that considering human acts in isolation from one another leads to quite irrelevant conclusions; while distinguishable, human acts only seem identifiable in terms of their functional relations to one another. We have to deal with 'teleological distinctions' rather than "distinctions of existence", as John Dewey (1896) put it in his prophetic criticisms of the reflex arc concept in psychology. Thus as a part of our attempt to explain a person's actions, be they linguistic or otherwise, we must inquire how these actions are related to all his other possible actions - understanding those of his actions which are not intelligible in terms of their relation to those which are. For instance, in attempting to explain the child's acquisition of language, we do not search for 'underlying mechanisms', but try to understand how his linguistic activities are related to his nonlinguistic ones, how his social behaviour is related to his individual behaviour, and so on. Understanding the precise order of the activities involved in the acquisition of language allows us, if each of the separate activities involved is already familiar and easily accomplished, to influence the course of language learning deliberately and systematically.

Formally, then, in explaining human action, our first step is to inquire into the function or value of an action. This involves a process of conceptual analysis, aimed, roughly, at saying what the action is and why it matters. Knowing what function or value an activity can have (and it may have a multiplicity of different values) provides us with a point of reference for differentiating it into its significant (and structure-dependent) aspects, e.g. in relation to a goal every human action has a stimulus and a response aspect, the act of seeing (say) is only complete when the act of reaching for an object (say) is complete, the total behaviour can only be differentiated into its aspects in relation to its end, function or value. During this phase of the inquiry the question of the person's nature, in virtue of which he acts as he does, has been left open. On the principled basis of the first two steps this can now be investigated by the traditional hypothetico-deductive method. Representations which suggest other possible ways in which the activity in question might be manifested must be constructed and their predictions tested; they will suggest how we might exploit the potentialities implicit in our spontaneous abilities in a deliberate and rational manner. Such constructs (or schematic explanations) while explicit and systematic need never be complete; because they can be developed by internal differentiation and transformation, they can provide definite guidelines for research while at the same time remaining open to subsequent modification (thus resolving our original dilemma).

This is a mode of inquiry which allows for the use of systematic theoretical constructs and directed empirical investigation, but which is not aimed at providing instrumental knowledge at all. It is aimed at advancing men's (our) personal awareness of the social world and our own place in it, and at providing us with techniques or disciplines for actualizing our own potentials more effectively within it.

This extremely truncated attempt to understand what underlies the dilemma of linguistics and how it might be resolved draws extensively on (besides those explicitly mentioned): Cassirer (1950, 1957), Dreyfus (1967), Harré (1970), Mead (1934), Taylor (1966), Vygotsky (1962), Winch (1958), and Wittgenstein (1953).

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