T H E   N O T T I N G H A M   L I N G U I S T I C   C I R C U L A R

Edited on behalf of the Nottingham Linguistic Circle

by

Walter Nash   and   Christopher Butler
School of English Studies, University of Nottingham

Editorial Advisory Panel:

H. Margaret Berry	School of English Studies, University of Nottingham
C.J. Pountain	Department of Spanish, University of Nottingham
M.C. Grayshon	Faculty of Education, University of Nottingham
J. Shotter	Department of Psychology, University of Nottingham
J.G. Williamson	Eaton Hall, College of Education, Retford, Nottinghamshire
B.J. Calder	Doncaster College of Education

Table of Contents: Page

© ver design by db & mws

EDITORIAL

The appearance of the present issue of NLC has been greatly delayed, partly in consequence of our hopes that the new volume might be published in a revised and improved format, and partly because our attempts to realise those hopes have revealed the weakness of the journal's financial position. We are to some extent victims of our own growth. In the past we have had no difficulty in producing and circulating a campus broadsheet, especially since we have received a good deal in the way of voluntary service and free materials. Now, however, the journal is of such a size as to preclude further reliance on campus charity; we have to pay our way, and at the moment we are not doing so. At a recent meeting of the Nottingham Linguistic Circle, it was agreed that the rate of subscription to NLC should be raised to £2 per annum from next October, and that subscribers to the Circular should then automatically be members of the Linguistic Circle. This reflects the inflationary trend of our exacting times. We hope, however, that subscribers will not be discouraged; it may somewhat mollify them to learn that we still intend to make improvements in the format and appearance of the magazine. Those subscribers who will still wish to receive NLC at the new rate are asked to complete the enclosed form and return it to the Treasurer (for address, see below).

Among the contributors to this issue is Michael Stubbs, recently appointed Lecturer in Linguistics. His is our first full-time appointment in the subject, and we welcome him both for his own sake and for what he represents in terms of the advancement of our plans for developing courses in Linguistics at the University of Nottingham. There at least we can make optimistic reports of a progress that may in itself give us reason to hope that the present lapse in the fortunes of NLC is no more than temporary.

Walter Nash   Christopher Butler

Back copies of NLC are still available at 25p. each. Subscribers wanting such copies should send their order, together with a cheque or postal order, to the Treasurer, Christopher Butler, School of English Studies, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD.

For an index to past issues, see the back page.

NOTICES AND PROSPECTS

(1) Forthcoming meetings:

Lugano, Switzerland
17-22 March 1975

Tutorial on computational semantics, c/o Institute for Semantic and Cognitive Studies, Villa Heleneum, CH-6976, Castagnola, Switzerland.

Cambridge
2-4 April 1975

Informatics 3. c/o K.P. Jones, Hon. Treasurer, The Malaysian Rubber Producers Research Association, 56 Tewin Rd., Welwyn Garden City, Herts.

Los Angeles
3-6 April 1975

2nd International Conference on Computers in the Humanities. c/o Prof. R. Dilligan, ICCH/2, Founders Hall 407, Univ. of Southern California, Los Angeles CA 90007, USA.

Nottingham
6-7 April 1975

Annual Meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea. c/o Dr. R. R.K. Hartmann, Language Centre, University of Exeter, Queens Drive, Exeter EX4 4QH. (Run jointly with LAGB - see below)

Nottingham
6-8 April 1975

Spring Meeting of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain. c/o Mr. C.S. Butler, Dept. of English, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD.

Birmingham
16-18 April 1975

Joint Seminar of British Association for Applied Linguistics and SELMOUS, on English Language Problems of Overseas Students in Higher Education in the United Kingdom. c/o Miss M. Willes, Dept. of Language Studies, West Midlands College of Education, Gorway, Walsall, Staffs.

Cambridge
13-19 July 1975

Summer School on Literary Statistics, sponsored by the Association for Literary and Linguistic Computing. c/o Mr. M.H.T. Alford, University of Cambridge Literary and Linguistic Computing Centre, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA.

Tampa, Florida
July 1975

Summer meeting of the Linguistics Society of America. c/o Linguistic Society of America, 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202, USA.

Exeter 30 July - 13 August 1975	German-English Linguistic Institute. c/o Dr. R.R.K. Hartmann, Language Centre, Univ. of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QH.
Leeds 17-23 August 1975	8th International Congress of Phonetic Sciences. c/o Dept. of Adult Education, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT.
Stuttgart 25-30 August 1975	4th International Congress of Applied Linguistics. c/o Herr D. Riebicke, 7 Stuttgart 50, Hallschlag 151, Germany.
August/Sept. 1975 (place and exact dates to be fixed)	International Conference on Computational Linguistics.
Poitiers 8-12 September 1975	Round Table on the methodology of audio-visual teaching in modern languages, c/o S.P.R.-Colloque, 9 Rue Michelet, 75006, Paris.
York 15-17 September 1975	Annual Meeting of the British Association for Applied Linguistics. c/o Miss M. Willes, Dept. of Language Studies, West Midlands College of Education, Gorway, Walsall, Staffs.
Amsterdam 13 December 1975	International Meeting/Annual General Meeting of the Association for Literary and Linguistic Computing. c/o Mrs. J. Smith, 6 Sevenoaks Avenue, Heaton Moor, Stockport, Cheshire SK4 4AW.
San Francisco 28-30 December 1975	Annual General Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America (for address see above)
Tokyo, 1976	3rd World Congress of Phoneticians. c/o Phonetic Society of Japan, 13 Daita-2, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, P.C. No.155, Japan.
Philadelphia Marriot 28-30 December 1976	Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America (for address see above)
Chicago 28-30 December 1977	Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America (for address see above)

(2) Reports on conferences:

Workshop on the Bases of Systemic Theory. West Midlands College of Education, Walsall, 17th-20th September 1974.

There is now a respectable number of linguists working within the framework of Systemic Linguistics. To their number may be added those scholars who, while not considering their work to fall specifically within the systemic model, are nevertheless in sympathy with the aims of the systemicist. The Walsall workshop provided a welcome opportunity for the exchange of ideas and information within the systemic field.

After an initial attempt to clarify the nature of some of the central points to be treated in later sessions, the participants discussed a number of descriptive issues, concentrating on the areas of transitivity, theme, modality and modulation, and time. Attention was also given to more theoretical issues, including the relationships of the various areas of the grammar to one another and to the 'functional components' proposed by Halliday, the nature of 'realisation rules', and the issue of levels in a systemic model.

As the workshop progressed, it became clear that although there were considerable differences in viewpoint (for example, between those whose system networks represent semantic options and those whose networks are primarily syntactic) there were also many basic areas of agreement underlying the different approaches. (C.S. Butler)

*   *   *   *

SSRC Seminar on the Classroom: "Alternatives to Interaction Analysis in Classroom Research". University of Leicester, 23-25 September 1974.

For some years now, many educational researchers have been interested in teacher-pupil dialogue. Much of this research has used "interaction analysis", a collective term for various techniques for "coding" utterances, and deriving largely from R.F. Bales' work in social psychology. Interaction analysis has been criticised on many grounds. This conference set out to present positive alternatives for analysing verbal and social interaction in the classroom.

Papers on aspects of language-use were read by: Clem Adelman (U. of East Anglia) on different varieties of classroom talk; Deanne Boydell (U. of Leicester) on verbal interaction in primary schools; Paul Atkinson (University College, Cardiff) on talk between doctors, students and patients during medical teaching, and Michael Stubbs (U. of Nottingham) on a sociolinguistic description of teacher-pupil interaction. Other papers were also read on wider aspects of social interaction in schools. Revised versions of the papers are to be published in G. Chanan, ed., Frontiers of Classroom Research, NFER, Slough. An

introduction to the book will be contributed by Sara Delamont
(U. of Leicester), who organised the conference and who runs
a classroom research group from Leicester.

This is clearly an area with which most linguists are
not familiar. Many educationalists are already involved,
however, in analysing language in use - this research could
be enriched by appropriate linguistic techniques and theory.
Also, the classroom provides a useful focus for developing
sociolinguistic methods and theory. (Michael Stubbs)

* * * *

International Meeting/Annual General Meeting of the Associa-
tion for Literary and Linguistic Computing. King's College,
London, 13th December 1974.

The Association for Literary and Linguistic Computing,
which held its inaugural meeting in April 1973, has since
then provided a forum for discussion and for the dissemination
of information among scholars interested in the application of
computational techniques in literary and linguistic research.

The list of participants at the International Meeting
afforded ample evidence of the truly international nature of
the membership. It is heartening to see that our Continental
colleagues are willing and able to visit Britain just for a
one-day meeting, even in these economically gloomy times.

In the absence of Professor A. Zampoli, who unfortu-
nately was called back to Italy and so was unable to deliver
his proposed paper on 'Statistical Studies of Present-Day
Italian', Professor S. Allén, of the University of Göteborg,
stepped in at very short notice to talk about a computer-
assisted lexical study of present-day newspaper Swedish.
Dr. A.C. Day, of the University of London, then gave a summary
of the strategies available to the linguist who wishes to
make use of the computer, but whose knowledge of computational
techniques is minimal. An ideal but often painful solution is
for the linguist to teach himself a programming language, and
Dr. Day was able to give a most useful thumbnail sketch of
the advantages and disadvantages, for non-numerical work, of
some of the main programming languages available. The morning
session concluded with an account by Dr. D. Packard, of
University College, London, of his scheme for using the
computer in the teaching of Ancient Greek.

In the afternoon session, Professor A. van
Wijngaarden, of the University of Amsterdam, presented a
most amusing paper on 'The Most Frequent Dutch Noun', during
which he pointed out the crucial dependency of lexical fre-
quencies on the range of text types represented in the corpus.
Professor R. Busa, S.J., of Venice, the first Honorary Member
of ALLC, delivered an address in which he made a plea for
the compilation of an inventory of targets in the field of
literary and linguistic computing.

At the Business Meeting, it was stressed that the
ALLC, like many other associations, was under considerable
financial strain, and that if it was to continue to pro-
duce its Bulletin, the enrolment of more members was
crucial. Anyone interested in joining ALLC should write to
the Secretary, Mrs. J. Smith, 6 Sevenoaks Avenue, Heaton
Moor, Stockport, Cheshire SK4 4AW. (C.S. Butler)

*   *   *   *

Hispanic Philologist Seminar, Kings College, London. July 7th-8th 1974.

The participants at this seminar were chiefly members
of the philology section of the Hispanists Association con-
ference, who felt the need for further informal discussion
on current points of interest in Spanish linguistics. Themes
included Asturian dialectology, historical semantics, the
syntax of the third person reflexive, lexicology, and the
identification of Romance elements in Arabic texts. It is
hoped that this seminar will continue to be held every year.

(C.J. Pountain)

ON DESCRIPTIONS OF LANGUAGE IN SOCIAL RELATION-
SHIPS: TWO VIEWS OF LINGUISTIC ORTHODOXY

(M.C. Grayshon is an educationist with a strong interest in
the sociology of language, and a boldly individual, not to
say unorthodox, approach to sociolinguistic studies. One
of his papers on "Social grammar" has already appeared in
NLC (see Vol. III, Nr. 1, p.40 ff.). In the following article
he elaborates his theoretical position. We thought it might
be useful and illuminating if a linguist of more conventional
views could be persuaded to write a short comment on Mr.
Grayshon's argument. Michael Stubbs, recently appointed
Lecturer in Linguistics in the Department of English, Univer-
sity of Nottingham, has kindly agreed to do this for us.)

1. Towards a Social Grammar

Abstract

        Grammatical descriptions of language in the early days
started off with terms derived from how language functioned.
These have become increasingly reified, and turned into des-
criptions of form and relationships between forms. If we
start asking what social and individual function language
serves, we find a very different way of describing language.
This is best shown by comparing English with West African
Tonal languages, when we see that the paralinguistic features
(or prosodic features) of English are related in a definite
pattern to grammatical features to suggest definite emotional
reactions. If we look beyond this, we see that there are two
further concepts, current in the field of social psychology,
which can help us to describe the functioning of language;
these are Status and Solidarity. Status has to do with the
relationship of inferior and superior, with the roles we
play, and with our perceptions of comparative status in those
roles. Superiority determines just what grammatical and
semantic forms are permitted to what speakers in any parti-
cular situation: role perception affects whether two parties
agree in their estimate of each others relative status, and
result in value judgements such as 'He's cheeky' 'The arrogant
bastard' etc. Solidarity, or friendship, modifies status and
allows a wider choice to both parties but is ultimately limi-
ted by status considerations. Finally emotion has two social
functions, and is related in two ways to status and solidarity.
Emotions can join people or separate people. I can be angry
with you, and John is joined with me in being angry, but
separated from you - all emotions have this dual property and
these need to be expressed in communication. Normally status
and solidarity determine what emotions are permissible in
which situation; under abnormal emotional stress, however,
social convention may be overruled.

        Social Grammar is conceived as a description of
communication relating language descriptions of formal rela-

tionships to social functions and needs, both at the societal level and the individual level. It covers, or will eventually cover, grammatical, semantic and paralinguistic features, but in its early days will only consider kinesic features when they strongly intrude.

Argument

Originally descriptive grammar leaned heavily upon function for its descriptions of language. Tenses are derived from awareness of time and the need to classify and refer in the time continuum; it also utilises the social attitude of conditional action. The grammatical terms 'order' 'question' 'refusal' 'negative' are derived from social actions requiring information, demanding action, refusing to act,etc. Over time these descriptions have lost their original function and have become formalised and indeed reified. They have finished up with no necessary relationship to social function.[1] This dehumanized world of language is seen most obviously in the old prescriptive grammars. In these it was suggested that there were imperatives of language behaviour dependent upon laws not made by man, relying on 'perfect' language lying outside man and society, the imposition of this 'perfect' language being entrusted to culturally superior persons. Regrettable traces of this can be seen in the letter columns of our national and local press, and still linger in some classrooms. No serious linguist accepts this type of grammar, but reification, implicit rather than explicit, creeps in. One brief example is all that space allows and that is the concept of 'grammatical fit'.

In his report to the Social Science Research Council[2] Professor J. Sinclair says:-

"One of the fascinating aspects of this work is the lack of fit between grammatical form and discourse function. For example, one often uses an imperative structure. "Open the window", to command someone to do something, but one can just as easily, and sometimes more successfully, use an

1. Berger, P. & Luckman, T.   THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY Doubleday. 1966

   Barth, F.   MODELS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS Occasional Papers No.33. Royal Anthropological Institute. 1966

   Kuhn, T.S.   THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS,INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE Vol.11. No.2. 2nd.Edition enlarged. University of Chicago Press. 1970

2. Sinclair, J.M. et al.   THE ENGLISH USED BY TEACHERS AND PUPILS. FINAL REPORT S.S.R.C. 1972. pages 183-190.

interrogative or declarative:

> Would you mind opening the window.
> Could you open the window.
> That window is still closed.
> It's very stuffy in here.

"We find that 'softened' commands occur very frequently inside the classroom. The teacher conceals his authority by using a grammatical form which implies that the children have a choice:

> Could you all turn to page 17.
> Kevin, would you like to do some maths now.

"We notice that teachers tend to ball back on imperatives when the children don't do what they are told:

> T: Kevin, would you like to do some maths now.
> P: NO RESPONSE
>
> T: It's time to do your maths now, Kevin.
> P: NO RESPONSE
>
> T: Come and do your maths, Kevin.

"Pupils very rarely make mistakes in the interpretation of an utterance and respond to an interrogative command as if it were a question. How do they manage? They need to use two pieces of information about the situation: first, what activities and actions are permissible at a given time - writing, drawing, talking, laughing, eating, are all activities which are allowed at certain times and forbidden at others; second, what actions are feasible at a given time. Using such information, we can state two rules governing the interpretation of utterances:

1.   Any declarative or interrogative clause which is concerned with a forbidden activity being performed by someone inside the classroom is to be interpreted as a command to stop.

> Someone is talking.   command
> Are you eating.   command
> Is the little boy eating?   question

2.   Any interrogative clause with _you_ as subject, containing one of the modal verbs, _can_, _could_, _will_, _would_, and describing a feasible action is to be interpreted as a command.

> Can you open your books at page 17.   command
> Can you swim a length of the baths?   question

We predict that if the last example was uttered at the swimming pool it would be followed by a splash!"

Now in this passage there is recognition that there is a difference between grammatical fit and discourse function but there is implicit the idea that grammatical terms such as 'question' 'interrogative' and 'declarative' have a permanency otherwise than that suggested by use and by man's definition.

There is no recognition in a change of function due to changes in society. When we look at the preceding passage from the point of view of man in society we see that -

The first thing to note is that a command can ONLY be given by a superior. As the English language developed only the superior COULD give an order. Without going into social history it can be said that a superior may well only have bothered to give orders in a form of words and an intonation and stress pattern reserved for inferiors. This can still be seen in institutionalized language such as that of the Army, where the inferior is not only prohibited from giving an order, but cannot even question or speak without permission to a superior:-

"Permission to speak, Sir."
"Not granted."

And that is the end of that.

With his social equals the speaker has to have a different pattern which reflects their relative social status; the nearer equal, the less authoritative can be the form or the intonation and stress. A complex situation might well require complex language usage in this order situation. (For a novelist's handling of this problem see the Hornblower books by C.S. Forester particularly Hornblower's relationship with Bush, his second-in-command). The grammatical forms have been determined by the social situation. The grammatical form which is known as a command grew up when superiors ordered an inferior what to do. The request form grew in a condition of social equality. The invitation to Kevin to do his maths is a good example of social grammar, exemplifying a perfectly good social fit. The social situation as conceived by the teacher suggests that politeness, the language of equals, will lead to a better general social classroom attitude. However as the inferior does not respond so the teacher utilizes increasingly authoritative utterances. There is in social grammar no lack of fit. The superior works his way through a series of utterances, all commands, but varying in 'politeness' and 'authoritativeness'. Both the recipient and the observer recognize a gradation of insistence on obedience; actual circumstances must determine the point at which obedience will be shown. The circumstances can be defined to some extent by the status of a given situation in a particular sub-culture (it is a very strict school; it is an easy-going school; it is an easy-going school but the staff stand no nonsense). Such status can be defined in terms of social grammar. Otherwise the determinant circumstances depend upon the individual's interpretations of other individuals - and this is a most complex situation to explore and define.

What has happened to the language is that the grammatical forms grew up, so to speak, in very definite social situations which gave them precise patterns. Society changed and instead of changing the patterns, used a sort of 'conservation of matter law', utilized the old forms, gave them a different usage and that was that. So as society changed, language usage has changed, but the old forms have not. It would therefore seem sensible now to use inverted commas with conventional descriptive labels such as "interrogative", "declarative", "refusal", "negative" etc. as these terms are not necessarily relevant to language usage. They could indeed be replaced by symbols of one kind or another, the terms themselves being reserved for more accurate use in social grammar.

In the example quoted we do not need to say that there is a lack of fit, but that in a status situation modified by a solidarity relationship, the superior has to work through a series of increasingly authoritative utterances before his command is eventually obeyed. It would then be necessary to categorize the utterances used and the features of communication (using perhaps standard linguistic terms) and then to move to another language and see how a similar situation developed.

In the development of a social grammar of language we would then go on to categorize the utterance used and the features of communication (using standard linguistic terms) and then to move to another language and see how a similar situation developed.

In the study of language there are those elements sometimes referred to as paralinguistic, sometimes as prosodic. The standard description is found in Crystal and Quirk (1964)[1]; this covers the items of intonation, stress, timbre etc. (For convenience in the rest of this paper I use the symbol I.S. to cover these in most of their permutations.) These descriptions of a language form the basis of such books as Dunstan (1969)[2] and Allen[3]. These give in a simple way a comparison of the internal relations of these features of tonal language on the one side and English on the other. When we look at the function of I.S. and ask question such as what function does it carry out?, we can immediately state that in tonal languages it changes the meaning of words, i.e. it has a semantic

1. Crystal, D. & Quirk, R.   SYSTEM OF PROSODIC AND PARA-
                              LINGUISTIC FEATURES IN ENGLISH
                              Mouton. 1964

2. Dunstan, E. ed.   TWELVE NIGERIAN LANGUAGES
                              Longmans. 1969

3. Allen, W.S.   LIVING ENGLISH SPEECH
                              Longmans. 1956

function. In at least one African language it indicates tense change[1] where the future is indicated by a high tone, the present by a medium tone, the past by a low tone. In certain Bantu languages it is used to differentiate the second and third person pronouns.[2]. Thus it is used in a grammatical function. In English the use is far more complex. It is concerned with emotions and grammatical functions, and these grammatical functions are closely related to social status. The grammatical form 'You're coming to dinner' can be inflected to make it a question; thus its grammatical form has remained the same but its function has changed.

These and other considerations suggested a comparison of English and Yoruba with regard to the communication of emotion in one type of grammatical form, that of a question. The result is written up in Grayshon 1975[3]. Further work was carried out in Nupe and Ibo. The complete comparison ended with a table/overleaf.
        as

---

1.   Nida, E.A.   LEARNING A FOREIGN LANGUAGE
                                    National Council of the Churches
                                    of Christ in the U.S.A. Revised
                                    edition 1957. page 128.

2.   ibid.   page 113.

3.   Grayshon, M.C. (1975) SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIAL GRAMMAR
                                    FEATURES OF ONE TYPE OF QUESTION
                                    IN YORUBA AND ENGLISH. 'LANGUAGE
                                    IN SOCIETY'
                                    Spring 1975.

	ENGLISH	YORUBA	NUPE	IBO/IGBO
ANGER	I.S. Pattern on nominal	Continuous form of the main verb. The pronominal equivalent of the English is next to the auxiliary verb. Stress on auxiliary verb.	Increasing speed, emphasis on the object of the sentence.	Emphasis on adverb of manner indicates anger.
INCREDULITY SURPRISE	I.S. pattern on pronominal. Stronger emotion is given by strengthening I.S. features.	We have the present infinitive form of the main verb. The pronominal equivalent has been replaced by the nominal. Emphasis is strengthened by vocabulary change.	Introduction of phatic utterance in the initial position; plus emphasis on the utterance and object of question.	New lexical features and tense change to present from conditional
IMPATIENCE	I.S. pattern on the verbal component	The verb is the same as are the positions of the nominal and pronominal. There are vocabulary changes.	Vocabulary changes with a change of meaning compared with English.	Further lexical changes Tense still in the present.

14

This is a somewhat crude analysis but it is sufficient to show that items of social information carried at the I.S. level in English appear elsewhere in the signalling process of other languages. In Grayshon (1973) [1] I draw attention to the fact that I.S. in English can modify and override the purport of the actual words used. I also show that I.S. features in English that show social relations move into the area of kinesics when similar information is transmitted in Mernkwen. The social feature is an example of status, of being a superior and thus determining what is said.

None of these discoveries could have been made if I had remained content with analysis of internal form in the normal linguistic manner. Because of reasons too lengthy to go into my attention has been concentrated upon language as an example of human individual and social behaviour. From this has come the attempt to start analysing language as function. It follows that if language is an expression of human behaviour and if we are concerned with language function, one at least of the determiners - and therefore the describers - would be social relationships. This might sound as though this is just another example of a sociolinguistic approach. This is not so because sociolinguists, in their descriptions of the operation of language in society, avail themselves of the established terminology of linguistics. The approach under discussion, social grammar, is concerned with a different description of language based upon language function in society. This, whilst it will be heavily indebted to normal linguistic descriptions, is closely involved in the relationship of individuals and groups in society. It is concerned with questions such as what is an order, what is a question, who can give orders and who can ask questions and how these social relationships are revealed in language. Where in the communication and signalling apparatus do we find the clues that allow us to communicate? As a corollary we then ask a second series of questions, having compared language with language to see how different languages utilise different levels of signalling to communicate social relationships. The answers to these questions will be highly relevant to the study of second-language learning and the role of mother-tongue interference.

We have, then, to develop a different description of language and to seek for some universals against which to locate ourselves in the societies in which language functions. Language has to be put firmly back into place as an expression of individual and social behaviour. There are many social and individual relationships which could be considered. I suggest three. First Status, which defines who has the power to determine what language can be used by whom and in what situations. An order by a superior to an inferior implies power to insist upon it being carried out. An order by an inferior to a superior is insubordination, cheekiness, rudeness etc. Second Solidarity, the individual relationship where friendship modifies status and allows many more language expressions

1.   Grayshon, M.C. (1973)   NOTTINGHAM LINGUISTIC CIRCULAR
                              Vol. III No. 1. November 1973.
                              page 40.

because of the reduction of the status gap. Third Emotion which is normally prescribed by status i.e. who can show anger to whom and in what circumstances is determined by the status superior; but in extremes strong emotion overrules both status and solidarity.

These relationships are expressed in different levels of communication in different language groups. As I pointed out earlier some tonal languages as compared with English use very different levels for communicating some emotions. Also that I.S. reveals the special relationship in English where this might be as 'far away' as kinesic features in other languages.

To describe these differences (and of course to do the obverse, to watch the society and derive language patterns) a new description of language is required. This I suggest might be social grammar. It would subsequently be useful in helping us to define, and perhaps suggest solutions to other problems; for instance, there are some subtle aspects of mother-tongue interference to which it might be relevant (Grayshon 1975a)[1].

Its social emphasis would make it valuable in other areas of language study. It is obvious that sociolinguists and others are seeking for new descriptions of language (Grayshon 1974)[2]. A social grammar would be of use and could well develop into a theoretical framework to contain much current work. In a brief article these can only be hinted at. Classroom language has already been suggested. However, there are other classroom situations where a social grammar would be useful. S.A. Phillips[3] points out that Indian children in Warm Springs in the U.S.A. failed to operate in the white classroom because their social assumptions were such as to make incomprehensible the teacher's communication. The teacher assumed a "status situation" with the teacher as superior, but the Indian children had been used to "solidarity situations" from about the age of eight onwards. This is related to the concept of vertical and horizontal language discussed by J.C. Richards[4]. J.J. Gumperz discusses social

1. Grayshon, M.C. (1975a)   op. cit.

2. Grayshon, M.C. (1974)   NOTTINGHAM LINGUISTIC CIRCULAR.
                               Vol. III. No. 2. June 1974.
                               Report on Socio-linguistic
                               Colloquium held in April 1974.

3. in ALATIS, J. editor   BILINGUALISM & LANGUAGE CONTACT
                               Monograph Series on Language &
                               Linguistics 23. Georgetown. U.P.
                               1970
                               Philips, S.A. ACQUISITION OF
                               RULES FOR APPROPRIATE SPEECH
                               page 95.

4. Richards, J.C.   SOCIAL FACTORS, INTERLANGUAGE,
                               AND LANGUAGE LEARNING
                               Language Learning. Vol. 22.
                               No. 2. pages 159-188.

interaction and suggests that social relationships refer to
regular patterns of interaction.[1] He lists items such as
father-son, salesman-customer, husband-wife. These do exist
but the actual relationship varies from culture to culture.
For example, the husband is not always the dominant partner,
whether by general social prescription or by individual
custom; a more fundamental relationship is that of status.
The language patterns associated with inferior status would
then allow us to make judgments about the binary relationships
postulated by Gumperz. Gumperz goes on to discuss styles.[2]
Further on in the same chapter the discussion continues about
the variety of styles. My analysis of this situation would
suggest that these styles are capable of being plotted on a
continuum of status at various points:-

1. gross society　　　　　3. village society
2. regional society　　　 4. family society

Social grammar would define those elements of utterances
which would allow the observer to define the different statuses
claimed by different actors, and to make observations about
the acceptability of their own perceived role and that of
other participants. In chapter XVI[3] Gumperz uses traditional
linguistic forms to analyse the differences between two groups
in Norway. In social grammar one would ask a further series
of questions. Do the two groups show emotions in different
ways? How do they modify status by solidarity? What
emotions are permitted in what social situations?

This discussion also shows the difference between
sociolinguistics as presently conceived and social grammar.
I take a quotation from the conclusion of this chapter.[4]

"In interactional sociolinguistics, therefore, we can
no longer base our analysis on the assumption that
language and society constitute different kinds of
reality, subject to correlational studies. Social
and linguistic information is comparable only when
studied within the same general analytical frame-
work. Moving from statements of social constraints
to grammatical rules this represents a transforma-
tion from one level of abstraction to another
within a single communicative system."

---

1. Gumperz, J.J.　　　　　LANGUAGE IN SOCIAL GROUPS
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Stanford U.P. 1971

2. ibid.　　　　　　　　　page 155.

3. ibid.　　　　　　　　　page 274.

4. ibid.　　　　　　　　　page 205.

The first point is of course that 'linguistic' needs a much
wider meaning; the so-called paralinguistic features are part
of social grammar descriptive apparatus. However, more impor-
tantly, at this stage in my thought I would suggest that in
social grammar we are not effecting a transformation from one
level to another but that we are developing a single descrip-
tion of a communicative system. Gumperz goes on to say that
the paper he has presented -

> "....demonstrates the importance of social or non-
> referential meaning for the study of language in
> society. Mere naturalistic observation of speech
> behaviour is not enough. In order to interpret what
> he hears the investigator must have some background
> knowledge of the local culture, of the processes which
> generate social meaning."

And I would add:

> "Yes, and he must be able to classify this local
> knowledge against universals which are to be found
> in the fundamental nature of society and of man
> himself."

Social grammar should add a new dimension to the study of
language in society. First, socially speaking, it gives some
universals which will allow a preliminary analysis of the
social situation which affects any particular group in relation
to a group. Secondly it gives another type of linguistic
description to the sociolinguistic tool-box. For example,
Bernstein in his works[1], together with those who have developed
his ideas, have suggested that the social structure creates
a code and the code affects the way in which a person per-
ceives the world, forms concepts about it, and expresses his
perceptions and concepts. Accepting the criticism that these
show different groups rather than that one group is necessarily
deprived in the sense of lacking what the other group has, this
analysis makes sense. However the original work suggested that
the choices people made lay in four areas:

a)   lexical differences
b)   grammatical structure differences
c)   lower information content and higher
     predictability in the restricted code
d)   the use of more introductory and final
     phrases in the restricted code.

The choice one had was, in the original statement of the theory,
limited for those with a working class background, whose "code"
was described as restricted. Contrarywise, the middle class
speaker had an elaborated code. I do not propose to discuss
the various criticisms and developments, but purely to show
first that this choice may be because the social situation

1.   Bernstein, B.   CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL
                      Routledge, Kegan Paul. 1968
     Lawton, D.   SOCIAL CLASS, LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION
                      Routledge, Kegan Paul. 1968
     Robinson, W.P.   CLOSE PROCEDURE AS A TECHNIQUE FOR THE
                      INVESTIGATION OF SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENCES
          IN LANGUAGE USAGE. Language & Speech. Vol.8 part 1 1968

limits the possibility of utterance - the restricted code user
is restricted, not so much because of his own limitations but
that, being different and in some sense inferior in status, he
just doesn't use the elaborated code. Thus alternance is not
only a property of an utterance but it may be a function of the
speaker. A speaker's alternance is determined not only by what
choice he knows but what choices the situation allows him to
use. My contribution is to draw attention to the function of
paralinguistic features particularly when they are classified in
relation to society, and at least add another dimension for
analysis. It seems also that not enough distinction is made
between social failure in language and systematic failure in
language[1]. There needs to be more careful investigation so
that we can distinguish between what is lack of language, i.e.
being below a standard through lack of grammar and lexis, and
the time where an appropriate utterance has not been used due to
social position, perhaps lack of social grammar awareness, or
where 'appropriate' is defined solely by the usage of a dominant
group who in the past has denied particular language patterns
to an inferior status group (c.f. language expectations of the
Southern States white man with regard to Negroes). A social
grammarian would analyse language in relation to status,
solidarity, etc. and thus create the conditions for a more
accurate and subtle discussion of the function of class in the
language situation. This would, I suggest, lead us away from
discussion purely in terms of social class and would make us
more aware of other status situations which affect language
choice.

This is a summary of a much longer discussion, but it
is, I hope, sufficient to open and give form to a debate upon
the need and form for a description of language placed firmly
in and closely related to society and the individual in society
comprehending function rather than form. Social grammar
seems a suitable title at this stage of the process.

M.C. Grayshon
Department of Education
University of Nottingham

---

1. but see Williams, F.   LANGUAGE AND POVERTY
Markham. 1970

Grammatical form, discourse function, dis-
course structure and social situation:
comment on Grayshon

For some years now an increasing flow of articles has
criticised "core" theoretical linguistics for avoiding the
knotty problems of analysing how language is used in social
contexts. Hymes (1962) and Labov (1970) are two now classic
articles in this vein, which provide the basis for a thorough
critique of the Chomskyan retreat from language as a social
phenomenon, and of the assumption of "an ideal speaker-listener
in a completely homogeneous speech community" (Aspects, 1965,
p.3). But although an impressive amount of general socio-
linguistic ethnography has now accumulated, there is still a
lack of work which rigorously relates sociological categories
to data on how people actually talk to each other in everyday
conversation.

A major problem in this area - one problem raised by
Grayshon in the preceding article - is the lack of fit between
linguistic form and function. There is no one-to-one corres-
pondence between syntax (or any other formal linguistic feature
for that matter) and underlying speech acts or discourse
functions. If we avoid discussing functions, then we retreat
back into analyses of syntactic structure. (This is Grayshon's
point.) But (I would add) if we avoid making structural
statements and specifying precise realisation relationships
between forms and functions, then we are doing "loose
linguistic sociology without formal accuracy", to use Firth's
phrase. Also, if we neglect the complexity of different levels
between utterances and social situation, then we produce a
reductionist description which misleadingly attempts to relate
isolated utterances directly to sociological categories. I
will give brief illustrations of these last two points.

I will begin from a small terminological distinction.
Let us restrict the terms interrogative, declarative and
imperative to grammatical forms, i.e. syntactic surface
structures (exemplified respectively by "Are you going away",
"You are going away" and "Go away"). And let us use the terms
question, statement and command to refer to discourse functions.
It is clear that there is no easy correspondence between
these two sets of terms. An interrogative might realise
either a question, in the sense of a request for information
(e.g. "Could you see him this afternoon"); or a polite
command ("Could you open the window"). A command might be
realised by an imperative ("Shut the window"), an interro-
gative ("Will you shut the window") or a declarative ("It's
time to go to bed"). One could continue with other permu-
tations, or with alternative contextually appropriate inter-
pretations of these utterances. For example, "Could you see
him this afternoon" might not be a question, but a request.
And so on.

But what does "contextually appropriate" mean here?
In other words, how can we specify "context" in precise
terms? I will argue that we can, and must, specify context
partly in terms of discourse structure.

Specification of grammatical forms is clearly necessary.
We can state, for example, that interrogatives (e.g. of the
"could you" type) are one way of making polite requests. But
we must note that interrogatives have other functions which
are dependent on their structural position at a particular
point in a discourse sequence. For example, at the beginning
of a telephone call (i.e. at initial position in this speech
event) one does not get,

    *A: hello is Jim there?
    B: yes - is there anything else you want to know?

but

    A: hello is Jim there?
    B: just a minute I'll get him.

The interrogative ("is Jim there?") is not a request for infor-
mation, but a request for action. We cannot explain how this
utterance can function (be interpreted) in this way without
specifying its structural position in the discourse.

My second and related point is made succinctly by Ashby
and Coulthard (in press):

> "A non-reductionist explanation and description of social
> life and language is achieved not by refraining from
> abstractions, but by taking the longest path from data
> to explanatory categories, seeing the data as entering
> into a series of levels of organization, each partially
> autonomous but interrelated with other levels. ...(an)
> adequate understanding of the relationship of language
> and social life must be based on an understanding of
> the different levels at which language is organized,
> and (we argue) that the categories of sociological
> theories should be related to categories of linguistic
> description as well as directly to data."

I will illustrate one aspect of this point by discussing a
fragment of conversation, and in order to be specific I will
choose a piece of data which bears on the (sociological)
concept of "solidarity" (a concept used above by Grayshon).
Clearly, solidarity is not something which conversationalists
can simply exude when they feel it - nor can one display
solidarity simply by saying "I am your friend". Solidarity
has to be accomplished through precisely describable conver-
sational strategies. Intuitions in this area are often hazy
in the extreme. So it is crucial to give the reader access
to data in the form of close transcripts of audio-recorded
conversation.*

---

*Transcription conventions:

- indicates short pause.　　(?) indicates inaudible word.

⌐ indicates overlap
L

A: I can't remember the title now   (1)

B: supplier - progress field representative part sales rep (2)

C: that's the one that   (3)

B: part sales rep - ⌐UK   (4)

C: L I was thinking that - that's the   (5)

D: maybe that was the one you had in⌐mind   (6)

C: Lthat was the one that

   the guy came up to talk⌐about   (7)

B: Lthat's right yeah   (8)

A: yeah - tha - yeah that's right sorry I'm (?) - they

   did include in that part of their that's right   (9)

C: and they were reps   (10)

This conversational fragment was recorded in a committee
meeting in an industrial setting. Intuitively, it shows
speakers trying to recall details from a previous meeting,
engaged in a kind of "group think" process, trying to keep a
check on what they each "have in mind" (6) or might mean.
But how do we recognise this? First, we can recognise various
discourse acts by which conversationalists mutually support
each other. We could label acknowledge the minimal kind of
support which signifies that an utterance has been heard.
Typical exponents of this category include "yeah", "mm", "uhuh"
with low, falling intonation. A slightly stronger from of
conversational support is accept which implies understanding,
and functions to accept an utterance as an appropriate contri-
bution to the talk. Exponents include "I know", "okay",
"oh I see". Endorse is stronger again: a translational gloss
might be "I wish to be associated with that utterance" or "I'd
have said that if I'd thought of it". Such items back up,
approve or ratify preceding talk. Exponents include: "that's
a point", "that's a thought", "I was thinking that" (5), "that's
right yeah" (8,9). More subtle exponents include partial
repetitions of previous utterances (6,7), (8,9), or B contin-
uing or completing A's utterance, as in this fragment,

A: and if they don't like it they eh -
B: they'll ⌐squeak
A: Lthey know what they can do

Mutual support in conversation is accomplished across
sequences of utterances as a joint production in real time
by specific, describable conversational "mechanisms".

These discourse functions form a cline and they can be
usefully grouped into a more general functional category of
feedback; they comment on and give conversational support to
a previous or on-going utterance, without contributing new
information or assumptions to the talk. Such utterances
have a discourse function of maintaining smooth conversation.

(Failure to give such feedback on the telephone quickly leads to, "Hello! Are you still there?") Clearly, such interactional behaviour can be explained only if conversation is studied in its own right as a partly autonomous system of interrelated levels of description.

It should be clear that I do not intend these comments as adequate analyses of the fragments, but only to illustrate some kinds of discourse organization (structures and functional categories of acts) which lie between utterances and sociological categories. Only after we have accounted for the function of utterances within a conversation can we look further for the sociological function of the talk in, say, sustaining a social role. There is no short-cut, then, from grammatical form or discourse function to sociological categories. The social situation does not, for example, directly "determine" grammatical forms. Grammatical forms (along with clusters of other features, paralinguistic, intonational, etc.) are exponents of discourse functions. But discourse functions are exponents of hierarchically related slots in discourse structures. Only through the study of both discourse structures and functions can we explain how conversation works: how speakers interrupt and give up the floor, show continued attention and agreement, and so on. And only when we have discovered these conversational mechanisms will we know precisely _how_ "solidarity", for example, is displayed.

My main points are therefore as follows. Linguistics should not retreat from the study of language-use in social contexts. But if such study is to be more than "loose linguistic sociology without formal accuracy", then we cannot jump directly from isolated utterances to sociological categories. We must study the function of utterances in conversational sequences and therefore study discourse structure. Most important then, concepts must be related to conversational data - that is, we must show how social roles are sustained through the ways in which people actually talk to each other. Attempts to find direct links between isolated utterances and social contexts are severely reductionist and reify the very sociological concepts they set out to study - since it is only through the many levels of conversational _interaction_ that social "roles" are realised and sustained.

Acknowledgements

Michael Stubbs
School of English Studies
University of Nottingham

References

ASHBY, M.C. and COULTHARD, R.M. (in press) "A linguistic description of doctor-patient interviews", to appear in M. Wadsworth, ed., Everyday Medical Life, Dent. (Available as Mimeo, University of Birmingham.)

CHOMSKY, N. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press.

HYMES, D. (1962) "The ethnography of speaking", in J. Fishman, ed., Readings in the Sociology of Language, Mouton, 1968.

LABOV, W. (1970) "The study of language in its social context", Studium Generale, 23, 1.

SINCLAIR, J.M., COULTHARD, R.M., FORSYTH, I.J., ASHBY, M.C. (1972) The English Used by Teachers and Pupils, Report to SSRC, Mimeo. (Revised version in press as Towards an Analysis of Discourse, Oxford University Press.)

STUBBS, M. (in press) "Die Organisation von Kommunikation im Unterricht", Thema Curriculum. (English version available as Mimeo.)

STUBBS, M. (forthcoming) "Teaching and talking: a socio-linguistic approach to classroom interaction", to appear in G. Chanan, ed., Classroom-Based Research in Britain (provisional title), National Foundation for Education Research, Slough.

SUMMARY OF 'SOME ISSUES CONCERNING LEVELS IN SYSTEMIC MODELS OF LANGUAGE'

(Robin Fawcett teaches Linguistics at the West Midlands College of Education, Walsall. He recently organised a workshop on the bases of systemic theory, a report on which will be found on p. 5. The following article is a summary of a talk given by Mr. Fawcett to the Nottingham Linguistic Circle in December 1973.)

1.   PREAMBLE

1.1   Scope of the paper

What I have to say here falls into two parts. As my title indicates, the principal aim is to summarise a very much longer paper. In it I discussed two major points of potential controversy within systemic theory (as well as a number of relatively minor points), but in the space

available it is not possible to do more than hint at the arguments that I would like to develop. In the circumstances I have decided to strip the summary to the bone, so as to have a little more time to discuss the more pressing of the two major concerns. I think it is important to give this matter an airing now, because there seems to me to be a danger that the justifiable doubts felt by many linguists (including those working in a systemic framework) about some recent proposals made by Michael Halliday may result in throwing the baby out with the bath water. The question to be considered is 'What is the status of the networks of options open to a mother in controlling a child (etc.), as proposed by Halliday (e.g. 1973: 72f) and Turner (1973: 153f) ?' I shall suggest that, though the implication in some of Halliday's more recent writings that these are a level of language is wrong, this does not in any way diminish the insightfulness of systemic theory as a whole, since the model is complete without these networks. More positively, I shall suggest that the new networks capture something that has both psychological reality and sociological significance, and that, from the viewpoint of the interplay between linguistics on the one hand and sociology, social psychology and psychology on the other, they represent a line of investigation that it is important to pursue.

In this paper, however, I shall not have space to do more than mention the positive side of the case, and I ask the reader to bear in mind, when reading the negative Part 3 of this paper, that my attitude to the sort of investigation that these networks represent is positive. This aspect will be explored fully in the revised version of the Nottingham paper that is at present in preparation; so will the other major question, which concerns the nature of the contrasts observable at the various levels of language that we may distinguish, and the nature of the relationship between the levels. These issues are as central as the first to the theory.

One thing that has made this paper especially hard to write is my debt to Michael Halliday, both for the many insights which I owe to him and for his encouragement to me to develop my own explicitly cognitive model. The fact that much of what I have to say here is critical of one of his suggestions should be seen in the wider context of my acceptance of most of his major assumptions. In fact this paper may be regarded as a sort of indirect tribute to his creativity, in that the challenge to discover what the status of these new networks is has resulted in the further development of my own model of a language-using mentality.

1.2   A note on diagrams

A good proportion of the paper can be summarised in diagram form more efficiently than in language. The former method is more economical of space (though not necessarily of time) and the reader is therefore invited to give himself some practice in the skill of diagram-reading (a skill to which our language-oriented education system gives relatively little attention).

SOCIOLOGY

COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

COMPUTER SCIENCE

| 1	situation
2	context (= 'semantics')
3	form — grammar (systems) / lexis (sets)
4	phonology
5	phonetic substance

HALLIDAY MARK I
(1961:244, 1964:18)

Overall model as in HALLIDAY MARK I, presumably. But the system networks are seen as:
a) divided into functional components;
b) semantic. (N.B. the concept of 'context' is not developed.)

2	s e m a	n t i c	s
exper-iential	logical	inter-personal	textual

HALLIDAY MARK II
(1970:144, 1973:141, but no overall diagram given)

1	situation
2	semantics
3	grammar — lexis
4	phonology
5	sounds

HUDSON (1971:12)

As in HALLIDAY MARK II, with 'grammar' further expanded:
systems (= semantics)
functions
structures
formal items

BERRY (forthcoming)

1 social system
options in behaviour

2 semantics
'social semiotic' networks
'pre-selection'

3 form (or lexico-grammar)
'functional component' networks
'pre-selection'

4 'grammatical structures'	networks of 'tone' etc.
'pre-selection' (?)	

the language system

5 phonology

6 phonetic substance

HALLIDAY MARK III (1973:92-101)

1 'c o n c e p t' 'knowledge of the universe' (incl. know-ledge of 1 and 2 in HALLIDAY MARK III)	↔	p t' problem-solver

2 semantics
'functional component' networks
realisation rules

3a f o r m syntax — items	3b macro-phonology (inton-ation)
morpho-phonemic rules	
4 micro-phonology	
neuro-muscular commands	
5 variations in air pressure	

the language system

FAWCETT (1973 a & b, 1974)

com-ponents not readily com-parable some simil-arities to FAWCETT

WINOGR

I should at this point make three things clear about my representations of Halliday's models in Figure 1. Firstly, the fact that there are three models (rather than one or two or four) reflects my interpretation of his writings over the period from 1961 to 1973. References are given.

Secondly, the relationships between the components of the models are derived more from an interpretation of his discussions of examples than from his own diagrams, since the former offer a fuller account of the models. Thirdly, in some of his more recent papers (e.g. Halliday, to appear : 1 - 8, which was not available when this paper was first prepared), Halliday seems to have restored the 'functional component' networks in transitivity, theme, etc. to the status of the semantic stratum of language, (or perhaps to the status of one of the semantic strata of language ?), which partially re-establishes the parallels with my own model.

2. SUMMARY OF THE PAPER GIVEN AT NOTTINGHAM

2.1 Purpose and scope

Part 1 begins by clarifying that the term 'level' is intended in a sense roughly equivalent to Lamb's 'stratum'. I then point out that, despite the centrality of the notion of level in building models of language, linguists seem to be in full agreement on surprisingly few of the related questions. The aims and scope of the paper are outlined.

2.2 Some minor issues

Three relatively minor issues are discussed, and the following conclusions reached:

1. The levels designated 'context' (or 'semantics') and 'phonology' in Halliday Mark I in Figure 1 should be regarded as levels, comparable to the level of 'form', and not as 'interlevels' between form and, in the first case, 'situation' (or 'concept') and, in the second, 'phonetic substance'.

2. The label 'semantics' is preferable to 'context'.

3. Syntax and lexis are not different levels, but complementary aspects of the single level of 'form', despite some references to them in the literature as different or partially different levels.

2.3 The levels of form and semantics

The very much longer Part 3 is an analysis of the implications for a model of language of Halliday's suggestions in his paper 'Towards a sociological semantics' (1973: 72f). Halliday Mark III in Figure 1 summarises the model implied there, drawing also on his other writings of the same period.

The model with which I would contrast it is my own, which is illustrated alongside it. I do not claim a high degree of originality for it, and it seems to me to represent in explicit form a combination of Halliday Mark II with Hudson's emphasis on realisation rules. The main difference to note at this point is the status of the 'functional component' networks, as we might call them, of options in transitivity and theme, etc. In Halliday Mark III they are incorporated in the level of form, whereas in Fawcett they constitute the level of semantics. Part 3.1 introduces the problems raised by this and other differences between the two models.

Part 3.2, however, discussed a problem which faces both models : the nature of the contrasts at the levels of form and phonology. The conclusions reached here run counter to the model outlined in general terms by Halliday in a number of places, in which each stratum of language is seen as consisting of a network of systems, rather as in Lamb's Stratificational Grammar (Lamb 1966, etc.). At the workshop on the Bases of Systemic Theory, held in September 1974 at the West Midlands College, Walsall, this emerged as a point of disagreement between Michael Halliday and a number of other systemicists, including Margaret Berry, Christopher Butler and myself. The case will be set out in the fuller version of this paper: here I shall simply summarise some of the key points.

1. A distinction is to be made between paradigmatic relations which are meaning-selecting and those that are meaning-transmitting;

2. contrasts such as those modelled in networks of transitivity and theme at the level of semantics are of the former type, and the term 'system' can appropriately be used for them;

3. contrasts at the levels of form and phonology are of the latter type, and the term 'system' is probably better avoided in referring to them;

4. this is because formal and phonological contrasts, unlike semantic contrasts, play no part in an explicit ('generative') grammar.

This is followed by a suggestion as to why paradigmatic relations at the level of form have been given the importance they have in systemic theory. I then make a proposal about the part that they, together with paradigmatic relations at the level of phonology, can justifiably be regarded as playing in a synchronic model of language - in fact in a model of language in use. Their possible significance as meaning-selecting contrasts in a diachronic perspective is also sketched in.

Part 3.3 describes Halliday's proposals for the recognition of a new generative base in the model, as indicated in what is seen as a six-level model in Halliday Mark III, and Part 3.4 gives five reasons for not regarding such networks as a level of language. These two parts are reproduced in full as Part 3 of this paper.

Part 3.5 explores further precisely what it is that the social semiotic networks of Halliday and Turner capture, and shows the way in which they may be incorporated in a model of a mentality which contains a model of language.

Part 3.6 explores some of the implications of recognising the psychological reality of this type of network for linguists attempting to work entirely within the code of language.

Part 3.7 draws together the points made in considering Halliday's proposal and presents the reasons for representing my model in Figure 1 in the way it is. The implications for much of the current systemic literature of accepting such a model are sketched in in Part 3.8, and suggestions are made as to where attention should now be focussed.

2.4   Getting from semantics to form

There was also a fourth part to the paper, which discussed the various concepts expressed in the systemic literature in the terms 'realisation' and 'exponence'. Then, in the light of these concepts, it examined the question of whether there are really a number of realisationally related 'sub-levels', such as seem to be implied by the suggestions of Hudson (1971) and Berry (forthcoming). However, this part of the paper was not read, in order to give time for questions on the earlier parts. A simplified version of some of the points appears in my article 'Some proposals for systemic syntax' (Fawcett, 1974).

3.   ON HALLIDAY'S SOCIAL SEMIOTIC NETWORKS

3.1   Summary of the overall model and an example of a network

In his writings between 1970 and 1973, Halliday has on the whole avoided using the term 'semantics' for his networks in transitivity, theme, etc. As I have indicated, the reason seems to be that he has been developing a multi-stratal model with affinities to that of Lamb (e.g. 1966), in which the term 'semantics' is used for a level that is 'higher' (in Lamb's terms) or 'deeper' (in transformational terms) than the functional components.

Halliday's writings in this period concern two main topics, which are often discussed in the same papers. The first is a compelling explanation, based on a case-study, of how a child comes to develop the complex adult semantics, with its several functional components. The second concerns a possible new level in an overall model of language. Though it has links with the developmental work, it derives more directly from the challenge to explain the 'failure' of working-class children in a middle-class-orientated educational system. Indeed, the four 'critical primary socializing contexts' which Bernstein discerns as relevant to this problem are derived from the seven functions of language outlined in Halliday's 'Relevant Models of

language' (1969/73), and it is the attempt to develop a net-
work showing the linguistic options that may mediate one of
these functions, the 'regulative' or 'control' function,
that has led Halliday and Turner to posit a possible new level
in an adult model of language. Specifically, they are con-
cerned to model the linguistic means by which mothers regulate
the behaviour of their children.

Halliday has used a number of labels for this 'level'.
One is 'behavioural semantics'. This term, which seems to me
to be a quasi-metaphorical extension of the proper sense of
the term 'semantics', leads in turn to the use of 'semantics'
on its own. He writes (1973: 55) that 'semantic options....
..are interpreted as the coding of options in behaviour, so
that the semantics is in this sense a behavioural semantics'
(my emphasis). But in his more recent writings (e.g. Halliday
1974) he introduces the alternative label of the social
semiotic. This label has two advantages. Firstly, it gives
a more accurate indication of the type of 'meaning' that such
networks offer, and secondly, it enables us to retain
'semantics' as an unambiguous label for an intra-linguistic
level. The implication of my last sentence is that I regard
Halliday's and Turner's social semiotic networks as extra-
linguistic, and this is a statement that I shall shortly try
to justify.

We shall now look at the strata in the overall model
that Halliday's writings describe, and then look more closely
at the social semiotic level of options. Its relations to
the levels 'above' and 'below' it are discussed in Part 3.5.

The model, as described in Halliday (1973: 92-101),
consists of the following levels:

1. an extra-linguistic level of behavioural options;

2. the social semiotic (or 'semantics');

3. the functional components that specify the
   'formal potential' (or 'lexico-grammar');

4. the phonology.

In addition, since there is not a one-to-one relationship
between the options in the functional component and their
realisations at the level of form as structures and items,
there must be a recognition of the purely formal contrasts
(such as clauses with or without a complement) which I
distinguished in section 3.2 as a separate level ('gramma-
tical structures', in Halliday's diagram on p. 101). I
have tried in Figure 1 to represent this model in a way that
makes it comparable with the others shown there. If phonetic
substance is included as a 'level' there are therefore in
this model six levels in all, of which the first and last
are not claimed to be in the linguistic system. So does
Halliday recognise four levels of language? He does not,
because by incorporating the level of formal contrasts that
we distinguished in section 3.2 with the networks in the
functional components he can claim, (as he does on p.76)

that the model conforms to the traditional tri-stratal one consisting of the three levels of semantics, form and phonology.

However Halliday is not dogmatic about the number of levels in language, any more than Lamb is, and he writes (p.94) of the possibility that we might need 'to interpose another layer of structure between the semantic systems and the grammatical systems'. I would argue that the traditional view that there are merely three levels is adequate, pending evidence to the contrary, and that so far we have no such evidence. See the next section.

We should now ask ourselves what it is that Halliday and Turner are modelling in their social semiotic networks. Figure 2 shows a representative part of a network, taken from Halliday (1973: 89), to give us a simple example to refer to. I assume that the reader is familiar with the conventions of system networks: if he is not, he may refer to Halliday (1973: 47). To the left of this network would appear as entry condition an option such as [imperative control] and to the left again [regulatory],. as in Turner (1973). The terms of the systems are intended ·to represent options in linguistic behaviour, as seen 'in a social perspective', to quote Halliday's chapter heading (1973: 48). The suggestion is that the selection of a set of terms in a network such as this would determine what options were selected in the functional components networks, just as these determine their formal and phonological realisations.

Suggested realisations, if the options whose numbers are given below are co-selected:

123   I'll smack you
124   Daddy will smack you
25   You'll get smacked

Note: there is a parallel network concerning conditions, which will give realisations such as If you do that again....

Figure 2: part of a simple social semiotic network, from Halliday (1973: 89)

In taking this position, one is claiming that one can in principle predict from a network such as that shown in Figure 2 what the realisation will be. Some examples of the results of certain co-selections are given. The numbers on the network and preceding the suggested realisations indicate which co-selections lead to which realisations.

3.2 Five reasons why social semiotic networks are not a level of language

There are five characteristics of this type of network that I want to draw attention to, each of which indicates that we are not concerned here with a level of language.

The first is that though the options to the right of the network are ones that must be mediated through language, the more highly generalised terms to the left of the system are less clearly subject to this limitation. The architypal threat is, perhaps, the raised fist. Clearly, this is not a kinesic surrogate for a speech act (as a nod may be for Yes). The concept of 'threat' illustrates the highly significant fact that the behavioural options being modelled here are, at least in part, ones that can be mediated through other codes than language.

Surprisingly, perhaps, this point is not at issue, since this characteristic of the network is recognised by both Halliday and Turner. Turner (1973: 151) writes, for example, that he 'could have constructed a behaviour potential to cover non-verbal as well as verbal strategies'. The corollary of this, however, is that these 'behaviour potential' networks are of the same order as those for non-verbal strategies. If this is so, we must go on to ask in what sense these networks can properly be viewed as a level of language. This, it seems to me, presents a difficulty for Halliday's model.

Secondly, consider how the verb smack comes to be selected. The option which it realises is physical punishment. Clearly, the verb smack is only one of a very large number that might have been selected instead. How does Halliday say that a performer may come to select this item? The answer is given in terms of a model in which Roget's Thesaurus exemplifies the way the lexicon may be stored, and smack is seen as being selected (p.86) 'from a lexical set expressing "punishment by physical violence", roughly that of '§972 PUNISHMENT'. But notice that we have jumped a level: this is a model of the lexicon, i.e. of the options in lexical meaning from which we select in parallel with the options that will be realised in syntax. In other words, the suggestion is that the meaning realised in the verb smack cannot be predicted in the social semiotic network (though Halliday suggests on the same page that a good many of the other semantic options, such as the transitivity type, can). Here, then, the network fails to complete the job which the label 'semantics' implies that it should do.

However, one might seek to counter this criticism by suggesting that, in a complete social semiotic network, the

meanings realised in Roget's verbs expressing 'punishment' would be spelled out in full. But if one did, one would be introducing here, at the social semiotic level, precisely the same set of relationships that one will need again later, at what Halliday calls the 'lexico-grammatical' level (the semantics in Fawcett and Halliday Mark II). If the selection of smack is an option in the social semiotic (which I doubt) it is odd to have to specify precisely the same set of options at a later stage in the generation of the sentence. If this is 'pre-selection' (cp. p.93) there is going to be an uncomfortably large amount of it in the total model. One must ask: does such a high degree of redundancy seem plausible? We expect some, since human beings are not perfect machines, but is it likely that the human mind would put up with such gross inefficiency?

Next, consider the choice between [agency specified] and [agency unspecified]. As in the case where 'smack' is selected in the social semiotic, there will be a precisely similar option in the semantic stratum. In the case of 'smack', it was a lexical choice; in this case it is a choice realised syntactically. Here too a model which specified the same option at two levels would appear to be an inordinately uneconomical model. It might nonetheless be correct, of course, but one should at least take a sceptical stance towards such proposals, and ask: Are the two levels really necessary?

Thirdly, notice that the network is, in Halliday's terms (p.76) 'open-ended in delicacy'. For example, compare the option [by speaker], which may be said to be 'terminal', with the option [by other], which is not. The network is open-ended at this point in the sense that we may envisage a further network of options as to who the 'other' might be. The realisations of this network might be (besides Daddy) Auntie or your grandfather or even perhaps the man with the straw-coloured hair who it belongs to. A crucial aspect of Halliday's concept of delicacy is (p.76) that 'we can stop [adding further specification] at the point where any further move in delicacy is of no interest'. There is a serious problem here, however. Although it is true that the investigator who is analysing the data can stop wherever it suits him, this is not the case if the network is envisaged as part of a generative grammar - or indeed as part of a flow chart of options selected by a speaker in producing a sentence. In both cases one must specify to the full extent of the network. In other words, if one constructs a generative grammar using system networks in the functional components, so that realisation rules specify the acceptable strings at the level of form, the concept of delicacy cannot be interpreted in a sense that allows one to stop where one wants. The reason is that when one tries to build a generative grammar in a systemic framework, it tends to be the most delicate features in the network that have realisations. (The less delicate options tend to serve as conditioning environments for other options.) Dick Hudson, the author of by far the most complex generative systemic grammar (1971), has had to make the same modification to the original formulation of the notion of delicacy (private communication). It therefore

seems certain that any network that is 'open-ended in delicacy' is modelling something very much less specific than a language system.

Then what is being modelled? The best route to an answer lies in asking: what are the criteria which are used in setting up this sort of contrast? The answer seems to be that the criteria reflect the hypotheses that result from the concerns of a particular sociological theory. Even if the hypotheses were to be proved to be an aspect of a language user's psychological reality, it would still not necessarily follow that the resulting network coincided with the semantics of the language, which I take to be definable as the set of options in meaning potential that is built into the organisation of the language. For example, the implication in this network is that the main distinction between possible agents is that between the performer and any other person. In another approach, the distinction might be between [parent] and [non-parent].

To summarise the argument up to this point, we may say that it is beginning to look as if the options in networks of this type are of two sorts: either they are essentially the same as semantic options, and so introduce an undesirable and unjustifiable amount of inefficiency into the model, or they are determined by extra-linguistic phenomena, such as might be characterised as 'distinctions in social role which are significant in the culture being investigated'. Such distinctions, of course, are not necessarily reflected in the language.

Fourthly, notice that all the examples of realisations that are offered are sentences (or, if I may offer an un-Chomskyan gloss for the term, potential speech acts). If this network is to be regarded as a network at the semantic level, it is a rankless semantics. The problem with a one-unit syntax is that all the intra-sential syntactic complexity of language must be handled in terms of paradigmatic relationships relevant to that one unit. Such a model is in principal possible; it could for example handle an infinite number of sentences by incorporating recursive devices such as that illustrated in Halliday (1973: 81-2), so that it could be 'generative' in Chomsky's full sense. However, although it may in the last resort be possible to model language in this way, it has at least one great failing as a model. This is that models should capture generalisations. We fail to do this if we say that a language consists of a set of options in behaviour that are realised as sentences, since such a model would miss the fact that it can achieve economy by recognising elements that recur within each sentence, such as are realised as clauses and nominal groups. The model that I propose seeks to capture these generalisations through the notions of referent-things as elements of referent-situations: see Fawcett (1973 a and b). Whether or not this is the optimal solution, it is clear that something important is missed if we set all possible sentences in a paradigmatic relationship to each other.

These four points seem to me to constitute good grounds
for querying whether Halliday's and Turner's social semiotic
networks really are in any sense a linguistic level. It is
therefore important to realise that Halliday develops the model
described here in a spirit of tentative exploration; indeed
the book is entitled Explorations in the functions of language.
Turner's approach is equally undogmatic. Halliday admits
(p.92) that 'the example chosen - the language used by a mother
to regulate her child's behaviour - was a favourable instance'.

However, he then goes on to point out that 'we would
not be able to construct a socio-semiotic framework for highly
intellectual abstract discourse'. And later he adds: 'of the
total amount of speech by educated adults in a complex society,
only a small proportion [my emphasis] would be accessible to
this approach'. If this is the case, it is surely evidence of
a more compelling nature than any I have offered so far that
the social semiotic networks are not a level of language. If
it really is the case that most speech by educated adults in a
complex society is not accessible to this approach, we are
left with an impoverished model for most of language use: a
model of language without a 'semantics'. Can it really be the
case that some language is to be explained in terms of semantic
options and some not (ignoring formulas)?

Let me summarise the five points:

1. The options to the left of the networks do not
   all need to be mediated though language.

2. Some of the more delicate options to the right
   of the networks are non-terminal, so that the
   network cannot function as a fully explicitly
   generative device.

3. Others of the more delicate options duplicate
   options that clearly belong in the semantics
   (or 'lexico-grammar'), resulting in a disturbing
   degree of redundancy in the overall model.

4. The networks only relate to whole sentences, and
   so fail to recognise any internal structure at
   this level.

5. Such networks can in any case only deal with the
   linguistic potential in certain fairly narrowly
   circumscribed types of encounters - and even
   then, only with the limitations indicated in 2.
   above.

Even if only one of these points were accepted, one should
surely hesitate before accepting the social semiotic net-
works as a level in a generative model of language.

Yet it is at the same time clear that such networks
do capture something that is close to some aspect of psycho-
logical reality. The representation of my model in Figure 1
indicates in very broad terms what I think it is, but clearly
a fuller treatment is necessary to discuss the ideas outlined

at the end of Part 2 of this paper. What does seem clear to me, and to be worth emphasising, is that though Halliday and Turner have through their work begun the process of extending our understanding of how we use our language, it is nonetheless fully justifiable for a linguist to limit his area of study to the code itself, with its three levels of semantics (in the sense of the functional component networks) form and phonology.

<div style="text-align:center">

Robin Fawcett
West Midlands College of
Education, Walsall.

</div>

References

BERNSTEIN, B. (ed), 1973, Class, codes and control: Vol II, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

BERRY, H.M., forthcoming, An introduction to systemic linguistics: Vol II Levels and links, London: Batsford.

CANDLIN, C.N. (ed), to appear in 1975, The communicative teaching of English, London: Longman.

FAWCETT, ROBIN P., 1973a, 'Systemic functional grammar in a cognitive model of language', University College London. Mimeo.

FAWCETT, ROBIN P., 1973b, 'Generating a sentence in systemic functional grammar'. University College, London. Mimeo.

FAWCETT, ROBIN P., 1974, 'Some proposals for systemic syntax: an iconoclastic approach to Scale and Category grammar, Part 1', in M.A.L.S. Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (publ. Shenstone New College, Bromsgrove, Worcs.)

FAWCETT, ROBIN P., to appear in 1975, 'Two concepts of function in a cognitive model of communication', in Candlin (ed), to appear in 1975.

HALLIDAY, M.A.K., 'Categories of the theory of grammar', in Word, Vol. 17, No. 3.

HALLIDAY, M.A.K., 1969/73, 'Relevant models of language' in Educational Review 22.1 and in Halliday, 1973.

HALLIDAY,M.A.K., 1970, 'Language structure and language function', in Lyons (ed), 1970.

HALLIDAY, M.A.K., 1973, Explorations in the functions of language, London: Edward Arnold.

HALLIDAY, M.A.K., 1974, 'A sociosemiotic perspective on language development', in Bulletin of SOAS, 37.1 (In Memory of Wilfred Whitely).

HALLIDAY, M.A.K., to appear, 'Text as semantic choice in
social contexts', in Van Dijk and Petrofi (eds), to
appear.

HALLIDAY, M.A.K., McINTOSH, A., and STREVENS, P. 1964, The
linguistic sciences and language teaching, London:
Longman.

HUDSON, R.A., 1971, English complex sentences - an intro-
duction to systemic grammar, Amsterdam: North Holland.

LAMB, S.M., 1966, Outline of stratificational grammar,
Washington: Georgetown U. Press.

LYONS, JOHN, 1970, New horizons in linguistics,
Harmondsworth: Penguin.

TURNER, GEOFFREY, 1973, 'Social class and children's
language of control at age five and age seven',
in Bernstein, B. (ed), 1973.

VAN DIJK, T.A. and PETROFI, J.S. (eds), to appear,
Grammars and descriptions, publ.

WINOGRAD, TERRY, 1972, Understanding natural language,
Edinburgh: the University Press.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF RESTRICTED AND ELABORATED CODES.

In a number of recent papers Bernstein has discussed in some detail the relationships of social roles with linguistic codes and with syntactic and semantic choices.

The concept code "refers to the principle which regulates the selection and organisation of speech events. The two codes, restricted and elaborated, are "likely to be a realisation of different social structures" (Bernstein 1972). In particular, an elaborated code is associated with an 'open' communication system, with a range of role discretion; while a restricted code is associated with a 'closed' communication system, with assigned roles. The codes, in turn, "create for their speakers different orders of relevance and relation".

In Bernstein (1972) the codes are defined "in terms of the relative ease or difficulty of predicting the syntactic alternatives which speakers take up to organise meanings". However, because of the difficulties involved in giving quantitative meaning to 'predictability', because syntactic as well as lexical choices vary greatly with context, and because there is no simple one-to-one equivalence between syntax and meaning, Bernstein has chosen, in later work, to examine the codes in terms of the orders of meaning themselves.

In Tables 1 and 2 are tabulated quotations from Bernstein's recent work (1972, 1974), which summarise some essential features of the codes. Given the plethora of terms used to contrast the two coes, one is left wondering just how many distinct dimensions can be dissected out, on which the codes could be said to differ. It is clear that all the dimensions discussed by Bernstein are closely related. The tables given here represent an attempt to arrange the pseudo-dimensions into some sort of meaningful grouping. The communalised/individualised distinction is surely the basic one; but the particularistic/universalistic opposition is closely related to it.

Bernstein states (1970a and b, 1974) that the socialisation of the child, initially in the family, occurs within a range of critical contexts. A development of the work of Halliday (1969) led to the identification of four such critical contexts: the regulative, concerned with authority relationships and the rules of the moral order; the instructional, concerned with the objective nature of things and persons, and the acquisition of skills; the imaginative, concerned with experimentation and the re-creation of the world in the child's own way; and the interpersonal, concerned with affective states. Much of the recent work of the Bernstein group has been concerned with the regulative context, in view of the expected important effects of social control on the language of the young child.

Bernstein has distinguished (1972) between imperative modes of control, and control based on appeals. The imperative mode "reduces the role discretion accorded to the regulated (child)". We are not surprised then, to read that "the imperative mode is realised through a restricted code".

Appeals are "modes of control where the regulator is accorded varying degrees of discretion in the sense that a range of alternatives, essentially linguistic, are available to him". Appeals are subdivided into two types: positional and personal. In Table 3 are tabulated some quotations from Bernstein (1972), giving the characteristics of positional and personal appeals. The similarity between the characteristics of positional appeals and restricted codes, also between personal appeals and elaborated codes, is striking. Despite this, however, Bernstein makes quite clear his belief that "positional appeals can be given in restricted or elaborated codes", and that the "distinctive linguistic variant" realising a personal appeal "again can be within restricted or elaborated codes". These statements would seem to require a clearer explanation than is to be found in the four papers cited. Certainly all the evidence presented in tabular form here tends to force the view that personal appeals are, at least in the communalised/individualised dimension, strongly suggestive of code elaboration, while positional appeals suggest the communalisation which is the very basis of code restriction.

It is true that, as Bernstein points out (1974), a rule can be "individualised (fitted to the local circumstances) in the process of its transmission." Bernstein calls this 'contextual specificity'. Instances could be imagined, where a basically positional appeal is given, but is made, in Bernstein's terms, more specific, in terms of the addressee and the circumstances. In such a case, we appear to be in a stage intermediate between positional and personal appeals. Indeed, Bernstein says that such increases in 'contextual specificity' would be expected to accompany code elaboration, a statement which fully agrees with the views put forward here. We would suggest, then, that 'contextual specificity' represents an intermediate stage between positional and personal orientations, and is for this reason an indication of code indeterminacy or even code switching.

A note on Bernstein's use of the terms 'contextual specificity' and 'context-specific' may be appropriate here. In discussing the regulative context, as above (1974), Bernstein uses these terms to indicate that the speaker "cuts his meanings to the specific attributes/intentions of the socialised, the specific characteristics of the problem, the specific requirements of the context". It is rather confusing, therefore, to find the same family of terms used in a rather different sense elsewhere, without any explicit comment on their ambivalence. When Bernstein says that a restricted code user will in some contexts use a range of linguistic options, but that "where such choices are made they will be highly 'context-specific', he surely means that the choices will be restricted to particular contexts, but

will be infrequent in most contexts. The 'contextual speci-
ficity' which can attach to rule-giving is <u>planned</u> (at
whatever level of consciousness), while the kind shown by an
essentially restricted code user in particular contexts
surely arises from the person's <u>inability</u> to use elaborated
codes in most contexts.

If we accept that positional appeals are more likely
to be associated with a restricted code, and personal appeals
with an elaborated code, then we must also re-examine
Bernstein's distinction between 'object' and 'person' modes
of restricted and elaborated codes. In Bernstein's view (1972)
"we need to distinguish between two basic orders of meaning,
one which refers to inter-personal and intra-personal rela-
tionships, and one which refers to relationships between
objects; thus object meanings and person meanings". These
two modes are said to occur within both elaborated and res-
tricted codes.

Bernstein himself (1972) associates positional controls
with the object mode, and personal controls with the person
mode. Since Bernstein believes that positional <u>or</u> personal
controls can occur within either elaborate <u>or</u> restricted codes,
he is able to distinguish four categories, corresponding to
the quadrants of the following diagram:

<div style="text-align:center">

Restricted

OBJECT   PERSON

Positional   Personal
controls   controls

OBJECT   PERSON

Elaborated

</div>

We have argued, however, that positional controls will tend
to be associated with a restricted code, while personal
controls will be associated more with an elaborated code. In
this case, the orthogonal representation above is invalid,
since the dimensions are by no means independent. We are led
to the conclusion that positional families, using mainly a
restricted code, will tend to concentrate more on the object
'mode', while personal families, using mainly an elaborated
code, any work largely within the person 'mode'. In
connection with the association of code restriction with the
object 'mode', it is noteworthy that, as Bernstein points out
(1972), "persons, if they are treated in their status capacity,
can be likened to objects".

In conclusion, we may make the following suggestions.
The essence of the elaborated code lies in the overriding
importance it attaches to the person as an individual,
interacting with other individuals in a social network. A
restricted code, on the other hand, is characterised by the
subjugation of individual qualities, and the highlighting of
those features which confer or maintain group membership.

The emphasis placed, in a restricted code, upon common assumptions, expectations and background, makes the explicit formulation of principle and operations redundant. On the other hand, an elaborated code user, recognising a differentiated rather than a communalised 'other', must make his meanings explicit, in the realisation that his hearer may possess a background, opinions and assumptions quite different from his own.

In the context of social control, we may recognise several basic types of strategy, which form a cline on the dimension of the role discretion afforded to the regulated person. At one end of the cline, we have imperative control, where little role discretion is allowed, and at the other end, we have personal appeals, where reference is made to the individual qualities and feelings of persons in the situation. B tween these two extremes, we have positional appeals, which can be modified in the more 'personal' direction by making them specific to the situation. We should expect a person confined to a restricted code to use predominantly (though, of course, not exclusively) the strategies towards the imperative end of the cline, while an elaborated code user would be expected to make greater (though not exclusive) use of strategies towards the personal appeal end of the cline.

Christopher Butler
School of English Studies
University of Nottingham.

References

* BERNSTEIN, B.B. (1970a) 'A critique of the concept of 'compensatory education'', in Rubinstein, D. and Stoneman, C. (eds.) Education for Democracy, London: Penguin Books, 110-121.

BERNSTEIN, B.B. (1970b) 'Education cannot compensate for society', New Society, 26 February, 344-347.

* BERNSTEIN, B.B. (1972) 'A socio-linguistic approach to socialization: with some reference to educability', in Gumperz, J. and Hymes, D. (eds.) Directions in Sociolinguistics, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 465-497

* BERNSTEIN, B.B. (1974) 'Social class, language and socialization', in Abramson, A.S. et al. (eds.) Current Trends in Linguistics Vol. 12, 1545-1562

HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1969) 'Relevant models of language'. Educational Review, 22(1), 26-37.

* These articles are most readily available in Class, Codes and Control, Vol. I: Theoretical Studies towards a Sociology of Language, ed. Bernstein, B. London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1971 (also reprinted in Paladin paperback).

Table 1

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF RESTRICTED AND ELABORATED CODES
(from Bernstein (1972) pp. 168-170 of Paladin paperback edition
of Class, Codes and Control, Vol. 1)

DIMENSIONS POSTULATED	Q U O T A T I O N
SYNTACTIC FLEXIBILITY/ RIGIDITY	"If it is difficult to predict across a representative range the syntactic options or alternatives taken up in the organisation of speech, this form of speech will be called an elaborated code. In the case of an elaborated code, the speaker will select from a wide range of syntactic alternatives and these will be flexibly organised. A restricted code is one where it is much less difficult to predict, across a representative range, the syntactic alternatives, as these will be drawn from a narrow range. Whereas there is flexibility in the use of alternatives in an elaborated code, in the case of a restricted code the syntactic organisation is marked by rigidity."
COMMUNALISED/ INDIVIDUAL-ISED	"A restricted code will arise where the form of the social relation is based upon closely shared identifications, upon an extensive range of shared expectations, upon a range of common assumptions. Thus a restricted code emerges where the culture or subculture raises the 'we' above the 'I'." "An elaborated code will arise wherever the culture or subculture emphasises the 'I' over the 'we'. It will arise wherever the intent of the other person cannot be taken for granted." "If an elaborated code creates the possibility for the transmission of individual symbols, then a restricted code creates the possibility for the transmission of communalised symbols."
STATUS ORIENTATION/ PERSON ORIENTATION	"...an elaborated code encourages the speaker to focus upon the experience of others, as different from his own. In the case of a restricted code, what is transmitted verbally usually refers to the other person in terms of a common group or status membership". "...restricted codes could be considered status or positional codes whereas elaborated codes are oriented to persons".

42

TABLE 2

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF RESTRICTED AND ELABORATED CODES

(from Bernstein (1974), pp.199-200 of
Paladin paperback edition of Class,
Codes and Control, Vol. I)

DIMENSIONS POSTULATED	QUOTATION
PARTICULARISTIC/ UNIVERSALISTIC	"Universalistic meanings are those in which principles and operations are made linguistically explicit, whereas particularistic orders of meaning are meanings in which principles and operation are relatively linguistically implicit" ".....elaborated codes orient their users towards universalistic meanings, whereas restricted codes orient, sensitise, their users to particularistic meanings".
CONTEXT BOUND/ LESS CONTEXT BOUND	"If orders of meaning are universalistic, then the meanings are less tied to a given context." "Where orders of meaning are particularistic, where principles are linguistically implicit, then such meanings are less context-independent and more context bound." "Where the meaning system is particularistic, much of the meaning is embedded in the context and may be restricted to those who share a similar contextual history. Where meanings are universalistic, they are in principle available to all because the principles and operations have been made explicit and so public".

TABLE 3

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF POSITIONAL AND PERSONAL APPEALS

(from Bernstein (1972) pp.181-184 of Paladin paper-
back edition of <u>Class, Codes and Control, Vol. I</u>)

TYPE OF APPEAL	QUOTATION
POSITIONAL	"Positional appeals refer to the behaviour of the regulated (child) to the norms which inhere in a particular or universal status. Positional appeals do not work through the verbal realisation of the personal attributes of the controllers (parents) or regulated (children)". "The essence of positional appeals is that in the process of learning the rule the child is explicitly linked to others who hold a similar universal or particular status. The rule is transmitted in such a way that the child is reminded of what he shares in common with others. Where control is positional the 'I' is subordinate to the 'we'." "Positional appeals transmit the culture or subculture in such a way as to increase the similarity of the regulated with others of his social group."
PERSONAL	"In these appeals the focus is upon the child as an individual rather than upon his formal status. Personal appeals take into account inter-personal or intra-personal components of the social relationship. They work very much at the level of individual intention, motive and disposition....." ".....where control is personal, the basis of control lies in linguistically elaborated and individualised meanings".
	".....the rules are assigned in positional control and achieved in personal control".

44

INDEX TO <u>NLC</u> 1 - 6: