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
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ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT

G.G. Corbett
University of Surrey

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the existence of a highly restricted movement rule which operates after agreement rules. Syntactic and semantic evidence is given, and the data are taken from Russian, French and English.

A frequent assumption in work on agreement, whether implicit or explicit, is that agreement operates within the smallest possible domain. Thus we assume subject-predicate agreement will operate in its smallest possible domain, the clause: that is, a predicate will agree with the subject of its own clause, rather than that of, say, a clause embedded below it. (One way this has been captured in transformational theory is by making subject-predicate agreement a cyclic rule.) Similarly, given that attributive agreement operates within the noun phrase (NP), in a complex NP we expect an adjective to agree with the noun in the NP immediately dominating it. Thus, in structure (1):



we expect the ADJ dominated by NP₃ to agree with the N similarly dominated, rather than, say, the N dominated by NP₁. A similar assumption is made in semantics: interpretation involves combining the meanings within constituents, beginning with the smallest constituents and working hierarchically to larger constituents. In the famous phrase:

(2) the pen of my aunt

'my' is interpreted as referring to 'aunt' rather than to 'pen'. With these assumptions in mind let us turn to data which appear to be inconsistent with them.

Russian

Most Russian numerals, when in the nominative (or accusative identical to the nominative), are followed by a noun in the genitive plural. Modifiers preceding the phrase stand in the nominative or accusative plural, while those immediately preceding the noun stand in the genitive plural.

For example:

- (3) èti pjat' xorošix stolov
 (nom.pl.) (nom.) (gen.pl.) (gen.pl.)
 these five good tables

The phrases of particular interest have the following form:


- (4) celyx pjat' časov
 (gen.pl.) (nom.) (gen.pl.)
 whole five hours

The most common alternatives to celyx in these phrases are dobryx 'good' and polnyx 'full'. We would expect the preceding modifier in (4) to be in the nominative, yet it stands in the genitive.

Any explanation of this apparent anomaly will depend on the postulation of a plausible structure for quantified expressions. The most promising suggestion is that of Perlmutter and Orešnik (1973:448-457): a structure consisting of two NPs, the second marked as genitive. It has been argued elsewhere (Corbett, 1978c:359-362) that a more general account of quantified expressions can be given if the genitive marker is not assumed to be present in underlying structure. The main reason is the considerable differences which exist between and within languages as to whether a genitive is required or not. For example:

- (5) Danish: et glas vand
cf (6) a glass of water
 (7) pjat' stolov (gen.pl.)
cf. (8) five tables


We therefore postulate a simpler underlying structure (9) for numeral phrases, and a rule of genitive insertion which operates on NP₃ under specified conditions, the specification varying from language to language:



The main factors which determine the applicability of genitive insertion in Russian are the 'nouniness' of the numeral and the case of the expression. The higher, nounier numerals (like million) always require genitive

insertion, whilst lower, less nouny numerals (like pjat') require genitive insertion only when they stand in the direct cases. (In the oblique cases numeral and noun stand in the same case: these forms would be difficult to generate if the NP₃ were already marked as genitive as proposed by Perlmutter and Orešnik.)

The derivation of phrases like (7) is now possible: pjat' is dominated by NP₂, stol- by NP₃, the conditions for genitive insertion are fulfilled, NP₃ is marked as genitive, and, after pruning of redundant nodes, phrase (7) results. The node immediately dominating pjat' is a problem: pjat' shows some features of adjectival behaviour, some of noun-like behaviour. As the treatment of such 'squishy' elements has received little attention we shall tentatively label such a node ADJ/N. If we now turn to the fuller phrase given as (3) the following underlying structure is postulated:



Genitive insertion will apply, labelling NP₃ [+gen] and both adjective and noun will take this feature. The adjective will further agree with its noun in number. However, the agreement of èti is more difficult. Clearly it will agree with NP₁ in case. While we might assume NP₁ would be marked [+pl]¹ this seems unlikely as numeral phrases do not necessarily take plural predicate agreement. It seems therefore that the head noun of the NP provides the necessary agreement feature. Pjat' cannot provide this feature - it is not specified for gender or number - therefore the N in NP₃ is scanned. This must occur before genitive insertion³ operates. (In other Slavonic languages, for example Serbo-Croat, the opposite rule-order obtains. See Corbett, 1978a:10.) The rule-order must be:

1. attributive agreement: xoroš^v - marked as [+pl], èt- also marked [+pl] after scanning for a noun in the NP;
2. genitive insertion (marking NP₃).



This mechanism enables us to account for:

(11) = (3) èti pjat' xorošix stolov
 (nom.pl.) (nom.) (gen.pl.) (gen.pl.)
 these five good tables

It cannot, however, cope with:

(12) = (4) celyx pjat' časov
 (gen.pl.) (nom.) (gen.pl.)
 whole five hours

The solution suggested is a rule which moves the adjective celyx after it has obtained the features of number and case. The operation of the rule is indicated below.



This rule, which we will call ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT, allows us to maintain the constraints on agreement rules which we assumed to be valid.

There is further evidence to support it. Though this is less usual, the adjective may remain in the postulated underlying position:

- (15) \check{S} est' polnyx raz
 (acc.) (gen.pl.) (gen.pl.)
 six full times
 (Solženicyn)


Both positions may, exceptionally, be occupied at once:

- (16) celyx dva polnyx kodeksa
 (gen.pl.) (nom.) (gen.pl.) (gen.sing.)
 whole two full codes
 (Solženicyn)

Perhaps the most convincing example is the following:

- (17) te poslednix tridcat' metrov
 (nom.pl.) (gen.pl.) (nom.) (gen.pl.)
 those last thirty metres
 (Simonov, quoted by Gallis, 1947:72)

Here two modifiers appear before the numeral but in different cases. Te remains in its underlying position where it was marked as nominative while poslednix stood before the noun and gained a genitive marker before being moved. The structure of (17) may be represented as follows:



Before leaving the Russian data we should mention an alternative analysis. Crockett (1976:345-7) suggests that adjectives like celyx modify only the numerals rather than the whole phrase. It is difficult to see why they should therefore stand in the genitive rather than the case of the numeral modified. However, there is more concrete evidence which shows the proposal to be inadequate. It involves constructions with 'two', 'three' and 'four' in Russian. When they are themselves in the nominative (or accusative identical to the nominative) these require the

following noun to stand in the genitive singular (as in 16 above); this is a survival of the dual number. Adjectives modifying such a noun may stand in the nominative or genitive plural. Thus (19) and (20) are both grammatical:

- | | | | |
|------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| (19) | tri
(nom.) | svobodnye
(nom.pl.) | nedeli
(gen.sing.) |
| (20) | tri
(nom.) | svobodnyx
(gen.pl.) | nedeli
(gen.sing.) |
| | three | free | weeks |

As has been shown elsewhere (Corbett, 1978b:260-2) the difference between sentences like (19) and (20) is that in (20) genitive insertion has operated while in (19) it has not. Now if adjectives like celyx modify the numeral, then the case of the following adjective should have no effect and both (21) and (22) should be grammatical:

- | | | | | |
|------|---------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| (21) | *celyx
(gen.pl.) | tri
(nom.) | svobodnye
(nom.pl.) | nedeli
(gen.sing.) |
| (22) | celyx
(gen.pl.) | tri
(nom.) | svobodnyx
(gen.pl.) | nedeli
(gen.sing.) |
| | whole | three | free | weeks |

The fact that (21) is ungrammatical is sufficient to disprove Crockett's suggestion. In the movement analysis the ungrammaticality of (21) is expected: if genitive insertion has not occurred, then there is no way in which celyx could have acquired a genitive marker before movement. On the other hand, (23) is grammatical:

- | | | | | |
|------|--------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| (23) | celye
(nom.pl.) | tri
(nom.) | svobodnye
(nom.pl.) | nedeli
(gen.sing.) |
| | whole | three | free | weeks |

Here genitive insertion has not operated and so celye stands in the nominative.

We conclude that Russian provides good syntactic evidence for a rule of ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT, which allows us to maintain the constraints on agreement rules which we assumed to be valid. We now turn to French, which also provides good syntactic evidence for such a rule.

French

The French evidence concerns numeral phrases including mille 'thousand'. Mille takes masculine agreement:

- | | | | | |
|------|------------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
| (24) | vingt et un
(masc.) | mille | livres
(fem.) | de rente |
| | twenty-one | thousand | pounds | income |

(Grevisse, 1964:340)

Now consider:

(25) huit mille bonnes livres de rente
(fem.pl.) (fem.pl.)
eight thousand good pounds income
(Molière)

(26) vingt-deux bonnes mille livres de rente
(fem.pl.) (fem.pl.)
twenty-two good thousand pounds income
(Labiche, both quoted by Grevisse, 1964:322)

Example (25) is analogous to (15): the adjective stands before the noun and agrees with it, in this instance in number and gender. In (26) it stands before mille, yet still agrees with livres. We cannot claim that mille is masculine: as French has only two genders, masculine singular is the default agreement for unspecified elements and this is the agreement we find in (19). Clearly, however, in (26) bonnes does not agree with mille but with livres. The relationship between examples like (25) and those like (26) can be captured by a rule of ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT like that postulated for Russian. So far we have considered syntactic evidence; we now turn to English which provides semantic evidence for the rule of ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT.

English

It will be recalled that we made the assumption that semantic interpretation, like agreement, works within the smallest possible domain. Consider the phrase:

(27) a tasty bag of fish and chips

'tasty' is to be interpreted within the domain of an NP: either 'a tasty bag' or 'tasty fish and chips'. Normally, the second interpretation is the one required. If we are to maintain this position we must argue that in underlying structure 'tasty' is a constituent of NP₃ and that it is moved to NP₂ by ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT. The English rule applies to more adjectives than that of Russian or French. It is favoured with set expressions:

(28) a nice cup of tea

(29) ?a cup of nice tea

Here movement is almost obligatory whereas with a 'new' expression it is optional:

(30) an excellent cartload of spinach

(31) a cartload of excellent spinach

However, movement is restricted to qualitative adjectives; relational adjectives may not be moved:

- (32) *a China cup of tea (ungrammatical if 'China' refers to the tea)

The best evidence concerns phrases which are ambiguous depending on whether an adjective has been moved or not:

- (33) a real piece of Dundee cake (as opposed to the fake stuff they sell in supermarkets); 'real' has been moved.
- (34) a real piece of Dundee cake (as opposed to the miserable portion you usually get from Aunt Mary); no movement.

The evidence from English is solely semantic. Even if adjectives agreed in English it is unlikely that we would thereby gain extra syntactic evidence. Consider (35), the Russian equivalent of (28):

- | | | | |
|------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| (35) | vkusnaja | čaja | čaju |
| | (fem.sing.nom.) | (fem.sing.nom.) | (masc.sing.gen.) |
| | tasty | cup | of tea |

To maintain our semantic assumption we must claim that here too the adjective has been moved. Unlike the examples discussed previously, it agrees not with the head of the NP from which it was moved but with the head of its new NP. The reason for this difference in behaviour is not hard to find. Neither pjat' nor mille is fully specified syntactically: neither has gender or number. When an adjective which is fully specified for agreement is moved into the same NP, it retains these features. However, an adjective moving into the same NP as a noun which is fully specified syntactically is in complete 'disagreement' with its new head noun and so is made to agree with it. Having considered the mechanics of the rule, let us now consider why it should exist at all.

The motivation for ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT

The English examples above suggest that set expressions force the adjective to move. The more like a composite noun the expression is felt to be, the more likely adjective movement. Similarly, numeral and noun behave, in surface structure, like a single NP and the removal of internal adjectives is understandable. Thus part of the motivation seems to be the production of a desired surface structure with adjectives before their (composite) nouns.

Production of a desired surface structure alone is insufficient motivation; not all adjectives are moved. The type of adjectives involved suggests emphasis as a motivating

factor: the Russian dobryx, celyx, polnyx, and the French bonnes are purely emphatic, while the English adjectives most frequently moved tend to be emotive ones used for emphasis: real, proper, genuine, fantastic, etc.

This double motivation (production of a desired surface structure and bringing emphatic adjectives to a position of prominence) appears to be sufficient to account for the examples discussed.

Conclusion

It has been argued that we may maintain our assumptions about agreement and semantic interpretation, providing we postulate a rule of ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT. There is good evidence for such a rule and some indication as to its motivation. It is unusual in that it operates after agreement rules but, unlike scrambling, is sensitive to the category of the element moved and to the configuration into which it is moved. As it is such a late rule, its formulation does not depend on our assumptions as to the source of adjectives; indeed it seems likely that adjectives like celyj and vkusnyj have very different sources but the rule applies to both. The important thing here is that the postulated underlying orders are normally grammatical even if less natural. We are therefore justified in claiming that phrases which differ only in that in one ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT has applied while in the other it does not have essentially the same underlying structure (possibly differing only by the presence or absence of a marker for emphasis on the adjective). Our postulated rule does not therefore stand or fall on the way in which adjectives are originally introduced into NPs. Further speculation on the nature of ADJECTIVE MOVEMENT must await more data.³ Though the evidence presented is incomplete, it is claimed that it is sufficient to show that such a rule must be added to the list of 'possible rules', that the rule operates with the same motivation in different languages, and that it merits further research.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 The numeral tri and the feminine noun nedelja combine to give phrases like (19) and (20) a roughly equal frequency of occurrence. See Corbett (1978d:61-2) for statistics.
- 2 I am grateful to several informants for these data, especially to N. Bokov and A. Nakhimovsky for eliciting responses from their compatriots as well as giving their own judgements.
- 3 It may be that a similar rule accounts for the following Uzbek data (Sjoberg, 1963:140). Adjectives can be moved in front of /bir/ 'a', 'one' to emphasise them:

- (i) /bir qiz/
a girl
- (ii) /guzal bir qiz/
beautiful a girl (a very beautiful girl!)
- (iii) /bir mačit/
a mosque
- (iv) /katta bir mačit/
large a mosque (what a large mosque!)

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MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN - QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT SPEECH

Bruce Willis
Associate Professor of Linguistics
Speech Department, Luther College
Decorah, Iowa

At the present time the status of knowledge concerning language dysfunctions is based primarily on data from adults who have acquired language and subsequently lost a portion of it. It is readily observable that many of the people classified as mentally retarded also exhibit language dysfunctions. For a number of reasons the mentally disabled child has not often been the subject of linguistic research. There has been a need to conduct basic research with children to determine how a first language is acquired. There is a need also to determine how central processing dysfunctions can affect the acquisition of a first language in children. Much of the research which does compare normal and non-normal speakers acquiring language concludes that there is no distinct difference between the two groups when they are at the same stage or MLU. The findings of Freedman and Carpenter (1976) indicated that at the Stage I level of linguistic development (Brown, 1973) the language-impaired children demonstrated a linguistic system no different than the system of normal Stage I children. Duchan and Erickson (1976) concluded that there was no significant difference between the performance of retarded children with language disorders and normal children. In 1967 Eric Lenneberg made several strong claims about mentally retarded children:

'a comparison of language in retarded children with language development in normal children indicates that there is a natural language-learning strategy that cannot be altered by training programs. Language unfolds lawfully and in regular stages. Language progress in the retarded appears to be primarily controlled by their biological maturation and their development of organizational principles rather than intelligent insight. The pathologically lowered IQ of the retarded does not result in bizarre use of language but merely in 'frozen' but normal primitive language stages.' (Lenneberg, 1967:326).

The critical portions of Lenneberg's statement are first, the claim that mentally retarded children undergo a 'delayed' language development and have internalized a linguistic system which corresponds to a younger normal child, and second, that there is a developmental plateau beyond which these children do not progress. In the remainder of this paper I will discuss these two claims about the speech of the mentally retarded child.

The subjects used in this study were 110 noninstitutionalized children. All were classified as educable mentally retarded (having an IQ range of 50-80). The children were placed in

three chronological age (CA) groups (7 years, 9 years, and 11 years) with each age group subdivided into three IQ groups (50-59, 60-69, and 70-79). A summary of the subjects is found in Table 1. The children were all singleton caucasians and none demonstrated any clinically significant neuromuscular or structural deficits of the oral mechanism. The majority of the subjects came from families classified as upper-lower class by the Warner Index of Status Characteristics (1949).

CA	7 years		
IQ	50-59	60-69	70-79
males/females	9/2	7/4	7/4

CA	9 years		
IQ	50-59	60-69	70-79
males/females	8/7	7/4	5/7

CA	11 years		
IQ	50-59	60-69	70-79
males/females	5/5	8/7	9/5

Table 1. Summary of the Subjects

All of the children were tested within two months of their seventh, ninth, or eleventh birthday. The responses were elicited from the children by showing them pictures of situations which they were asked to tell about or to 'tell a story about the picture'. The pictures were colourful covers from the Saturday Evening Post magazine. Fifty to sixty of the child's spontaneous responses were tape recorded and later transcribed verbatim. Each language sample was transcribed by at least two listeners to ensure accuracy of transcription. The responses were transcribed consecutively when possible, but occasionally some responses were too unintelligible to record and were thus omitted.

The procedure used to analyze the syntax of the spontaneous speech of the children was that developed by Laura Lee in her 1974 book Developmental Sentence Analysis. Lee's

normative data is based upon the speech samples of two hundred children, five girls and five boys at each three month age interval between two years zero months and six years eleven months. All of the children were from monolingual homes where standard English was spoken. All except two were from middle-income homes, as judged by the father's occupation. Only the children who obtained IQ scores between 85 and 115 on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test were included in Lee's study. The analysis is designed to assess developmental progression in children's language by means of scoring eight grammatical categories. These categories are (1) indefinite pronouns, (2) personal pronouns, (3) main verbs, (4) secondary verbs (5) negatives, (6) conjunctions, (7) interrogative reversals, and (8) WH-questions. Weighted values within each of these categories make it possible to compare syntactic development not only in that category but also across categories. A developmental sentence score is obtained for each child by dividing the total number of points scored by the number of sentences in the sample. This score provides a measure of sentence complexity for each child and it represents the child's spontaneous use of grammatical rules at a particular time in a particular setting. Table 2 shows the norms for the children in Lee's study. (See end of article for remaining tables.)

The developmental sentence analysis was conducted on each language sample of the retarded children and a developmental sentence score was determined for each child. The mean of each of the three IQ ranges in each age group is presented in Table 3. A language delay can be estimated by using this chart. From the mentally retarded child's performance one extends a line horizontally to meet the 50th percentile line, and thus, determines that the child's performance was equivalent to the mean of another chronological age. In this study a mentally disabled child with an IQ in the 70's at age seven has a mean developmental sentence score of 5.99 which is equivalent to a normal child of three years three months. There is a delay of three years nine months. At age eleven a child with an IQ in the 70's has a mean developmental score of 6.68, equivalent to a child of approximately three years six months. The 'delay' in this case is seven years six months. It is to be noted that almost all of the means of the mentally retarded group correspond to the normative scale range of three to four years of age.

The question now arises as to how much alike is the speech of a younger normal child and older mentally disabled children. Lee has conducted exhaustive statistical analyses to determine the discriminating power among the eight grammatical categories. The most useful feature of the procedure is that it determined a rank order of the categories from the most discriminating between adjacent age levels to the least discriminating. For the two hundred subjects in Lee's study the rank order was: (1) main verbs, (2) conjunctions, (3) indefinite pronouns, (4) personal pronouns, (5) secondary verbs, (6) negatives, (7) WH-questions, and (8) interrogative

reversals. Tables 4, 5, and 6 depict a comparison of the component grammatical categories of the mentally disabled group to the same categories of normally developing children between the ages of three years zero months and three years eleven months. This is the age group to which the mentally retarded child was equated by the developmental sentence score. In comparing the three most discriminating categories of main verbs, conjunctions, and indefinite pronouns we note several differences. The mentally retarded child is consistently lower in the category of main verbs and with only one exception the mentally retarded child is lower in indefinite pronouns. In the conjunction category the mentally disabled group is consistently higher than the normal child, often more than doubling the percentage that this category contributes to the total developmental score. Thus, it appears that even though a mentally retarded child may have a developmental sentence score equivalent to a younger normal child, the internal factors which constitute that score exhibit significant differences in the syntax of the sentence. The retarded child was not embedding one idea inside another as effectively as normal children. They would string the ideas out alongside each other in a co-ordinate structure.

After reviewing the transcripts of the children it was apparent that the children were often remiss in their perceptions of the pictures. On the whole they did not perceive the nature of the conflicts represented. They would note and recognize particular objects in the pictures, but they were unable to relate those objects to each other, or to see that, taken as a whole, they depict a situation or emotion, or tell a story. To investigate this aspect of the speech of the retarded child an analysis of the semantic categories was conducted. The children in this study did not use semantic categories in the same manner or frequency as a normal child.

The semantic categories examined are those suggested by Roger Brown in his book A First Language. A brief explanation of some of these categories is necessary. The agent is someone or something, not necessarily animate, which is perceived as having its own motivating force and can cause an action or process. Actions generally involve perceived movement. The object is someone or something either suffering a change of state or simply receiving the force of an action. The locative is the place or locus of an action. An entity is anything having a distinct separate existence. Attribute serves to specify some feature of an entity which could be known from the class characteristics of the entity alone. Demonstrative includes words such as 'here', 'there', 'this', or 'that'.

In this study all of the items of multiple semantic relations used by each child were analyzed. These included two-term relations, three-term relations, four-term relations, two-term relations with an expanded noun phrase, and three-term relations with an expanded noun phrase.

These relationships are defined semantically and serial order is not necessarily implied with the order stated. Thus, the child might say either 'flat tire' or 'tire flat' and both would be counted as an occurrence of entity and attribute. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 7. In this table the prevalent semantic relations of two, three and four terms are expressed as percentages of the total multi-morpheme items. These percentages represent how the children in the study chose to tie together the semantic relations which they perceived in the pictures. I would like to focus attention on the two categories of three-term relations and two-term relations with an expanded noun phrase. In the discussion of the three-term relations Roger Brown suggests that it is 'as if' two or more of the elementary relations were concatenated with all repetitions of terms deleted. Thus a construction like 'dog chase rabbit' (agent, action, object) seems to have as its components 'dog chase' (agent, action) and 'chase rabbit' (action, object) with the repeated action 'chase' deleted once. Brown makes the general prediction that any child who produces some more complex construction will also produce the simpler component constructions into which it can be analyzed. The child producing agent, action, locative constructions should also produce both agent and action as well as action and locative forms. But the converse need not be the case; the components do not guarantee the composition. In the other complex constructions with a noun phrase expanded it is not as if relations were simply conjoined with deletion. It is rather as if one term itself unfolds as a two-term relation. For example, in the action and object construction 'pick up book' the object is represented in a maximally simple way by one word. In 'read my book' the object unfolds as itself a relation of possessor and possession. In this study a rather small set of semantic relations accounted for almost all of the utterances in the spontaneous speech of the 110 children. The set of simple relations combined in the same two ways; concatenation with deletion and expansion of one term.

Let us now compare these figures in Table 7 with information about the speech of normal children. Brown makes an important point about the two types of construction which involve more than a single elementary relation. He says,

'It is evident that three-term relations (dog chase rabbit) are on about the same level of difficulty as two-term relations in which one term is expanded (read my book). Most children who have constructions of the one kind also have constructions of the other kind, and the percentages tend to rise together through the course of development. It should be noted that both kinds of construction may be said to be composed of, or at any rate to express, just two elementary relations. This suggests that the effective complexity limit on the child's constructions may be stated in terms of the number of elementary relations he is able to program into a single sentence.' (Brown, 1973:183)

For the children in this study the constructions with embedding of one semantic relationship inside another (two-term with expanded noun phrase) were much less frequent than the linear arrangement of the same number of relationships (three-term relations). From the table we find that the total percentage for three-term expressions compared to the total percentage for the two-term with expanded noun phrase for each age and IQ group is as follows: 19.6/5.6; 23.5/5.4; 19.7/5.8; 15.9/6.5; 19.1/10.3; 17.6/12.4; 25.2/9.8; 18.4/8.4; 18.0/8.7. The data is consistent for all age groups and for all IQ ranges. The spontaneous speech of the retarded children seems to indicate that they do not view these two constructions as being equally complex. The children do use all of the two-term relations necessary for the more complex embedding, but they do not program these expanded noun phrase forms into their speech as frequently as normal children, if at all.

Is it possible that the retarded child will outgrow this stage of syntactic and semantic development and approach the usage of the normal child? This brings one to the second portion of Lenneberg's statement; that the retarded child has his grammar frozen at some normal primitive stage. To investigate this question five subjects in the educable mentally retarded category were tested annually for four years (ages seven, eight, nine, and ten). The same set of stimulus pictures was used each year. The mean Developmental Sentence Score for these children was calculated and is shown in Table 8. The lack of syntactic progress is obvious. In Lee's study across all age groupings normal children scored significantly higher on the important categories of main verb and conjunction at each successive age level. For example, the conjunction category percentage of total points scored (in one year intervals from age two to age seven) is 3.5, 6.1, 9.1, 13.4, and 18.4%. In the group of disabled children the percentage of the conjunction category to total points scored is 17.3, 14.6, 17.7, and 11.8% for the years shown. In the main verb category one of the children lost all agreement in the verb between testing at age seven and again at age ten. A detailed analysis of the longitudinal study cannot be presented in the space available here, but from the data one can see that the retarded child does indeed reach a plateau in development beyond which he does not progress. In fact, the group may regress under certain conditions. In any case, the speech of the retarded in this 'frozen' stage is unlike the normal child at any primitive stage.

The same semantic analysis was conducted on the speech samples of four of the children in the longitudinal study. The results are found in Table 9. It is again dramatically clear that the percentage of items found in three-term relations is much greater than the percentage of items in two-term relations with an expanded noun phrase. This is true for each child for all four years tested. The children have also reached some sort of a plateau in semantic

development in that they do not show noticeable change over this four year period. Note that the children fail to embed certain semantic relationships even though their spontaneous speech exhibits all of the relations necessary for these constructions. All of the children have examples of possessor and possession (my dog, her hat) as well as numerous examples of entity and attribute (yellow pencil, big dog), but only one of the children ever expressed the expanded form possessor and possession (my yellow pencil, her big dog). These same children did use three-term relations frequently however. The children have indeed reached a 'frozen' stage in Lenneberg's terms, but it is unlike the normal child's early development.

The findings of the study suggest that the mentally retarded child does not have an internalized linguistic processing system or systems which are equivalent to a younger normal child. The difference is not just quantity of language, there are also qualitative differences.

Some work has been done recently on neuroanatomy of the mentally retarded child. Dominick Purpura has demonstrated two types of dendritic spine abnormalities in retarded children: dendritic spine loss and the presence of very long, thin spines that resemble the developing spines of primitive neurons. The functional significance of these abnormalities is not known. It is reasonable to expect, however, that spine loss and alterations in the dendritic spine geometry exert significant effects on the integrative operations of the dendritic systems which act as receptor surfaces for synaptic input to cortical neurons. If this is indeed the case then it is not surprising that the non-normal speaking child may be forming hypotheses about the structure of the language which are different from those of the normal speaking population. These invalid hypotheses may lead not only to incorrect conclusions about the syntactic and semantic structures, but they may also be dead ends which are a deterrent to subsequent grammatical development. This abnormal dendritic spine development may possibly be an explanation for the apparent difference between the speech of retarded children and younger normal children. It could also offer a partial account for the apparent plateau these children reach in their linguistic development. Perhaps future research with mentally retarded children will be a fruitful area for the neurolinguist.

In closing, I would like to make a few general comments about the nature of this type of study. As many researchers have already pointed out, fifty utterances are restrictive in providing an adequate sample for language analysis. This type of sample may also be inadequate because of the limitations of the stimulus items and the method of presentation. For example, the number of negative sentences and WH-questions is very low. Responding to or reacting to pictures does not prompt these particular constructions in the child's speech. Many of the objects and situations illustrated in the stimulus pictures, although they are

recognizable to the children, were not true representations of the daily experiences of the children. The stimulus task of telling a story or interpreting a picture is not the same as a task which requires a child to relate to a more concrete occurrence which he or she has recently experienced, or as a task which requires the children to describe what they need or how they feel about something. The intensity of personal situations and involvement in stimulating verbal behaviour is certainly greater than that provided by colourful pictures. The advantage of the pictures is that they provided a controlled environment for the speech patterns expressed by the children. I also have reservations about the developmental scoring system but in order to make the comparisons valid Lee's procedure was followed in this study.




Table 2. Norms for Developmental Sentence Scoring (reweighted) [Lee, 1974]






Table 3. Comparison of Means of DSS scores of Mentally Disabled Children (N = 110)

IQ (70 - 79) ————— (60 - 69) - . - . - (50 - 59) -









 Normative Group IQ (50-59) IQ (60-69) IQ (70-79)

Table 6

Comparison of the Component Grammatical Categories in their Percentage of the DSS Score

[Age 11]




 Normative Group IQ (50-59) IQ (60-69) IQ (70-79)

IQ N	Age 7			Age 9			Age 11		
	50-59 12	60-69 11	70-79 12	50-59 13	60-69 11	70-79 13	50-59 11	60-69 15	70-79 14
Multi-Morpheme Items	489	629	662	603	694	896	752	1097	1030
Two-term relations									
Agent and action	12.9	15.7	14.4	17.2	13.8	12.3	11.8	13.7	11.1
Action and object	16.0	7.5	8.3	11.4	6.2	6.2	9.0	7.7	5.4
Agent and object	.4	.8	.1	.2	0	.6	.4	.3	.6
Action and locative	5.5	1.6	1.5	2.6	1.4	2.4	1.3	2.7	1.6
Entity and locative	3.0	3.5	3.2	3.5	2.9	3.0	4.5	3.9	5.8
Possessor and possession	2.6	4.5	6.3	4.5	6.6	4.7	5.3	5.6	6.3
Entity and attribute	9.6	9.4	10.0	9.1	11.8	11.4	9.4	9.6	12.2
Demonstrative and entity	11.4	9.8	8.9	10.1	9.0	11.6	7.6	9.1	10.2
Three-term relations									
Agent, action, and object	11.9	14.8	13.4	9.9	13.8	11.2	17.1	12.4	13.7
Agent, action, and locative	5.9	7.3	4.8	4.3	4.3	5.4	7.0	4.6	3.0
Agent, object, and locative	.2	.8	.3	.7	.3	.2	.4	.3	.1
Action, object, and locative	1.6	.6	1.2	1.0	.7	.8	.7	1.1	.8
Four-term relations									
Agent, action, object, and locative	1.8	3.3	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.8	4.1	1.6	2.0
Two Terms with NP Expanded									
Agent and action	1.2	1.1	1.1	2.2	2.3	2.8	1.6	2.3	1.6
Action and object	2.2	1.6	2.9	2.2	1.9	.7	1.2	2.1	.9
Agent and object	0	0	.1	0	.1	.1	0	0	.1
Action and locative	.4	.1	.1	.5	0	.6	.1	.4	.2
Entity and locative	1.4	2.0	1.1	.5	1.4	2.9	1.3	1.0	2.5
Possessor and possession	.2	0	.1	.2	.1	0	.3	0	0
Entity and attribute	.2	.1	.1	.3	.6	.1	.4	.3	.5
Demonstrative and entity	0	.5	.3	.6	1.4	2.4	.8	.7	.9
Three Terms with NP Expanded									
Agent, action, and object	2.6	4.1	5.3	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.1	3.5	3.4
Agent, action, and locative	0	1.0	.1	0	.6	.3	.5	.7	.5
Agent, action, and object	.6	.8	1.2	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.6	2.4	2.1
Other two-term relations with low frequency									
Benefactive	0	.1	0	0	0	.1	.3	0	.3
Indirect object dative	1.0	.6	1.4	.8	.7	1.7	1.2	1.0	1.4
Experiencer or person affected dative	1.4	3.0	3.6	1.9	4.4	2.2	2.1	4.6	2.4
Comitative	.8	.8	1.4	.8	1.3	.9	.8	.6	.7
Conjunction	1.8	2.4	3.3	3.6	2.5	3.2	2.3	3.6	4.3
Classificatory	2.2	.8	1.1	1.2	1.6	2.0	1.5	2.0	2.7
Others	.6	.9	1.4	2.0	2.0	1.3	1.0	1.8	1.9

Table 7. Prevalent semantic relations of two, three and four terms expressed as a percentage of the total multi-morpheme items




Table 8. Means of Four Year DSS scores of one group of Mentally Disabled Children (N = 5)

Longitudinal Group (Mean IQ = 70.8)

	Child I (IQ 53)				Child II (IQ 73)				Child III (IQ 76)				Child IV (IQ 79)			
	Age 7	8	9	10	7	8	9	10	7	8	9	10	7	8	9	10
Multi-Morpheme Items	77	74	71	91	52	47	62	70	58	101	77	66	54	53	55	54
Two-term relations																
Agent and action	14.3	13.5	5.6	9.9	19.2	19.1	16.1	11.4	15.5	10.9	18.2	9.1	18.5	34.0	16.4	9.3
Action and object	14.3	4.0	4.2	2.2	9.6	10.6	1.6	2.9	3.4	1.0	2.6	4.5	0	1.9	5.5	5.6
Agent and object	0	0	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Action and locative	3.9	1.4	0	0	5.8	4.3	1.6	1.4	1.7	0	1.3	1.6	1.9	0	0	0
Entity and locative	2.6	2.7	1.4	1.1	0	8.5	8.4	1.4	5.2	5.9	6.5	3.0	3.2	1.9	3.6	7.4
Possessor and possession	3.9	5.4	9.9	3.3	0	2.1	4.8	2.9	0	5.9	2.6	4.5	7.4	5.7	5.5	9.9
Entity and attribute	6.5	5.4	18.3	24.7	7.7	17.0	14.5	18.6	10.3	24.8	11.7	4.5	14.8	11.3	9.1	18.5
Demonstrative and entity	3.9	6.8	4.2	9.9	3.8	10.6	8.4	15.7	22.4	5.9	5.2	15.2	0	0	3.6	5.6
Three-term relations																
Agent, action, and object	24.7	31.1	14.1	7.7	21.1	12.8	16.1	25.7	13.8	12.9	22.1	23.8	22.2	20.8	27.3	13.0
Agent, action, and locative	5.2	4.0	9.0	4.4	9.6	4.3	3.2	2.9	3.4	7.9	3.9	4.5	5.6	0	7.3	11.1
Agent, object, and locative	0	0	0	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Action, object, and locative	0	0	0	1.1	0	2.1	1.6	1.4	0	0	2.6	1.6	0	0	0	1.9
Four-term relations																
Agent, action, object, and locative	1.3	5.4	4.2	3.3	3.8	0	1.6	2.9	1.7	2.0	3.9	3.0	0	1.9	3.6	3.7
Two Terms with NP Expanded																
Agent and action	1.3	0	1.4	2.2	1.9	0	0	0	0	1.0	2.6	0	0	1.9	1.8	1.9
Action and object	0	0	1.4	0	1.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.0	3.7	1.9	3.6	1.9
Agent and object	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Action and locative	0	0	0	0	1.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Entity and locative	0	1.4	0	4.4	0	2.1	1.6	2.9	6.9	1.0	1.3	4.5	0	0	1.8	1.9
Possessor and possession	0	0	0	0	0	2.1	3.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Entity and attribute	0	0	0	1.1	3.8	0	1.6	1.4	0	1.0	0	0	0	3.8	0	0
Demonstrative and entity	1.3	0	0	5.5	0	0	4.8	4.3	0	0	0	0	1.9	0	0	0
Three Terms with NP Expanded																
Agent, action, and object	5.2	9.5	8.4	3.3	3.8	2.1	3.2	0	0	7.9	3.9	4.5	5.6	3.8	0	1.9
Agent, action, and locative	0	0	0	1.1	0	0	0	0	0	1.0	1.3	0	0	0	0	0
Agent, action, and object	2.6	0	1.4	6.6	0	2.1	0	0	3.4	3.0	1.3	0	3.7	0	3.6	3.7
Other two-term relations with low frequency																
Benefactive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3	0	0	0	0	0
Indirect object dative	1.3	0	0	0	1.9	0	0	1.4	0	0	1.3	1.6	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.9
Experiencer or person affected dative	2.6	5.4	2.8	0	0	0	3.2	1.4	1.7	0	3.9	0	1.9	1.9	0	1.9
Comitative	0	0	0	1.1	0	0	0	0	1.7	0	0	0	0	0	1.8	1.9
Conjunction	3.9	2.7	2.8	2.2	3.8	0	3.2	1.4	6.9	7.9	2.6	6.1	5.6	3.8	1.8	1.9
Classificatory	0	1.4	5.6	1.1	0	0	1.6	0	1.7	0	0	3.2	0	0	0	1.9
Others	1.3	0	2.8	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.9	0	1.8	1.9

Table 9. Longitudinal study of the semantic relations expressed as percentages of the total multi-morpheme items

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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POETRY AND CONVERSATION: AN ESSAY IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Ronald A. Carter
Department of English Studies
University of Nottingham

In this short article my main aim is to explore some of the possibilities available within a framework of discourse analysis for explaining effects produced by 'conversations' in poetry. The text I wish to devote particular attention to is a dialogic ballad by W.H. Auden, entitled 'Song V' in Collected Shorter Poems (1966:48) but more widely known as 'From Reader to Rider'. It will, I hope, be an interesting exercise since this is the kind of poem to which stylistic analysis is not normally applied. In performing this analysis I hope the following subsidiary purposes may be fulfilled: firstly, I want to suggest that, in tackling such poems, grammatical analysis is not always particularly useful; secondly, I hope to make out a case for all poems being in varying degrees interactive, and to suggest that analysis should therefore acknowledge appropriate contextualisations for the literary message.

After introducing the text, I include an account of my intuitions concerning the effects of the poem. This means that analysis starts from a subjective base of 'hunches' about the text. I feel this is only right and proper, and even though analysis is limited to and by those intuitions, it is at least, in my view, preferable to exhaustive and unfocussed unravelling of the text. As a poem, 'Song V' is both short and neat, and works in a specific tradition. Comments on its particular literary context will also be conjoined with the purely linguistic analysis.

Song V

'O where are you going?' said reader to rider,
'That valley is fatal when furnaces burn,
Yonder's the midden whose odours will madden,
That gap is the grave where the tall return.'

5 'O do you imagine,' said fearer to farer,
That dusk will delay on your path to the pass,
That diligent looking discover the lacking
Your footsteps feel from granite to grass?'

10 'O what was that bird,' said horror to hearer,
'Did you see that shape in the twisted trees?
Behind you swiftly the figure comes softly,
The spot on your skin is a shocking disease.'

'Out of this house' - said rider to reader,
'Yours never will' - said farer to fearer,
15 'They're looking for you' - said hearer to horror,
As he left them there, as he left them there.

My feelings about this poem are as follows. It is distinctly a 'conversation' poem with at least two speakers interacting within an 'inner context' or micro-conversation (though we should not forget that there is also a macro-conversation or 'outer context' operating between Auden and the reader). Within this exchange I feel the 'tone' of the dialogue is markedly fearful and unsettling. The response in each case sounds aggressive and threatening while the questioner seems somehow uncertain of his ground. Even though the exchange is short I sense too a struggle between the speakers for dominance. As someone overhearing the conversation, as it were, I am also unsettled by the lack of referential clarity; the speakers seem to know what is being referred to but to me the object of their talk is ambiguous. My intuitions are to some extent corroborated by a number of literary critics writing on the text. For example, Hoggart (1951:56) concludes an important effect of the poem to be that the reader should learn that 'the first positive step ... is not to give in to fear'; Spears (1963:57) sees the poem as 'a refusal of compromise and a call to action...', while Hynes (1976:94) infers that the poem offers the alternatives of 'a fearful action' or a 'frightened sick passiveness'. However, such impressions need to be converted into harder currency. Unfortunately, I do not believe grammar offers very much help in this instance.

Analysis of the poem's grammar reveals that as far as sentence and clause structure are concerned, 'grammetrics' plays a significant part. Indeed, the congruence of sentence and stanza structure is only matched by that of clause and line. In three of the four stanzas each line introduces a new main clause (and a new proposition) while in the remaining one (st. 3) the whole stanza is taken up with one main clause. In grammatical mood, too, there is a similarly neat pattern in the almost equal division between interrogatives and declaratives with the final stanza containing what appear to be replies to the interrogatives. For example:

'O where are you going?' said reader to rider, (st.1)
'Out of this house' said rider to reader, (st.4)

It might be worth recording here that at these levels at least the neatness of fit does not seem to go with the unevenness of the interaction.

But the verbal groups in the poem have a much more heterogeneous pattern. Most notable are the switches in tense from present (lines 1-2,4), future (line 3), present (line 5), future (lines 5-8), past (lines 9-10), present (lines 11-12) to, in the final stanza, a present tense followed in the final line by a simple past tense item ('As he left them there') which suggests an action completed, yet also curiously suspended in time. The 'reader', 'fearer', 'horror' figure(s) perceives an unknown threat in the immediate environment (I am here taking lines 9-10

to refer to a very recent past) that will somehow affect future action. The shuttling between future, a continuous present, a more 'permanent' or modal present (e.g. line 11; see Kress, 1977), a simple past and a past tense in the final line, which seems to frame a perpetually frozen action, lends some objective linguistic support to the confusion and uncertainty which the poem communicates. This kind of feeling may be explained further by recognising that within nominal group structure the deictics here are mostly exophoric, thus forcing the reader to imaginatively construct a situation for the action. Yet when it is seen that only minimal adverbial/prepositional information is provided concerning the time, manner (line 10) or place (line 3) for these occurrences, then it is clear that no real context for the referents is disclosed. In fact, it could be said that the questioner fears things but does not know how or why or where these fears will materialise. For the reader in the outer context, at one further remove from the action, the nature of the discourse is even more puzzling.

One feature of the poem, foregrounded by repetition, which has not been discussed so far, but which may contribute to some of the effects described above, is the manner of notation for the participants, that is 'reader'/'rider', 'fearer'/'farer', 'horror'/'hearer'. The absence of either modification or qualification of these key functional headwords, together with a suppression of articles, works to isolate these participants in two main expressive ways. Firstly, the self-standing nature of the headwords suggests a collective or generic (rather than individuated) speaker representing perhaps both a wider group and/or some universal characterising feature. As a result Auden might be seen to be polarizing moral or psychological positions in a process of formal disputation - a feature also characteristic of the ballad tradition.¹ More immediately striking, though, is a second sense that each stanza may contain a different interlocutor (i.e. the 'reader' changes to 'fearer' and then to 'horror') which raises the question of whether the nature of the interaction is changed in consequence. A solution to this may be to assume that only two participants are engaged in the exchange and that in the course of, and probably as a result of, the ensuing dialogue, the identity of the interlocutors is constantly shifting - almost as if two types in a community or, more extremely, two parts of the same personality were represented. In the ensuing discourse analysis of the text I shall thus presume a 'two-party conversation' and, for convenience, refer to the interlocutors as questioner (Q) and respondent (R) although the particular notions proposed by such tags may well prove to be inappropriate.

A grammar of the poem, though here necessarily somewhat truncated, helps to explain some things but it does not get very near to accounting for the kind of intuitions developed. To name but a single problematic feature: to

what extent do the neatly balanced interrogatives and declaratives actually communicate questions and statements? If the interaction is perceived to be unsettling or is felt to contain 'tones' of threat and assertion, then linguistic analysis has to go beyond the mere form of such features.

One of the most important functions of discourse analysis is to help us distinguish what is said from what is done, that is, from the actions performed with the words. It is perhaps worth quoting in this respect from an article by Labov (1972) in which he attempts to formulate rules which explain our ability to connect utterances in sequence by the functions they have. This may be particularly apposite in the case of this poem since, although it was remarked that the poem contains a sequence of question and answer/reply, this, in fact, does not account for the sense of threat and strangeness. Labov outlines the problem as follows:

A statement follows a question; the question is a request for information; but in what way does the statement form an answer to that request? ... In answering A's request for information Q-S₁ with a superficially unrelated statement S₂, B is in fact asserting that there is a proposition known to both A and B that connects this with S₁.

This is subsequently developed by Labov into the concept of 'shared knowledge':

Given any two-party conversation, there exists an understanding that there are events that A knows about, but B does not; and events that B knows about but A does not; and AB events that are known to both. We can then state simply the rules of interpretation:

If A makes a statement about a B-event, it is heard as a request for confirmation.

That is, if A talks about an A event it is not heard as a request; if A talks about a B event it is a request for confirmation; if A talks about an AB event a 'shared knowledge' is being drawn on.

To return to the poem 'Song V' the main problem is in explicating how the answers of the respondent (R) do not appear to follow in any rule-governed way from the questions put by Q. For example, the question from 'fearer' to 'farer':

O do you imagine ...
Your diligent looking (will) discover the lacking
Your footsteps feel from granite to grass?

is answered by:

Yours never will.

The latter is a statement which, except limitedly via the second person pronoun, does not in any real sense pick up cues from the questioner and use them in the formulation of an answer. In fact, the expected response to questions containing 'you' and 'your' would be those which preface the requested information with a personal 'I'. Here the propositions are, as it were, returned to the questioner in what may be intuitively felt to be a clipped and assertive manner. According to the framework suggested by Labov for connecting the actions being performed with words in initiation/response sequences, it is possible to account for this kind of interchange in terms of there being something known to both interlocutors. In other words, there is a 'shared knowledge' of an AB event(s), known to R and Q, which explains R's statements as sequential and coherent responses to Q's propositions. That is, to take a related example, the reply 'They're looking for you' (line 15), particularly with no reference for the third person plural pronoun, would appear an unconnected answer except in terms of discourse rules allowing reference to some knowledge shared by both participants.

However, there still remains the problem of our intuition that R returns Q's question in such a way that, whatever their shared knowledge, it can be felt to be threatening. One way of attempting to account for this is to concentrate attention on the 'questions' posed by Q. The term is placed in inverted commas because, although addressed to R, the propositions put forward do not always seem to function directly as questions. Firstly, some questions (e.g. lines 1 and 11) are not so much 'why' questions requesting information, as closed questions requiring only a yes/no or single phrase reply or, from another viewpoint, function rather as a regulator of behaviour than as an elicitation. If, as re-reading of the poem confirms, Q does not want R to leave, then the opening 'question' is more likely to be construed as an attempt to control the action or behaviour of R. Secondly, Q appears to answer his own questions and to allow no 'space' for R to reply. This is, of course, brought about primarily by the structure of the poem and its particular folk-song conventions but the effect is to reinforce the position of authority clearly claimed for himself by Q. Allowing no 'turns' to R until the end of the sequence puts the 'reader' in an authority structure and forces us to see his 'questions' as a series of power moves which enable him to hold the floor for as long as he requires (see Sacks et al, 1974, below).

How, then, might this handling of discourse structure be interpreted, particularly by R? If viewed in the context of the utterance preceding or subsequent to it, Q's questions would be felt to function more as declarations or assertions to which counter-assertion might be the only appropriate response. In themselves, particularly given Q's control of the exchange structure of the discourse, the questions would appear to be threats or particularly assertive challenges to R. Furthermore, if a 'shared

knowledge' of referents is assumed (note the repetition of 'that' with its deictic pointing to what might be taken to be recognisable to both participants²) then the questions become, as it were, requests for confirmation. Requests for confirmation or questions about what is already known suggest an initially dominant role for Q, but they also progressively reveal (it is a pattern characteristic of teachers talking to pupils, cf. Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975) a parallel 'tone' of unsettledness or uncertainty surrounding Q's actions.

The effect of this on R is to produce what are largely interpretable as counter-assertions. The force of R's 'replies' is given particular prominence on two or three main counts. Firstly, when R finally holds the floor he makes three separate utterances, allowing no 'turn' to Q. Three such statements in sequence can be felt to take on the function of a threat or, at the least, a challenge.³ Secondly, the increasing independence of R's successive replies needs to be noted. In other words, R's first reply 'Out of this house' is in more or less strict sequence with the opening question (and in one sense provides an assertive counter to any connotations of control of behaviour contained in the question). But the second and final 'reply', as noted previously, return the propositions to Q without any modification being advanced. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Q is allowed no re-initiation of the discourse. In any exchange structure there is, as shown by Sacks et al (1974) an accepted norm of the floor being returned to the questioner after the interlocutor has answered.⁴ This is broken here by R's action ('As he left them there'). It lends further support to the view of R gaining increasing ascendancy in the discourse over an increasingly uncertain Q - as well as providing some linguistic explanation for what has been described loosely as his assertive 'tone'.

This 'characterisation' of the participants is confirmed as the discourse proceeds, since the lexical items describing the 'reader' become more powerfully associated with fear (e.g. 'fearer', 'horror'), while those connected with 'R' or the 'rider' remain more consistent lexically. The alternation between confident assertion and increasing tentativeness in the interaction/discourse structure is reflected formally, too, by the alternating masculine and feminine end-rhymes (the latter with its unstressed, falling last syllable suggesting tentativeness), by the shifting identity of the speakers (especially Q), by the rhythmic organisation of the poem between rising and falling movement divided by a consistently placed caesura:

Behind you swiftly/the figure comes softly,
The spot on your skin/is a shocking disease.

And, finally, it is reflected by a pattern of lexical incongruity consisting of archaisms juxtaposed with contemporary usages and dialectisms which, together with the

switches in the poem's tense patterns, reinforces a sense of our not quite knowing what kind of order we are in. The impression of division, of a confused condition and of alternating viewpoints may also be compounded by the phonological similarities in the designation of the two speakers e.g. 'fearer' - 'farer', 'horror' - 'hearer' suggesting almost two aspects or slightly shifting parts of the same personality (hence the reference made by R to 'them').⁵

The 'final word' here seems to be left with 'R', the rider, who, in interaction with Q, is dominant in controlling and exploiting the rules of discourse to gain the ascendancy and issue something in the nature of a challenge to Q as he moves on. It is a feature of the interaction resources of the poem which, together with other similar effects, can only be explicated by analysis at the supra-sentential level although it is one which still requires greater refinements in discourse analysis to explain its total effect.

I hope to have shown here that it is difficult to speak of the style employed by Auden in this poem without drawing on work undertaken within discourse analysis. The framework of discourse analysis used here is neither sharply defined nor broad enough to categorise all aspects of the poem's structure. But it will, I hope, be clear that by drawing on the work of analysts such as Labov and Sacks, we can substantiate impressions which resist explanation within the grammatical model, such as tone and the 'style' of the conversational interchange. Of course, it can be pointed out that such overtly 'dialogue' poems are rare occurrences. Nonetheless, linguistic analysis has so far resisted the challenge offered by such poems; in fact, with the exception of Burton (1976, 1978) I know of no consistent attempt to undertake stylistic analysis of dialogue. Yet I do not want such an analysis to be restricted only to poems with this kind of overtly dialogic structure. It is my contention that all texts, to the extent that they are interactive, require analysis from within a dimension of discourse. In order to underline this point, I should, finally, like to take a brief look at another of Auden's poems. In so doing, I want to extend further the notion of contextualisation for the text, and adopt Widdowson's productive suggestions concerning the nature of the communication situation in literary artefacts.

Widdowson (1972, 1975) proposes the following 'dual-focus situation' as appropriate to literary discourse:

I ₁	I ₂	II ₂	II ₁
Sender	Addresser	Addressee	Receiver

He argues that in 'normal' communication sender and addresser, and addressee and receiver, are identical,

whereas in literary communication the two poles are separable. This is certainly borne out in the case of 'Song V' where Q and R inhabit an inner context of I₂/II₂ whose discourse is the subject of communication between Auden I₁ and the reader II₁. But can the same be said of 'Consider', which is not so markedly 'dual' in its context of situation?

Reasons of space permit consideration only of the final verse paragraph. The full text is contained in Auden (1966:49-50).

Seekers after happiness, all who follow
The convolutions of your simple wish,
It is later than you think; nearer that day
Far other than that distant afternoon
5 Amid rustle of frocks and stamping feet
They gave the prizes to the ruined boys.
You cannot be away, then, no
Not though you pack to leave within an hour,
Escaping humming down arterial roads:
10 The date was yours; the prey to fugues,
Irregular breathing and alternate ascendancies
After some haunted migratory years
To disintegrate on an instant in the explosion of mania
Or lapse for ever into a classic fatigue.

Recognising the risks of ignoring a number of highly significant communicative features, I am here interested in exploring only two aspects of the poem: firstly, the way in which apparent statements with the declarative form of 'It is later than you think;' (line 3) and 'You cannot be away, then, no ...' (line 7) can be felt to assume in context a quite different function. My own feeling is that their effect may be closer to that of a command or even a warning (though analysis of 'Song V' has demonstrated the difficulties in being precise about the latter kind of speech act). Secondly, I am interested in accounting in some way for the kind of ambiguities created by the preponderance of exophoric reference in this verse.

In their work on classroom discourse, Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:33) propose some rules for the interpretation of the discourse functions of a declarative clause.

Any declarative or interrogative is to be interpreted as command to do if it refers to an action or activity which teacher and pupil(s) know ought to have been performed or completed and hasn't been.

- | | |
|---------------------------|----------|
| 1. the door is still open | command |
| 2. did you shut the door | command |
| 3. did you shut the door | question |

Example 1 states a fact which all relevant participants already know; example 2 is apparently a question to which all participants know the answer. Both serve to draw attention to what hasn't been done in order to cause someone to do it. Example 3 is a question only when the teacher does not know whether the action has been performed.

In the context of the poem 'Consider', it should be recalled that the dominant mood in the first two verse paragraphs is that of imperatives: as Sinclair (1975) points out, the mood form which is least liable to change in communicative function. Since there is no context supplied between stanzas 2 and 3 to suggest completion of the action for which the imperatives were advanced it can be supposed that the participants here are faced with 'action or activity' which they know ought to have been performed but which has not. As a result the clause 'It is later than you think' might, in particular, be construed as a 'command to do'. In fact, I would propose that the insertion in this context of a negative 'You cannot be away, then, no ...' comes across as an especially admonitory command. Sinclair and Coulthard's rule thus provides some explanation of our sense that commands are being issued here rather than statements; but this interaction has to be seen alongside the kind of complexities in the channel of communication between participants which arise from an application of Widdowson's construct.

In this extract from 'Consider' the addresser I₂ addresses an interlocutor(s) ('seekers after happiness') in terms that appear to presuppose the existence of a particular 'code' or set of interactional norms operating between the participants. The deictics, e.g. 'that day', 'that distant afternoon', 'the ruined boys', 'You cannot be away', 'They gave the prizes ...', point to contexts which are not explicable within the terms of reference set up by the text. Such density of exophoric reference means that the reader, prepared to construct a coherent provisional universe for the 'inner context' of the poem is to a considerable extent thwarted. For example, what is 'that distant afternoon', and when was it? Who are 'the ruined boys'? How is it that we might hear the 'You' as connected in some way with these events? Who is the 'You'?

Here the poem's speaker would seem to assume that what he is referring to is either known or recognisable to his interlocutor(s). That is, the discourse can be seen to be built on a considerable proportion of 'shared knowledge' (Labov, 1972:above). In other words, if A and B are addresser and addressee, the events depicted are neither A events (known to A) nor B events (known to B) but AB events (known to both A and B). The speaker is therefore, to employ a term of Sacks (1972), exploiting a code or set of norms which enables him to 'membership' his listeners. Sacks (1972) is concerned to explicate how we hear certain terms for objects, persons and activities both across and within sentences. He demonstrates a framework for explaining how a remark can be an extension of a topic centering around a particular type of 'member' and introduces the descriptive concept of a 'membership categorisation device' formalised via a hearer's maxim:

If two or more categories are used to categorise two or more members of some population, and those categories can be heard as categories from the same collection: Hear them that way.

For example, Sacks cites the sentences:

'The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.'

in demonstration of the cultural competence which enables one to recognise those sentences as belonging together. Here 'baby' and 'mommy' are heard as co-members of the device 'family' and can thus be linked together. Similarly, in the extract from 'Consider', category-bound activities such as open-air school prize givings, and owning and driving cars, may be heard as belonging together within the device(s) of a particular social group. It should be said though that, in the case of these activities, the competence required to fulfill the 'hearer's maxim' is much more distinctly that of a socio-cultural or a socio-historical kind than in Sacks's examples. The formula for the norms recognised and applied within the shared knowledge of the participants remains, however, the same.⁶

It thus appears that a code is being employed which draws on a presupposition that the addressee or listener can be membershiped and re-membershiped. In fact, not only is this made manifest by the addresser's deictic references but also in his 'formulation of place' (Schegloff, 1972) with such location terms as 'that distant afternoon' and 'down arterial roads', which are unconnected except by a process of spatial, temporal and contextual orientation built on a code known to addresser and addressee. Consequently, no explicit definition of place is needed; the speaker orientates his discourse around points of shared experience.

'Consider' is clearly a poem whose inner situation exhibits some deviance from the norms of communication operating between author and reader. The discourse structure of the poem builds in contextual clarity only for those readers able to apply the relevant hearer's maxim and thus identify with or share the same knowledge as the addressee(s) being membershiped. The reader is thus forced to be either an observer or observer-participant (that is, he shifts constantly between II₁ and II₂). If the former, he may be particularly uncertain how to 'take' the speaker and may consider him to be inflexible both in his presuppositions and the 'direction' of his speech acts: if the latter then more context will be automatically supplied and a greater ability to follow will result. Where this degree of 'identity' with the speaker can be presumed, it is unlikely that the declarative clauses in question will be felt to command as such. Instead a framework might be provided for analysing out something more approximate to gentle, less authoritative admonition.

My tentativeness here is due both to the kind of discourse analysis I have adopted (which is general, eclectic and largely ethnomethodological in orientation) and to the state of the art which still requires much more rigorously linguistic testing if the insights it offers are to be fully quantified. It is dangerous, too, to see discourse analysis

in isolation from its inevitable convergence with other modes of analysis. Grammar frequently has a larger part to play than I have allowed here; the specifically literary context of the conventions governing the reading of a text are significant too. The lexical organization of the ending of 'Consider' which Fuller (1970:47-48) reveals to be a specialist register of clinical psychiatry clearly works to reinforce the impressions of 'membership-ping' described above.

Before the intuitions developed with regard to each text can be substantiated in detail, more work is clearly needed on the construction of 'situation' in literary texts as well as on the reader's competence in what Culler (1975: 164) terms 'distance and deixis, in lyric poetry. The mood structure of each discourse here is of considerable interest, too. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:29) refer to this as the 'tactics' of a discourse.

It is place in the structure of the discourse which finally determines which act a particular grammatical item is realizing.

... the discourse value of an item depends on what linguistic items have preceded it, what are expected to follow, what do follow. (1975:34)

In this regard Sinclair's 'general rule of interpretation' (Sinclair, 1975), from which we can deduce that it is unusual for a declarative to follow in sequence from an interrogative, or even more strikingly from an imperative, will be seen to be of enormous potential value for work on the two texts I have examined here. And I have highlighted here but two areas for development.

Notwithstanding such reservations I do conclude that it is to a framework of discourse analysis that we have to turn in order to account for the workings of 'conversation' in poetry and, by extension, to the yet more complex area of interaction in narrative. For interesting first steps see Pratt (1977) and Chatman (1975). Of 'Song V' and 'Consider' I believe it can be fairly said that the style of the texts is primarily describable within the kind of contexts they create. Ultimately, we can talk of these texts only insofar as we talk with them.

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'Song V' and an extract from 'Consider' are reprinted by kind permission of Faber and Faber Ltd. from Collected Shorter Poems by W.H. Auden.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 For example, the folk-song 'The Cutty Wren'. See 5 below.
- 2 In line 10 the insertion of 'that' for 'a' in the question 'Did you see that shape in the twisted trees?' might have the effect of increasing the tension of the utterance by asking a question about what is presumably known.
- 3 Though no reliable rules have as yet been established within discourse analysis to account for this, Searle (1969:65) in several respects provides a most useful starting point via his analysis of the speech act of promising.
- 4 See Sacks (1972): '... a person who has asked a question has ... a reserved right to talk again, after the one to whom he has addressed the question speaks. And in using this reserved right he can ask a question.' Here, however, question and answers are chained over a long sequence. As Coulthard (1977:71) notes such sequences are typical of doctor/patient interviews or courtroom cross-examination. Both these facts suggest further possible interpretive lines. For example, a substantiation of impressions concerning the poem's tone, of formal disputation; or support in the structure of the exchanges for the references in the poem to illness, e.g. line 12. A further point of interest here (which for reasons of space cannot be developed) is Sinclair and Coulthard's notion of 'orientation' (see Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975:130). It is significant in this exchange that the respondent asserts his independence of the questioner by not allowing in his own discourse any convergence of linguistic items which appear in the questioner's initiations.
- 5 Further discussion of the literary context specific to this poem may be found in Spears (1963:57-58, 73).
- 6 It is interesting to note, however, the even more precise membership in the original (1930) version of the poem. See W.H. Auden Poems (Faber, 1933).

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SURVIVAL OF CIPHERED FORMS OF LANGUAGE

Richard Coates
University of Sussex

In this paper, the word 'ciphered' will be taken in a novel and narrow sense to mean 'characterised by the systematic replacement of some unit of a particular rank (e.g. phoneme, word, phrase, sentence) at a particular level (e.g. phonological, lexical, syntactic) by another, either from the same inventory or from a different one; or by the systematic insertion or reordering of such units'. Thus yob is a phonological/orthographical ordering cipher whose domain is the word; rosé may be regarded as a lexical replacive cipher of pink in English; the town drain may be a phonological/orthographical ordering cipher whose domain is the (lexical words of the) phrase the down train; a topicalisation phenomenon like clefting may reasonably be regarded as a syntactic insertion cipher whose domain is the sentence (Fred needs a bath - It's Fred who needs a bath). An open cipher is a ciphering system which may affect any unit at a given level.

Where a language exists in a ciphered form, it persists in that form only as long as the rationale for its ciphering persists. The reasons for ciphering may be purely communication-functional (as in the case of cryptography) or alternatively social in origin, that is, identificatory, in accordance with the desire for some in-group status for the speaker. The death of the former type of ciphered language is readily predictable: it is abandoned when it ceases to serve the need from which it arose, for example when the cipher is broken. Ancient and simple ciphers may persist in the guise of puzzles; for example, the replacement of vowel symbols by the next alphabetic consonant symbol once practised by German scribes (cf. Braune & Mitzka, 1961:12). Phonologically ciphered forms such as Pig Latin (Halle, 1964:342-3), and the Birmingham (England) school-children's cipher which has left the residual olly-bars for barley 'pax' (truce terms) are popular among children until the desire for non-public expression is lost and the stigma of a childish pursuit is made to be felt. It will be seen that these reasons for the demise of ciphers during the time when the linguistic repertoire is being acquired are not entirely communication-functional, and bridge the gap to the discussion of the second general type of cipher.

The death of the second, social-identificatory type, is harder to predict. Its markers are frequently lexical (e.g. slang, technical terms restricted to some register or even to some school, deliberately archaising vocabulary, etc.) in which case some subset of the vocabulary may (not must) be ciphered. Markers may be at other levels; thus some phonological aspects of the 'female' forms of such languages as Yana (Sapir, 1949) and Chukchee (Bouda, 1953) may be regarded as ciphered forms of the 'male' language; for example, the terminal devoicing that is one of the

characteristics of 'female' Yana (Sapir, 1949:208). Some alleged syntactic transformations look like group-bound cipherings, for example, Postal's (1971:intro.) Yiddish-movement. Each of the quoted cases is likely to be sociolinguistically stable as long as the social identifications which they mirror and reinforce remain in existence.

Sociolinguists have recently brought up some cases of language interaction which very strongly resemble ciphering. Gumperz and Wilson (1972:251ff) demonstrate the interaction of Kannada, Urdu and Marathi in an Indian village community (Kupwar), where their conclusion is that to all intents and purposes these three languages share a syntactic surface structure (p.256) and phonology (passim) and differ essentially in lexical choice (p.270). The trilingual system is here strongly reinforced by the local caste structure, and the domains of use for each language are largely fixed. The languages appear to have influenced each other strongly, and each has 'grown' features diachronically proper to the others. We see that where contact results in convergence, a system most akin to ciphering may emerge; unitary syntactic slots in Gumperz and Wilson's case are filled by equivalent items from a socially-guided system of choices. (One might quibble about which language is the base on which the cipher operates. It seems immaterial. It could be any of the three, or a system of placeholders; although this latter alternative is less felicitous.)

Denison (1972; especially 1976), in discussing German, Friulian and Italian trilingualism in an Italian village (Sauris), sets up a paradigm for language death as follows:

- (a) initial monolingualism in L_A
- (b) introduction of L_B in some domains, usually in 'H' functions
- .
- .
- .
- (m) L_B transmitted first to children, with L_A restricted to certain domains
- (n) increasing domain-restriction of historical L_A tending eventually to zero

Denison (1976) gives the name of 'language suicide' to those cases where L_A 's death is accompanied by a massive importation of items and structures from languages L_B , L_C ... L_N . The 'death-wish' of such a language is accentuated by a diminishing structural disparity between it and the newcomer language, and the more so where the newcomer L_B is, as it often is, a form bearing higher prestige than L_A .

The tendency just described seems to be an increasing pressure on the historical L_A to be interpreted as a ciphered form of L_B . The greater the structural similarity between the two languages, and the more restricted the domains in

which L_A is considered appropriate, the more L_A is under threat. These two preconditions feed each other, because the former undermines speakers' sense of the autonomy of L_A and the latter actually does restrict that autonomy. The end result of such increasing role restriction may be the occurrence of L_A only in fixed cultural and even topographical contexts. For instance, Yorkshire Dales British (cited by Denison, 1976) in its function of counting sheep:

(1) yan, tan, tethera, pethera, pimp

(for the last two items cf. Welsh pedwar, pump), or Anglo-Manx.

(2) [tʃi'manin beg] and [hop tʃu nei]

preserved respectively as a greeting to the fairies whilst crossing the fairy bridge at the Crossag, and as a chorus of a folksong. A prestigious L_B without a sufficiently large autonomous group of speakers to maintain it may also become so restricted, for example, Norman French in the Houses of Parliament on the giving of the royal assent to bills:

(3) le roy (la reine) le veult

These 'survivals' of British, Manx and Norman French are contextual cipherings of supralexicalevels, that is, cipherings of phrases or sentences which are theoretically available in English but only appropriate in certain other, fixed, circumstances. Ready translations are:

(1') one, two, three, four, five

(2') hello, little people; (no translation available for second example)

(3') the king (queen) wishes it (to be so)

These survivals should be contrasted with open cipherings such as Pig Latin mentioned earlier, which are not contextually restricted to such an extent, and not at all linguistically restricted: any lexical word may in principle be ciphered.

It is noteworthy that (2) and (3) are syntactically noticeably different from their English equivalents. Their structural disparity from English may have helped to preserve them; (1) is a matter of rote-learning of items not syntactically connected, and its survival cannot be explained in terms of the failure of the two languages, British and English, to coincide structurally. On the other hand, the process of numeration, whatever its language-specific upper bound, is universal. The crucial preserving factor in all three cases, whether there is structural disparity or not between the paired instances of L_A and L_B sequences, is that the sociocultural domains for the use of the dying or dead language are rigidly fixed.

Comparison of the cases cited by Gumperz and Wilson on the one hand and by Denison on the other leads us to the view that instability or imbalance in the domain system governing language choice is the major direction-giving factor in hastening the death of some language involved in convergence. I do not wish to assert that language death necessarily proceeds in this way; Dorian (1973) has shown how dying languages may follow internal patterns of development owing nothing to convergence. The larger-scale changes in the initial consonant mutation system of the Gaelic spoken in Embo, Sutherland, cannot, evidently, be ascribed to direct English interference.

Now if L_B is a prestige language and L_A a nonprestige language, no necessarily fatal pressure exists on L_A . Evidence for this assertion may be found in the diglossic situation in German-speaking Switzerland and inversely, the survival of immigrant Arvanitika (Albanian) in Greece (Trudgill, 1976). Additional factors discourage L_A use; as we have seen, convergence alone does not, but needs to be backed by a disintegration of the domain structure appropriate to L_A accompanied by local denigration of L_A :

- (i) Lack of prestige or of general currency of L_A
- may help (ii) convergence towards L_B (which is supported by extra-community norms),
- and (iii) disintegration of the domain structure of L_A .
- (i, ii, iii) feed (iv) local denigration of L_A .

It seems that the nearer L_A is to being able to be described by simple lexical transfer rules from L_B (i.e. the nearer it is to being an open cipher at the lexical level), the greater the denigration of L_A is likely to be and the more rapid its disappearance in creative language use, provided that no stable domain system backs the usage of L_A and L_B . When an L_B becomes the first native language of speakers in a particular community, L_A must automatically adopt the 'first foreign language' role and become subject to learning strategies based on the assumption that L2 structures are direct equivalents for those in L1 unless explicit indications are given to the contrary (i.e. the assumption that L2 is an open ciphered form of L1)¹. If L2 (= L_A here) is supported by no external norm or agreed excellence, it is more open to interference/transfer pressures in that correction is not institutionalised and in that there may well be no motivation towards purism in L2. In short, this state of affairs will encourage convergence, the persistence of interference errors, and the feedback development of the notion that L2 is an open cipher of minimal social and communicative value in ordinary contexts - a cipher which may be outgrown in the same fashion as the childish ciphers mentioned above.² Persistent uses of L2 will then be largely metaphorical, i.e. participate in an ever more closed, domain-bound system, perhaps even possessing only

one domain. Thus the strongest candidates for L2 survival are strongly contextualisable utterances³ (cf. the British and Manx cases above), particularly if the domains involved have a powerful affective sentimental or local-patriotic component. These may well survive long after creative use of L2 has ceased. One might thus predict that slainte as a toast will outlive functioning Gaelic⁴, just as the apparent cipher [tʃi'manin beg] as an invocation has outlived functioning Manx. The domain-binding in our Manx cases is to a domain which the culture borne by L_B probably did not even recognise, and thus [tʃi'manin beg] could not be an open ciphered form of some 'corresponding' sentence of contextualised English.

Vocabulary relating to items or behaviour patterns special to L_A culture is probably readily assimilated in L_B, with the result that the feeling that it is to be assigned L_A status is liable to be lost. Single lexical items with no obvious L_B equivalent are thus not likely to be a factor militating towards L_A maintenance; rather they are merely switched into L_B domains as being items proper to the whole communicative repertoire rather than to one of the languages alone. (The repertoire is after all the full linguistic expression of the communicative needs of the community, and a language is merely one of or a number of the codes in it in a multilingual situation.) The survival of these single lexical items may well thus depend precisely on their not being ciphered forms of L_B lexical items.

It would be easy to multiply examples, so let us content ourselves with mentioning just two:

- (i) the survival of native names for the indigenous flora and fauna in languages of conquerors, and
- (ii) the universal tendency of placenames to survive language replacement

Neither of these two categories, evidently, has a pre-existing correspondent in some L_B, and in a community speaking L_A and L_B they may be regarded as in some sense the property of the entire repertoire rather than of one of the languages individually.

Summary

Fatal pressure on items in a system may thus come about when that system (and a fortiori the items themselves) may be described mathematically as a ciphered form of some other system, where ciphering is a process of one-to-one coding at some rank (e.g. word, phrase) which has socio-linguistic value. Where this value is weakened, the rationale for the preservation of the ciphered form also weakens. When this happens, preservation of L_A forms is encouraged best in strongly affective contexts having reduced relevance to L_B cultural norms, and consequently not being derivable from them or from apparently equivalent forms of L_B.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The initial stimulus for this paper came from Denison (1976). I wish to acknowledge information given by Jim Blake and Howard Corlett during the preparation. My thanks are due to Norman Denison, John Lyons and John Trim for reading and commenting on earlier drafts.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Since 'overt language-behaviour ... is causally related to various other features of the situation in which it occurs' (Catford, 1965:2), there is an obvious theoretical parsimony in the assumption of a one-to-one tie-up between units of content and units of form.
- 2 But, with reference to unciphered language: 'The child (sees language) mainly as a means of communication. (He is) seldom interested in language, but rather in the information which it conveys'. (Macnamara, 1973:40). A socially valueless cipher will thus be under pressure among the 'learning' generation.
- 3 Because metaphorical and affective uses of some code often coincide; witness for example F.J. Strauss' use of metaphorical code-switching into Bavarian dialect in his political speeches; cf. Fishman (1972:50).
- 4 Cf. in a slightly different way the survival of the Latin toast pros(i)t in German, transferred from restricted bilingual social groups to the general language community with a consequent loss of awareness of its Latin origin. Again this has outlived its dying language of origin.

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A NOTE ON SINCLAIR AND COULTHARD'S CLASSES OF ACTS INCLUDING
A COMMENT ON COMMENTS

Margaret Berry
Department of English Studies
University of Nottingham

I have recently been using Sinclair and Coulthard (1975, henceforth SC) as a textbook for part of a course for students of English on varieties of the English language. The book has proved very useful in such a context. Insights have been gained not only into the language of the school classroom, but also into other related varieties of English such as the language of university seminars and the language of radio and television quiz programmes.

As was to be expected, however, problems arose when attempts were made to code data and when it became necessary to adapt the descriptive system in order to apply it to types of data other than classroom discourse. The problems were particularly numerous when coding in terms of classes of act and when decisions were necessary over whether to set up new classes of act. Although admirably explicit over certain matters, for example, the conventions followed in the setting up of ranks of unit (SC:122-123), Sinclair and Coulthard do not, in spite of a detailed discussion of acts, make clear what conventions they followed when setting up classes of act, and they do not always give sufficient information to make it possible to use their system of classification. In fact it is not always clear how they are using the term class.

They give three kinds of clue to their meaning of the term:

- 1) 'The system we have produced is hierarchical and our method of presentation is closely modelled on Halliday's Categories of a (sic) Theory of Grammar. All the terms used - structure, system, rank, level, delicacy, realization, marked, unmarked - are Halliday's.' (SC:24)

It is interesting to note that class is missing from this list of terms. A quotation from the following page, however, suggests that class too is used in the sense in which Halliday used it in 1961.

'The link between one rank and the next below is through classes. A class realizes an element of structure ...' (SC:25)

- 2) '... we insist on a relatively small number of speech acts defined according to their function in the discourse and combining in predictable structures to form higher units.' (SC:11)

(Presumably speech act for Sinclair and Coulthard = class of act.)

Again we find that class is related to structure. In addition it is related to function. Sinclair and Coulthard seem to use the term function in two different ways: to refer to the operation of an item at a particular place in sequence and in a particular relation to other parts of the surrounding discourse (e.g. SC:13-14); in the more informal way in which the layman would probably use the term, to refer to the 'job' which an item does in the discourse (e.g. SC:40-44). With the former of these two meanings we are of course back to structure again.

- 3) 'It is place in the structure of the discourse which finally determines which act a particular grammatical item is realizing, though classification can only be made of items already tagged with features from grammar and situation.' (SC:29)

(Presumably act here = class of act.)

Again a reference to the structure of the discourse, but here we find that grammatical and situational features are also important.

It would appear from the above quotations that, although grammar, situation and function in the more informal sense have been taken into account in the classification of acts, operation in structure is of paramount importance, as it is for class in Categories of the Theory of Grammar. It seemed a useful exercise to examine the Sinclair and Coulthard classes of acts to see to what extent they were classes in a Categories of the Theory of Grammar sense.

Halliday (1961:260) says:

'... there will be certain groupings of members of each unit identified by restriction on their operation in structure. The fact that it is not true that anything can go anywhere in the structure of the unit above itself is another aspect of linguistic patterning, and the category set up to account for it is the "class". The class is that grouping of members of a given unit which is defined by operation in the structure of the unit next above.'

Class, then, is the category set up to account for and predict constraints on sequencing or ordering.

Halliday distinguishes between primary classes, secondary classes and sub-classes. A primary class is a class which stands in one/one relation to an element of primary structure. For instance, verbal group is a primary class of the unit group, since verbal groups always realize the element predicator and the element predicator is always realized by a verbal group.

Secondary classes are arrived at in two ways. Firstly, it may be possible for an element of structure to occur at

more than one position in sequence, but it may be that not all the members of the primary class which realizes that element of structure have an equal potentiality for occurring in all possible positions. The primary class may then be divided into secondary classes on the basis of the positions in which the members can operate. For instance, the primary class adverbial group which realizes the element of structure adjunct can be subdivided into secondary classes on the basis of the positions in the sequence of elements of the clause at which its members most naturally operate. Secondly, primary structures can be more delicately analyzed as secondary structures. A secondary class is then a class which stands in one/one relation with an element of secondary structure, just as a primary class is a class which stands in one/one relation with an element of primary structure. For instance, the primary structure of the nominal group is usually described in terms of modifier, headword and qualifier, each of the elements of structure being realized by a primary class of items. The modifier can be more delicately differentiated in terms of deictic, ordinator, epithet and noun-modifier, each of these elements of secondary structure being realized by a secondary class of items.

Sub-classes appear whenever there is

'a relation of mutual determination, or "concord", between two classes; each divides into two sections such that a member of one section of one class is always accompanied by a member of one section of the other class.' (Halliday, 1961:260)

For instance, when we divide nouns into countable nouns and uncountable nouns, what we are really doing is sub-classifying the members of the primary class which realizes the element headword on the basis of their potentiality for occurrence with certain members of the primary class which realizes the element modifier. Countable nouns can occur with a, each, these, those, etc.; uncountable nouns cannot. Since the determination is mutual, deictics (members of the secondary class which realizes the element of secondary structure deictic) can be sub-classified on the basis of their potentiality for occurrence with countable or uncountable nouns. (Sinclair, 1972:151-153, 239)

It is also worth bearing in mind the term cross-class which Sinclair himself introduced in a talk on class in scale-and-category grammar in Edinburgh in the mid-sixties. He drew attention to the fact that the nominal group was not really a primary class as it was related to two elements of structure, the subject and the complement. While certain nominal groups such as the cat and Aunt Jemima can realize either subject or complement, there are others such as them and very good indeed which are restricted to the realization of the complement. The class nominal group, defined as it was in early scale-and-category grammar, was too all-embracing. It did not fully take account of

restrictions on the operation in structure of groupings of members of a unit. It did not explicitly demonstrate the extent to which 'it is not true that anything can go anywhere.' The moral of Sinclair's talk seemed to be that one should not too readily resort to cross-classes.


Of Sinclair and Coulthard's twenty-two classes of acts, two, loop and aside, according to the summary of the system of analysis (SC:24-27), bear no relation to any element of structure. This is surprising in the case of loop. A loop seems to have the same function in relation to a particular class of bound exchange as does a conjunction in relation to a bound clause. A conjunction, or binder, introducing a bound clause is usually said to be realizing the element adjunct in the clause.

It is less surprising that aside bears no relation to any element of structure. An aside is tangential to the discourse, not part of the discourse. As such it would not be likely to have any recognizable place in the discourse; it would be impossible to predict where it would occur or to suggest any constraints on its occurrence. An aside really does seem to be something that can go anywhere.

Three of Sinclair and Coulthard's classes appear to be primary classes: accept, evaluate and silent stress, which realize respectively the pre-head of a follow-up move, the head of a follow-up move and the qualifier of a framing move. (SC:26-27)

Elicitation, directive, informative and check appear to be sub-classes which together add up to a primary class, as do reply, react, acknowledge. There is a relation of mutual determination and concord between these two sets of classes, such that one of the first set is always accompanied by a particular one of the second set, elicitation being followed by reply, directive by react and informative by acknowledge.

Check, like elicitation, is followed by reply, the difference between check and elicitation in structural terms being that it is optional for a check to be followed by a follow-up move, while it is essential for an elicitation to be so followed. (SC:53) Sinclair and Coulthard refer to elicitation, directive, informative and check as a single system. (SC:26) The paradigmatic relations which hold between these classes could be more explicitly represented if two systems were assumed, one dependent on the other.



The first system would then be set up on the basis of concord with the class of act realizing the head of the answering move, the second system on the basis of the essentialness of a follow-up move.

The second factor that hinders us from straightforwardly regarding the seven classes listed above as sub-classes is that acknowledge, as well as realizing the head of an answering move, can also realize the pre-head of an answering move. In other words it is a cross-class. If one is going to set up a cross-class, presumably the best reason for doing so is that the classes which have been conflated to form the cross-class have identical membership. This may well be the case for the class that realizes head in an answering move that follows an informative and the class that realizes pre-head in an answering move that follows a directive. I wonder though if cor and wow are really as likely in the latter context as in the former and, if they do occur in both contexts, whether they would be spoken with the same intonation and whether they would have the same meaning in the two contexts.

Metastatement and conclusion also look like sub-classes which together add up to a primary class. (SC:27) Certainly they form a system, and although there is no other set of sub-classes with which they have a relation of mutual determination, they are in concord with something in their structural environment. A metastatement will only occur if a teaching exchange is to follow. A conclusion will only occur if a teaching exchange has preceded it.

Cue, bid and nomination appear to be secondary classes. (SC:26) Although Sinclair and Coulthard do not say so, the primary element of structure select seems to be more delicately describable in terms of three elements of secondary structure, in one/one relation with which stand respectively cue, bid, and nomination.

The same seems to be true of prompt and clue, in this case the element of primary structure concerned being post-head. Sinclair and Coulthard say that prompt and clue form a system. (SC:26) It is true that in Categories of the Theory of Grammar systems are allowed to consist of secondary classes, but systems are not now usually formulated in this way. Secondary classes are not mutually exclusive in the way that sub-classes are, and mutual exclusiveness of terms is of course an essential property of a system.

Marker, starter and comment are cross-classes. Marker realizes signal in an opening move, signal in a focusing move and head in a framing move. Starter realizes pre-head in an opening move and pre-head in a focusing move. Comment realizes post-head in an answering move, post-head in a follow-up move and post-head in a focusing move. In addition, although the summary of the system of analysis (SC:25-27) does not allow for this, the analyzed texts include an act in an opening move which has been coded as a comment. (SC:89)

- (3) Today I thought we'd do three quizzes. ms
 We won't take the whole lesson to do
 a quiz because I want to talk to you
 some of the time. com (SC:63)
- (4) So that's the first quiz con
 and I think you got that all right. com (SC:66)

The second sentence in example (3) seems to be

'a statement which refers to some future time when what is described will occur. Its function is to help the pupils to see the structure of the lesson, to help them understand the purpose of the subsequent exchange, and see where they are going.' (SC:43)

In other words it is a second metastatement. The fact that the first clause is negative does not seem to me to make any difference to the basic function of the sentence. The act which has been coded as comment in the fourth example is certainly closer in form and function to the comments which occur in follow-up moves than the other examples discussed so far. However it does differ from the comments which occur in follow-up moves in the scale of its reference. It seems to be an evaluation, but an evaluation not of a particular response, an evaluation of the pupils' part in a whole section of the lesson. It includes an anaphoric item and it is significant that the antecedent of this item is the first quiz, which has formed the subject matter of a whole section of the lesson. It seems to me to differ too greatly from other comments, not only in its position in sequence but also in the way it is related to the rest of the discourse, for it to be included in the same class as other comments. If there are no other similar examples in the unpublished texts of the Sinclair and Coulthard corpus and if it is considered uneconomical to set up a class for one example, I would prefer to see this example coded as a conclusion as it seems to have more in common with conclusions (position in sequence, relation to the rest of the discourse, kind of phoricity) than with other comments.

The unpublished texts include only one example of an act which has been coded as a comment in an opening move,

- (5) Who got the Ptolemy one right? el
 I never know whether to say
 Ptolemy or Tommy or Thomy. com (SC:89)

and only one example of an act which has been coded as a comment in an answering move,

- (6) Yes rep
 If you've got a printed one
 you shouldn't have. com (SC:107)

The example in (5) would be better coded as an aside, as it is not really part of the discourse. It is in fact ignored by the pupil who responds to the elicitation and by the teacher herself who then goes on to produce a follow-up to the response. (6) appears after a pupil elicitation described by Sinclair and Coulthard as 'INAUDIBLE', which makes it rather difficult to tell if the so-called 'comment' really is a comment, and if so what it is a comment on. Sinclair and Coulthard themselves seem to be rather confused over this point. Although it is coded as part of an answering move on page 107, on page 47 the same act is coded as the head of an opening move. It is still said to be a comment however, which makes the fifth place in structure that this ubiquitous class of act is allowed to occupy. It seems reasonable enough to treat this example as the head of an opening move, but in this case it should surely be coded either as a directive or as an informative.

I am suggesting, then, that the examples discussed above were not adequately 'tagged with features from grammar and situation' before being classified. If the acts coded as comments were more thoroughly investigated in this way it might well be found that not all of them could go anywhere, that starters proper were restricted to opening moves and that comments proper were restricted to follow-up moves.

Certainly it was the starter and the comment that caused most trouble in seminars at which attempts were made to code data. There seemed to be virtually no restriction on what one could call a comment and very little restriction on what one could call a starter. There were strong complaints from the seminar that items doing very different 'jobs' were being lumped together under the same heading.

This situation would be partly eased if, as suggested above, starter and comment were each restricted to one place in structure. The disquiet felt by my seminar group would not I think be completely removed however. Even at the one place in structure their intuitions as native speakers were that items with different functions were being placed in the same class.

Sinclair and Coulthard seem to admit this in connection with the comment. They say

'its function is to exemplify, expand, justify, provide additional information.' (SC:42)

The value of this list of functions is diminished by the fact that it does not seem to have been set up in such a way as to be finite and to consist of mutually exclusive terms.

It ought to be possible to construct a list of kinds of comment which would be finite and in which the terms would be mutually exclusive. Again, what is necessary is a more

thorough tagging of items with grammatical and situational features. Formal features that might well be relevant include: whether the item was a statement or a tag question (Sinclair and Coulthard do mention statements and tag questions in connection with comments, but they do not suggest that the difference between them is significant, SC:42); if a statement, whether the item was first person, second person or third person; whether the item repeats any lexical item(s) from the preceding reply, accept or evaluate; what kind of phoricity, if any, is present. Situational features that might well be relevant include: whether the teacher is referring to ongoing activity in the classroom, or to some aspect of the subject matter of the lesson; if referring to ongoing activity, whether the activity is the pupils' activity or the teacher's own; whether the proposition involved can be assumed to be knowledge shared by teacher and pupils or the property of the teacher alone. The exact relation of the proposition to neighbouring propositions would also be relevant.

The acts coded as comments in follow-up moves in the analyzed texts (SC:63-111) seem to fall into the following classes:

Interactive comments. Realized by tag questions. Function is to emphasize the interactive nature of the discourse, to jolly the class along as it were, rather than to add any new information. e.g.

(7) It's jolly hard isn't it. Ever so hard. (SC:65)

Reinforcing comments. Realized by statements which include repeated lexical items and certain other types of cohesion. (A full discussion of different types of cohesion is of course beyond the scope of this note.) Function is to reinforce appropriate replies. This is the class of comment that seems most closely related to the evaluate act. e.g.

(8) It means 'be careful' because the road's very slippery. (SC:68)

Controlling comments. Realized by second person statements referring to pupils' ongoing activity. Function is to direct the course of the discourse. e.g.

(9) You're shouting out though. (SC:93)

Explaining comments. Realized by first person statements. Function is to explain some part of the teacher's own contribution to the discourse. e.g.

(10) I changed the last word. (SC:63)

Additive comments. Realized by third person statements, probably distinguishable from reinforcing comments on grounds of amount and types of cohesion. Function is

to add further information in relation to the subject matter of the lesson. e.g.

- (11) They drained out all the liquid from the body and rubbed special preserving oils into the body, wrapped it in bandages and put it in the case.
(SC:85)

If the above classes were sub-classes, we should have a system or network of systems at the place in structure post-head in a follow-up move. However to show that these were sub-classes we should have to demonstrate firstly that they were in concord with something in their environment and secondly that they could not co-occur.

In fact there is some evidence that they do co-occur. For instance, an interactive comment co-occurs with an additive comment on page 80 and again on page 87, a reinforcing comment with an interactive comment on page 80, a reinforcing comment with an interactive comment on pages 83-84, and a reinforcing comment with an explaining comment on pages 72-73. In this case they should probably be regarded as secondary classes, particularly if it could be shown that when they do co-occur they always occur in the same sequence. There is insufficient evidence in the published Sinclair and Coulthard texts to draw any conclusions on this point, but there is some slight indication that study of further texts might prove fruitful. There certainly seems to be a tendency for reinforcing comments to precede other kinds of comment, and there is a tendency for additive comments to follow other kinds of comment.

These suggestions must remain very sketchy and tentative. There is no room for a full discussion in a note. I have tried simply:

1. to indicate the sources of some of the confusion that arose in seminars devoted to the coding of data in terms of Sinclair and Coulthard's descriptive system.
2. to suggest that the so-called comment is an act which is worthy of further investigation. Such investigation might well prove interesting both from the point of view of discourse structure and from the point of view of the techniques which the teacher uses in the classroom.

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REVIEW of William Labov &
David Fanshel

Therapeutic Discourse:
Psychotherapy as Conversation,
New York: Academic Press,
1977. Ppx + 392, £10.65

Therapeutic Discourse represents a major advance in the analysis of conversational interaction. In the first place, the approach is interdisciplinary, so that insights are provided both into the therapeutic strategies involved, as well as the conversational mechanisms which underlie them. From the point of view of the analysis of therapeutic discourse, this is one of the first attempts to focus on the actual language used in the interview as opposed to the more common use of global categorizations which often appear intuitive and arbitrary. For linguists, this book provides arguments for the linguistic analysis of conversation as well as detailed exemplification of the form this might take. In keeping with the readership of the journal for which this review is intended, I shall focus primarily on the interest and value of the book for linguists.

First a brief outline of the contents. Chapter 1 argues for the need for the analysis of therapeutic interviews as a form of conversational activity which is of considerable importance to human beings. The background of the study, Fanshel's interest in the objective analysis of therapeutic processes and Labov's interest in formalizing the structures governing the use of language, is presented along with a brief outline of the case of the patient, Rhoda P., who had been diagnosed as having anorexia nervosa. A brief argument is provided for the linguistic analysis of discourse but also for extending the analysis to considering the relation of the interaction to its social frame, that is, the rights, obligations and duties of the discourse participants.

Chapter 2 argues for a comprehensive discourse analysis. By this is meant an analysis which is explicit and replicable as well as accountable to the whole of the text rather than selected aspects. Chapter 3 proposes and illustrates rules of discourse while Chapters 4 to 9 provide a detailed analysis of the text, a fifteen minute interview between therapist and patient, divided into five episodes. Chapter 10 summarizes the analysis, and Chapter 11 outlines some directions for the analysis of conversation. The text of the interview appears in Appendix A, followed by references and indices to the discourse rules, paralinguistic cues, propositions, interactional terms, utterances, as well as an author and subject index. The inside covers set out the general and local propositions discussed in the text, as well as the special symbols used, e.g.:

- (S) One should express one's needs and emotions to relevant others.

Many previous analyses of conversational interaction proceed on the basis of an utterance-by-utterance form of categorization. Other analyses are restricted almost

entirely to a consideration of paralinguistic cues and non-verbal features. The present analysis takes into account paralinguistic features (though not non-verbal features, which could not be analysed as the recordings were audio only). Spectrographic displays are used to illustrate the occurrence and duration of hesitations while pitch contours were measured on a real-time spectrum analyser. Prosodic cues are utilized in the interpretation of utterances. For example, the utterance 'That looks clean t'you?' with heavy stress on 'that' and 'clean' and an extra-high rise on 'you', originally used by Yiddish groups, but now widespread in American English to express aggravation or scepticism, is glossed with the meaning: 'If you think this is clean, you are crazy'. On the other hand, it is pointed out that prosodic cues are often idiosyncratic and ambiguous. Indeed, they are held to be necessarily so as providing a form of communication which is deniable when the speaker is explicitly held to account for a possible meaning conveyed by a prosodic cue. In any case, in this study, prosodic cues are interpreted in co-occurrence with other features rather than in isolation.

The meaning of utterances, in the sense of 'what the speaker is getting at', is made explicit in expansions which accompany the analysis of each utterance. Expansions incorporate meanings conveyed by prosodic and paralinguistic cues, identifications of the referents of pronouns, expressions of time, etc., which are recoverable from the preceding text and from the shared knowledge of the participants as well as factual material from other parts of the interview, other interviews with the same patient and discussions of the interview by the therapist. The nature of such an expansion can be illustrated by an example from the text (p.160), with certain details omitted:

<u>Text</u>	<u>Cues</u>
An-nd so - when - I called her t'day, I said, 'Well, when do you plan t'come <u>home</u> ?'	Exasperation: 'plan to': implication of deliberation. Contrastive stress on <u>home</u> .

Expansion

When I called my mother today (Thursday), I actually said, 'Well, in regard to the subject which we both know is important and is worrying me, when are you leaving my sister's house when (2): any obligations you have already have been fulfilled and returning home where (3): your primary obligations are being neglected as (4) you should do as (HEAD-Mo) head of our household?'

Such expansion is problematic and controversial. There is the danger of overinterpretation. Some analysts restrict themselves to interpreting the surface text only. Others, such as the ethnomethodologists, would permit interpretations which are 'warrantable' from other parts of the text. For example, a particular meaning can be justified if it is shown that the hearer demonstrably hears it that way or if the speaker subsequently provides evidence for that interpretation. The present expansion is justified by reference to information from outside the text. The lengthy expansion of 'well', described as a discourse marker which refers backwards to a topic of shared knowledge between participants, and the inclusion of 'actually' to distinguish between what the patient imagines herself saying and what she reports herself as actually saying, are cases in point. The numbers in brackets refer to propositions, the 'cognitive component' of the interaction. For example, (HEAD-Mo) refers to the proposition that the mother is a competent head of the household. These propositions are not usually stated explicitly in the text because adult interaction is normally indirect and mitigated, yet they are included as representing what is actually being talked about. The aim of therapy is directed towards isolating such propositions and making them explicit. Clearly any attempt to reveal the underlying meanings of utterances is most important for therapists and others concerned with making sense of talk riddled with misunderstandings and misapprehensions. Whether, however, such expansions are possible and practicable in the analysis of other forms of discourse remains to be seen.

A further problem, more of concern to the therapist perhaps, is that such expansions make the text explicit to the extent that the nature of the interaction is distorted. Mitigating devices are not accounted for and the interaction appears more abrasive and direct than it actually was.

The present approach has, however, the advantage that it seeks to account for all possible meanings available to the participants. This is particularly important when considering the interactional significance of an utterance. It is shown how most utterances accomplish several speech acts simultaneously, some at a fairly deep level of abstraction. For example, the utterance quoted above, 'When do you plan t'come home?' is seen to perform the following speech acts: 1. a request for information; 2. a request for action; 3. a request for help (in the house); 4. a challenge to the mother's performance of her role as head of the household; 5. an admission of inability to cope with obligations; 6. an assertion to the therapist that one of the basic suggestions of therapy, expressing one's needs and emotions to relevant others, has been carried out.

When the utterance is considered in relation to preceding and subsequent utterances, it is possible to see how it responds to preceding requests, and so on, while at the same time setting up expectations for a response. The next

speaker can respond to one or more of the speech actions accomplished and conversational interaction is indeed characterizable as a selection from among various options available at any moment of the interaction. The actual selection reflects the participant's interactional strategies. These can only be interpreted adequately against the background of what might have been selected. Thus the present approach, while possibly being open to the criticism of overinterpretation, accounts more adequately for conversational interaction by considering the hierarchical nature of speech actions as well as the selection of particular strategies of interaction from a series of available options.

The expansions of each utterance are accompanied by interactional statements which show the relations to other utterances, or more specifically, the actions which they accomplish. Actions are shown to refer back to a previous speech action, to make assertions etc., which require a response, and some actions fulfil both functions of referring back or responding and expecting a response.

The rules of discourse discussed in Chapter 3 are of two types: rules of interpretation and production which relate utterances, 'what is said', to speech actions 'what is done', and rules of sequencing which relate the actions being performed to each other. The authors stress that there is no obligatory sequencing between linguistic forms but rather between the actions performed by these forms and for this reason pay greater attention to the former type of rule with the aim of characterizing more exactly what is being sequenced.

Many of the rules presented here are similar to those discussed elsewhere, for example, the conditions underlying requests for action are similar to those proposed by philosophers of language such as Searle. Rules are provided for recognizing imperative constructions as requests for action by reference to conditions underlying their use such as need for the request, need for the action, the hearer's ability, willingness and obligation to carry out the action, and the speaker's right to make the request. Indirect requests for action are accomplished by asserting or questioning these conditions as well as other factors such as the existential status of the action (i.e. whether it has been performed or not), the time for its performance and the consequences of its performance. Similar rules are provided for requests for information. These conditions also form the basis for responses to requests. For example, a request for information or a negative assertion about one of the conditions underlying a request for action is a means of putting off the request. In addition, the nature of these speech actions is explicated in social interactional terms. For example, a repeated request is heard as an aggravated form of criticism of the hearer's failure to perform a requested action, thus implying role incompetence.

Thus requests for action and information are seen to be grounded in social interaction and can be related by means of the consideration of social factors such as the relative status of the participants to higher level actions such as challenges, (e.g. to a person's role competence), retreats, defences, and so on. Thus a principled basis is provided for recognizing these higher level categories which goes beyond the usual intuitive analysis.

Narrative structure is described, and narratives are shown to be interactional events which can often function as equivalent to single speech acts such as response, putting off a request, challenge, and so on. In fact, in the interview analysed, the patient often used a narrative without any prefatory material as an indirect means of achieving such speech acts. Finally, devices used for achieving coherence in conversation, where there is no obvious linguistic relation between utterances, and some aspects of sequencing, for example, the types of response which can follow a request for action and the possible responses which these give rise to in turn, are discussed briefly.

The authors modestly point out that these rules of discourse are not intended to be taken as definitive and might be altered by future researchers. I would like to discuss some possible problems arising from their present formulation. One immediate issue is the implicit assumption of the universality of the rules. For example, the Rule for Requests begins (p.78):

If A addresses to B an imperative specifying an action X at a Time T_1 ...

The time of the action is considered to be a necessary part of the rule as reference to the time factor is one means of putting off and reinstating requests. In the subsequent discussion, it is claimed that where the time for the action is not specified, it is assumed to be 'right now' or 'at the first available opportunity'. Lesley Milroy (personal communication) has pointed out that the possible legitimate response to a request for action 'What, now?' indicates that the time for the action is open to negotiation. Often the speaker has in mind when the action might be appropriately performed and the hearer has to determine this or negotiate it. In any case, different participants, particularly with different cultural expectations, might have widely differing views as to what constitutes the 'first available moment.' Similarly for requests for information, where the time of response is assumed to be identical with the time of utterance of the request. In some cultures, there is sometimes a considerable gap, often as much as a day, between a request for information and its response (Philips, 1976). Obviously some constraints are necessary in the formulation of these rules.

The other main point concerning the rules of discourse centres around the following issues: what constraints are there on the occurrence of certain forms, what other possible formulations are there for the rules and which realizations are likely to occur in interaction and under what conditions? For example, a possible way of putting off a request for action is to request information about the 'existential status' of the action. One example is 'Isn't it dusted already?' as a means of putting off a request to dust the table. It seems that here only a negative interrogative can be used to accomplish a 'put-off'. (Incidentally, surely this interrogative equally refers to the need for the action?) Another problem arises with relating rules to forms, for example, with the interpretation of 'Look, you been away long enough' as a request for action. Here reference is made to condition 1 for requests for action (the need for the action) and this is further explained as being a statement about the mother's need to be away from home (p.160). It doesn't seem apparent, however, that this utterance makes reference to the implied action requested (i.e. 'come home'), as is assumed in the interpretation. Indeed, no action is referred to at all and the interpretation by the hearer of the utterance would have to be based on inference where the utterance is heard as referring to an aversive situation which the hearer can remedy by a particular act. Similar objections could be raised to other examples which are assumed to refer to this condition, for example, 'don't you think the dust is pretty thick?' and 'this place is really dusty' as attempts to get the hearer to dust the room (p.83). These can only be interpreted as requests for action where the situation is understood to be aversive and the hearer infers which action is necessary to remedy it. In the case of a speaker who liked dusty rooms, these utterances could hardly be understood as requests to remove the dust.

I would also like to take issue with the claim that denial or questioning of a precondition on a speech action amounts to implicit acceptance of those conditions which have not been denied or questioned (p.88). Certainly, once the objections have been met or the information requested has been supplied, the original request is reinstated (following the Rule for Reinstating Requests, p.93). However, it would still be possible to subsequently question or deny other preconditions. This being so, although the request is reinstated, it is not necessarily the case that the other conditions were actually accepted at the time of the initial objection. Clearly, participants can make objections one at a time and there might be some strategic advantages in doing just that.

Those familiar with other types of discourse analysis which are more concerned with the constituent analysis of discourse and proposing combinations of items in structures, (e.g. Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975), will find little material for comparison here as the authors do not seem particularly concerned with this issue. Certainly, a list of speech actions is presented with some indication of how they might

combine, (Figure 5, p.61). Yet no attempt is made to state constraints on the combinations of particular items in syntagmatic structures. Furthermore, various terms are not clearly defined. For example, a 'remark' is differentiated from an 'assertion' as putting less constraint on the following utterance, (p.63, note), yet there is no clear indication of how to recognize and distinguish these terms. However, the multicoding of speech actions and the recognition that they often have a double discourse function (i.e. as a response and also an elicitation of a subsequent response), would, in any case, make the type of exchange structure proposed by Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) highly problematic.

More trivially, there are a few errata. Some works referenced in the text are not specified in the list of references, e.g. Stubbs (1973), Labov (1967), Schegloff (1974). On p.78 note 1, reference is made to precondition 5 of the Rule of Requests, yet the preconditions are numbered only 1 to 4 in the text. The reference on p.199 to the Rule for Putting Off Requests should read p.86, not p.90.

I began by expressing the view that this book represents a major advance in the analysis of conversation. The authors envisage application of their method of analysis of other types of conversation, including, interestingly, 'the monitoring of one's own speech in daily life' (p.6). My own work on the analysis of children's conversations will be enriched by the insights provided in this book. One interesting field of investigation would be the development of indirection in children's expressions of propositions. Another derives from the claim that people monitor utterances as possible requests for action in precedence over other interpretations and only treat an utterance as, for example, a request for information, if one of the preconditions for a request for action is not fulfilled. The developmental significance of this claim could be related to the work by Shatz (1975) showing that children's responses to adult utterances are initially subject to an action-based strategy. Development might then be shown to take the form of learning to recognize the conditions underlying valid requests for action as a means of distinguishing them from requests for information.

Linguists might object that this book goes beyond the defined area of the discipline. Certainly, linguistic form is not considered primary in the interpretation of utterance meaning and appeal is made to various extralinguistic phenomena such as shared knowledge and social norms. However, the book remains in keeping with the aims of linguistics as the scientific study of language by providing an explicit and principled account of the use of language. It is encouraging to see linguists involved in issues which are of vital concern to humanity. This involvement underlies the work presented in the book and can be aptly expressed in the authors' closing words (p.360):

'It seems to us that the main justification for the microanalysis of conversation is the immediate benefit it gives us in enriching our understanding of human relations, and the ways in which people deal with one another.'

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Reviewed by

Michael F. McTear
Ulster Polytechnic
Belfast

REVIEW of Roman Jakobson Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning, translated by John Mepham, with a preface by Claude Levi-Strauss. Harvester Press, Hassocks, 1978. Pp xxvi + 116

This is a translation of Six leçons sur le son et le sens (Minuit, Paris, 1976), and one cannot but sympathise with the translator for his failure to get at the original nuances in the punning and symptomatic original title. The translation mainly reads well, with only a few infelicities such as multiform (51), educes (76) (déduit in the original, 86), significative differences (42). There are some printers' frolics - Harvester's printers clearly do not have an IPA typeface - but I think only one error not involving a special symbol: significant for signifiant (23). Jakobson's agreeing to publish his 1942 Ecole libre des hautes études lectures may have one or all of three justifications: either they are a significant historical document, or they have pedagogical value, or they have especial relevance to contemporary ideas in phonology. Lévi-Strauss' preface emphasizes the importance of the first argument, particularly in the sense of their impact outside linguistics; he draws an interesting semiotic parallel between the phoneme in sentence construction and contentless symbols in mythopoeia. He also performs a little excursion into the nature of closed personal symbolism and synaesthesia, hinted at in J's sixth lecture. However, he appears to parody J's intention; because J is searching for a social-conventional and/or a genetic-neurological basis for sound symbolism, i.e. he believes it may have a universal character 'in some way imposed upon us by nature' (115). This is a view related to that which informs J's work on acquisition and aphasia (1941) and other writings (e.g. 1963, 1965, 1975). As J says,

'The search for the symbolic value of phonemes ... runs the risk of giving rise to ambiguous and trivial interpretations...' (114)

and Levi-Strauss' remarks on nuit and jour in their phonological and lexico-syntactic aspects bear him out.

I do not presume to evaluate J's contribution to linguistics (cf. Vachek, 1966:20ff, Ivic, 1965), but as a historical document, the Six Lectures are a welcome publication, since much of J's influential middle-period writing is buried in the vast Selected Works. (Are we to see a vaster still Collected Works?) They make a concise bridge between Praguean linguistic theory and the concerns of his work with Fant and Halle (1952, 1956). They give an insight into his obsession with binarism as a logical and psychological basis for linguistic methodology. They perform a number of useful ancillary services to intellectual history, for example by reminding us (and instructing me) of the role of Albert

Sechehaye in the development of linguistics (47-8) which went beyond that of being an editor of Saussure; and that of Rousselot as a godfather of the motor theory (12). Further, we should note that the principle of l'arbitraire du signe, uncritically re-enunciated in publication after publication (for some recent examples, cf. Copceag, 1973:37, 1976:33), was challenged on the basis of Saussure's own intellectual framework (110-2) by Benveniste forty years ago on grounds that deserve to be remembered, and which are developed here by J. These views argue for the necessity of the signifier/signified relationship in that both elements of the sign are the product of non-a priori segmentation of the planes of form and substance. Consequently their association in the sign is necessary from the point of view of the system of the language in which it is embedded, even though the association is historically fortuitous. The signified is 'inevitably tantamount to the signifier', the two are 'symbiotic' and 'mutually evocative'.

This brings us to the importance of the book for current linguistics. Here we find a perspective on the question of semantic universals; for if these exist in a God's truth sense, the doctrinaire structuralism of J and Benveniste has no use for us. Lyons (1977:234, 249) reminds us that relativism is not a definitive feature of structuralism; however, we may accept the relativistic flavour of such findings as Malinowski's (1922:23-4; 1935:II, 15) suggesting that there are indissoluble or intimate links between a particular taxonomic principle in some culture and its lexicalisation in the language associated with that culture. In so doing, we take the Jakobson-Benveniste position that the principle and the lexicalisation are necessarily linked in the signified-signifier relation for at least some signs; an eclectic solution which valuably weakens metatheory and does no violence to established data. (Further, on untranslatability, see Lyons, 1978.) For these elements the signified-signifier relation is historically arbitrary and fortuitous, but systematically necessary.

I have spent a lot of time in this review talking about meaning, but the sequence of terms in the book's title is not arbitrary. Sound is for J, as the above discussion makes clear, a way into meaning by various channels, and his discussions presuppose a proper description of sound systems (i.e. a Praguean one). In fact, the role of sound is so pervasive that when a chance arises to speak of the valeur of a paralinguistic, nonverbal form, J ignores it (17).

His remarks on sound-systems are familiar enough, but occasionally have unexpected repercussions for modern theory. In autopsying Baudouin de Courtenay's and Ščerba's 'psychological' phoneme, he reminds us of that data collected by Ščerba, which bears on the critical question of psychological reality in phonological representations

(1915:70ff; cf. also Linell, 1974, in press; Coates, 1977: 2.261), and of the sociology of phonological change; Sčerba's data suggests indeed that the question of what a sound is (reportedly) perceived as is not to be neglected, and that occasionally a rigorous distributionalist method will mask informants' intuitive data of interest.

J's Twaddellian discussion of the nature of the phoneme in Lecture III is also of importance in that it highlights the growing awareness among linguists of the distinction between fictional verisimilitude and psychological veracity (cf. Lass, 1976:epil., 1977, 1978, n.7, who asserts that the former may be of value to linguists) - between World III existence and World I existence of constructs. The relation between the two in the notions of general and individual competence (Coates, 1978) remains to be explored in depth. J seems to believe (82) that a psychological validation of the small number of distinctive features is that they can be thus memorised easily, a concept which I find difficult.

In arguing against Saussure's conception of the linearity of phonemic patterning, and in favour of the simultaneous exponency of phonological and grammatical categories, J correctly dispels the view that phonemes are necessarily monolithic. It is possible, though, that features themselves should be thought of as linear entities (Coates, 1979); and in view of the usefulness of the phoneme as a perceptual category in psycholinguistics, perhaps a re-evaluation is called for of the staticity/dynamicity question and the question of the primacy of simple or complex units.

These bearings on current concerns are, I suspect, incidental to the purpose of the publication, and we as teachers should find the book's major use to be as a short introduction to mainstream phonology by one of the creators of that mainstream.

The reader of the six lectures may be overcome with nostalgia for a time when phonetics, phonological theory, Bühlerian semiotics and semantic theory in general formed a closely-argued intellectual whole (cf. Holenstein, 1975:162ff). But if the introduction of theoretical syntax has broken an over-simple parallelism between categories of form and content it has done well. (For some, it hasn't.)

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Reviewed by

Richard Coates
University of Sussex

REVIEW of R.F. Holt Kaleidoskop - ein deutsches Lesebuch,
London: Edward Arnold, 1978. Ppvi +
90, £2.50

What's the use of 'readers' in language teaching? Many courses for the popular school languages contain some such (more or less genuine) textual discourse, often in addition to the lessons proper, the dictionary, and any audio-visual material, presumably to illustrate how real language is used by real people.

Holt's Lesebuch is no worse than most of its type. It sets out to proffer a relevant selection from modern German authors to encourage 'reading around' at that difficult stage when a basic course has not quite managed to prepare the learner for advanced literary study, and it hopes to achieve this goal by a judicious grouping of excerpts together with a number of optional exercises and a word list, especially for Australian students in senior secondary, junior tertiary and adult evening classes.

There are several flaws in such a comprehensive approach. It is undoubtedly true that a gap exists between the elementary grammar lesson and the lit crit seminar, but can any single text-book really make up for the shortcomings of the two extreme methods? And what evidence is there to prove that this particular collection provides the necessary motivation for and practice in reading? Is it in fact 'modern', 'diverse', and 'interesting' enough? Of the 28 pieces, only 4 come from the period after 1960, while 5 are from well before 1940. Their authors are well-known figures, from Peter Rosegger to Heinrich Böll and from Anne Frank to Marion Dönhoff, but once again they document only the literary genres. There are no letters, no speeches, no conversations, no reports, no broadcasts... The passages are grouped under six conventional subject headings, but one wonders whether even those that make concessions to parochial topics ('A sand-storm in Central Australia', or 'The intricacies of cricket') make riveting reading for a struggling intermediate learner.

The extracts themselves are fairly short and self-contained, the latter feature coming rather as a surprise when one considers that they are usually taken out of some context. Each is accompanied by a short introduction to its provenance, a few lexical notes in the margin to translate idiomatic phrases, and four types of exercises to give practice in 'comprehension', 'vocabulary', 'grammar', and 'self-expression'. Again there are more open questions than solved problems. Why, if the stress is on comprehension, do the productive exercises (all in German) outweigh the receptive ones? Why is so little guidance given (no models) to the learner? Why, in spite of the lip service paid to such fashionable notions as 'register', 'grammatical transformation' and 'semantic fields', is the treatment of

usage labels and the coverage of sentence and word formation patterns so inadequate? But worst of all, and in my view unpardonable in these exciting days of discourse analysis and psycholinguistics, what justification is there for the complete neglect of the factors that are known to contribute to the processes of text comprehension? Surely some attempt could have been made to design exercises for recognising the cohesive signals that give texts their structure and thus promote intensive and/or extensive types of reading!

The flaws in production (21 typing errors on the acknowledgement page alone) and the relatively high price, while not by themselves serious objections to the book, add insult to injury.

In sum, if you must use this reader, do it with caution.

Reviewed by

R.R.K. Hartmann
University of Exeter

This is not an easy book to review. It is a collection of French newspaper headlines, brief newspaper reports and advertisements, each of which is followed by comprehension questions in English. The extracts are representative and the language authentic; the presentation is clear with particularly attractive reproductions of advertisements. The topics covered are typical of newspaper stories: traffic accidents, weather conditions, natural disasters such as storms, floods or forest fires; the advertisements are on popular themes: restaurants, air travel, sale bargains. This is 'everyday French', if in one register only.

This raises the first question. The material is authentic, but the range is narrow. Even popular or local newspapers cover a wider field, and the pupils for whom this book seems intended, i.e. 'those less able to cope with the more traditional skills of written production in the foreign language', would surely benefit from a more varied diet.

A more important question concerns the aims and approach of the book. According to the author, it is 'designed to test the pupil's power of comprehension'. If the aim is to test, what is the justification for the thorough twelve-page vocabulary at the end? Perhaps we can assume that the aim is both to test and to teach. We need to ask further how the author defines comprehension. For him it is 'the ability to comprehend the essential gist of what is being read'. Yet the practice seems different. Here is one of the shorter but typical extracts and the questions set on it.

Storms in Italy. En Sicile les violents orages qui ont provoqué des inondations et des glissements de terrain ont fait une vingtaine de blessés samedi dans la partie ouest de l'île.

1. What two things have been caused by the violent storms?
2. When did these happen?
3. Which part of Sicily has been affected?
4. How many people received injuries?

If the word 'gist' is to retain its normal meaning, such detailed questions go beyond the elicitation of 'the substance, or the main point(s)' and oblige the student to concentrate on discrete items of vocabulary. Indeed, the use of newspaper reports, containing information in

highly condensed form does not train pupils in grasping longer units of connected writing and sets a premium on the knowledge of vocabulary.

Some sections, like the one on weather reports, are more successful in building up in stages towards an understanding of a longer passage; on the whole however the book seems too 'bitty' and at the same time insufficiently structured for a class text. Its main use would probably be as a source book for teachers.

Reviewed by

W. Grauberg
Language Centre
University of Nottingham

