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FOREWORD

The articles in this volume have been chosen to reflect the longstanding concern of systemic linguistics with texts: with the linguistic forms, meanings, structures and textures of texts and their relation to their social contexts.

The first two articles, by Poynton and Martin, represent what may be thought of as the present mainstream of systemic linguistics. Poynton assumes Halliday's general theory of text-context relations (e.g. Halliday, 1978) and investigates a particular aspect of language, names, in the light of this theory. Martin reviews critically the work which has been carried out within the framework of the theory and draws attention to improvements in methodology which will be necessary if the work is to advance.

The next two articles represent a relatively new development in systemic linguistics, the work on genre initiated by Hasan (e.g. Hasan, 1978). Hasan herself discusses in depth a particular genre, the nursery tale. Ventola reviews the work so far carried out along Hasan's lines, considers the implications of existing methods of formalising the claims made and proposes a new type of formalisation.

Systemic linguistics has always been application oriented. There is a strong tradition of wishing to study language in a way that will be useful outside linguistics itself. Butt's article continues this tradition, demonstrating the uses of systemic linguistic analysis in literary study.

The last two articles, by Weber and Thompson, are not systemic in the strictest sense, since they do not make use of systems. However, they are very much in the spirit of systemic linguistics, sharing many of its assumptions about the goals of linguistics and about the nature of the data; and they provide welcome evidence of the interaction which is now beginning to take place between systemic linguists and linguists of other traditions. It is particularly appropriate that Thompson's article should be included here since it is a revised version of a paper read to the Tenth International Systemic Workshop, held at Nottingham in September, 1983.

References

HALLIDAY, M.A.K. (1978) Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning London: Arnold

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Margaret Berry,
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NAMES AS VOCATIVES: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS

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1. Vocation and Name: two instances of the marginalization of interpersonal meaning

The networks VOCATION at clause rank and proper noun (henceforth NAME) at word rank are not infrequently seen as somewhat marginal or peripheral linguistic categories. To take VOCATION first, such a viewpoint would seem to derive from the lack of an adequate interpretation of the significance of certain characteristics of the system and its realizations. The principal features which presumably cause greatest difficulty are that the system VOCATION is grammatically optional and that its realizations have no fixed place in clause structure. It is not entirely surprising, then, if such characteristics give rise to the suspicion that VOCATION cannot really matter very much in the grammar of English. This is not to say that the interpersonal functions of the system and its realizations are not recognised. The difficulty is in incorporating such knowledge into a grammar.

If one accepts Halliday's (1979) proposal that different kinds of meaning employ different kinds of structure, however, then the grammatical characteristics of VOCATION and its realizations are more comprehensible. Halliday distinguishes between three semantic components, ideational, interpersonal and textual, and his hypothesis is that

> (i)each of these semantic components typically generates a different kind of structural mechanism as its output, or realization; and that (ii) these different types of structure are non-arbitrarily-related to the kinds of meaning they express. (Halliday, 1979:61)

The two structural types that are of particular interest in the context of this paper are elemental (constituency) structures, realizing the experiential type of ideational meaning, and prosodic structures, realizing interpersonal meanings. Vocatives seem clearly to be elements in prosodic rather than constituency structures. But since, as Halliday points out (1979:71-3), it is only linguists in the 'socio-anthropological tradition...who... have tended to develop prosodic models' while those in the 'psycho-philosophical tradition have usually worked with constituency models of structure', it is hardly surprising that VOCATION has not been the subject of much attention by linguists of the latter tradition but that it can be handled within the framework of systemic linguistics.

A number of other features of VOCATION and its realizations can be identified, apart from the optionality of the system itself and the comparative freedom of movement within clause structure of its realizations. Many of these features have undoubtedly contributed to a fairly wide-spread ignoring of VOCATION as a grammatical phenomenon. Such features include:

a. Of the three types of vocative, calls, addresses (as distinguished by Zwicky (1974:787) and exclamations, two (call and exclamation) are usually realized as minor clauses and the third (address) as an intonationally post-tonic element in clause-final position. (Downing's observation that what are obviously address type vocatives have a 'distinctive intonation contour' (1969:574), is worth commenting on insofar as he is using a system of notation (Trager) which does not treat intonation as a prosody, as does Halliday (1967) whose system I have used here, but rather identifies pitch and stress phonemes attached to segments, i.e. treating prosodic interpersonal structures in constituency terms. (v. Halliday, 1979:71).

b. The structure of vocatives is more commonly univariate than multivariate - that is, when they have any structure at all. (See Halliday (1965/1980) on multivariate/ univariate structure, and below).

c. Vocatives are commonly realised as NAME (itself regarded as marginal), in forms which tend to be unique to that class.

d. Vocatives are also realized in everyday colloquial conversation by slang items (slang being yet another 'marginal' category), with characteristic morphological and phonological structures. (cf. Wescott, 1976).

Turning to the NAME network, the focus of most discussions of names is on how they differ from other types of linguistic items in terms of meaning, linguistic properties and, ultimately, linguistic status. Features commented on include:

a. Names are claimed to have reference but not sense (v. Lyons 1977:219-22) or to have sense only contingently (Markey, 1982).

b. Personal names are not ordinarily translated, so seem to be outside the language, though they <u>are</u> usually accommodated to the phonological system of the language in which they are being used and to that extent can be seen as part of that language. (v. Lyons, 1977:222).

c. Flouting conventions of personal name assignment on the basis of gender, e.g. by naming a girl <u>John</u>, may occasion comment, even severe disapproval, but can hardly be said to be ungrammatical. (Lyons, 1977:221, who suggests that a clause like <u>John has just cut herself</u> is probably not semantically problematic either).

(d) Names are less likely to appear in plural form or with modification of any kind than are common nouns. (See e.g. Long, 1969, Quirk et al., 1972, Halliday, 1984).

As a consequence of such characteristics, names are commonly regarded as linguistically marginal. One version of such an interpretation is found in Hudson (1980:125) who suggests that names as the main markers of power and solidarity in English 'might fairly be described as peripheral to the system of English as a whole, in the sense that proper names used as vocatives...could be handled in a separate section of the grammar with little or no consequence for any other parts of it'. A more far-reaching claim regarding linguistic status is made by Markey (1982) who questions whether names ought even to be regarded as linguistic items insofar as they 'do not share the developmental properties of "normal" grammatical items...(and) are peripheral to concerns which lie at the core of the theoretical investigation of language'. (p.141).

In what follows I hope to demonstrate that what speakers of English do with names is related to other parts of the grammar and that the implications of name forms and functions are anything but peripheral to a comprehensive theory of language.

Names as vocatives are found at three ranks of realization: word, word complex and (nominal) group. Only names at word rank and word complexes consisting exclusively of names will be dealt with in this paper. Thus word complexes including title as well as name(s), e.g. Dame Zara Bate, and structures involving modification, e.g. poor little Johnny, will not be dealt with here. (See Poynton, in preparation, for an account of vocatives at all three ranks, including non-name items and structures).

Two major classes of names will be identified and characterised and a lexico-grammatical network presented which specifies both the forms both types of name may take and the structures they may occur in.

In the final section, lexico-grammatical choices from the NAME network will be related to contextual choices, specifically tenor. A system network for tenor will be proposed and a number of observations made about the linguistic realisation of one of its component systems in terms of both paradigmatic opposition and delicacy within the NAME network. For the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that VOCATION is an interpersonal system. (See Martin, 1984, with reference to ambiguity/ambivalence on this issue in Halliday, 1984). This assumption will be made so that the metafunction/register hookup hypothesised by Halliday remains unproblematical: that is, tenor as component of social context is typically realized through the functional-semantic component interpersonal. (Halliday, 1978:189).

2. Names in English: categories, forms and choices

2.1. Categories of names

Speakers of English recognise two types of name, basically distinguished according to function. Firstly there is the name or names freely chosen for an individual, usually by the parents, variously known as given name, Christian name, personal name, forename. In the case of that one of this set which is the name most commonly used by and to an individual and which, in combination with the second kind of name always precedes it, then the term first name is also used. Such an item need not be the first of an individual's given names,however, or even one of them at all. Former Prime Minister of Australia, John Malcolm Fraser, is always known by the second of his given names and Joseph Horace Harold Jarman, now deceased, was apparently known as Ted. (Sydney Morning Herald, 7.IV.1983).

Secondly, there is the name not usually chosen for or by an individual but passed on from parent to child creating, in Barley's felicitous phrasing,'an identity linking different generations into a unity'. (Barley, 1974:18). This kind of name is variously known as surname, family name or last name. Such a name may be compound, whether this is indicated with a hyphen or not (e.g. McArthur-Allen, Kingsford Smith), but an individual has only one such name.

There is some overlap between these two types of name. Many items regularly occur as either personal or family name (e.g. Graham, Martin, Meredith, Leonard, Rose, Douglas, James, Joyce, Leigh/Lee). Items that are generally regarded as family names may also be 'borrowed' as personal names, especially for males (e.g. Mitchell, Wade, Kent, Bradley, Todd, Ryan, Darcy, Seymour, Howell), and much less commonly for females (e.g. Ainsley, Brooke, Kelly, Courtney, Lindsay). (See 2.2).

The term nickname also occurs as a type of name. In the non-technical or folk use of this term, however, there is considerable overlap between this category and the two dealt with above. For some, nicknames are non-names used as names (which is broadly how the term will be used here), while for others any hypocoristic form of an item of either major name type is regarded as a nickname (e.g. Annie from the personal name Anne, Campo /kæmpoʊ/ from the family name Campese (/kæmpizi/ in Australian English). Such usage is to be found for example in Morgan et al, 1979, and Lawson, 1973, the latter a psychological study using semantic differential analysis to investigate responses to different name forms and the former a sociological study of naming practices among British school-children where a social distinction between names one acquires through the 'official machinery of naming' and those one acquires 'informally (and possibly contrary to one's wishes)' was the focus of attention and linguistic distinctions were only secondary). (p.9.).

Here, as clear a line as possible will be drawn between nickname and what will be referred to as real name (i.e. a name that could appear on an official document such as a birth certificate or passport). Any item that can be regarded as a hypocoristic form (diminutive, familiar or pet form) of a real name will be so interpreted. (See 2.3. below for a detailed account of the range of hypocoristic forms of English names). The term nickname will be restricted to items-used-as-names such as: nominalised epithets and nominals relating to personal appearance or behaviour (e.g. Curly, Blue (for a red-head), Doll, Tup (because the bearer of this name was referred to as 'as big as twopence' as a small child), Matchstick, Scruff); items with some phonetic similarity to one or other of an individual's real names, commonly chosen to be as offensive or irreverent as possible (e.g. Toad fromThodey, Hiccups from Hickox, Sewers from Suresh, Smelly from Samele /səmili/, Antirrhinum (and consequently to the English Snapdragon) from Antoninus - particularly outrageous since the referent was a nun!); acronyms based on all or some initials (e.g. Cap from initials C.A.P., /ɒʊsi/ from initials of family name O'Connor, Jaws as an anagram of initials A.J.W.S. (Morgan et al, 1979:39); forms originating as corruptions by small children of names or other words (e.g. Boosey /busi/ from beautiful, Wizzy from Elizabeth); and what Partridge (1937) calls 'inseparables' or inevitable nicknames (e.g. Tug Wilson, Nobby Clark).

Though it is possible on the whole to keep nicknames formally distinct from real names, an example of name use such as Bill, used not because of any part of the real name but derived from playing the role of Bill the Burglar in childhood games of cops and robbers, does create problems. No grammar alone could be expected to account for this kind of 'playing with the system', where what linguistically is a real name is not a real name in the real world but a nickname. Likewise, while an individual has no difficulty in specifying which part of their full name is family name and which given or personal name(s), it is only knowledge of how the two kinds of names are ordered that enables the first element of feminist writer Dale Spender's name to be identified as personal name and the second element of novelist James Joyce's name to be identified as family name.

The basic grammatical distinction between name types is in terms of gender-marking, where those that are so marked correspond by and large with the set of personal names while those not so marked by and large fall into the set of family names. Gender-marked names are, naturally, of two kinds: female and male. This pair of paradigmatic oppositions, one dependent on the other, is readily formalised into systems, viz.



Figure 1: Real name (lexico-grammatical stratum; word rank)

This method of classification leads to the identification of three lexical sets of names, all of which have some degree of overlap with at least one other set (and in the case of two of the three types also with what will be referred to as the general lexicon), but where the extent of the overlap and the degree of tension at the point of overlap vary. The facts regarding overlaps of name categories (where an item can be a member of more than one category) can be represented schematically as in Figure 2 below. (Note that no attempt has been made to represent possible quantitative differences in the sizes of the three sets of names nor the extent of the overlaps between them. Likewise, the incomplete circle representing the general lexicon of English is to be understood merely as larger than any of the other sets).



Figure 2: Co-membership of name categories in English

Starting with female names, there is a very small amount of overlap with, i.e. co-membership of, the classes of both male and non-gender-marked names. The absence of significant overlap with the set of male names is readily interpretable culturally in terms of a premium placed on the ability to readily identify individuals as belonging to one gender or the other in a culture with a powerful ideological commitment to maintaining as clear-cut a gender distinction as possible. The basis of the gender-distinction in names is partly conventional (i.e. certain names become known as female or male names on the basis of usage as such) but it is also phonological. Gender-marking is achieved by means of distinctions with respect to:

(a) Syllabicity: while the majority of gender-marked names in English are bi-syllabic (58.6% of female names and 58.3% of male names in the contemporary lists in Dunkling, 1977), over a third of female names are longer than this and nearly a third of male names are monosyllabic. When one takes into account that the form of male names most likely to be chosen is the truncated, i.e. monosyllabic, form (see Lawson, 1973, on preference for this form by both males and females) and also notes that female names are less likely to be truncated but more likely to be suffixed forms ending in -y, i.e. bisyllabic forms, then the difference in syllabicity becomes more marked.

(b) Phonotactics: Female names typically end vocalically, while male names end consonantally and there are differences in the choice and frequency of use of final consonants in female and male names: approximately two-thirds of female names in contemporary use end vocalically, while three-quarters of male names end consonantally; and while /n/ is the most favoured consonant in final position for both female and male names, more than twice as many male as female names end thus. (See Poynton, 1981).

Where a name can be marked for either gender (e.g. Leslie/Lesley, Ashley, Kerrie/Kerry, Kim, Shannon, Noel, Lee/Leigh, Robyn(ne)/Robin - and note that in many cases gender-marking is achieved orthographically), there is a strong tendency for such items to become 'feminised': either in the sense that they are regarded as 'sissy' names for males or in the sense that they come to be used exclusively for females. A nice example of the first kind was provided some years ago in N.S.W. when the then Premier, known generally as Bob Askin, was to be knighted. He chose to become Sir Robert Askin rather than to use his actual given name which was Robin. If Askin had been of the newer generation of Australian political leaders he may very well not have seen his name as an issue but he was of the older iron-hand-and-not-much-velvet-glove school and presumably felt that being publically known as Robin would not go with this image.

Instances of the second kind of feminisation are not hard to find. The name Shirley was originally used as a family name, came to be used as a male name (see below) and then as a female name - no doubt helped by Charlotte Bronte's 1849 novel of that name, where the heroine was given the name Shirley by parents who would have used it for a son if they had had one, and later by the enormous popularity of film star Shirley Temple in the 1930s. A century after Bronte's highly marked choice it would have been inconceivable for a male to be named Shirley. A very recent example is Ashley. This has until very recently been a male name (as listed in Dunkling, 1974:32, 'The central stock of boys' names') but appeared among the most popular choices for girls born in 1983 (Sydney Morning Herald, 3.I.1984).

Presumably in both these cases the final /i/ sound has been a significant factor in the switch both because it is vocalic but also because it has the same shape as the hypocoristic suffix -y which is more widely used to females.

Turning now to the relationship between the set of female names and other lexical sets, two kinds of overlap or borrowing are observable. Firstly, this set borrows from the general lexicon, selecting particularly:

flowers/plants:	Bryony, Marigold, Hazel, Jasmine, Holly, Laurel, Primrose, Ivy, Violet, Heather, Myrtle, Iris, Pansy, Willow...
'jewels':	Ruby, Amber, Pearl, Crystal...
seasons:	Summer, Autumn (American only, according to Dunkling, 1974)
months/days:	April, June, Tuesday, Sunday

Such borrowing does not seem to occur for male names. (There are no instances in Dunkling's main or supplementary lists of the basic name stock. (Dunkling, 1974)).

Secondly, items from languages other than English (including some general lexical items and endearments as well as names) are readily borrowed into the set of female names, appropriate adjustments being made to the original phonology, e.g.:

Australian Aboriginal:	Kylie
French:	Aimee, Blanche, Cherie, Danielle, Desiree, Fleur, Mignon, Nicole...
German/Scandinavian:	Anneliese, Astrid, Gerda, Freya, Heidi, Ingrid...
Russian/Slavonic:	Anika, Lara, Natasha, Olga, Tania, Tamara...
Italian:	Bianca, Cara, Donna, Gemma, Mia, Nicola (male in Italian)...
Spanish:	Anita, Elena, Dolores, Inez, Juanita, Mercedes...
Hebrew:	Hannah, Hephzibah, Leah, Naomi, Rachel, Rebecca...

Male names are borrowed from other languages but much less frequently. Probably the largest set would be those borrowed from Hebrew via the bible (e.g. Aaron, Adam, Daniel, Jesse, Joel, Nathan, Tobias, Zachary). In many cases the phonotactics of non-English name forms would inhibit the borrowing of male names: English gender-marks by a word-final opposition between vocalic and consonantal sounds whereas in many languages both female and male names end vocalically and the choice of vowel is significant. This factor probably explains why borrowings from

Germanic languages (including Carl, Conrad, Eric, Kirk, Kurt) and some Russian names (e.g. Boris, Ivan) are acceptable but Italian and Spanish male names largely not.

Female names are further distinguished from male in two further ways. Orthographic variation, which occurs in both, is much more widespread for female names. Not only are there more sets of conventional variants of female names, the set including Catherine/Katharine/Kathryn etc. being one of the best known examples, but female names are much more likely than male to appear in idiosyncratic spellings. Of the 43 most popular female names for 1983 no less than 17 appeared in variant spellings, some of them decidedly unconventional (e.g. Amie, Leesa, Rachelle, Anabel, Ashlea, Jacalyne). Only eight from the comparable list of forty-six most popular male names appeared in variant orthographic form, however, and only one of these could be regarded as in any way unusual (by virtue of using French spelling rather than English i.e. Marc rather than Mark). (Name lists from Sydney Morning Herald, 3.I.1984).

Finally, invented names, including items combining elements of other names, may readily enter the set of female names as long as they are phonotactically appropriate: e.g. Jiann from parents Jim and Fran is perfectly acceptable as a female name while the other possible combination of these names, Frim, is not possible as a female name but is perfectly acceptable as a nickname and is so used. Other invented names include Frusannah (from Frances and Susannah) 'occasionally used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' (Withycombe, 1950:117) and Kahlia (invented by Lindy Chamberlain for the daughter born subsequent to the disappearance of another daughter, Azaria, whom she was convicted of murdering in one of the most sensational murder trials in Australia for decades).

Male invented names are rare, if they occur at all and likewise, while many variants and hypocoristic forms of female names become independent names, this is much less common for male names. Dunkling includes numerous examples among 'The central stock of girls' names' (Dunkling, 1974:36-9) including Ann/Anne/Anna/Annette, Catherine/Karen/Karina/Kate/Katie/Kathleen/Katrina. Mary/Marie/Maria/Miriam, but very few instances are to be found among the comparable lists for boys: Robert/Robin, Carl/Charles, John/Ian/Ivan/Sean, Mark/Marcus, Tobias/Toby is pretty well a complete list.(pp.32-3)

The sets of female and male names are kept fairly well apart, then, but hardly in ways that one could call ideologically neutral. The phonological differences and patterns of borrowing from other languages would seem to be yet another manifestation of a pattern of associations between Anglo-Saxon word-stock and the basic everyday stuff of living on the one hand and between French/Latinate vocabulary and the 'extras', nice but not necessary, on the other hand which has an extremely long history among English-speaking peoples. Anglo-Saxon names were certainly

gender-marked (Barley, 1974), but since the elements which made up personal names seem to have been available (in different positions) for use by both females and males there would seem to have been no scope for linguistic characteristics to be used ideologically.

Turning now to the relationship between gender-marked (in particular, male) and non-gender-marked names, there is considerable overlap which needs to be looked at from several points of view.

Diachronically, many names which are now non-gender-marked were derived from gender-marked items (e.g. from male names, Dawkins, Johnson, Lucas, Pritchard, Aitken, Ransome, Garrett, Elliott, Robertson; from female names: Annison, Empson, Maudling, Tillotson). Any gender-marking such items may once have had seems to have entirely disappeared, however. Many items which as personal names are currently gender-marked seem synchronically to lose their gender-marking when used as family names (e.g. Graham, Meredith, Leonard, Martin, James, Douglas, Joyce - predominantly male when used as personal names). A further set of items that can occur as either personal or family name are gender-marked when used as personal names but are regarded as borrowings from the set of family names (e.g. Mitchell, Todd, Seymour, Wade, Ryan from a very large set of male names; Brooke, Kelly, Courtney from an extremely small set of female names). And, finally, there are non-gender-marked names which can be used as personal names but which have no overt gender-marking (e.g. Manning Clark, doyen of Australian historians; Harlean Carpenter, original name of actress Jean Harlow; Spangler Arlington Brough, original name of actor Robert Taylor).

It is likely that these last three groups represent three stages in a diachronic process which begins with the use of a non gender-marked name as a personal name, a phenomenon with a long history in English (v. Langenfelt, 1940; Withycombe, 1950:xl-xlii). Such items are presumably initially interpreted as family-names-used-as-personal-names, as is Manning today, but where they become more widely used (rather than being merely an idiosyncratic choice or confined to one family) then they may begin to acquire gender-marking (as have Kelly, Mitchell, Ryan today). Where such names become commonly used, then the gender-marking presumably becomes fixed - although phonotactic and historical considerations may lead to a subsequent change in the marking - and a gender-marked item exists side by side with a non-gender-marked item with the same phonological shape. The names Cecil and Shirley are instances of names which were originally non-gender-marked family names and subsequently acquired gender-marking through use as personal names, in the case of Shirley (whose history is outlined above) the gender-marking changing from male to female.

The practice of borrowing a family name for use as a personal name is, and seems always to have been, largely restricted to males, however, and it is still a minority practice: the vast

majority of full names consists of one or more gender-marked items as personal name(s) and one non-gender-marked item as family name. Particularly in the United States, and now starting to occur more frequently in Australia where it has not been a widespread practice, one does find a family name (particularly the mother's family name) used as a middle name. If this practice were to become more widespread, then the structure of full names might raise even more problems for analysis than is currently the case. (See 2.3. below).

The relationship between male names and non-gender-marked names would seem then to be different again from that obtaining between either female names and the general lexicon or female and male names. It would seem that virtually any 'Anglo' non-gender-marked name is potentially available for borrowing for use as a personal name by males and consequently may come to be included in the set of male names. The implication is of an implicit maleness associated with the apparently non-gender-marked set of names which is reflected in the fact that use of a non-gender-marked name with reference to an unknown individual will be assumed to be reference to a male, whether such an item is in fact a family name (widely used in address or reference to males but seldom to females) or a personal name. In other words, another instance of maleness being grammatically unmarked but hardly ideologically neutral.

2.2. NAME choices in English

Figure 3 below presents the systems at primary delicacy in a network for the paradigmatic choices for NAME in English. NAME is initially cross classified in terms of three conjoint systems with the names (NAME) TYPE,(NAME) FORM and (NAME) COMPOSITION. (NAME) TYPE (System 1) may be either [real name] or [nickname], where the former term is realised by any name that can appear on an official document such as a birth certificate or passport and the latter is realised by any item used as a name which is not a hypocoristic form of an actual name or regarded as a potential [real name]. (See 2.1 for further details). It will be assumed here (though such is by no means always the case) that choosing [nickname] automatically co-selects [simplex], as indicated by the I-T notation. (See Halliday & Martin, 1981:11 for this convention).

Diachronically there has been a certain amount of leakage from items originally realising [nickname] which eventually came to be regarded as realisations of [real name], but synchronically the distinction is reasonably clear, as demonstrated by the following piece of dialogue from Ray Lawler's classic Australian play, The Summer of the Seventeenth Doll:

DOWD: What did you say your name was again?

BUBBA: Bubba Ryan,

DOWD: Bubba? Is that what they call you?...What's your real name?

BUBBA: Kathie.

(Lawler. 1957:93)



Figure 3: NAME in English (primary delicacy)
(lexico-grammatical stratum; word rank)

It is possible to formalise systemically the range of types of nickname but this will not be done here, partly for reasons of space but mainly because the oppositions in such a network seem neither to consistently reflect underlying formal oppositions (though they include some formal oppositions) nor to relate to different functions in context. Though one can characterise the processes involved in the formation of nicknames, the functions seem much the same. (See the discussion at the end of this section and in section 3 below on proliferation of forms in relation to minimal social distance).

The systems for which [real name] is entry condition have already been specified in Figure 1 above. Nothing more need be said here about these systems and their realisations other than that the relationship between the terms [gender-marked] and [non-gender-marked] and the terms personal name and family name seems to be one of realization, with the latter terms representing features at some underlying semantic level. Personal names are predominantly realised as gender-marked items (or the choice of a non-gender-marked item as personal name marks it as male) and family name is realised as a non-gender-marked item (or the

potential-gender of an item is never realised). Personal name and family name are identifiable as such only on the basis of sequence in a full name. (See 2.3 below).

System 8, (NAME) COMPOSITION, offers a choice between [simplex] and [complex] where the latter allows for recursion, necessary if full names are to be generated. The restrictions on co-selections and available choices in cycles subsequent to an initial choice of [complex] are dealt with in 2.3 below.

System 4, (NAME) FORM, offers a choice between [hypocorism] and [full form], where the former term is realised by any familiar, diminutive or pet form of a name and the latter term is quite transparent. (Individuals may in fact have given names which diachronically, or even synchronically, have the form of hypocorisms. These can cause difficulties and will be mentioned again below). Both terms of this system are combinable with either term of the (NAME) TYPE system, though there are some differences of detail in the more delicate choices available which will be dealt with below. At this level of delicacy, the principal restrictions that need to be mentioned involve limited access to more delicate choices entered via the feature [hypocorism] if [complex] has been selected from the (NAME) COMPOSITION system.

Figure 4 presents the rest of that part of the NAME network dependent on the feature [hypocorism]. This feature is fundamentally realised by means of diminutive forms and the subclassification performed by System 5 distinguishes between the two types of diminutive formation in English. The feature [truncated] is realised by iconic diminutives, involving truncation or clipping of the full form (generally to a monosyllable, e.g. Marg from Margaret, Len from Leonard, Fitz from Fitzgerald). (See Jesperson, 1928/1933:408 on clipped forms as diminutives in English). The feature [augmented] is realised by symbolic diminutives, specified in Systems 6 and 7 as the features [suffixed] and [reduplicated], realised respectively by suffixation and reduplication. The systems concerning these processes appear as conjoint systems because one may choose either or both [suffixed] and [reduplicated]. (Some sort of and/or notational form might be a preferable way of presenting the options here).



FIGURE 4: (NAME) FORM choices in English

Not all names have forms which are realisations of [hypocorism: truncated]. This is not only true of most monosyllabic names (but note the existence of alternate monosyllabic forms of some names which are conventionally regarded as diminutives and hence are equivalent to truncated forms, e.g. Jack for John, Jim for James). Many bi- and poly- syllabic names do not appear to have regular truncated forms either (e.g. Elaine, Rachel, Sarah, Felicity). Where truncation does not appear to operate to produce an independent iconic diminutive form, it is nevertheless commonly the case that one syllable from the name can be used as the base of augmented (particularly suffixed) forms. Conversely, not all names which have forms realising [truncated] also have forms realising [augmented]. e.g. Di is readily formed from Dianne or Diana but the most common symbolic diminutive suffix -y can only be added subsequent to the addition of a consonant to this monosyllabic form (viz. /daɪzi/ or /daɪdi/) and the resulting forms are not conventional hypocoristic forms but seem fairly unstable.

Most names, especially personal names, have at least one contrast in form realising the opposition [hypocorism] versus [full form] and some make a very large number of contrasts. Family names more commonly involve one contrast only, e.g. Smith/ Smithy (or Smithers , and note the 'florid' Smithykinsbug recorded by Morgan et al, 1979). Newcombe/Newk, Campese/Campo, Wheeler/Wheels, Blundell/Blunders, Carroll/Cazza (a typically Australian English form, though parallel monosyllabic forms with final /z/ do exist in some varieties of British English. See Poynton, in preparation).

The most delicate system in Figure 4 is presented as a set of oppositions between a range of possible suffixes (listed in their most common orthographic form, followed by a phonological representation). For many personal names, and for some family names, this set of options is recursive, up to five choices being available in ordered sequences. The choices are probably best formalised in some notational form such as the following:



( ) = optional. {a, b} = a or b. {a, b} = a or b OR a and b in order top to bottom

C = consonant which may need to be inserted (usually a voiced stop)

FIGURE 5: Suffix combinations for English personal names [1]

From such a statement the following hypocoristic forms of personal names can be generated (all attested forms):

le	Pamela	--	Pamble	/pæmbl/
s	Julie	--	Jules	/dʒulz/
le + s	Robert	--	Bobbles	/bɒblz/
y	Gunter	--	Gunty	/gʌnti/
le + y	Gregory	--	Gregly	/grɛgli/
s + y	Megan	--	Megsy	/mɛgzi/
o	John	--	Johnno	/dʒɒnoʊ/
o + s	Melanie	--	Mellos	/mɛloʊz/
y + o	Kathleen	--	Kathio	/kæθioʊ/
kin	Sam	--	Samkin	/sæmkn/ or /sæmkɪn/
kin + s	Thomas	--	Tomkins	/tɒmknz/
y + kin	(no attested forms but native speakers consider acceptable)			
y + kin + s	Anne	--	Annikins	/æniknz/
le + kin + s	(?)Frances	--	Franglekins (M)	
le + y + kin (+s)	Gregory	--	Greglykin(s)	
s + y + kin (+s)		--	Gregsykin(s)	
le + y + kin + Cle + s	Gregory	--	Greglykindles	
s + y + kin + Cle + s		--	Gregsiekindles	
poo + s	Jane	--	Janepoons (M)	
y + poo	Alberto	--	Albertipoo	
y + poo + s	Bradley	--	Braddipoos	
y + poo + Cle + s	Michael	--	Mikeypoodles (M)	
le + y + poo + le + s	Gregory	--	Greglypoodles	
s + y + poo + le + s		--	Gregsypoodles	
pops	Ju (?)	--	Jupops (M)	
y + pops	Roselands	--	Rosypops *	
le + y + pops	Gregory	--	Greglypops	
s + y + pops		--	Gregsypops	

TABLE 1: Suffix combinations for English personal names

(M) indicates that an item is cited in Muhlhausler, 1983.
* The asterisked item is the only attested example of this suffix combination: Roselands is a suburban shopping centre in Sydney. Native speakers consider such a form perfectly possible as a personal name.

The suffix -a, which seems only to be found in Australian English, has not been included in the above formula since it does not seem to enter into combinations with other suffixes and its distribution is extremely restricted. It occurs only after a monosyllabic base ending in /z/ or /k/, where such sound does not appear in the relevant syllable in the full form of the name, e.g. Barry → Bazza, Perrin → Pezza, Eric → Ekka, Maurice → Mokka. A further suffix, -ers, which seems only to occur attached to family name forms, has been excluded from the list of suffixes altogether, not only because it does not seem to combine at all with other suffixes but mainly because the suffix options as presented in Figures 4 and 5 apply mainly to personal names: family names do not seem to be quite as complex but they are different. The network presented here has been simplified.

The combinatorial potential of this set of suffixes raises a number of interesting questions which will be dealt with, together with issues relating to the recursion deriving from the choice [complex] at primary delicacy in the NAME network, in a separate section below.

2.3. Recursion, logical structure and context

The (NAME) COMPOSITION system (System 8 of Figure 3) will allow four types of name items to be generated, one type at word rank and three kinds of word complex. Figure 6 below repeats all of the systems presented in Figure 1 and Figure 3 above, with the exception of the (NAME) COMPOSITION system itself, i.e. all realizations are at word rank so that the network functions precisely as if the term [simplex] had been chosen.

If the term [complex] is chosen from the (NAME) COMPOSITION system of Figure 3, then three kinds of word complex can be generated, characterized semantically as follows:

(a) personal name$_1$ + personal name$_2$ (+ personal name$_n$)

Such forms usually involve a maximum of three or four choices, with two being the most common, but longer strings are possible. This is certainly the case in play but Thomas Sean Thomas Patrick Eamonn James Joseph, named for the seven signatories of the document setting up the Irish Republic, could well be a real name. (Cyril Kersh, The Soho Summer of Mr. Green, cited in Dunkling, 1974:59).

Such forms are generated by selecting [real name], [full form] and [complex] on the first cycle and selecting the same features on subsequent cycles until the desired number of items has been



FIGURE 6: Simplified NAME network, with sample realizations

(N.B. The I-T notation blocks the formation of reduplicated forms not only of non gender-marked names, which seems correct, but also of nicknames which probably is not correct, e.g. surely Frim could become Frim-Fram.)

selected. The co-selection [full form] rules out such sequences as Jimmy Robert, where an individual's given name is James Robert. It is possible, of course, for an individual to have been given a hypocoristic form as their real name. If such forms are only diachronically hypocoristic, i.e. now constitute personal names in their own right (e.g. Sally from Sarah), then there is no problem. Where the given name is synchronically hypocoristic (e.g. Annie from Anne), then sequences including it are likely to be perceived as marked (?marginally ungrammatical). Contrast Sarah Annie (actual name) with Sarah Anne. Some forms, e.g. Kate, Sam, can be either full form or hypocoristic and are not marked.

The most common realizations of this type will require selection of [real name: gender-marked: female/male] on each cycle. Choosing the same gender-marking on each cycle is the norm but it is possible to alternate, producing marked ('unusual') names such as:

Quentin Alice Louise (Bryce), (Convenor of the National Women's Advisory Council in Australia)

Marion Michael (Morrison), (original name of film star John Wayne)

It is probably only such gender-marked sequences of personal names that are used as vocatives (see section 3 below), though the gender-marking may be largely phonotactic, e.g. Tenille Kelly (Hay-Payens). (S.M.H. 7.I.84). In the case of a name like Charles Manning Hope (Clark), it is highly likely that the personal name sequence would not occur as a vocative.

b. personal name + family name

Realised by a sequence consisting of any term with entry condition [real name] followed by [real name: non gender-marked] as follows:

[real name: gender-marked: female] + [real name: non gender-marked]
Yolanda Klempfner, Tamie Fraser, Judy Patching

[real name: gender-marked: male] + [real name: non gender-marked]
Robert Di Castella, Bob Hawke, Quentin Bryce

[real name: non gender-marked] + [real name: non gender-marked]
Manning Clark, Blake Fox

While the second cycle must co-select [full form], the first-cycle may choose [hypocorism] but only [truncated] or [suffixed: y], i.e. the least marked address choices. Note also that while congruence between grammatical gender-marking and the actual gender of the bearer of a name is the norm, and is assumed generally by speakers of English, incongruent choices are made, exemplified in the three sets of names above where the last example of each kind is an incongruent choice: Judy Patching is male; Quentin Bryce is female, as is Blake Fox.

c. Personal name$_1$...personal name$_n$ + family name (= full name)

Where the last cycle must choose [real name: non gender-marked] and all cycles must co-select [full form].

Though the NAME network presented in FIGURE 3 above will generate all of these forms it does not appear possible to assign them a logical structure purely on the basis of analysis of the forms generated. There are two kinds of difficulty. Firstly, there are those names where the status of the elements vis a vis one another is only ascertainable if one knows what the full name of an individual actually is. Thus the relationship between the first two items of my own name seems to be the same as the relationship between the first personal name and the family name, that is, both seem to be hypotactic relationships. (Cate McKean compared with Cate Poynton). These are in fact not different versions of the same name, however, but different names (or, if one likes, the names of different people). Personal name sequences of gender-marked items (type (a) complex structures) do not seem to be distinguishable intonationally from personal name + family name sequences (type (b) complex structures) when such structures are being used as vocatives (whether as calls, addresses or exclamations, and whatever key appears to be being used. See Halliday, 1967, on key). In such cases, however, the gender-marking itself serves to identify the form as paratactic. A not dissimilar problem is seen, however, when one considers the relationship between personal name sequences with gender-marking in terms of their transitivity. If such sequences are seen as paratactic ('and' type), then the basic feature of such structures where value is simply position in sequence takes on a particular significance as far as names are concerned. While eggs and bacon and bacon and eggs can refer to the same breakfast dish, with different thematic focus, Christina Louise and Louise Christina cannot refer to the same person. They are different names. The second element in such name sequences would seem then to be secondary in some sense, but without being either modification or grammatically subordinate, i.e. to have something of the flavour of a hypotactic structure.

A second problem involving logical structure concerns personal name + family name sequences. These are clearly hypotactic but can be analysed as either α-β or $\beta\alpha$ sequences, depending on the context.

Historically, the development of family names in English took place by means of modification of personal names, commonly by means of a Qualifier, so that the original structure was α-β In many contexts now, however, this sequence has been reversed. Records of all kinds treat the family name as α. Many adults when asked 'What's your name?' in 'public' contexts (e.g. business transactions of various kinds, including telephone as well as face-to-face encounters) will respond with family name and maybe follow this with personal name, i.e. family name is α and personal name is the β. Adults in 'private' contexts, e.g. at a party,

and children in most contexts, however, will generally respond to the same question 'What's your name?' with personal name, treating it as α and may not ever make their family name known at all.

There seem no parallels to this variability of logical structure in relation to context as far as other logical systems are concerned. There is no reason to think that such structures ought not to be analysable in terms of the same categories which have been found to be operative elsewhere however, so the problem of accounting for this phenomenon remains.

A rather different and even more interesting problem involving recursion and, ultimately, context concerns the formation of multiply suffixed forms of names, specifically hypocoristic forms of personal names, e.g. Meggles from Megan, Braddipoos from Bradley, Franglekins from ?Frances, Mikeypoodles from Michael. Such items would seem to be basically hypotactic structures, where the base is the α element and the affix the β element. But unlike an item such as operationalization, which has a hypotactic structure $\alpha\beta\gamma\delta\varepsilon$, these hypocoristic name forms seem to repeat the β element.

The first issue then is that the univariate/multivariate structure distinction seems somewhat blurred in these multiply suffixed name forms. Multivariate structures are by definition non-recursive, i.e. a structural sequence $\alpha\beta\beta\beta$ is not supposed to occur. There are instances of what looks like recursion of a single functional element, e.g. Adjunct at clause rank and Epithet in the nominal group at group rank (as in comfortable spacious old house). These are not in fact instances of recursion at all but sequential choices of elements which are not differentiated at primary delicacy but certainly are at secondary delicacy, when various sub-types of Adjunct and Epithet can be distinguished.

There is, however, at least one other instance of 'recursion' of the same functional element, that involving sequences of attitudinal Epithets, e.g. the dirty rotten lousy stinking so-and-so. Considered interpersonally rather than experientially such items realizing Epithet can be said to be equivalent (though obviously not identical): the experiential meaning has largely been stripped from them and they function largely as intensifiers of the negative attitude being expressed. Hence it seems not unreasonable to regard sequences of them as, in some sense, recursive.

Though the items themselves may be more or less equivalent, however, (as is the case with hypocoristic name suffixes), so that different choices do not involve different experiential meanings, there are differences in interpersonal meaning which are directly relatable to the number of choices made. Basically, the longer the string of attitudinal modifiers or hypocoristic suffixes, the more emphatic the affect and/assertion of intimacy. Thus the contrast between

you rotten bastard
and
you filthy rotten lousy stinking bastard

is one of moderate compared with considerably augmented negative affect, as the contrast between Greg and Gregsykins involves contrasts between moderate social distance and considerable intimacy as well as considerably augmented affect. (The unmarked affect in intimate situations is positive, but intimate forms may also be used for teasing and to convey certain kinds of negative affect between intimates and non-intimates. This phenomenon of inversion occurs regularly in vocatives, certainly in Australian English). (Section 3 below will take up again the issues of affect and a social distance/intimacy dimension of social relations, called there contact, in presenting a formalization of tenor options in a systemic network).

To return to the question of the structure of these interpersonal sequences, it would seem that one can in fact functionally distinguish between elements realized by items making up such sequences but in quite a different way from the functional differentiation of elements in structures when considered experientially. Thus a word like operationalization can be regarded as a hypotactic morpheme complex with structure as follows:

operat	ion	al	iz	ation
α	β	γ	δ	ε

where the relationship between the α element and the others is similar to the relationship, called modification, at group rank, between a head and its modifiers.

A name form like Gregsypookins can be analysed structurally in precisely the same way, viz:

Greg	s	y	poo	kin	s
α	β	γ	δ	ε	ζ

but the relationship between the α element and the others is nothing like one of modification. Rather it is one that can be called intensification or augmentation or accumulation (cf. Halliday, 1979:66, who refers to the cumulative effect of multiple modality in a clause), in that each further choice reiterates and emphasizes the basic interpersonal meaning involved.

Should such name forms be analysed thus, however? Halliday (1974:96) is quite explicit that 'the logical element in the linguistic system...once it is built into language becomes neutral with respect to the other functions, such that all structures whatever their functional origin can have built into them inner structures of a logical kind'. Halliday (1979) contrasts logical structures, which are recursive, with experiential, interpersonal and textual structures which he characterizes respectively as particulate (elemental), prosodic and periodic, where these latter types of structure generate simplex units and logical structures generate complexes. He does not mention the

possibility that any of these other types of structures may contain logical structures, yet this is clearly the case with some kinds of experiential meanings (generally realized as particulate or constituency structures) e.g. modification and tense at group rank, and the clause complex itself.

Handling the structures realizing interpersonal meanings is somewhat different, however. Halliday regards such structures as prosodic insofar as 'the meaning is distributed like a prosody throughout a continuous stretch of discourse' (Halliday, 1979:66) and suggests that representation may best be carried out not by trying to force such structures to fit into the constituency mould but by treating them 'like prosodies in phonology, that is as contrasting features having no place in the constituent structure (which is, after all, an experiential structure) but which are specified separately and then mapped on to the constituent structure as a distinct step in the realization process'.

There do seem to be two kinds of interpersonal structure, however, rather than one and though both can, in somewhat different ways, be called prosodic they do need to be differentiated and probably represented somewhat differently. The kind of structure which is most readily identifiable as prosodic is typified in such interpersonal features as mood and modality, tone and key, intensity, attitude. Such meanings are realized:

- as items or features whose scope is a whole clause or clause complex (e.g. mood, modality, tone);

- as a discontinuous or reiterated 'motif or colouring' (Halliday, 1979:66) strung throughout a clause, functioning as a kind of interpersonal concord or harmony, e.g. modality as in Halliday's example:

  > I wonder if perhaps it might be measles, might it d'you think?

  and attitude as the following expanded form of another Halliday example:

  > Christ they beat the bloody hell out of those bloody bastards!

Such structures can be said to be diffuse prosodic structures in contrast with the compact prosodic structures found in multiply suffixed hypocoristic name-forms and in attitudinal Epithet sequences in nominal groups. Such structures are clearly prosodic in a general sense insofar as they reiterate the basic interpersonal meaning, with the characteristic cumulative effect, but the mode of realization is closer to that of constituency structures. One can, of course, find both kinds of realization within the same item, e.g. (a further elaboration of the last example):

Christ they bloody well beat the living daylights out of those lousy rotten stinking bastards!

where single underlining indicates the items which carry negative attitude and are elements of a diffuse prosody extending over the whole clause and double underlining indicates a subset of this attitudinal lexis which seems more constituent-like insofar as it is localized.

Such compact structures do not seem to occur at clause rank, only at group and word ranks. There are certainly sequential strings of interpersonal items at clause rank (e.g. might it possibly, perhaps, do you think?) but intonation makes clear that these are strings or lists, that what is involved is a kind of serial iteration or repetition of items which are distinct in form but equivalent in function. It would seem that the nominal group and the word are more congenial environments for compact prosodic structures than is the clause. This impression may be merely an effect of the smaller scale of these units or it may reflect some kind of apportioning of interpersonal meanings throughout the rank scale. Such a distribution might begin with the following table (not intended to be complete):

RANK	INTERPERSONAL MEANINGS
clause	role in speech event (↘ mood)
group	intensification (↘ modification)
word	attitude (realized by at least three kinds of contrast: neutral vs loaded, full form vs hypocorism, Anglo-Saxon vs Graeco-Latin origin)

Table 2: Distribution of interpersonal meanings through the rank scale

To return specifically to hypocoristic name forms, the progressive piling-up of suffixes has not merely a cumulative or intensifying function but correlates in a very specific way with situation. There would seem to be an inverse relationship between the degree of recursion and the range of situations within which such forms may be used appropriately, such that maximally recursive forms are only used to an extremely small number of addressees with whom one has an on-going intimate relationship (probably only spouse/lover, children and possibly siblings and a few extremely close friends) and even then only in interactions not accessible to outsiders.

Parallel to this use of recursive name-forms is the use of endearments, the use of pet names and the creation of nicknames. In all of these the same phenomenon recurs: the use of a number of parallel means of expressing the same meaning. And the existence of four methods of doing this is the same phenomenon

at a higher level, where the expressive techniques range from lexicalisation of affect (seen in endearments such as dear, sweetheart, darling, etc.), through the formation of diminutive forms of names, to an implicit metaphorical technique in the case of pet-names, i.e. calling someone angel, baby, possum, even wombat, is saying something like: 'I think of you as one thinks of something that is little and human/little and furry' etc. (See Wierzbicka, 1980, for this style of characterising semantics). All of these techniques make use of the general linguistic code that is available to all speakers of English while the fourth technique for expressing intimacy by means of vocatives does something a little different: it involves the creation of elements of a new code, unique to a particular relationship, by means of which familiar terms are given new semantic values and new terms will be invented - most characteristically new names for the people involved in that special relationship.

At this point, two notions seem potentially relevant: Halliday noted the phenomenon of over-lexicalization, the proliferation of synonymous expressions, in what he referred to as anti-languages (Halliday, 1976:571) and Wescott coined the terms hyperpolysemy and hypersynonymy to refer to two kinds of one-to-many form/meaning relationship characteristic of slang (Wescott, 1976/1980). The question of the relationship of name forms and other intimate forms of address to situation needs to be formalised, however, before such notions can be profitably employed as explanatory tools.

3. From lexico-grammar to register: NAME choices as realisations of TENOR choices

Despite some doubt about the metafunctional address of VOCATION (see Martin, 1984, re Halliday, 1984), there seems no doubt at all that terms of address have to do with the interpersonal aspects of situation, i.e. can be seen as realisations of tenor. This is true whether one sees those interpersonal aspects in terms of an opposition between power and solidarity (as in the pioneering work of Roger Brown and his colleagues: Brown and Gilman, 1960, Brown and Ford, 1964, Brown, 1965; and specifically with respect to tenor within a systemic framework in Martin, 1981, Martin and Rothery, 1981); in terms of statuses and role relationships (e.g. Halliday, 1984:Appendix) or, from yet another perspective, in terms of a cline whose end-points can be labelled formality and informality (Spencer and Gregory, 1964, and the work of Ellis and Ure, e.g. Ellis, 1965, Ellis and Ure, 1969, Ure and Ellis, 1977).

Rather than choosing between competing accounts of what tenor is all about, the approach adopted here will be to propose that three dimensions of social interaction are directly relevant to interpersonal linguistic choices and that all of these need to be taken into account. The dimensions will be called POWER, CONTACT and AFFECT and are presented in Figure 7 below as the names of three conjoint systems which together make up a tenor network.



FIGURE 7: TENOR network (register plane)

POWER is the dimension probably best understood, thanks to the work of Roger Brown and his colleagues, who have demonstrated with respect to terms of address that it is not merely what kind of address term one chooses but what term one chooses in relation to what one's addressee has (or might have) chosen that is important. Thus, reciprocal choices (the quintessential English example being first-naming) indicate what Brown et al call solidarity, but which will be referred to here simply as equal power, and non-reciprocal choices indicate a situation where interlocutors have unequal power.

It is not difficult to extrapolate to other linguistic systems and to suggest that a realizational principle of reciprocity is the means by which tenor choices from the POWER system are activated. An obvious example, apart from the VOCATION system, is the selection of MOOD choices: if interactants in certain types of situation consistently make different choices (e.g. interrogative versus declarative) or consistently realize speech functions with different degrees of congruence (e.g. command realized by imperative compared with by modalized interrogative), then it seems fairly clear that power is not equal. Where interactants appear to have equal rights to make the same choice, whatever the frequency of actual choices, then power would seem to be equal.

The CONTACT dimension takes into account such social distance factors as how long a relationship has existed, whether interaction is frequent or infrequent and whether interaction episodes are brief or extended, how numerous the roles played by the interactants are with respect to one another and whether the relationship (or any individual interaction) is more person-oriented or more task-oriented. At least all of these factors are relevant to whether an interaction (and consequently the language used by the participants) is characterized in terms of formality or informality, intimacy or familiarity or distance, all of which seem to be interconnected and part of a single dimension. More will be said below about this dimension (including a possible realizational principle), since it is the dimension most relevant for making choices from the NAME network.

The third dimension, AFFECT, lies behind the expression of emotion or attitude. This dimension does need to be considered independently of POWER and CONTACT, despite what seem to be dependency relationships of both with AFFECT: POWER [unequal] inhibits the expression of emotion or attitude on the part of the subordinate, i.e. makes the choice of AFFECT [unmarked] much more likely than the choice of AFFECT [marked]; and increases in CONTACT generally mean that AFFECT [marked: positive] is the unmarked co-selection. It is this latter unmarked relationship which means that name forms like Mikeypoodles function as markers of both minimal social distance (i.e. as realizations of CONTACT [most] on a single scale for this dimension) and of strong affection (i.e. as realizations of AFFECT [marked:positive/permanent]).

Returning to the CONTACT dimension now specifically with reference to NAME choices, the most striking aspect of the relationship between these two networks is that degrees of CONTACT are realized in terms of both paradigmatic oppositions and degree of delicacy within the NAME network itself. Each NAME system at primary delicacy, involving oppositions between [real name/ nickname], [hypocorism/full form] and [simplex/complex] (see Figure 3 above), is utilized to realize CONTACT choices, most usefully thought of at this stage as a single dimension ranging from [most] to [least]. Secondary delicacy systems in the NAME network, [real name: gender-marked/non gender-marked] and [hypocorism: truncated/augmented] (see Figure 6), also seem to be utilized to realize CONTACT choices and there is a possibility that the same might be true of more delicate systems. Not only are paradigmatic oppositions exploited in this way but so also is degree of delicacy, the relationship being that greater delicacy (particularly in the (NAME) FORM system) realizes greater CONTACT.

This phenomenon of exploiting the characteristics of the system network itself in order to realize choices from a higher level semiotic seems most developed with respect to the NAME network, but the [hypocorism/full form] opposition is certainly utilized with respect to other nominals as a means of realization of CONTACT oppositions. Compare cig/ciggie with cigarette, Brits with British people, wait a sec with wait a second, polly with politician, rego with registration (of a car). (The last two possibly only Australian English).

To explore the relationship between the NAME and CONTACT networks in more detail, the first and most obvious thing to note about NAME choices in relation to CONTACT is that one cannot enter the NAME network at all unless one has had at least enough contact with an individual to know what their name is. A revealing political use of this principle is seen in the following anecdote:

> News watchers in Washington were puzzled last week when, for the first time in his Administration, Ronald Reagan declined to speak to reporters by name at his weekly press conference. Using names is a Reagan ploy for flattering journalists, but as he can't remember them he has to use a seating chart. Presumably someone pinched his chart that day.
> (Column 8, Sydney Morning Herald. 10.I.1984)

(There are what one might term pseudo-names, such as Fred, which may be used as a term of address for anyone, known or unknown, but these are a separate issue and will not be dealt with here).

Having entered the NAME network, the extent of that prior contact will determine what choices are available in several ways. Firstly, it will determine what, if any, complex choices are available: one may know only the personal name (or the family name, or maybe only a nickname) of someone known casually, whereas

one will know all names of those one is intimate with. Secondly, the extent of prior contact will determine the range of name forms available. Someone not well known will tend to be given one form only (generally what can be called the least-marked form, which tends to be [full form] or [suffixed: y] for females and [full form] or [truncated] for males, while someone known very well is much more likely to be addressed with various name forms. (See Brown and Ford, 1964, who referred to this phenomenon among good friends as multiple naming, and below).

This wider choice range for those one knows well is used in a number of ways. Firstly, it enables a speaker to signal more delicately their assessment of an addressee in a particular situation, including signalling a desire to move the relationship on to a new footing. (Which will not always be towards greater intimacy: the breakdown of a relationship is frequently marked by gradual restriction of the range of address choices actually made).

In adult interaction with children, failure to use the usual term of address and use instead of a term which realises the opposed term in the NAME network (i.e. [full form] instead of [hypocorism], [complex] instead of [simplex]), is well understood by children to be an indication of adult disapproval and even anger. One four-year-old boy, usually called Robbie, was quite explicit about this knowledge: when asked what his name was, he replied 'Wobbie. Wobert means cwoss'.

The same phenomenon, involving the contrast between [simplex] and [complex] in the context of an adult communicating to adults via written rather than spoken language, but interpreted less affectively, is found in the following extract from a short story:

> I took him along to the board, and stood behind him while, short-sighted and without his glasses, he peered at it. There was a note there alright which said simply, 'Carl Lelouche left the Order today'. The formality of the notes always struck me as bizarre; why the surname for God's sake? He was one of us, a small group, a family almost; it was hardly likely we wouldn't be able to place him. But of course the formality was already a way of distancing; the full name like that, on a board, somehow isolated and removed him.
> (Gerard Windsor, Over and over les adieux. In Windsor: 1982:96-7).

There would seem to be a relationship between degree of delicacy in the NAME network and CONTACT in the tenor network such that more delicate choices are used to realise more CONTACT (with its concomitant positive affect) and less delicate choices are used to realise less CONTACT. When a less delicate choice contrasts with the usual (more delicate) choice, then it serves to indicate that the speaker is stepping back from the previously established

level of intimacy in the relationship. Such action is interpreted by the child as a withdrawal of affection and by adults as a distancing device.

The relationship between delicacy in NAME choice and extent of CONTACT reaches its limits with the choice of [hypocorism: suffixed] whose realisations offer a plethora of forms with which to vary the address repertoire between intimates but where the number of loops back into the system seems more relevant than the actual choices made. Whether there is any point in trying to distinguish Greglykins from Gregsypoos is a moot point: what is absolutely clear is that both are considera bly more intimate than Greggy and vastly more so than the least-marked form Greg. (Only 'straight' uses of these forms are being considered here: many realisations of the most delicate choices are used for teasing or as means of signalling that the recipient of such forms is behaving childishly in the opinion of the speaker. The whole phenomenon of inversion in the use of vocatives is too complex to be taken up here. (See Poynton, in preparation).

Finally, to take up the two related notions of over-lexicalization and hyperpolysemy/hypersynonymy mentioned above, which may serve to provide some basis for explaining the proliferation of seemingly equivalent but not identical name forms, apparently a genuine instance of free variation, which occurs at the most delicate end of the NAME network.

By the term hyperpolymorphy Wescott refers to the occurrence of a plurality of alternants for most slang items and he sees this as one of the salient grammatical characteristics of slang. (Wescott, 1976/1980:402). Though he attempts no explanation of the phenomenon he describes, Wescott's paper is important because it focusses attention clearly on a set of linguistic characteristics which are describeable, and which are presented as characteristics of slang which is treated seriously as a type or variety of language rather than as an arbitrary set of lexical items invented willy-nilly in the 'never-ending search for originality' which is the kind of explanation often provided by students of slang. Halliday refers to such explanations and proceeds to offer his own explanations of what is essentially the same phenomenon, with respect to anti-languages, in the following terms:

> But there is more to it than that. If we consider underworld languages in terms of a general comparison with the languages of the overworld, we find in them a characteristic functional orientation, away from the experiential mode of meaning toward the interpersonal and the textual modes. Both the textual orientation (the "set" toward the message, in Jakobson's terms) and the interpersonal (the "set" toward addresser/ addressee...) tend to produce this overlexicalization: the former because it takes the form of verbal competition and display, in which kennings of all

> kinds are at a premium; the latter because sets of words which are denotatively synonymous are clearly distinguished by their attitudinal components...
>
> Both of these are normal features of everyday language, in which textual and interpersonal meanings are interwoven with experiential meanings into a single fabric of discourse. What characterizes what we are calling anti-languages is their relatively greater orientation in this direction.
> (Halliday, 1976:571-2, emphasis in original).

To the extent that slang, the language of any in-group, and intimate language, characteristic of an in-group that is perhaps most typically a dyad, can be said to be anti-languages insofar as each 'creates an alternative reality' and 'is to be defined...as a systematic pattern of tendencies in the selection of meanings to be exchanged', then Halliday's account holds for them too. As contact increases towards intimacy then a new balance needs to be established between metafunctions, establishing priority for interpersonal meanings, and a variety of linguistic techniques will be used which serve both to create and maintain the strong affective bonds which characterize that relationship, to constantly reinforce its reality by saying in as many ways as possible that things are indeed so in this tiny world.

On the basis of such an interpretation of the relationship of NAME choices to TENOR choices, there seems to be a realisational principle operating which may well be generalisable to other lexicogrammatical systems, just as a principle of reciprocity seems to be the general means by which tenor choices from the POWER system are operationalized. Might it not be possible to characterise points along a generalised CONTACT cline, with poles [most] and [least], in terms of a parallel principle of proliferation?

If such a principle does operate, then it is almost certainly not in terms of a simple correlation between most/least CONTACT and more/less proliferation, but rather in terms of shifts in the range of choices available within a number of lexico-grammatical and possibly discourse systems as well, as choices are made from the conjoint systems which together make up the CONTACT dimension of tenor. With respect to POWER and its principle of reciprocity it is certainly the case that subtle shifts in power relationships are reflected not merely in the fact of reciprocity or non-reciprocity but in terms of what systems are involved and what the overall balance is in terms of reciprocity, e.g. if the user of the more familiar term of address is not also the one who nominates the topics of the conversation then the balance of power may not be quite where one first thought it was.

Systemic linguistics has the potential for providing the most comprehensive and the most integrated account of the relationship between language and situation if the kind of detailed account of

grammatical, and more recently discourse, systems that is now familiar is paralleled by careful and detailed formalisations of contextual (register) categories. Much needs to be done, however, before it might be possible to say that we have grasped the essentials of how the language we use is shaped by our relations with the various alters we share our lives with.

Notes

1. I am indebted to Robin Fawcett who suggested this method of notation and did the first version of it. He also provided a number of the multiply-suffixed hypocoristic name forms listed in Table 1.

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FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS IN A GRAMMAR: A REVIEW OF DEPLOYABLE RECOGNITION CRITERIA

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1. Functional linguistics

Some years before functionalism became fashionable in linguistics (see Newmeyer, 1980, Chapter 7 for discussion), systemic linguists addressed themselves to the task of developing a functional model of language. The functional orientation they adopted reflected itself in a number of different areas: (1) the use of functions (or relations) alongside classes (or categories) in their structural descriptions (Hudson, 1967 [1981]); (2) the use of metafunctional components reflecting clusters of paradigmatic oppositions in their grammars (Halliday, 1967-8; 1969; 1970); (3) a concern with cohesion, or relations beyond the sentence (Halliday, 1964 [1967];Hasan, 1968); (4) an interest in register, the relationship between language and situational context (Halliday et al., 1964; Gregory, 1967); and (5) the application of their model in such diverse areas as stylistics (Enkvist et al., 1964; Halliday, 1971 [1973]), language teaching (Doughty et al., 1971), language learning (Halliday, 1975), socialisation (Bernstein ed., 1973), artificial intelligence (Winograd, 1972) and others. Of these areas, it is the second, the use of paradigmatically based metafunctional components in the grammar which most clearly distinguishes systemic from other functionalist approaches. In this paper linguistic and other relevant evidence for these components will be reviewed, and their relation to the fourth of the systemicists' functionalist orientations noted above, register analysis, will be briefly considered.

2. The concept of metafunction

The first clear use of metafunctional components in the literature is found in Halliday's seminal 'Notes on transitivity and theme in English'. There, in an attempt to interpret the complex interaction between case relations, theme, and information structure, Halliday presented paradigmatic descriptions of TRANSITIVITY and THEME, and was able to demonstrate that while choices within the TRANSITIVITY and THEME networks showed a high degree of interdependence among themselves, there was relatively little systemic dependence between these two major networks. The argument is further developed in Halliday (1969 [1981]), where MOOD options are considered as well, and semantically orientated glosses are introduced for the three major clusters of choices considered:

clause networks	general component of the grammar
TRANSITIVITY	experiential
MOOD	interpersonal
THEME	intratextual (later textual)

Fig.1: Halliday's 1969 glossing of clause systems as functional components

As well, Halliday suggests a fourth component, the logical, realised by univariate structures (for which see Halliday, 1981), deriving from recursive systems. Because of the systemic dependence of these recursive systems on certain TRANSITIVITY options, this logical component would later be treated alongside the experiential as a subcomponent of the ideational metafunction. Thus, by 1973, the relationship between metafunctional components and clause systems was that outlined in Figure 2. This relationship has remained stable in Halliday's writing since that time.

clause networks	metafunctional components	
TRANSITIVITY	experiential	ideational
(recursive systems)	logical	
MOOD	interpersonal	
THEME	textual	

Fig.2: Halliday's 1973 onwards assignment of clause networks to metafunctional components

In origin then, the concept of metafunction is an empirical claim about the paradigmatic organisation of clause systems in English. It is publicly testable only to the extent that it refers (1) to a particular rank - the clause; (2) on a particular stratum - lexicogrammar (by which is meant the first stratum of non-phonological networks, referred to generally by Fawcett and sometimes by Halliday - rather perversely to my mind - as semantics); (3) to closed system items - grammar; and (4) to synchronic patterns. Since its introduction the concept has been extended (principally by Halliday, 1973:141; 1978:132 and Fawcett, 1980:95) far beyond these empirically oriented limitations to include other ranks (groups and words), open system items (lexis), other strata (the tone group in phonology), and developmental patterns (Halliday, 1975). Something of the nature of these developments can be seen from the function/rank matrix presented in Halliday 1973:141 and reproduced as Figure 3 below.

These extensions are made principally on the basis of analogy to the kinds of meanings associated with certain metafunctionally interpreted systems in synchronic clause rank grammatical networks (although structural evidence is sometimes appealed to as well). The major problem with these extensions is that once the concept of metafunction ceases to refer to the paradigmatic organisation of system networks it cannot be tested by writing optimal (sic) grammars for English and observing how systems cluster as Hudson, (1974 [1981]) suggests. An example of extension by analogy will be considered in section 4 below; and in section 6 a way of making such extensions testable will be considered. In the meantime, as a point of departure for the discussion, the concept

of metafunction will be approached as an empirical claim about synchronic clause rank systems.

The focus on grammatical systems stressed above may come as a surprise to those familiar with Halliday's more recent writings in which metafunctional components are referred to as semantic: '...we shall assume that the semantic system consist of four functional components: experiential, logical, interpersonal

function / rank	IDEATIONAL: Experiential	IDEATIONAL: Logical	INTERPERSONAL	TEXTUAL
CLAUSE	TRANSITIVITY types of process participants & circumstances (identity clauses) (things, facts & reports)	condition addition report; POLARITY	MOOD types of speech function modality (the WH-function)	THEME types of message (identity as text relation) (identification, predication, reference, substitution)
Verbal GROUP	TENSE (verb classes)	catenation secondary tense	PERSON ('marked' options)	VOICE ('contrastive' options)
Nominal GROUP	MODIFICATION epithet function enumeration (noun classes) (adjective classes)	classification sub-modification	ATTITUDE attitudinal modifiers intensifiers	DEIXIS determiners 'phoric' elements (qualifiers) (definite article)
Adverbial (incl. prepositional) GROUP	'MINOR PROCESSES' prepositional relations (classes of circumstantial adjunct)	narrowing sub-modification	COMMENT (classes of comment adjunct)	CONJUNCTION (classes of discourse adjunct)
WORD (incl. lexical item)	LEXICAL 'CONTENT' (taxonomic organization of vocabulary)	compounding derivation	LEXICAL 'REGISTER' (expressive words) (stylistic organization of vocabulary)	COLLOCATION (collocational organization of vocabulary)
INFORMATION UNIT			TONE intonation systems	INFORMATION distribution & focus

HYPOTACTIC COMPLEXES OF CLAUSE, GROUP & WORD

PARATACTIC COMPLEXES (all ranks): co-ordination, apposition

COHESION ('above the sentence': non-structural relations): reference; substitution & ellipsis; conjunction; lexical cohesion

Fig.3: Halliday's 1973 function/rank matrix

and textual' (1978:128). As is usual in Halliday's later writings it is not clear whether the term semantic is being used to refer to grammatical networks or not here. But the potential for misunderstanding is very clear. Such a passage implies that the metafunctions are opposed to TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME as semantics is opposed to grammar - the difference in other words is a stratal one, as outlined in Figure 4:

semantics	grammar
experiential	TRANSITIVITY
interpersonal	MOOD
textual	THEME

Fig. 4: Halliday's later implication of metafunction and grammatical systems as stratally opposed

Appealing as this model may appear, it presents an extremely misrepresentative picture of what systemic theory has so far been able to achieve. To date, reasonable descriptions of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME, and of some group systems have been offered by Halliday, Hudson, Fawcett and others; and some of these have proved comprehensive and explicit enough to be implemented in a generative format in various AI projects (Winograd, 1972; Davey, 1978; and currently the work of Mann and Matthiessen at the Information Sciences Institute in California). Beyond this, next to nothing has been published in the way of semantic networks underlying and stratally opposed to those concerned with TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME (Halliday's 1984a approach - SPEECH FUNCTION - reported in Martin, 1981a - is an exception, and in no way constitutes a fully elaborated semantic stratum of descriptions). This means that to date, the semantic stratum proposed in Figure 4 has next to no content, and that consequently the assignment of metafunctional components to that stratum is quite meaningless. To the extent that the labels experiential, logical, interpersonal and textual have any content at all, they do so by referring to grammatical systems. Now, as in 1969, they are names for 'functional components in the organisation of the grammar of a language' (1981: 139). Thus the focus on grammatical relations in this paper.

It may prove useful at this point to review the nature of the argumentation motivating a metafunctional interpretation of clause grammar. This argumentation runs along the following lines. First, consider the systems [transitive/intransitive], [declarative/interrogative] and [marked Theme/unmarked Theme]. These are outlined in Figure 5 and illustrated in 1 to 6 below.



Fig.5: three clause systems (VOICE and THEME analysis for purposes of illustration only; not intended as descriptions of English)

[transitive]
1. Malachi plays the bass.

[intransitive]
2. Don plays well.

[declarative]
3. Lester plays the trumpet.

[interrogative]
4. Does Lester play the trumpet?

[marked Theme]
5. The reeds Roscoe and Joseph handle.

[unmarked Theme]
6. Roscoe and Joseph handle the reeds.

Now consider three further systems: [active/passive], [polar/wh] and [cleft/uncleft]. When added to the network in Figure 5, these systems can be seen to subclassify rather than crossclassify features included there. Only [transitive] clauses can be [active] or [passive]; so this system depends on the feature [transitive]. Similarly, only [interrogative] clauses can be [polar] or [wh]; and only [marked Theme] clauses are [cleft] or [uncleft]. These dependencies are shown in Figure 6 and illustrated in 7 to 12.



Fig.6: dependency of clause systems illustrated

[active]
7. Malachi plays the bass.

[passive]
8. The bass is played by Malachi.

[polar]
9. Does Lester play the trumpet?

[wh]
10. What does Lester play?

[cleft]
11. Its the reeds Roscoe and Joseph handle.

[uncleft]
12. The reeds Roscoe and Joseph handle.

Looking at Figure 6, one can see that the systems considered are beginning to cluster in terms of their paradigmatic dependency on each other. Moreover, this dependency is semantically interpretable in terms of the function of these systems. Systems 1 and 2 have to do with a speaker's representation of experience: the type of process and the nature of the participants involved. Systems 3 and 4 have to do with interaction: what the speaker is doing with the listener in conversation. And systems 5 and 6 have to do with the way in which the clause as part of a text unfolds: how the clause fits into its context. Systems 1 and 2 represent the kind of meaning encoded through TRANSITIVITY: experiential meaning. Systems 3 and 4 represent the kind of meaning encoded through MOOD: interpersonal meaning. And Systems 5 and 6 represent the kind of meaning encoded through THEME: textual meaning. It is Halliday's experience, and that of a number of other systemicists (even Hudson, who expresses reservations about the metafunctional organisation of grammar in 1974 [1981], draws networks clearly organised in this way as late as 1971:69-71), that as clause networks are developed beyond the delicacy (and naivety!) of Figure 6, systems continue to cluster in terms of dependency on each other, and that the three largest clusters reflect the metafunctional organisation of grammar being considered here.

It is easy to see from the form of this argument that paradigmatic dependency is crucial to motivating metafunctional organisation in a grammar. So in section 3 the criteria provided by paradigmatic dependency will be examined in detail. Systemicists do not appear to rely on any single criterion as necessary or sufficient for assigning systems to metafunctions, and examples will be given wherever possible of descriptions which do and do not make use of the criterion being considered.

3.1. Paradigmatic criteria

1. Systems X and Y are in different metafunctions if the clause is their point of origin. (cf. discussion in Fawcett 1980:35-6)

The abstract form of this criterion is presented in Figure 7.



Fig. 7: criterion 1 - simultaneous entry

This criterion is satisfied in Halliday (1976) and is illustrated in Figure 8. Halliday assigns MOOD to the interpersonal metafunction and PROCESS TYPE to the experiential.



Fig. 8: simultaneous entry satisfied

This criterion is not satisfied elsewhere in Halliday's descriptions (e.g. 1978) nor in Fawcett (1980). Halliday (1978:132) treats POLARITY and PROCESS TYPE as experiential, although both are entered simultaneously as illustrated in Figure 9. Similarly, Fawcett (1980:95) treats PROCESS TYPE and CIRCUMSTANCE as experiential though both have the clause as their entry condition as illustrated in Figure 10.



Fig.9: simultaneous entry unsatisfied (Halliday, 1978)



Fig.10: simultaneous entry unsatisfied (Fawcett, 1980)

2. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if one provides an entry condition for the other. (cf. discussion in Fawcett, 1980:34-5)

The abstract form of this criterion is presented in Figure 11.



Fig. 11: criterion 2 - systemic dependence

Satisfaction of this criterion has been illustrated in Figure 6. For example, systemicists typically treat VOICE (variously analysed) as dependent on the type of process selected (e.g. Fawcett, 1980:137)

and thus as an experiential system (cf. the features [operative/ receptive] in Halliday 1967a). This does not mean that textual meaning is not relevant to an explanation of why a clause is active or passive. Some consideration of THEME is essential to explain VOICE selection. But in terms of its paradigmatic dependency VOICE is an experiential system.
This criterion is not satisfied in Fawcett (1980) nor in Halliday (1970 [1976]) as Figure 12 illustrates. Fawcett considers ATTITUDINAL systems to comprise a separate metafunctional component even though they depend in large part on the feature [declarative] (cf. Unfortunately I lost/*Sadly did I lose?/*Luckily come here), and should thus be grouped with interactional as interpersonal according to criterion 2. Similarly, Halliday treats MODULATION as part of the experiential metafunction even though it depends on the feature [indicative] just as the interpersonal system MODALITY does (cf . He must be here/Must he be here?/*Must be here by six).



Fig. 12: systemic dependence unsatisfied
(Fawcett 1980; Halliday 1970 [1976])

3. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if they each provide part of a conjunctive entry condition for some system Z.

The abstract form of this criterion is presented in Fig. 13



Fig. 13: criterion 3 - involved in a conjunctive entry condition

This criterion can be illustrated as both satisified and not by considering the interdependency of POLARITY, MOOD and TAGS in English. The TAG system allowing both [reversed] and [constant] polarity depends on the clause being both [positive] and [declarative] (cf. He came, did he?/didn't he?; *He didn't come, didn't he; He didn't come, did he?). Halliday, 1982, appears to treat POLARITY and MODALITY as interpersonal, satisfying the criterion (contrast Halliday, 1973, where POLARITY is assigned to the logical metafunction, and Halliday, 1978, where it is experiential at clause rank and interpersonal in the verbal group - if anything underlines the need for criteria in assigning systems to functional components it is inconsistencies such as these!). Fawcett, 1980:95, treats POLARITY (referred to by him as NEGATIVITY) as a separate functional component, thereby not satisfying this criterion. Figure 14 raises the potentially embarrassing problem for Fawcett of having a system, the TAG system, dependent on features from two different metafunctional components. Presumably, other than paradigmatic criteria would have to be applied in determining its metafunctional address.



Fig. 14: involvement in a conjunctive entry condition satisfied (Halliday, 1982) and not (Fawcett, 1980)

4. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if they each provide part of a disjunctive entry condition for some system Z.

The abstract form of this criterion is presented in Figure 15.



Fig. 15: criterion 4 - involved in a disjunctive entry condition

This criterion is illustrated in Figure 16 where the interaction of PROCESS TYPE and CIRCUMSTANCE is outlined. Both systems are taken as experiential by Halliday, 1973, and Fawcett, 1980. The network allows for both The book is on the table [relational:circumstantial: location] and John sat there [material/circumstantial:location].



Fig. 16: involvement in a disjunctive entry condition satisfied (Halliday, 1973; Fawcett, 1980)

5. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if a markedness relation holds between them. (see Halliday and Martin 1981:11)

The abstract form of this criterion is presented in Figure 17.



Fig. 17: criterion 5 - involved in a markedness relation

This criterion can be illustrated as both satisfied and not by considering the interaction of POLARITY and MOOD ([exclamative] clauses in particular). As noted above, Halliday (1982) appears to treat POLARITY as interpersonal while Fawcett considers it a distinct functional component in spite of the markedness relation between the features [positive] and [exclamative]: What a fool John is! but not *What a fool John isn't.



Fig. 18: involvement in a markedness relation satisfied (Halliday, 1982) and not (Fawcett, 1980)

6. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if they are a special type of system (i.e. recursive).

The only example of this criterion in the literature is found in Halliday, who most clearly in 1979 argues that all and only recursive systems constitute the logical metafunction. As noted above, Halliday sees connections between these recursive systems and experiential ones. These connections appear to be based on criterion 2 - systemic dependence (see Halliday, 1978:131). The abstract form of this criterion is given in Figure 19.



Fig. 19: criterion 6 - being a special (i.e. recursive) type of system

Both the selection of SPEAKER TYPE and TENSE are recursive systems in English and are thus assigned to the logical metafunction. The SPEAKER TYPE system is dependent on the PROCESS TYPE feature [verbal], which exemplifies the kind of interconnection Halliday sees between logical and experiential systems, generalised as ideational. SPEAKER TYPE and TENSE are outlined in Figure 20 (there TENSE is portrayed, somewhat controversially, as a clause rank system; its rank is not really crucial to criterion 6, since this criterion is not oriented to paradigmatic dependency per se).



Fig. 20: recursive systems illustrated

Fawcett (1980) treats TENSE as experiential rather than logical, and treats non-recursive systems such as supplementary linkage (furthermore, moreover, in addition - 1980:178) as logical, and so does not appear to be making any use of this criterion in defining his logical component.

7. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if semantically parallel.

This criterion refers to the fact that different systems or clusters of systems may reflect parallel semantic oppositions which can be abstracted in a generalised network combining what the grammar actually treats as distinct systems. An example of this line of arguing is found in Halliday, 1984a,where parallels are drawn between MODALITY and TEMPORALITY (and with MODULATION and POLARITY as well, though these will not be discussed here). Both the MODALITY and TEMPORALITY systems have 'median' and 'outer' values as Figure 21 shows.

The generalised VALIDITY COMMENT system is extended to include POLARITY in Figure 22. It is presumably because these three systems of MODALITY, TEMPORALITY and POLARITY can be generalised in this way that Halliday implicates TEMPORALITY as interpersonal whereas Fawcett includes it (under the heading of time specification) in the experiential component.



Fig. 21: criterion 7 - semantically parallel oppositions



Fig.22: VALIDITY COMMENT in English - Halliday, 1984a

A good example of this criterion not being satisfied is found in Halliday (1970 [1976]) where MODALITY and MODULATION are similarly generalised, but MODALITY is described as interpersonal and MODULATION as experiential. The semantic parallels between these two systems are outlined in Figure 23.



Fig.23: MODALITY and MODULATION in English generalised (Halliday, 1970)

3.2. Syntagmatic criteria

In this section syntagmatic criteria will be reviewed.

8. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if they generate the same type of structure.

This argument is developed in Halliday, 1979, where he characterises experiential structures as segmental, interpersonal structures as prosodic, and textual structures as culminative. For example, systems such as ATTITUDE and MODALITY are characterised as prosodic because they can be realised at several different places in a single clause as 13 and 14 illustrate.

13. Jesus I wish that cocksucker would shut his fucking face.

14. I think it might be a good idea if he kept quiet, don't you?

Both ATTITUDE and MODALITY are treated as interpersonal by Halliday (1973), but TENSE and temporal CIRCUMSTANCE are treated as experiential in Halliday (1978:132) although these systems effect a prosodic realisation of TIME in the clause as illustrated in 15.

15. All day he kept on dashing in and out of the flat.

9. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if there is some syntagmatic dependence between their realisations.

This criterion refers to a kind of semantic dependence between different systems which will presumably have to be handled paradigmatically at some stage, but which has not yet been formalised in this way. One example of this is illustrated in 16 where the realisation of TENSE and LOCATION in time agree (cf. Halliday, 1984b). Note the unacceptability of 17 and 18.

16. John has just arrived today.

17. *John has just arrived last week.

18. *John had just arrived now.

Adverbial and verbal realisations of MODALITY exhibit a similar type of concord, though perhaps less strictly so than for TENSE and LOCATION in time. Both types of realisation of MODALITY are treated as interpersonal by Halliday (1970 [1976]), but Halliday's 1979 arguments about all and only recursive structures being logical makes TENSE logical and LOCATION in time experiential, violating this criterion.

19. Surely that would be a Range.

20. ??Certainly that might be a Range, mightn't it?

10. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if they are involved in the realisation of the same functions (grammatical relations).

This argument is developed in Martin, 1981a, and relates to clause SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS and MOOD. Clausal ELLIPSIS must be described with respect to the structural functions Subject and Finite (comprising Halliday's Mood element) and Predicator, Complement and Adjunct (comprising his Residue). These functions are generated by the MOOD network. Since ELLIPSIS determines whether or not Mood and Residue are realised, and must be described with respect to these functions, it seems necessary to treat it as an interpersonal rather than a textual system. This criterion is satisfied in Martin, (1981a),but not in Halliday and Hasan, (1976), where clausal ELLIPSIS is treated as textual. This is not to say that considerations of THEME and INFORMATION are irrelevant to explaining why certain types of ELLIPSIS and SUBSTITUTION are selected. But the ELLIPSIS and SUBSTITUTION patterns themselves must be specified interpersonally. Clausal ellipsis and substitution are illustrated in 21 to 23.

21. Is John coming?
    - Yes, he is Ø

22. Is John coming?
    - Yes Ø

23. Is John coming?
    - Possibly so

11. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if the structures they generate encode semantically analogous relations.

This criterion is the syntagmatic version of criterion 7. It has never been explicitly developed but may be implicit in Halliday's generalisation of experiential and logical meaning as ideational. It involves noting similarities of meaning between univariate and experiential multivariate structures.

In describing the types of semantic relation involved in univariate structures, whether hypotactic or paratactic, Halliday (1984b) recognises two general relations - expansion and projection:

24. John came in and sat down. (expansion)

25. 'Sit down', John said. (projection)

Within expansion, three subcategories are suggested - extension, elaboration and enhancement:

26. John was tired and he was hungry. (extension)

27. John was tired; he was absolutely exhausted. (elaboration)

28. John was tired because he hadn't slept that night. (enhancement)

Extending involves adding something, elaboration has to do with restating, and enhancement with qualifying.

Certain parallels can be seen between these general types of expanding relation and a number of multivariate structures, at both clause and group rank. In the clause for example, Range elements represent a kind of elaboration of the Process (do a dance, sing a song, shoot a gun); Goals are a kind of extension (hug a stranger, drop a ball, shoot a deer); and Circumstances function as enhancements of the clause (run in the yard, meet Mary after six, play with John). Similarly, in nominal groups, Classifiers elaborate through subclassification, Epithets extend by adding qualities and Qualifiers enhance (the large stone wall in the garden). And in the verbal group, phrasal particles elaborate, modulating phased elements can be interpreted as extending, and adverbial groups as enhancing (kept on hilariously sending up the audience - adverbials like hilariously are normally taken experientially as Circumstances of manner, with their relation to the Process no different than had the Circumstance been realised by a prepositional phrase; but this misses the traditional sense in which the adverbial modifies the verb in what looks like a hypotactic logical relation). Generalising expanding relations across univariate and multivariate structures in this way might then be taken as evidence for the general ideational interpretation of experiential and logical meaning.

This argument is rather weak in that 'semantically analogous' is not well defined. But if expansion can be somehow extended to include Agent, Process, Range, Goal, Beneficiary and Circumstance but not Theme/Rheme or Mood/Residue, to cover Epithet, Classifier, Thing and Qualifier but not Deictic, and to include phased modulation, phrasal particles, adverbials and Events but not TENSE or MODALITY, then a relevant criterion may be available.

3.3. Ranking the criteria

One thing that is clear from the variety of criteria offered to this point is that systemicists need to be more explicit about which they are using when making claims about the number of functional components they recognise in their models. Fawcett (1980) recognises eight principal (along with a possible three minor) components in contrast to Halliday's four. These are aligned (as far as possible) in Figure 24 for purpose of comparison:



Fig. 24: Halliday's and Fawcett's functional components compared

Aligned in this way, the differences seem to amount to a question of delicacy. But this is not good enough. The question is, more delicate with respect to what criteria? In establishing negativity (Halliday's POLARITY) as a separate functional component Fawcett seems to be placing more weight on criterion 1 - simultaneous entry - than on criteria 3 (joint involvement in a conjunctive entry condition), 4 (joint involvement in a disjunctive entry condition) or 5 (involvement in a markedness relation), all of which are relevant to the connections between POLARITY and MOOD. Or, in recognising a distinct affective and modality component, Fawcett seems to be placing little weight on criterion 2 (providing an entry condition for another system); both affective choices and modality have MOOD options as their entry condition, although they are relatively self-contained once entered. Similarly, in distinguishing thematic from informational, Fawcett seems to be ignoring the interconnections spelled out by Halliday in his 1967/8 papers on TRANSITIVITY and THEME.

Unfortunately, neither Halliday nor Fawcett have been very explicit about the weight they give to the criteria discussed above. Fawcett (1980:36) does write in favour of using similarity of meaning as a guide. But this involves making use of subjective intuitions about relations between systems, and has no empirical content. As such it leads simply to notional categorisations, which are in no way publicly testable.

It is one thing to agree with Gregory (1982:72) that we need to be careful about attempting 'to prove metafunctions'. Certainly there are different ways of ranking the criteria offered, often no doubt in light of particular descriptive goals. But it is quite another to avoid the question of criteria altogether. If certain goals demand that weight be given to criteria leading to one categorisation rather than another, fine. But both the goals and the weightings need to be made public if systemic grammar is to be seen as making any testable claims about the functional organisation of language.

3.4. Some related factors

The remaining factors are far too weak to be considered as criteria at this stage. Nevertheless, they do appear to influence the metafunctional address of systems in the writings of various systemicists, and so will be reviewed here.

> 12. Systems X and Y cannot form a metafunction unless they are usually realised in a clause.

A slightly stronger reading of this would read: 'Unless they are described'.

One good example of a set of systems infrequently realised in a clause (VOCATION would be another), and usually ignored or confused with CONJUNCTION in descriptions of English is CONTINUITY (Martin, 1981b; 1983c). The systems involved all relate clauses to their context, as does CONJUNCTION, but the systems are generally realised

within rather than between clauses and involve a different set of oppositions. These systems are presented in Figure 25. Since they are infrequently realised in a clause, and seldom described, they are a poor candidate for a metafunctional component in spite of satisfying criterion 1 and being relatively self contained.



Fig.25: CONTINUITY in English (Martin, 1983c)

13. Systems X and Y can't form a metafunction unless there are a large number of systems dependent on them.

This factor refers to systems satisfying criterion 1 (simultaneous entry) but which have very few systems dependent on them. One such system is VOCATION which allows for the insertion of a name for an addressee into a clause. There are positional variants which need to be accounted for, but for the most part the choices available have to do with group, not clause structure. VOCATION is simultaneous with all other clause systems, but has never been realised as a metafunctional component, presumably in part because of its small size, and in part because of criterion 12 - infrequent realisation. Halliday (1984b) hovers between treating it as interpersonal because of its meaning or textual because of its tendency to be realised before or after the Theme or after the Rheme in clause structure. Fawcett, on the other hand, treats a similarly minor system, negativity, as a distinct metafunctional component in spite of its small size.

14. Systems X and Y can't be located metafunctionally if conditional realisation statements are used to replace wiring that might have satisfied one of criteria 1 to 7.

Fawcett (1980) uses conditional realisation statements which have the potential, especially where negative conditions are specified, of destroying the paradigmatic environments to which criteria 1 to 7 refer. One possible use of such conditioning realisation statements would be to replace the correlative marking referred to in criterion 5. The I/T notation in Figure 18 could thus be replaced by a realisation rule of the following form:

[exclamative] ↘ +Wh; Wh/{Attribute / Circumstance} ; Wh^Subject unless [negative]

This rule inserts the Wh function, conflates it with either an Attribute (How silly he is!) or Circumstance (How quickly she ran!), and concatenates it with Subject in the environment of a [positive] clause. Similar rules could be used to replace the [positive/negative] system in the CONTINUITY network in Figure 25. This would in turn result in reducing the number of systems involved, perhaps making the system less likely as a metafunctional component given factor 13.

The interaction of conditional realisation statements and network wiring needs to be seriously reviewed in light of the above remarks. Something more than notational variants is likely to be found at stake.

15. Systems X and Y can't be related metafunctionally if knowledge of the world is appealed to to handle paradigmatic dependencies between them.

A good example of this factor relates to the treatment of MOOD in the work of many systemicists. MOOD is typically subclassified as in Figure 26, with Wh questions focussing on the Subject distinguished from those focussing on other constituents for structural reasons - [Wh Subject] questions do not involve the concatenation of Finite and Subject that others do.



Fig. 26: MOOD (focus on wh questions) in English

But it makes no sense to select [Wh other:Complement] if for example the clause being generated is [intransitive] from the point of view of TRANSITIVITY. So in a sense, the selection of this feature depends on or is controlled by particular selections from TRANSITIVITY. In general systemicists have not attempted to formalise this dependency in either their networks or realisation rules. Further problems arise in considering THEME as to what is selected as Theme. A Complement cannot be chosen if the clause is [intransitive].

It seems to be generally felt, although only Fawcett (1980) has argued this explicitly,that 'knowledge of the world' is responsible for preventing incompatible selections of features from different metafunctional components, and that these dependencies will not be formalised in the grammar. This raises the question of what kinds of dependency are the responsibility of grammar, but this will not be explored here. The point as far as this paper is concerned is that when systemicists explicitly or implicitly make use of 'knowledge of the world' in the way described here, they are making decisions about the applicability of criteria 1 to 7 above.

16. Systems X and Y are in the same metafunction if they encode the same kind of meaning.

This factor probably has no place in a list of criteria orientated to giving the concept of metafunction some empirical base. But it has been advocated by Fawcett (1980:37) and so will be reviewed here. Certainly it must be admitted that it is a rule of thumb used by many systemicists.

This criterion suffers from two main weaknesses. First of all, it is circular. The reason linguists have intuitions about what types of meaning systems encode is because of the metafunctional organisation of grammar. So these intuitions are hardly criterial. Moreover, when linguists' intuitions differ, there is no way to resolve a conflict. Second, this factor is open to rampant misuse via the notional fallacy, which in this context takes the names and accompanying connotations of metafunctional components and makes them defining. A good example of this danger relates to Halliday and Fawcett's use of the term 'logical'. Since 1975 Halliday has argued that all and only recursive systems are logical. However, Fawcett (1980) argues that supplementary linkage is also logical, since it involves something of the 'logic' of natural language. A very similar notional fallacy is found in Halliday and Hasan (1976) who argue that CONJUNCTION is textual since it relates sentences to each other in a text. They then go on to subclassify CONJUNCTION as internal which they relate to interpersonal meaning and external which they relate to experiential meaning. Needless to say, this makes their metafunctional interpretation of CONJUNCTION self-contradictory.

This final factor obviously has a role to play in the heuristic by which systems and metafunction are explored. But as a criterion

for establishing the metafunctional address of systems in a public way it has nothing to recommend it. To the extent that it is used in establishing function components in a grammar, these components will have that much less empirical validity.

4. Arguing by analogy to other ranks

Since systemicists have generally attempted to extend the concept of metafunction beyond clause rank patterns, some consideration will be given here to how this analogical extension proceeds. The problem is, of course, that at ranks other than the clause there is no convincing paradigmatic evidence to be found. Group, word and clause complex systems do not cluster into neat metafunctionally interpretable bundles the way clause systems do.

Some syntagmatic evidence can be found. Halliday (1984b) points out that both nominal and verbal groups begin with a deictic element, treat experiential type meanings segmentally, and allow for the prosodic interpolation of attitude and modality reflecting their interpersonal organisation. In this form of argument, parallels are being drawn as far as the textual component is concerned between the Theme in a clause, the Deictic in a nominal group and the Finite in a verbal group both in terms of the initial position in which they are realised and their general function which involves relating clauses, and nominal and verbal groups to the context in which they are used. (Similarly, you fucking bastard you prosodically realises attitude as did I think it might be a good idea if he kept quiet, don't you? in 3.2. above.)

As far as deixis is concerned, this form of arguing might be extended to projecting clause complexes, where the projecting clause situates the projected clause in a particular discourse plane. The textual analogy is summarised in Figure 27.

rank	example	structural function	type of textual meaning
clause complex	John said he'd come	alpha clause	verbal projection
clause	John arrived	Theme	point of departure
nominal group	The man arrived	Deictic	participant identification
verbal group	The man has just arrived	Finite	primary tense

Fig. 27: Extending the textual function by analogy across ranks

But the evidence is in general far from clear. Nominal groups, for example, realise textual meaning in the Numerative (the second boy), Epithet (a bigger boy) and Thing (this one) elements as well as in the Deictic slot - hardly the predicted culminative pattern. To the extent that metafunctional organisation is present it seems to be of a fossilised kind, reflecting more the phylogenesis of

group structure than a synchronic fact about English or any other language. Much of the analogy to other ranks (and strata) by Halliday and Fawcett is in fact predicated on criterion 16 (similarity of meaning), the weakest criterion of all in terms of giving metafunctional components empirical validity.

It should be pointed out here, however, that cases of paradigmatic diversification at other ranks do occur. Martin (cf. Rochester and Martin, 1979; Martin, 1983a) hints at a textual network for REFERENCE in nominal groups which might be seen as wired in parallel with experiential systems (if the latter can in fact be stratified with respect to nominal group networks). As noted above, Halliday and Hasan (1976) distinguish internal and external conjunction, relating the former to interpersonal meaning and the latter to experiential. This interpretation seems at first to be based simply on criterion 16, similarity of meaning, since their description would have to be formalised along the lines of Figure 28.



Fig. 28: Halliday and Hasan's interpretation of CONJUNCTION (1976)

But it turns out that when more delicate descriptions are worked out for internal and external conjunction, the kinds of choices internal conjunction involves differ from the oppositions constituting external relations. Consider, for example, the networks for internal and external concession in Figures 29 and 30.



Figure 29: Internal concession in English (Martin, 1983c)



Figure 30: External concession in English (Martin, 1983c)

Overall there are a large number of conjunctions that can only be used internally; these give the networks for internal and external conjunction a very different shape. So in fact Figure 28 must be reworked along the lines of Figure 31 in a comprehensive analysis. And in Figure 31 the systems are seen to cluster along metafunctionally interpretable lines.

The problems with assigning CONJUNCTION to a metafunctional component, alongside those noted in connection with clause ELLIPSIS in 3.2, show how important it is that paradigmatic descriptions are elaborated before systems are assigned to metafunctions. Halliday (1973 and 1978) assigns cohesion to the textual metafunction, presumably in light of criterion 16. But when the paradigmatic dependencies are themselves examined in detail, quite a different picture emerges. CONJUNCTION has its own metafunctional organisation. Clause ELLIPSIS needs to be assigned to the interpersonal metafunction. And the status of LEXICAL COHESION is unclear. Perhaps only REFERENCE emerges as an unequivocally textual system once criterion 1 to 5 are brought to bear on the wiring involved.



Fig. 31: Metafunctional organisation of CONJUNCTION (Martin, 1983c)

In short then, empirical evidence for the concept of metafunction at other than clause rank is not always easy to find. There is only a little hard evidence at group rank, and what there is tends to reflect the phylogenesis of English rather than its synchronic structure. This makes undertaking a global function/rank matrix for English a less than determinate task.

5. Other types of evidence

Before turning to a discussion of register in section 6, a number of other factors relevant to the metafunctional organisation of language will be considered. Two of these relate to 'extrinsic' evidence from psychology and sociology; two relate to language development, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic; and one relates to the way in which the metalanguages of linguistics model the phenomena in question.

First, it is possible that sociolinguistic evidence can be brought to bear on the question of recognising metafunctional components. It might be, for example, that in a particular situation type differences can be noted between groups of speakers with respect to one or another metafunction. Hawkins'(1977) work on codes implicates the textual metafunction and further studies might be able to localise code differences in particular contexts with one or another metafunction, thus providing indirect evidence for the metafunctional organisation of language.

A second type of evidence might be provided by psycholinguistics. It might be possible to show, for example, that language disorders affect one metafunctional component while leaving others intact. Rochester and Martin's (1979) work on schizophrenia points to a breakdown in the textual metafunction with experiential and interpersonal meaning largely unaffected. Further studies of thought disorders or types of aphasia, may well implicate the psychological reality of one or another metafunctional component.

Turning to phylogenetic factors, as reflected in language typology, it may turn out that languages tend to agree on what kinds of meaning go together and that systems that are difficult to pin down in one language are fairly clearly metafunctionally located in another. Tagalog, for example, (see Martin, 1981b) provides much stronger syntagmatic evidence than English for the distinction between CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY. CONTINUITY items in Tagalog all appear in the same set of post-verbal syntagmatic slots, whereas in English there is more flexibility of realisation. Conversely, the way in which Tagalog handles participant identification and Theme selection through its FOCUS system (Martin, 1983b) may be taken as support for the generalisation of textual meanings across ranks (Theme in the clause and Deictic in nominal groups) discussed in section 4 above. Contrastive studies of language typology may well in future shed considerable light on the status of metafunction as a universal organising principle for grammatical choice.

A fourth factor relates to language development in children. Halliday (1975) provides evidence that the child's uses of language do cluster into metafunctional components as the child moves into the adult system. Further studies along these lines, such as those recently completed by Painter (1982), seem certain to provide a number of insights into the ontogenetic reality of metafunction.

One final perspective which needs to be mentioned is that provided by the way in which rival theories of language model metafunctional diversity. Halliday himself was influenced by the Prague School in developing the idea of functional components in a grammar, and a number of contemporary models address the question at least implicitly. Early TG models, for example, used PS rules to develop the experiential organisation of a clause, obligatory T-rules triggered by dummy symbols generated by the base component (Imp, Q, Wh, etc.) to handle MOOD, and post cyclic optional T-rules to cover textually oriented phenomena such as thematic fronting. In later versions of this model, these parallels are replaced with stratal ones - pragmatics concerned itself with textual relations, semantics focussed on experiential meaning, and syntax addressed itself to various structural questions which in English tend to reflect MOOD. When compared to later versions of TG grammar, systemic grammar can be seen to be a basically 'importing' model: systemicists prefer to handle as many patterns as possible in their grammar, which has evolved into a semantically rich, functionally oriented semantax (not unlike Dik's independently evolving, and metafunctional organised functional grammars - 1978). TG grammar on the other hand has been more interested in 'exports' - assigning more and more descriptive responsibility to semantics, pragmatics and performance theory in an attempt to at first constrain, and then apparently to do away with altogether, rules of transformational power in their model.

The stratificational models of both Lamb and Gleason as well use strata to reflect metafunctional diversity, sharing with TG grammars a neo-Bloomfieldian concern with a relatively shallow syntax (Sullivan, 1980) linked up with a textually and experientially oriented semology. The fact that so many different models reflect experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning in one way or another is evidence that there are patterns there in the structure of language to be described. Just how much importance a model assigns to explicitly modelling these patterns is up to a given theory in light of its descriptive and explanatory goals.

6. Register and metafunction

As should be clear from sections 2 to 5, no matter how many types of evidence for the metafunctional organisation of system networks are considered, how the various factors are weighted and ranked and so on, there will always be some indeterminacy in assigning certain systems to metafunctions. It appears that considerations internal to language strongly implicate the existence of metafunctions, but leave certain problems unresolved. One way to try and clear up these areas of uncertainty would be to look at the relation between

language and context, on the assumption that language is the way it is because of the way it is used - that functional components exist because of what language has to do.

The study of the relation between language and context is referred to in systemic theory as the study of register. The links between metafunction and register were first noted by Halliday in the 1960s. His 1964 register categories of field, mode and style were developed independently of his analysis of clause systems into the networks referred to as TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME. In noting the obvious correlations between register categories and functional components, with field by and large determining TRANSITIVITY choice, mode by and large determining THEME selections and style (later termed tenor following Spencer and Gregory, 1964) MOOD choice, Halliday gave systemic theory its most powerful insight into language as a social semiotic, enriching the model with functionally oriented explanatory power far beyond that formalised in other generative models.

Halliday's proposal is open to empirical confirmation by manipulating the contextual variables of field, mode and tenor and seeing just which parts of the grammar are affected. Sadly, rigorous experimentation along these lines has never taken place. If the hook-up between register and metafunction does seem by and large to hold, then it provides a source of evidence bearing on the metafunctional location of systems. Presumably the most effective way to proceed is to first establish the relation between field, mode and tenor and those clause systems for which there is abundant paradigmatic and syntagmatic evidence for their inter-relatedness. Then situations could be devised in which systems such as POLARITY or VOCATION, whose metafunctional address is uncertain, were investigated. It should be possible to see whether POLARITY choices for example, vary along with MOOD selection or vary systematically in terms of TRANSITIVITY (or even THEME) selections. Possibly the language internal indeterminacy would be reflected in the register; possibly not. In the former case a functional explanation for the indeterminacy would be provided; in the latter, evidence in favour of one or another metafunctional address for disputed systems would be available. Overall, if explored along these lines, the links between register and metafunction might provide one means of empirically validating the metafunctional location of systems, and in particular of extending the concept of metafunction to other ranks and strata and to open system items.

The main problem with testing the metafunctional address of grammatical systems in this way is that there is as much uncertainty about register categories themselves as there is about functional components. As noted above, Halliday et al. (1964) present an early register categorisation in terms of field, mode and style. There field refers to 'what is going on: to the area of operation of the language activity' (p.90). They make the point that only when language activity accounts for most of what is going on can field be equated with topic or subject matter. In playing a game, for example, very little of what is going on may in fact be verbalised. Their mode

refers to the medium, speech or writing, and the role played by language activity in the situation. And style refers to the relations among the participants. Halliday later adopts Spencer and Gregory's (1964) term tenor in place of style (with style left for use in linguistic studies of verbal art - stylistics). The important thing to note here is that purpose, or functional tenor, if we make use of Gregory's term in this regard, appears to be grouped with channel under the heading mode. By 1965, aspects of purpose appear to fall under the heading field as well: 'The field: here we include subject matter; and also the type of situation in which language is being used, including the purpose - e.g. didactic or explanatory, for information, for action, consolation or self-satisfaction' (Halliday, 1965:14). Definitions of field in terms of social activity or 'institutional focus' (cf. Benson and Greaves, 1981) appear particularly prone to attracting purpose in this way (see discussion of Halliday, 1978, below).

Gregory (1967) proposes a four way categorisation of field, mode, personal tenor and functional tenor. His field does not appear substantially different from Halliday's 1964 discussion of the term, and his personal tenor seems to parallel Halliday's style. Where his categorisation does seem to differ is in his removing the role played by language in the situation from the category mode, and setting it up as a separate category of functional tenor (perhaps also subsuming some of the purpose oriented aspects of field?). Neither Gregory (1967) nor Gregory and Carroll (1978) treat purpose as part of field as in Halliday (1965).

Ellis and Ure (1969) present an independently developed four way cut, using the terms field and mode in ways perhaps most comparable to Gregory, but referring to personal tenor as formality and functional tenor as role - although role in their model seems to have more of a generic orientation, subsuming narrative, exposition and the like (cf. Gregory, 1967:181 footnote 3). Mode is expanded to include degree of feedback and preparedness alongside the more traditional speech/writing channel dimension.

Halliday (1978) maintains his three-way division of field, mode and tenor. And he continues to describe aspects of what might be seen as functional tenor, and placed under mode as field: 'But it (mode) extends to much more than this (choice of medium), to the particular semiotic function or range of functions that a text is serving in the environment in question. The rhetorical concepts of expository, didactic, persuasive, descriptive and the like are examples of such semiotic functions' (1978:144-5). He describes the field of one text for example as follows: 'Instruction: the instruction of a novice - in a game (e.g.Monopoly with equipment present - for the purpose of enabling him to participate' (1978:226). Why instruction is considered an aspect of field, and persuasion an aspect of mode is never spelled out.

Fawcett (1980), although couching his description in 'psychologese', and apparently not considering himself to be doing register analysis,

produces a categorisation which is strikingly like that of Gregory. These different approaches to register categorisation are summarised in Figure 32.

Halliday, MacIntosh & Strevens (1964)	Gregory (1967)	Ellis & Ure (1969)	Halliday (1978)	Fawcett (1980)
field	field	field	field	subject matter
mode	mode	mode	mode	channel
style	personal tenor	formality	tenor	relationship purpose
	functional tenor	role	(mode??) (field???)	pragmatic purpose

Fig. 32: Various register categorisations compared

The purpose of this brief review of the various register categorisations proposed by systemicists is to point out the difficulty of applying the kind of testing of systems with respect to register variables suggested earlier because there is no agreed set of register categories to use. Moreover, most of them are so informally defined that it is by no means clear that any reasonable test could in fact be carried out. It would appear that considerable shunting between metafunction and register will have to go on before workable correlations are established.

In the meantime, it is important to note that only Halliday has attempted to provide a register categorisation which is in fact testable via his proposal that field by and large determines experiential patterns, mode textual patterns and tenor interpersonal ones. It should thus be possible to refute Halliday's categories by taking rhetorical genres such as exposition or persuasion (assuming that these themselves are well enough defined to be recognisable), and showing how they determine different interpersonal selections in MOOD when they should only be affecting THEME; or by taking say fairy tales and fables (if Halliday in fact conceives of these as rhetorical genres) and showing how they make systematically different experiential selections when they should only be affecting THEME. In such cases, either the register categorisation or the metafunctional address of systems will be out of step. And given the variety of paradigmatic and syntagmatic evidence available for assigning systems to metafunctions, and the complete lack of any independent evidence for a given register categorisation, it seems likely that the register categories themselves would need adjusting. Considerable reconsideration will almost certainly have to be given to the extremely sketchy definitions of register categories given in the past if anything like a workable register metafunction hook-up is to be developed. Unfortunately, there is no space in this paper to further explore this very pressing problem.

Developing a workable register categorisation is not the only problem that lies in the way of testing the interaction between register and metafunction proposed by Halliday. At least three further difficulties present themselves, and have probably stood in the way of developing the theory along these lines.

First, there has been some uncertainty in the literature as to whether clauses or texts are to be related to context. Benson and Greaves (1973), following Gregory's model, include both command (Be quiet) and persuasion (If you continue to giggle like that you will disturb the other readers) (1973:104) as examples of functional tenor and make use of clause size units to exemplify them. Then they go on to illustrate a variety of functional tenors with whole texts. However, it is important to note that particular lexicogrammatical selections are relatable to their context only via the text as a whole. It is the textual structure which clauses realise, rather than the individual clauses themselves, that relates to register variables. So register categories have to be understood as referring to texts, not sentences.

Second, there is the question of what 'determine'in a phrasing of the register metafunction hook-up along the lines of 'register determines metafunction' means. As noted above, not every clause in a text can be directly related to register on its own. It is rather the patterning of lexicogrammatical selections in a text that is determined by register. This makes the relation between register and lexicogrammar probabilistic, and the type of determination involved will have to be modelled via some kind of variable rule. The necessary marriage of variation theory and systemic grammar has yet to take place; some relevant remarks are included in Martin (1983a).

This leads to the third point, which has to do with determining whether register categories predict lexicogrammatical selections in a way that is statistically significant. There are a number of difficulties here. For one thing, meanings are harder to count than sounds - there are simply more of them and so they tend to occur less frequently in text. There are bound to be problems getting enough instances to do statistics on. Another factor which has to be taken into account is Halliday's suggestion that lexicogrammatical systems are inherently weighted (equi-probable or skewed choices), favouring one option over another regardless of context. How these inherent probabilities are to be determined (the registerless data needed simply does not exist) remains something of an open question at this stage. In light of these factors, it is probable that linguists may have to abandon analysing naturally occurring data for a time, and work on data gathered from specially designed situation types. The variables they are interested in probably do not, in many instances, occur with sufficient frequency in accessible situations for this type of control to be avoided.

Finally some comment on the relation of the logical metafunction to register is needed. This is likely to prove the most troublesome of the register metafunction links to be established. The literature is full of evidence (albeit conflicting) concerning the relation of TAXIS to mode (see for example, Tannen, 1982). This could prove somewhat embarrassing if the logical function is seen as closely aligned to the experiential under the heading ideational, since it is field, not mode, that is expected to influence experiential meaning. It may be that the ideational function as a whole cannot be related to any one register category; or that the basis for recognising logical systems (a particular type of system and structure - i.e. recursive) means that it cannot be hooked up with register the way the other metafunctions can. Or it may simply be that the current interpretation of mode in terms of the speaking/writing opposition is naive (certainly degree of feedback and degree of abstraction seem to get closer to an explanation of why the language used in different media differs as it does). Whatever the case, there is some messiness here to be explained (which emphasises how important it is to get field, mode and tenor as nearly correlated with experiential, textual and interpersonal meaning as possible in the first place; allowing messiness in from the beginning will very likely sabotage the entire enterprise).

7. Conclusion

In this paper the status of metafunctional components in systemic grammar has been explored and Halliday's suggestion that register categories can be related to these categories discussed. First, internal linguistic evidence for the concept of metafunction was reviewed. A number of paradigmatic and syntagmatic criteria for grouping systems into functional components were considered. These criteria do not always uniquely determine the functional address of systems, and some method of ranking and weighting the criteria will have to be devised whenever function rank matrices are drawn up. Then consideration was given to the idea that if register categories could be shown to be linked with certain core and well motivated systems, they could be used to test the metafunctional address of systems whose location is unclear or in dispute. This suggestion depends for its implementation on empirically establishing the link between register and central clause rank grammatical systems. And it was suggested that the register categories proposed by systemicists to date probably need to be reworked and more explicitly defined before any register metafunction hook-up can be satisfactorily explored.

Until it can be so explored, the functional orientation to grammatical choice and its relation to context which distinguishes the systemic from other functionalist approaches will continue to have a rather weak empirical foundation. On the positive side, systemicists appear to have uncovered more evidence for functional components in a grammar than have other schools. It remains for them to assemble it in a coherent way so that others might see what they have been able to achieve.

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THE NURSERY TALE AS A GENRE

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Anyone who has followed recent literature on what the structure of a story is like will be impressed at least by the sheer quantity of material available. As most of these writings are concerned with presenting views on the canonical form of 'story', it is somewhat disturbing to find the term story equated with narrative. The most explicit enunciation of this position is to be found in Longacre (1974), but a covert assumption that narrative is story is present in most literature. (e.g. Labov & Waletzky: 1967; Labov: 1972; Martin & Rothery: 1980; 1981; Kress: 1982; etc.). The view is disturbing because, even without such an equation, the term 'story' is wide enough, being used to refer to a range of discourse types which differ markedly from each other in their structure; a fictive-story is nothing much like a news-story (Michaelis: 1983); the composition-story that the primary school teacher evaluates as her pupil's 'creative' writing is far removed in its structure from life-story; and autobiographies are not all like 'narratives of personal experience', while the narratives of personal experience, on the authors' own reckoning (Labov & Waletzky: 1967) are not identical with 'myths, folk tales, legends, histories, epics, toasts and sagas' - not that this disclaimer has deterred the use of their schema for the description of quite different types of discourse. Is this just a coincidence, or could it be that their schema is really designed with an eye to the simpler, non-cyclical story, rather than the 'narrative of personal experience'? What, anyway, is 'personal experience'? Is my experience of Saturday grocery shopping a personal one? It does arouse extraordinarily strong emotions in me, especially on those occasions when I am under work pressure. And when, sometimes, I describe my frustrating shopping experiences, no one in the family says: so what? Does that mean they have 'a point'? And is it the same kind of point to which Labov and Waletzky draw attention? It is not easy to answer these questions. However, I do know that the overall structure of my discourse about my shopping experiences does not follow the lines laid down by Labov and Waletzky (1967) and Labov (1972).

Now it may be said that I am indulging in a 'merely terminological debate', which can be tolerated as some kind of a tidying up act, but which is definitely below the prowess of minds bent upon 'deeper', 'more abstract' issues of discourse analysis. I doubt if this is a correct appreciation. Differences in terminological usage are likely to go hand in hand with differences in organizing and defining the very phenomena one is claiming to throw some light on. In particular, when one's aim is to present a hypothesis about the canonical form of some type of discourse, a clear

definition of the type itself appears to be essential. Starting from a well-defined centre, it is possible to reach out and make contact with folk tales and sagas and myths; but if the nature of the central phenomenon itself is not clearly defined, the validity of one's claims cannot be checked. These considerations have prompted me to narrow my focus: I do not even claim to be concerned with all types of story - fictive or non-fictive; I am concerned simply with one sub-variety, the scope of which I shall presently define.

But why study the nursery tale? And why study its status as a genre? There can be many answers to these questions; mine is based on personal experience. During 1968-71 I was employed on a project financed by the Nuffield Foundation to conduct a Sociolinguistic Study of Children's Stories. The project was located in the Sociolinguistic Research Unit at London University Institute of Education under the general directorship of Professor Basil Bernstein. One of the aims of the project was to determine how close children of varying social backgrounds came to telling a bed-time story when asked to do so. Clearly, a pre-requisite of undertaking such research is an explicit idea of what does or does not count as a bed-time story. The expression 'bed-time story' appears to contain an obvious clue to its contextual identification: bedtime stories are stories read to children, if not simply at bed-time, at least mostly for the children's entertainment. I assume that in this sense, the term would coincide largely with the term 'nursery tale', especially if middle childhood is seen as the upper age limit for the audience. Assuming this equivalence, from now on I will use the term 'nursery tale' in preference to 'bed-time story'. This would allow the unambiguous use of the shorter form 'tale' to refer to stories intended for a juvenile audience - an advantage that the short form 'story' lacks as it can refer to Aesop's Fables as well as Updike's Pigeon Feathers.

Although the definition narrows the field considerably, it is not explicit enough for use in an empirical research. Interpreting this view literally, the subjects could never produce a bed-time story, for by its very definition it would be for use by a researcher rather than for the delight of a juvenile audience. But even ignoring such perverse hair-splitting, *Pop goes the Weasel* would definitely not be seen by most of us as a nursery tale, though it is used for the enjoyment of children; nor is the presence of rhyme the definitive fact as 'The Story of the Little Market Woman' who 'went to market her eggs for to sell' (Opie & Opie: 1970) would demonstrate convincingly. By contrast, Jacob's *The Rose Tree* would still be recognized as a tale, even if it were being read and analysed for the purposes of a linguistic publication. Although the nature and structure of the genre has definitely been influenced by the purpose - or at least by one of the purposes - for which it is characteristically used - i.e. the entertainment of juvenile audiences - this does not mean that other modes of defining the genre are not valid. Popular as the facile slogan is that literature is that which is read as literature

(Eagleton: 1983), it simply avoids the fundamental question, or at least postpones it: Is there anything in common to those texts which the members of a given community are likely to read as story (or literature)? The labels for discourse genre are signs like any other linguistic sign. Like all signs, they are subject to variation; but it is doubtful that qualitatively, this variation is different from that which is recorded for the meanings of such signs as nice, silly, host, and so on. Despite the inherent variation of the linguistic sign system, at a particular point in the history of a speech community, the terms of this system are understood largely in the same way by sizeable groups. Sign without signification is a theoretical anomaly. The post-structuralist claim that the labels for the literature genres are empty of significance because the signification is susceptible to change over periods of time (Eagleton: 1983; Culler: 1975; 1983) is, therefore, hard to interpret except as an over-reaction to naive literariness. Generic labels - whether they refer to literature or non-literature - have meanings, which are just as much determined by their value and signification as the meanings of other linguistic signs. Thus it matters that the nursery tale would generally be seen today as part of a paradigm which contains other terms, e.g. nursery rhyme, ballad, fable, short story, novella, novel and other literature genres. Equally, it matters what people treat as a nursery tale, for it indirectly points to what they think the term signifies. None of this absolves us from asking: what, if any, features characterize those texts which today's community is willing to treat as a nursery tale? The question is worth asking even if the finding is that the community groups are completely erratic in their choice - which, I must admit, appears entirely unlikely.

On another count, it seems quite reasonable to raise the question of the properties of the text: we note that very young children develop a fairly accurate receptive model of what counts as a tale. Their judgement is not conditioned by whether it is day or night; rather they react to some aspects of a piece of language. The orientation of my research demanded an explicit model of just those aspects. What I needed was a clear idea of the range of criteria which can be used for deciding whether a text produced by a child carried a strong probability of being treated as an instance of the genre 'bed-time story'. So at an early stage of my research I was concerned with three related questions:

a. Are there any properties that a text must display if it is to be regarded as an instance of the genre 'nursery tale'? It is obvious that individual nursery tales differ from each other in many ways. Despite such dissimilarity, is it possible to establish some invariant properties? If the answer is 'yes', we need to know the source(s) of this variance and invariance, as well as their function in the economy of both an individual text and the genre as a whole.

b. What are our judgements about the completeness of a story based on? Under what conditions would a tale be considered incomplete?

c. Why is the structure of the nursery tale as it is?

Early in 1968, I asked these questions with specific reference to the nursery tales. Since then my work has led me to conclude that the considerations, in general, apply to all other genres and are, therefore, relevant to text typology as a whole. Elsewhere, I have suggested that the crucial properties of a genre can be expressed as a definite range of possible textual structures (Hasan: 1978; 1979; MSSa). If this is true, then, irrespective of the differences between genres, the considerations relevant to the description of text structure will be the same at a certain degree of abstraction. More immediately, the general meta-language for such description will be non-unique, i.e. applicable to all genres, even though quite clearly the potential of structures available to each specific genre will vary, displaying properties at least some (combination) of which will be genre-specific. Approaching the description of text structure in this manner has the merit of drawing attention to phenomena universally relevant to the structuring of texts. Although much of this paper will be concerned with the answers to the first two questions raised above, I shall attempt to link my account of the nursery tale as a genre to other discourse genres, qualitatively different from the tale, thus demonstrating the versatility of the general theoretical framework for the description of text structures. The point need not be debated that in some respects, the nursery tale is related to the genres of literature. In discussing the issues raised in the third question above, I shall comment on the implications of this fact. It would serve my purpose well to begin the discussion by an examination of the last question first. Here I will be concerned with comparing the nursery tale, on the one hand, with a certain class of genres - the service encounters - which would be immediately perceived as distinct from the tale; and, on the other hand, I will compare it with those genres with which it can be shown to share a great deal - namely the genres of literature.

As it is not possible to go into details here, I shall refer the reader to my earlier analyses of text structure, where texts belonging to other genres formed the corpus (Hasan: 1978; 1979; 1981). The texts analysed in those studies were embedded in a clearly pragmatic environment. The term 'pragmatic' is used here largely as in Malinowski (1923; 1935). There is a clear distinction between such texts and the nursery tale. Let me add at once I do not mean to deny that nursery tales - either in their construction or in their recounting - have a pragmatic purpose. The difference I have in mind may be clarified by examining the role of language in the total social activity. Using Halliday's terminology (Halliday: 1977), the role of language at any one occasion of its natural use may either be

'ancillary' or 'constitutive'. This is a difference to which both Goffman (1964) and Hymes (1972) have also drawn attention. It is not the case that only the ancillary role of language always coincides with a pragmatic purpose. In fact, as Malinowski has argued (1923; 1935), all texts can be shown to have some pragmatic purpose in the culture in which they occur; environments, however, may or may not be pragmatic. In fact, then, I am drawing a distinction between a text's pragmatic environment and its pragmatic purpose. The environment of a text is pragmatic - and the role of language, most clearly ancillary - in those social activities where a positive or negative goal completion is characteristically achieved in one face-to-face encounter. The paradigm cases of such activity are various classes of service encounters. Here, in principle at least, goal completion does not require several 'goes' of encounter. Along this axis, the buying of vegetables is clearly distinguishable from the buying of a house, just as both of these are clearly distinguishable from the nursery tale. Only in the first of these is language not the crucial determinant of the definition of the nature of the activity; this is not true of the latter two.

The structure of texts embedded in such pragmatic environments as set aside above appears relatively transparent. I suggest this is because on such occasions of language use, several semiotic codes operate convergently (Hasan: 1981); their total configuration is relevant to the definition of the context of situation. For this very reason the boundary between language and non-language is at serious risk, so that a given element of the text's structure may be realized either linguistically - through sayings; or para-linguistically - for example, through gesture; or totally non-linguistically - through some action. Hence, at least some of the parameters of the material situational setting of the text assume a major status in access to the meanings of such texts. The structure of such texts is transparent to the extent that the nature of the social activity itself is transparent to the interactants and observers. Thus, in response to the question: what is the motivation for the overall shape of the text? it can be successfully argued for this class of texts that the viability of the postulated elements of their structure rests upon the properties of the relevant context of situation, that the relevant context of situation must contain a specification of the relevant parameters of the material situational setting, and that it is this configuration, in toto, which functions as the motivation behind the generic structure of the text. The higher level semiotic encoded in text structure is constituted by cultural institutions. To put it succinctly, the components of the contextual configuration are predictive of the range of structures available to texts capable of occurring in the specified environment.

Nor does this approach entail a one-way relation between language and social reality. To me it seems that my position is supported, rather than otherwise, by the fact that there exists a two-way relationship between context and semiotic codes: the latter are

instrumental in the definition of the former; and equally, the perception of a social situation acts as a constraint upon semiotic behaviour. Once the definition of a situation has been 'launched' and achieved - partially or wholly - the ensuing semiotic behaviour of the interactants can be evaluated either as supportive of this definition - i.e. as appropriate, and in essence, predictable; or as non-supportive, i.e. at best, as a bid to redefine, and at worst, as irrelevant to the occasion, hence inappropriate. These remarks are particularly relevant to the class of texts presently under discussion. Since the components of their relevant contextual configuration are being defined thus-and-thus through the convergent operation of various semiotic codes, it is possible here to ask with regard to any specific message in any individual semiotic code whether it, too, is operating convergently. The power of language for the definition of social context is undeniably great; still, I doubt if language behaviour can be an exception to this general rule. A painting exhibition cannot be declared open, if there is no location to house it, no paintings to exhibit, and no audience to open the exhibition to. Prior to the linguistic act of declaring the exhibition open, a varied range of semiotic behaviours will have to have been undertaken, which in their turn are made possible by the institutionalization of art of this kind within at least some section of the community. These create the taken-for-granted reality of 'art', 'audience' and 'exhibition'. So an entire semiotic complex is active in a pre-linguistic ratification of the definition of this particular situation; it is through such semiotic behaviours on the part of a number of interactants, that a previously non-existent situation has achieved a palpable social status. But, once this status has been achieved, the linguistic behaviour of the dignitary invited to declare the exhibition open, becomes subject to constraints: for example, on an occasion of talk so defined, he may not discourse upon the economic viability of setting up a boot-lace factory in the town, unless, like Perry Mason, he can 'connect it up' with the matter in hand. That there is a matter in hand all concerned will agree. This position appears to me to be in keeping with Goffman's seminal work on face-construction (1967). The recent empirical investigation carried out by Cloran (1982) supports these arguments.

The above discussion brings us full-circle to the original assertion that for those occasions of talk where several semiotic codes act convergently, the role of language is ancillary, the environment pragmatic, it is possible to state a structure potential for an infinity of texts capable of occurring appropriately in that environment. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the relevant factors of the environment - i.e. the contextual configuration - is causally related to the elements of the text structure; the text is, here, a verbal expression of the social activity, and so by reference to the social activity, a generalized statement of text structure can be achieved.

How far are these general statements applicable to the nursery tale? A doubt about their applicability arises because at least in one important respect the nursery tale differs markedly from those categories of texts embedded in pragmatic environments: in the case of the nursery tale, the role of language is constitutive precisely because it plays such a crucial role in the determination of the tale's genre that it may be regarded as the primary source of its definition. This is true whether we examine it from the point of view of text construction or from that of text recounting or reception. We observe that a given text may or may not be assigned to this genre only on the basis of the presence or absence of certain properties; but these properties themselves become accessible to the audience only through language. While it may be true that the criteria for the evaluation of tales will vary over centuries (Eagleton: 1983), I doubt if the basis for what is or is not a tale can be provided independent of language. None of the other semiotic codes may substitute the role of language in the realization of the elements of its structure. Paralinguistic codes such as those of gesture and voice quality, if introduced - as in a 'lively' recounting - are totally parasitic on the language of the text. Their appropriacy is judged not by anything lying outside the text in the actual environment of text construction or reception but primarily by reference to the language of the text.

I see these features as the direct consequence of the role of language in the definition of the genre. To say that this role is constitutive is tantamount to the claim that, unlike texts embedded in pragmatic environments, the language of the tale is not responsive to factors of the material situational setting within which the creation or the recounting of the tale takes place. So the messages of the text present theses (Ellis: 1966) the experiential content of which is, as a rule, unrelated to the immediate surroundings. Therefore, the extra-linguistic characterizations of this genre are much weaker than the linguistic ones. In this respect, the nursery tale is very much like the other genres of literature, on whose periphery it lies (Vygotsky: 1971). This is not to claim that texts of the literary genres are suspended in vacuo, having nothing to do with the life of the community. Rather it is to argue that for this entire range of genres we must recognize at least three distinct orders of context. First, we must recognize the context of creation, whereby the artistic conventions of the author's community are reflected - directly or indirectly - in the created texts; the author's conception of the audience finds an expression there and the author's own individual preoccupations are built into the text. Secondly, there is the context of the audience's contact with the text, wherein his responses to the meanings of the text at one and the same time reflect communal attitudes and personal orientations. Thirdly, and most relevant to arguments here, there is the reconstituted context which is specific to that one text - what it is about, in what relations the characters and events are placed vis a vis each other, how do the theses hang

together and what are the strategies through which the text achieves a generally recognizable generic shape (for a more detailed discussion see Hasan: 1976; 1980; MSSb). Although these remarks are made with specific reference to the literary genres, I would suggest that they apply to a greater or lesser degree to all genres where the role of language is constitutive. For example, the seemingly simple but deeply interesting question of what renders a textbook obsolete in, say, chemistry, biology, physics or linguistics cannot be handled effectively except by some such conception of multiple contexts.

I would suggest that the nature of the factors which motivate the elements of structure in such genres is relatively opaque. This is because the environments in which such texts are either created or received bears only a tangential relationship to their inner unity. It follows, then, that the elements of the structure of the nursery tale can neither be seen as fully governed by the author-audience interaction nor by the fact that the nursery tale has the purpose of socializing young children into the culture, of entertaining them constructively or of soothing them to pleasurable slumber. The single salient fact that appears most relevant is the over-all adherence to an array of existing conventions. But to say that the structure of the nursery tale is controlled by artistic conventions is to explain nothing, unless alongside of this assertion we can also provide a convincing account of how artistic conventions themselves originate and how any change is successfully introduced into a body of pre-existing conventions. Even if I were capable of throwing light on these questions, this would require a paper by itself; so at least for the time being, I shelve a more detailed discussion of the question of what motivates the elements of the structure of the nursery tale. I shall take as my starting point the earlier assertion that the structure of the nursery tale conforms largely to a pre-existing convention. This would imply that, to construct a concept of the criterial properties of the tale one must be exposed to the data which consists of nursery tales. It occurs to me that at least insofar as the child is concerned, perhaps storying is not so very different from shopping; within their own terms of reference both represent universes of discourse which ante-date the child, and both can be accepted, rejected or modified in keeping with the experiences to which the child is exposed as she achieves social maturity. To my mind, the significance of this discussion lies in the fact that all current accounts of the structure of the nursery tale - mine included - are very much more clearly beholden to the linguistic corpus of the genre than is the case with shopping or being interviewed by a doctor. Nonetheless, I hope to draw attention to the growth of a convention for the construction of the tale, which would go some way towards upholding the general approach I have favoured.

Let us turn now to the first question: are there any properties that a text must possess in order to be seen as an instance of the genre 'nursery tale'? In order to save space, I must assume

familiarity with the framework I have presented in earlier writings (Hasan: 1978; 1979; Halliday & Hasan 1980), though most of it grew originally from my efforts to grapple with the notion of stories for and/or by children. The most relevant notion here is the Generic Structure Potential (SP or GSP for short). The GSP is an abstract category; it is descriptive of the total range of textual structures available within a genre G. It is designed to highlight the variant and invariant properties of textual structures within the limit of one genre; and to achieve this, the GSP must be capable of specifying the following facts about text structure:

a. it must specify all those elements of structure whose presence is obligatory, if the text is to be regarded as a complete instance of a given genre by the members of some (sub)-community;

b. in addition, it must enumerate all those elements whose presence is optional, so that the fact of their presence or absence, while affecting the actual structural shape of a particular text, does not affect that text's generic status;

c. the GSP must also specify the obligatory and optional ordering of the elements vis a vis each other, including the possibility of iteration.

Meeting these requirements, a GSP would represent the total potential of structures for a genre G, while the actual or schematic structure of any one instance of G would represent a particular configuration permitted by the GSP itself. The GSP is thus analogous to a system, while the actual structure of some individual text is just one possible instantiation of some particular path allowed by the GSP. It is important to underline the fact that the GSP is a statement of the structural resources available within a given genre. Just as a lexicogrammatical network itself carries no implications about which of its options would be selected in any given clause or group, so the GSP carries no implications about which of the permitted configurations will be manifested in a given text. A text is perceived as complete if it realizes all the obligatory elements. Since such elements are crucial to the generic status of the text, the greater the proportion of such elements realized (verbally), the easier it is to judge correctly the text's generic status (in displacement). The recognition of optionality - both for the elements and for their order vis a vis each other - builds in the possibility of text variation from the start. From the point of view of structure alone - i.e. ignoring the lexicogrammatical realization of the elements - two texts may vary either because each is systematically relatable to a distinct SP, or because each represents a distinct set of selections permitted by the same SP. This statement captures our experience that not only is there structural difference between texts of distinct genres but also texts belonging to

the same genre are not necessarily identical in their structure. Note that the entire discussion has been couched in general terms. What has been said about the GSP above is true for all genres, so that we may claim general applicability for the theoretical framework, even though the specific details will vary from one genre to the next.

With these preliminary remarks I shall turn my attention to the structure potential of the nursery tale. The data on the basis of which the SP is constructed consists of such anthologies as Grimms, Jacobs, Aesops and more recent tales for children. For the SP to be valid, it must prove adequate for the description of these and other existing tales; further, any newly constructed text which conforms systematically to the SP should be recognized as an instance of the genre by socialized readers today. I suggest that the SP presented below would meet both these criteria.

[(‹Placement›^)Initiating Event^] Sequent Event^Final Event [^(Finale)· (Moral)]

Figure 1

The round brackets in the above representation enclose elements which are optional; the claim of the SP is that we can find nursery tales in which there may be no element Placement and/or Finale and/or Moral. I hope to show below that the optionality of the element Placement is a development whose roots lie in a much older convention relating to the presence of myths. The elements NOT enclosed in round brackets are obligatory; in the absence of any one of these elements the tale would be considered incomplete. The angled brackets enclose elements whose lexicogrammatical realization may be included or interspersed with the lexicogrammatical realization of some other element(s). The raised dot · between elements refers to the fact that the order of the elements on the two sides of the dot is reversible, while the carat sign ^ indicates relative fixity: the element to the right of the carat sign cannot precede the element on the left of the sign. Since mobile elements are mobile within a certain limit, the boundaries of such a limit are indicated by enclosing the relevant elements in a square bracket. In the SP above two such brackets exist. The first encloses Placement and Initiating Event; the second encloses the elements Finale and Moral. The latter bracket is simpler, claiming that Moral might precede Finale or vice versa but that neither can precede Final Event. By contrast, the first square bracket refers to a more complex state of affairs. Here the claims of the SP can be read as follows:

a. the element Placement is optional; (hence the round bracket);

b. if it occurs two alternatives are available:
   i. either it will precede Initiating Event (hence the ^ between the two)

ii. or it will be included/interspersed in the Initiating Event (hence the angled bracket)

The possibility that the realization of the Placement may follow that of the Sequent Event is not permitted. In this respect the nursery tale differs from literary short stories where today no such restriction is to be observed. The remaining symbol in the SP is the curved arrow appended to some element(s); this symbolizes the possibility of iteration for that element. Since the labels for the elements were selected on the basis of their mnemonic value, they are hopefully self-explanatory, though a word must be added regarding the difference between Final Event and Finale. The former stands in a logical relation to some event(s)/state(s) of affairs; it represents a culmination, or what Labov refers to as Resolution (Labov: 1972). Finale, on the other hand, is the highly conventionalized 'return to altered rest' statement about the main protagonists, intimating a habitual tenor of existence for them, which can then logically function as the Placement for another tale. This is precisely what happens in serial stories of the type exemplified by Revd. Awdry's Railway stories.

The significance of such a GSP is two-fold. On the one hand, if valid, it will describe adequately the existing tales and function as the grammar representing the resources for the creation of new tales; on the other hand, if the metalanguage for this SP is the same as that for SPs set up to account for markedly different genres, this could be taken as some substantiation for the assertion made above that generic structures as a whole are subject to the same general conditions, and that the same metalanguage is generally applicable. The reader might care to compare figure 1 with the following - figure 2 - which represents the GSP for shopping transactions:

[('Greeting')^(Sale Initiation)^][(Sale Enquiry^) Sale Request^Sale Compliance^Sale^] Purchase^Purchase Closure (^Finis)

Figure 2: After Hasan (1979; 1980; MSSa)

I have attempted to argue above that a shopping transaction is far removed from a nursery tale. If any relations are observed between the two, they are likely to be largely general (see, for example, Butt & O'Toole: MSS). Note, though, that so far as the statement of the generic structure potential is concerned, we need the same kinds of notions that apply to the generic structure potential for the nursery tale: our concern is with obligatory and optional elements; with obligatory and optional ordering of the elements; with iteration and inclusion. In both cases the GSP is a system-like object whose potential product is an 'array of actual structures' (Hasan: 1978). The genre, as conceived of here, is fluid; it is not represented simply by a number of texts, each of which is the realization of but one schematic structure.

In recent years, especially in the analysis of the structure of dialogic discourse, it has been suggested that units such as 'exchange structure' or 'adjacency pair' or a sequence of messages such as Initiate Respond Acknowledge should be thought of as elements in the structure of 'conversation', where the term 'conversation' should effectively be read as 'non-monologic discourse'. Some of the best examples of such analyses are to be found in Sinclair and Coulthard (1975), Coulthard and Montgomery (1981); and of course there is the always inspiring work of Goffman (1981). To me it seems that the status of these units is not that of the elements of generic structure. Note, in the first place, that exchange structures, adjacency pairs and triads etc. are not universally applicable across genres. For example, it is not easy to postulate such relations between messages in a monologic discourse (Hasan: MSSc). This brings me to the second observation that the status of such units vis a vis text structure is the same as that of clause complexes; the only difference between the two is that one is based on adjacency pairing, the other on joining through cause, effect, sequentiality, etc. And although both play a part in the realization of the elements of textual structure, these latter type of elements or their configuration cannot be specified by reference to the categories of adjacency pairs or clause complexes. This claim is not very different from saying that the boy is not a function in the structure of the sentence the boy ran; rather it is a realization of the conflation of the functions Subject, Theme, Actor. The functions Subject, Theme and Actor are not set up by reference to what nominal groups are like, even though a statement of how these functions may be realized is an essential part of the overall description of the structure of the sentence, and will necessarily involve reference to groups such as the boy.

To judge the adequacy of the SP postulated for the tale it is necessary to discuss each of the elements and the crucial realizational features associated with each. Since this requires a good deal of time and space, instead of dealing with all elements superficially, I shall concentrate on an in-depth discussion of the element Placement. I shall also attempt to hypothesize how the optionality of Placement has developed in nursery tales of European origin. First, a few general comments on the realization of the elements of a GSP. Any description of the lexicogrammatical realization of textual structure must at once focus both on variance and invariance. It is possible for two texts of the same genre to be exactly alike in their structure without being exactly alike in the realization of this structure (Hasan: MSSa); in fact, realizational variance must occur if they are two distinct texts rather than two distinct tokens of the same text. The crucial question is that of locating the sources of variance and invariance. For example, according to the GSP in figure 1 above, tales may vary structurally with specific regard to the element Placement, since three possibilities are open:

a. tale has no Placement;

or b. tale has a discrete Placement, which must precede Initiating Event;

or c. tale has a non-discrete Placement, so that its realization is interspersed or included with the realization of the Initiating Event.

Table 1: The options open to nursery tale for Placement

But, two tales in which is selected the same option, say, the second one above, are not necessarily identical in all respects; they may differ in the actual meanings and wordings which realize discrete Placement in the two tales. And, what is equally important, even from the point of view of realization, the two tales may be alike without being entirely identical.

Experience in textual analysis will bear out the hypothesis that the invariant aspects of the realization of story - or for that matter any text type - can be handled better by appeal to semantic properties. Thereafter, a semantically motivated model of language description will provide specification of the range of lexicogrammatical patterns which are capable of realizing these specific semantic properties. Thus, statements about the invariant aspects of the realization of some textual element may take a standard form, requiring that any stretch of language capable of realizing a specific element of textual structure must 'have' the semantic property this or that. The approach I am suggesting is somewhat different from Longacre's (1974; 1977) who postulates a deep and a surface structure. His framework leads to a reification of entities without contributing to explicitness of criteria. For example, it is not clear what is achieved by the claim that 'Aperture ('once upon a time') is 'considered to be a feature of the surface only'; the corresponding deep structure element for Longacre (1974) is Exposition. But when it comes to practical analysis of a text, the question is precisely: how is the element Exposition realized? The answer that it is realized by the surface feature Aperture is not exactly revealing. In the last resort, the chunk of language that one says corresponds to, realizes or is the bearer of a deep structure element of Exposition has to be recognizable in some way that can be stated explicitly in unambiguous terms. In the words of Mandler and Johnson (1977), what is needed is a theory which would 'provide a clear and unambiguous parsing system which can be used for dividing the story in structurally important units'. I suggest that the essential attributes of 'the structurally important units' of any text type will have to be stated in semantic terms. But this by itself is not sufficient, otherwise Rumelhart's schema (1975) would be quite unambiguous, which, according to Michaelis (1983) is not the case. For this strategy to be successful,

we also need a model of language description, which can be used for making non-ambiguous statements about the realization of the semantic attributes by reference to which the structurally important units of text types can be identified. Thus, any discussion of the realization of textual structures will involve at least three types of abstraction

Type 1: an element of a GSP, e.g. Placement

Type 2: its crucial semantic attribute(s), e.g. person particularization

Type 3: the lexicogrammatical pattern(s) capable of realizing person particularization, e.g. indefinite modification

Table 2: The realization of the elements of generic structure

Table 2 is not presented as a complete statement of how Placement in nursery tales can be analysed. In applying these principles to the realization of this element, I shall proceed from the simplest case, i.e. option (b) (see Table 1) where it is realized discretely.

The crucial semantic property relevant to the realization of the element Placement is that of 'character particularization'. Whatever else is or is not achieved at this element, this much of meaning must be conveyed. However, this semantic property itself may be manifested lexicogrammatically either explicitly or inexplicitly. I shall describe the former mode first; so, the focus of the discussion at present is a discrete Placement whose realization is explicit. The most frequent, almost formulaic linguistic manifestation of character particularization is achieved through a declarative clause, in which the Process is relational - either existential, intensive or possessive - and the role of Participant is mapped on an indefinite nominal group where the modifer must be realized either by the indefinite article or by a cardinal numeral. These linguistic features are exemplified by the following:

1. Once upon a time there was a woman...
   (Jacobs: Tom Tit Tot)

2. There was once upon a time a good man who had two children a girl by a first wife, and a boy by the second.
   (Jacobs: The Rose Tree)

3. Once upon a time when pigs spoke rhyme
   And monkeys chewed tobacco,
   And hens took snuff to make them tough,
   And ducks went quack, quack, quack, O!

   There was an old sow with three little pigs...
   (Jacobs: Three Little Pigs)

An examination of a wider range of corpus shows that the important lexicogrammatical fact here is not the nature of the Process but the characterization of the nominal group which realizes some Participant role. So it can be stated quite categorically that character particularization when explicitly realized must involve the presence of nominal group(s) the Thing word of which must be an animate - or qua si animate - noun modified by the indefinite article as in a woman, a good man, an old sow or by a cardinal numeral as in two children and three little pigs. Definite modifiers e.g. the, his, her, etc. can be used only when they can be interpreted by reference to an already particularized person. The Process, on the other hand, does not have to be relational as the following example shows:

4. A wolf used to raid a farmer's hencoop every night

Why is it that indefinite modification achieves character particularization? The rationale is extremely simple: an indefinite modification always implies that there exist other entities of the class named by the noun so modified. What achieves particularization is precisely the contrast between those singled out by mention and those left aside unmentioned (Butt: MSS). I see character particularization as the one single crucial semantic property relevant to explicit realization of Placement.

Apart from this crucial property, there are two associated ones. The difference between the two kinds of semantic properties is that the former has to be present if Placement is discrete and explicit; the latter do not have to be present, but often are. These may be referred to as 'temporal distance' and 'impersonalization'. Through temporal distance, the events and characters of the tale are placed at a point in time far removed from that of the tale's creation or reception. The congruent, and, again, almost formulaic formal realization is through a Temporal Adjunct with the feature 'far' e.g. once upon a time, (long) long ago or just once. Its non-congruent, metaphorical (Halliday: MSS) realization is achieved by diverse means: either a Locative Adjunct is used with the feature 'far', or reference is made to some mythical being or to an improbable (set of) event(s). In example 3, we find both the congruent and metaphorical realization of temporal distance, where the metaphorical realization takes the form of a series of events each of which is equally improbable. In 5, the metaphorical realization takes the form of invoking a mythical being; and introducing a Locative Adjunct:

5. When good King Arthur reigned, there lived near the Land's End of England, in the country of Cornwall, a farmer who had one only son called Jack.
(Jacobs: Jack the Giant-killer)

I would draw attention to the use of the myth in the nursery tale. Mythical characters, places and events are treated as

common knowledge standing in no need of introduction. The treatment of myth as common shared knowledge has significant consequences for the optionality of the element Placement, as I shall argue at a later stage.

Impersonalization refers to the convention whereby neither the narrator nor the audience can be assigned the role of dramatis personae in the tale. Even when Kipling addresses his audience as Best Beloved, this form and all others co-referential with it, relate to the outer contexts of creation and reception; they do not pertain to the inner reconstituted context of the tale itself. Milne's Winnie-the-Pooh is of some interest from this point of view. Christopher Robin, introduced into the tale as one of the characters therein, is unrecognizable to Christopher Robin the audience, as the extract below shows:

6. He crawled out of the gorse-bush, brushed the prickles from his nose, and began to think again. And the first person he thought of was Christopher Robin.

('WAS THAT ME?' SAID CHRISTOPHER ROBIN IN AN AWED VOICE, HARDLY DARING TO BELIEVE IT.

'THAT WAS YOU .'

CHRISTOPHER ROBIN SAID NOTHING, BUT HIS EYES GOT LARGER AND LARGER, AND HIS FACE GOT PINKER AND PINKER .)

So Winnie-the-Pooh went round to his friend...
(Milne: Winnie-the-Pooh, italics in bracket from the original)

On finding out that he is in the inner context of the tale, Christopher Robin's eyes grow 'larger and larger' and his face gets 'pinker and pinker'; and well it might, since the experience of listening to tales does not generally prepare one for such an eventuality. The semantic property of impersonalization shows the tale's unmistakable affinity to literature, where the I of the poem, the story or the novel is best not interpreted as referring to the person of the author. This permits us to add one more observation to the realization of character particularization: the Thing-noun of the realizing nominal group should have the speech role 'other' (Halliday and Hasan: 1976). Both the associated properties - temporal distance and impersonalization - have essentially the same function: they both remove the events and the characters of the tale from the axis of the biographical to that of the general and hypothetical. Thus, the tale with explicit Placement is clearly marked off from narratives of personal experience such as analyzed by Labov (1972).

These three properties - particularization, impersonalization and temporal distance - can be seen as forming the semantic nucleus that is relevant to the realization of Placement. In addition,

two other semantic properties need mention; these are 'attribution' and 'habitude'. By attribution I refer to the fact that the particularized character may be assigned certain characteristics; these may pertain to quality, status, possession or relationship. The formal realization of attribution is achieved by clauses with intensive, circumstantial or possessive Process where Carrier is a particularized nominal, and/or by the presence of appropriate Modifying/Qualifying elements in nominal groups. Habitude refers to the assignment of habitual acts/states to the particularized character(s). A linguistic unit capable of realizing this property must refer to an even tenor of existence, which can later function as the background to the set of events which constitute the various stages of the tale. The habitual nature of actions can be indicated through the selection of simple past tense where the Lexical verb of the Process is non-punctiliar; however, with punctiliar verbs the use of iterative expressions, e.g. <u>often</u>, <u>for many years</u> and/or such exhaustive expressions as <u>whenever</u>, <u>wherever</u>, <u>nobody</u>, <u>anybody</u> and/or a modal auxiliary is required. Thus, examples 2 and 5 cited earlier continue as follows and constitute Placement of the two stories:

2a. There was once upon a time a good man who had two children: a girl by a first wife, and a boy by the second. The girl was as white as milk, and her lips were like cherries. Her hair was like golden silk, and it hung to the ground. Her brother loved her dearly, but her wicked stepmother hated her. (Jacobs: <u>The Rose-tree</u>)

5a. When good King Arthur reigned, there lived near Land's End of England, in the country of Cornwall, a farmer who had one only son called Jack. He was brisk and of a ready lively wit, so that nobody or nothing could worst him.

In those days the Mount of Cornwall was kept by a huge giant named Cormoran. He was eighteen feet in height, and about three yards around the waist, of a fierce and grim countenance, the terror of all the neighbouring towns and villages. He lived in a cave in the midst of the Mount, and whenever he wanted food he would wade over to the main-land, where he would furnish himself with whatever came in his way. Everybody at his approach ran out of their houses, while he seized on their cattle, making nothing of carrying half-a-dozen oxen on his back at a time; and as for their sheep and hog, he would tie them round his waist like a bunch of tallow-dips. He had done this for many years, so that all of Cornwall was in despair. (Jacobs: <u>Jack the Giant-killer</u>)

Attribution and habitude have the function of foregrounding those characters which are most central to the development of the tale. In 'filling out' the character(s), they set up a certain expectation of typical behaviour in a range of circumstances. Or to put it another way, the events of the tale retrospectively justify the attributes and habitual behaviours assigned to the character(s). Thus, at least in well-made tales, the presence of these properties is fully motivated. However, so long as their realization continues, the tale is 'arrested' at the element Placement. In order to move to the element Initiating Event, the cycle of the habitual has to be broken by a one-time-occurring event. I refer to both these properties of attribution and habitude as 'elaborative'. So the semantic properties associated with the element Placement fall into two categories: those which are nuclear, and those which are elaborative. Particularization, temporal distance and impersonalization are nuclear while attribution and habitude are elaborative.

I would suggest that potentially all elements of the nursery tale have these two general types of semantic properties associated with them. The difference between the two is that at least some selection from among the nuclear properties is essential to the movement of the tale, while the tale can progress without any selection from the elaborative properties. For this reason the latter can be viewed as optional. Moreover, the over-all structure of the tale has a way of getting round the absence of the optional category. For example, if attribution is not built in at Placement, the later developments of the tale would still permit the audience to infer such an attribute retrospectively. In Jacobs' Tom Tit Tot we are not told first that the old woman's daughter was stupid; however, we infer this from the girl's inability to interpret an idiomatic expression of her own mother tongue which leads her to make a gaffe. In this respect, the tale is like a certain kind of literature, where it is truer than in everyday life that handsome is he who handsome does. The behaviours - verbal and non-verbal - of a character in a story or novel become a means of symbolically articulating (Hasan: 1979; MSSb) its value in the text, and ultimately relate to the entire thematic development of the literary artefact.

Table 3 presents a summary of the semantic properties relevant to the element Placement and their typical lexicogrammatical realization; Table 4 presents an informal analysis of 2a, using the categories summarized in Table 3.

NUCLEAR	**Crucial**	
	Person particularization	Realized by indefinite modification eg *a, some, one, two, three* . . . of animate/qua si animate nouns as Thing.
	Associated	
	Impersonalization	Realized by third person noun as Thing in nominal group with modification as above.
	Temporal distance	Realized by Locative Adjunct (Temporal/spatial) with semantic feature 'far'; Metaphorically, Location identified by the improbable, the exotic and the mythic.
ELABORATIVE	Attribution	Realized by Intensive, Possessive or Circumstantial Process; Carrier particularized person; attribute, identity, possession, relation or by Epithet, Ordinal, Classifier and/or Qualifier modifying particularized person as Thing.
	Habitude	Realized by simple past if Lexical Verb of Process non-punctiliar; otherwise by modals *used to, would* and/or Locative Adjunct (Temporal) with feature 'frequent' eg *often, every now and then*, and/or conditional expressions eg *whenever, whoever, whatever* etc.

Table 3: Summary of realizational categories for explicit discrete Placement

once upon a time:	Temporal distance realized by Temporal Adjunct, with feature 'far'
A good man:	person particularization realized by indefinite modifier:a + animate Thing:man impersonalization realized by third person noun as Thing:man attribution realized by Epithet: good modifying man
two children: a girl; a boy:	person particularization realized by modifier two, a, a + animate Thing: children, girl, boy
had:	attribution realized by Possessive Process; Carrier: a good man Possession (relation) two children: a girl...a boy
a first wife:	person particularization and attribution realized by a and first, respectively; (note relation between man, wife)
the second wife:	person particularization and attribution realized by the and second (both interpreted by reference to a first wife)
The girl was as white as milk:	attribution realized by Intensive, attributive process; Carrier: the girl (particularized)
her lips were like cherries:	attribution realized by Intensive: attributive Process; Carrier: her lips (note Introduction by reference to particularized person)
her hair was like golden silk:	attribution as above
it hung to the ground:	habitude (= metaphorical attribution) realized by simple past hung non-punctiliar lexical verb)
Her brother loved her dearly:	habitude realized by simple past loved non-punctiliar lexical verb
her wicked stepmother hated her:	habitude realized as above; attribution realized by Epithet wicked

Table 4: The semantics and lexico-grammar of the realization of Placement in Jacobs' The Rose-tree

This completes our account of the explicit realization of a discrete Placement. How is in-explicit realization of discrete Placement achieved? The semantic property central to this distinction is of person particularization. Hopefully, the above account has demonstrated that when the realization of discrete Placement is explicit, then person particularization is made explicit within the text. In-explicit realization is built upon the assumption of common, shared knowledge. Thus, it immediately raises the question of allusion to other texts, whether spoken or written, that are supposed to be current in the community. When person particularization is achieved through the use of a proper noun, I refer to this as in-explicit realization. The use of a proper noun implies that the person mentioned thus is known; this in turn implies the existence of other texts, and brings allusion into play. The body of knowledge that is assumed as available, independent of the text under focus, may be the property of large sections of the community, as is the case with characters from mythologies. For the members of their own community neither Zeus, nor Indra, nor King Arthur, nor St. Paul need be explicitly particularized. Their identity has been created cumulatively through the mythic system absorbed by large sections of the culture so that the assumed familiarity can be used as a point of departure as in example 5 and again as below:

7. When King Arthur's glory was at its best, his sister, the Queen of Lothian lived at her lonely castle in the north...
(Hope-Moncrieff: The Young Unknown)

At a more restricted level, a qua si mythology may be created by a succession of tales themselves. Here the mythology is not so pervasive, and must be regarded as the property of a much smaller section of the community as a whole. The creation of such restricted mythologies perhaps provides an insight into the nature of the widely accepted myths. Some examples would be Dr. Who, Tin Tin, Asterix, Babar,Winnie-the-Pooh, Christopher Robin, Revd. Awdry's various engines named Gordon, Thomas, Edward, Percy, etc. or the dinosaur Desmond. Each tale in such a saga augments the mythology, and to the devoted young audience the characters thus created might possess a particularization which might well exceed their perception of the particularization of King Arthur and his valiant knights. Today's child is far more likely to ask: who is Merlin? than: who is Dr. Who? A well-established saga of tales can take a lot for granted as is evident from 8, which the uninitiated have difficulty in following. Those sagas still struggling to establish themselves may have to resort to a reminder as in 9:

8. Henry and Gordon were lonely when Thomas left the yard to run his Branch Line. They missed him very much.

They had more work to do. They couldn't wait in the shed till it was time, and find their coaches at the platform; they had to fetch them. They didn't like that...
(Revd. Awdry: Troublesome Engines)

9. I wonder how many of you know Sammy? I expect some of you have heard the story of how he saved the express from an accident. In those days he was only a rather unhappy little shunting engine, but ever since that adventure he has been a proud passenger engine on the line between Sleeping Sunbury and Little Bumbledon... (Gibbs: Sammy Meets Father Christmas)

I suggest that the modern practice of using proper nouns to refer to the dramatis personae without a textual person particularization has its origin in the above-mentioned phenomena. But in many modern nursery tales, we do not have even a qua si myth to fall back on; so the effect of this practice is quite different from that which it has in the inter-textually supported saga. At this moment we are probably witness to the stabilization of a change in the conventions of the nursery tale. Be it as it may, the door to the optionality of Placement is opened partly through the possibility of in-explicit realization. But before I turn to this, a word about non-discrete Placement.

Non-discrete Placement is included or interspersed within the realization of the Initiating Event. Let me first provide examples of non-discrete Placement, whose realization is explicit:

10. A girl once went to the fair to hire herself for servant. At last a funny-looking old gentleman engaged her, and took her home to his house (Jacobs: Master of all Masters)

11. A woman was sitting at her reel one night;
And still she sat, and still she reeled, and still she wished for company
(Jacobs: The Strange Visitor)

In both these cases the particularization is explicit, but it is presented along with (some part of) the Initiating Event. This is borne out by the fact that the event(s) mentioned relate to a particular occasion rather than habitual doings. Lying at the border of explicit and in-explicit non-discrete realization are openings of the following type:

12. Once upon a time when the pigs spoke rhyme...

All the birds of the air came to the magpie and asked her to teach them how to build nests. For the magpie is the cleverest bird of all at building nests.
(Jacobs: The Magpie's Nest)

13. The cat and the mouse
Play'd in the malt-house:

The cat bit the mouse's tail off
(Jacobs: The Cat and the Mouse)

In 12 an entire super-ordinate species all the birds is mentioned, followed by what appears to be mention of a sub-species the magpie. Then, within the same message, one specific member of the sub-species is mentioned, i.e. her, with a return to the whole species of the magpie immediately after. The specific member is not explicitly particularized for the audience. In 13, this to-ing and fro-ing between species and member is absent; simply one specific member from each of the two species is mentioned, but the specificity of the two members is not explicated textually. However, in both cases the interaction between the characters builds upon some characteristic attribute of the species, so they can be treated as prototypes. In 12 such knowledge is not just presumed, but explicitly stated in the last sentence of the example: For the magpie is the cleverest... etc. In 13, where the inter-active patterns of behaviour for the two species are supposed to be common shared knowledge no such explicit explanation is provided. The relation between cat and mouse is treated on a par with the wider mythic systems; both kinds of knowledge are seen as pervasively shared by members of the community. What cats do to mice is not something one needs to be told about explicitly just as what Merlin or King Arthur can achieve needs no specific mention. If 12 and 13 are compared with 10 and 11, it will be seen that while the latter have a vestigial manifestation of Placement in the initial indefinite nominal groups, A girl and A woman, the persons of the (specific) magpie, the cat and the mouse are not particularized textually. Although neither contains the crucial semantic property of person particularization, in 12 at least the associated property of temporal distance and the elaborative property of attribution are present; and this permits us the possibility of treating the opening as 'some sort of' Placement. Of course, the 'sort' that it is, is 'in-explicit', non-discrete Placement, not containing the crucial characteristic of the element. This makes 12 a 'fuzzy' case. But even 13 is somewhat fuzzy. True that it does not have either the nuclear or the elaborative properties, but the ambiguity of the reference of the cat and the mouse as either species or as prototype, as well as the possibility of assumed knowledge of their attributes etc. makes it doubtful whether we can think of it as a story entirely without Placement. This fuzziness is removed when a character is brought in as a proper noun with the role of a participant in a once-occurring event. In such cases the associated and elaborative properties alone can be used as a means of determining whether the tale contains the element Placement. In 14, 15 and 16 it cannot be maintained that there is any indication of the element Placement:

> 14. One day, when Christopher Robin and Winnie-the-Pooh and Piglet were all talking together, Christopher Robin finished the mouthful he was eating and said carelessly: 'I saw a heffalump today, Piglet' (Milne: Winnie-the-Pooh)

15. One day Henny-Penny was picking up corn in the cornyard when - whack! - something hit her upon the head. 'Goodness gracious me!' said Henny-Penny; 'the sky's a-going to fall; I must go and tell the king' (Jacobs: Henny-Penny)

16. Janet was looking in the window of the sweet-shop. It was full of Easter eggs.

'Which would you like, darling?' asked her mother. Janet had already made up her mind. Right in the middle of the window was a chocolate egg with a blue ribbon...
(Wilson: Chocolate kittens)

Although there is no Placement in 14-16, at a more delicate level they differ from each other. The identities of the characters mentioned in 14 have already been carefully constructed through other texts. Someone unfamiliar with the Pooh saga will fail to appreciate this fact. However, in 14 and 15 the tale establishes itself as a tale by invoking a fictional environment, which does not run parallel to the events of everyday life. Little boys do not talk to piglets, though a piglet with a capital P is different; hens do not carry messages to kings, but a hen that is qua si human (note the her) is different. In 16, this fictional quality is absent; it could very well be the description of a day's doing for Janet, which is being presented from the point of view of a third party. Given the sentence Peter was going to the carnival and on the way he lost his pocket money, we do not immediately react to it as an event in a tale as we do when told A girl went to the fair to hire herself as a servant or An old woman was sweeping her house, and she found a little crooked sixpence. It seems to me that tales opened by examples 14-16 cannot be said to have 'taken up' the option of Placement. And if 8 is seen as part of the Placement for Troublesome Engines, this is purely on the basis of the myth of Railway Engines and by virtue of the elaborative properties of attribution and habitude.

This discussion of the options for Placement and their realization may be summed up as in Figure 3 below:



Figure 3: The Realization of the options of 'Placement'

Hopefully, the figure is self-explanatory, especially when read in conjunction with the examples cited for each quadrant, and the information provided in Table 3. (a) and (d) are diametrically opposed; (a) is the clearest case of the selection of Placement, while (d) is the clearest case of the non-selection of Placement. If (a) and (d) are seen as the end points of a continuum, (b) and (c) represent two mid-stages on it. In (b) the Placement is discrete but inexplicit as for example in:

17. Mr. and Mrs. Vinegar lived in a vinegar bottle.
Now one day...
(Jacobs: Mr. Vinegar)

18. Tommy Grimes was sometimes a good boy, and sometimes a bad boy; and when he was a bad boy, he was a very bad boy. Now his mother used to say to him: 'Tommy, Tommy, be a good boy, and don't go out of the street, or else Mr. Miacea will take you'. But still when he was a bad boy he would go out of the street; and one day...
(Jacobs: Mr. Miacea)

In these cases the Placement is discrete; neither the attribution nor the habitude 'run into' the realization of the Initiating Event. But note that characters are not explicitly particularized, being mentioned by name as if they were already known. (c), on the other hand, is realized explicitly, but is included within the realization of another element, Initiating Event. A certain degree of confusion can arise here, the source of which is discussed below. Before leaving Figure 3, note the incomplete circle, which lies on the periphery of quadrants (b), (c) and (d). The examples here are of the type in which 'placing' the character appropriately would depend upon the degree and kind of socialization that the reader has had. This is where fuzzy cases such as the magpie, the cat and mouse, Henny-Penny, Winnie-the-Pooh, Gordon, Henry, Thomas, Milly Molly Mandy and King Arthur belong.

I do not propose to discuss the realization of the Initiating Event with the same degree of detail - this would require a paper to itself - but it is important to comment briefly on this element of the tale, since the difference between discrete and non-discrete Placement is not often appreciated. Some confusion arises from the fact that, at a more delicate level, the Initiating Event can potentially be seen as made up of three parts. Elsewhere, I have referred to these as 'setting' 'event' and 'culmination' (Hasan: MSSd); perhaps, it would have been more appropriate to use the terms 'frame' 'main act' and 'sequel'. The justification for these alternatives will hopefully become obvious as the discussion continues. 'Frame' is a part of the Initiating Event which may or may not be present. In 1a it is not selected, whereas in 15 it is:

1a: (i) Once upon a time there was a woman,
(ii) and she baked five pies
(Jacobs: Tom Tit Tot)

15: (i) One day Henny-Penny was picking corn in the cornyard
(ii) when - whack! - something hit her upon the head.
(iii) 'Goodness Gracious me!' said Henny-Penny;
(iv) 'the sky's a-going to fall;
(v) I must go and tell the king'.

Clause (i) of 15 has the function of frame. Frame refers to a state of affairs which acts as the background for the main act. So the semantic property essential to it is anteriority OR concurrence with main act. Lexicogrammatically, the clause realizing frame may have a progressive tense to indicate concurrence, but this is, of course, not the case if anteriority is indicated. Consider the following example:

19. (i) One day the master was out, (ii) and then the lad, <iii> as curious as could be, hurried to the chamber where his master kept his wondrous apparatus for changing copper into gold...
(Jacobs: The Master and his Pupil)

Here frame is realized by (i); the tense is a simple past and (i) is anterior to the main act, realized by clause (ii).

Main act is an essential part of the Initiating Event. Semantically, it is characterized as punctiliar process, a one-time happening or doing. Often the one-time-ness is realized by the selection of a Temporal Adjunct, e.g. one day in 15 and 19; but such underlining is not essential. In 1a, we simply have and she baked five pies; the punctiliar nature of the main act is sufficient by itself to indicate onceness. But how do we pick out the one-time happening and doing which functions as the main act? This has been perceived as a serious problem. So, for example, Longacre comments 'I have been unable to find any surface structure features which distinguish an episode which encodes the Inciting Moment from any other Episode' (Longacre: 1974). Although his Inciting Moment is not exactly identical with what I refer to as main act, there is a good deal of overlap. Both Labov (1972) and Rumelhart (1975) appear to rely on the one-time-ness of the act, but this requires a contrast with Placement or frame; and I have attempted to show that both Placement and frame are optional. A tale could begin with A woman baked five pies just as we have A girl once went to hire herself for servant. If the Initiating Event consisted of only one such action or happening, one could always stipulate that the first action or event with the semantic features 'actualized time' and 'one-time-ness' is the critical one; but this is not the case. For example, in 14 we find two progressive and three simple past tenses:

14. (i) One day, when Christopher Robin and Winnie-the-Pooh and Piglet were talking, (ii) Christopher Robin finished the mouthful he was eating (iii) and said carelessly: (iv) 'I saw a heffalump today, Piglet'.

Here it would be quite wrong to suggest that (ii) finished is the main act in the Initiating Event since nothing much hangs upon the act of finishing. It is really the saying (iii) that sets the whole story going. So the main act is where it all begins to move. And we can make some generalizations about its lexicogrammatical realization:

(a) Process be punctiliar;
(b) Process be Non-relational (i.e. Material or Mental or Verbal);
(c) The tense of the verbal group be non-progressive;
(d) If (a-c) are equal for two (or more) processes, occurring in a clause-complex (Halliday: MSS) then the one that is temporally posterior-most will realize the main act of the Initiating Event.

Table 5: The lexicogrammar of main act

The main act is followed by sequel. These are states of affairs which are related to the main act in specific ways. At least three kinds of relations can be found: (i) (purely) temporal sequence; (ii) causal dependence; and (iii) tangential relations. It is an interesting fact that most of the relations between the states of affairs in the Initiating Event are of the causal type.

Temporal sequence which is generally favoured as the most frequent relation within the story turns out to be the outcome of the fact that effects follow causes temporally. Sequel again poses a problem. The fabric of a tale appears seamless; and in this integrated whole each happening or action is related in some way to some other. The best criterion I have found for the closure of the Initiating Event - which is logically the closure of sequel as well - is to relate it to the main act. The main act sets up an expectancy. Thus (1a) baking sets up an expectation of eating/selling/giving the baked goods; (19) hurrying into a chamber sets up an expectation of getting out of that chamber; (15) being hit on the head sets up an expectation of a safety measure or a retort. An Initiating Event closes where an expectation that has been set up by the main act is frustrated. Thus, within its own organization the Initiating Event is like a metaphor for the whole tale just as a clause may be said to be a metaphor for the text (Halliday: 1981). The part frame (or setting) appears to resemble Placement; and, in fact, so far as I can see, neither Labov (1972) nor Rumelhart (1975) make a distinction between what I have called Placement and frame. There are, however, crucial differences between the two concepts: frame is only locally relevant, while Placement is relevant to the whole tale. To say that the story of the Rose-tree (see example 2a) and of Henny-Penny (see 15) can be re-written, following Rumelhart, as:

Story - Setting + Episode

or, following Labov, that both can be described as having the element Orientation does not do justice to the structuring of the two tales. Introducing characters in frames is not the same thing as introducing them in Placement.

Although the account of the realization of the nursery tale's structure is incomplete, I hope that the preceding discussion has shown that the line of approach suggested here might be a fruitful one. Not only does it permit a statement of the possible tale structures, but coupled with a model of language description in which the relationship between meaning and wording is treated in a systematic, non-adhoc manner, the approach presented here might permit more accurate, more revealing statements than have been possible hitherto. In point of fact, the description of the structure of the nursery tale is simply a modest beginning; the much more challenging question is that of the basis for evaluative judgements of the tales. And this enterprise will require attention to variation in realizational strategies. At that time, we shall have to begin to scrutinize the depth of what Longacre - and many other linguists - refer to as surface structure. For meaning and wording, even though we dissociate them for purposes of analysis, are a unity. The more exciting challenges for linguistics are yet to come, when having abandoned the dissociated approach of deep and surface structure, we enquire into the linguistic bases for understanding inferences and implications. The study of the comprehension of texts, in which the role of language is constitutive, pushes us inevitably in that direction.

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THE DYNAMICS OF GENRE

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Introduction

Within the systemic-functional view of language the interest in generic qualities of texts has very much been inspired by Hasan's pioneering work on text structure (Hasan, 1978, 1979; Halliday and Hasan, 1980). The identity of a text as an instance of a particular register or genre (the terms are treated synonymously by Hasan, see e.g. Hasan, 1978:230; Halliday and Hasan, 1980:82) comes to be defined through Structure Potential (SP), which is determined by the variables of the context of situation, field, mode and tenor, cumulatively and which is represented linearly.

Martin (in press), who is also interested in text structures and text identities, on the other hand considers that the terms genre and register are to be seen as representing abstractions of a different kind, both functioning as semiotic systems but on different communication planes, genre underlying register. Genre 'represents at an abstract level the verbal strategies used to accomplish social purposes of many kinds' (Martin, in press:4).[1] This achievement of social purposes represented by genre proceeds as various stages, and these stages are recognizable as elements of the Schematic Structure (SS) of a genre. Genre is seen to regulate what is happening on the register plane by constraining the possibilities of combining field, mode and tenor in society as the unfolding of an instance of a genre (a text) takes place from element to element. The SS elements are generated by networks which present genre agnation in the culture of a society.

This article will discuss both the linear and the network representations of generic text structures proposing a more dynamic approach to text structure descriptions and to the definition of text-relatedness.

1. Hasan's Views on Genre/Register

Hasan's views on genre/register are best summarized with the following figure:



Figure 1. Contextual Configuration Determining The Structure Potential of A Genre

On the semiotic level or the level of context of situation the extra-linguistic situation can be related to language by abstract variables field, mode and tenor, jointly referred to as the contextual construct. When a specific extralinguistic situation is in question, field, mode and tenor are seen to have specific values which can be labelled as a whole as the contextual configuration. The contextual configuration of a particular social context is considered to determine the type of discourse, i.e. genre/register, possible in that context. And 'associated with each genre of text - i.e. type of discourse - is a generalized structural formula [SP], which permits an array of actual structures' (Hasan, 1978:229). Hasan's claim then is that

> context is a determinant of the structural formula [SP]: the values within a CC [contextual configuration] determine what elements may occur in what configuration...the CC relevant to a genre embodies the semiotics of that genre (Hasan, 1978:231)

What then is the SP of a genre like? It is seen to consist of elements - elements, which are functional (and realized by lexicogrammatical units), 'the functions themselves being determined by the semiotics of the text genre' (Hasan, 1978:229). But an SP is not simply an inventory of elements. It is a sequentially ordered statement of elements. The sequencing of elements of the SP is:

> imposed by the natural logic of the social event whose verbal expression is...'text'...order in text structure is also a function of the values of the CC...The order of the elements is determined by the values of the CC cumulatively (Hasan, 1978:239)

The generic structure is then displayed by a linear representation where the labels of elements denote the functions of the elements of the social process and where various notations are used to express the different possibilities of sequencing the functional elements. In Figure 1, a simplistic example of such a linear representation of an SP of a genre is given as X^Y•(Z), where the functions of elements X, Y and Z are determined by the contextual configuration values x, y and z and where the ordering possibilities are given by using notations of ^ for fixed ordering, • for mobility (i.e. Z may also precede Y) and (Z), meaning that the element Z may not actually occur in a text (i.e. it is an optional element, whereas X and Y are obligatory elements and are genre-defining). This SP gives an array of texts: T1: X+Y+Z, T2: X+Y, T3: X+Z+Y (where + signals the realizational sequence).

As can be observed the elements X and Y are present in all of the texts. They are 'elements whose presence is essential to any complete text embedded in the contextual configuration under focus' (Halliday and Hasan, 1980:21). This is why obligatory elements are considered to define genres. The texts which include all the obligatory elements of the SP of a genre are to be considered as complete texts of that genre. A text must be considered incomplete

> if only a part of some recognizable actual structure is realized in it [i.e. only some of the obligatory elements are manifested in the text]; and the generic provenance of the text will remain undetermined, if the part so realized is not even recognizable as belonging to some distinct actual structure [i.e. it is non-text, see Halliday and Hasan, 1980:83]
> (Hasan, 1978:229)

Hasan's hypotheses may be summarized as two major issues involving the definition of genre and register:

1. a text is an instance of a genre if it can be shown that it is derived/generated from an SP of that genre in such a way that it, firstly, includes all the obligatory elements of the SP and, secondly, follows the sequencing of elements as portrayed by the linear representation of the SP of the genre in question;

2. following the formulation above, it is considered relatively straightforward to define what is a complete text representing a genre and distinguishing it from the 'fuzzy' texts which do not comply with the criteria given above.

By drawing evidence from the work that has been carried out on service encounter texts and their generic qualities (see Ventola, in preparation), both of these issues will be placed under scrutiny.

2. Linear Representation

According to Hasan, when field, mode and tenor have the following values

> field = economic transaction: purchase of retail goods: perishable food...
>
> tenor = agents of transaction: salesman-customer; social distance: near maximum...
>
> mode = channel aural: +visual contact; spoken medium... (Halliday and Hasan, 1980:18)

the type of discourse that can occur in that context is the genre/ register of 'buying and selling perishable food in face-to-face interaction' (Halliday and Hasan, 1980:83) and the SP that generates all the texts belonging to that genre is:

> [(< G >˙)(SI)^][(SE˙) {SR^SC} ^]S^ P^ PC (^F)
> (Halliday and Hasan, 1980:27; for an example of a text instance generated by this SP, see ibid:18)

Key to notation:

G	= GREETING	( )	= optionality
SI	= SALE INITIATION	[ ]	= limitation for mobility
SE	= SALE ENQUIRY	˙	= mobility
SR	= SALE REQUEST	< >	= inclusion
SC	= SALE COMPLIANCE	^	= fixed order
S	= SALE	↶	= recursiveness
P	= PURCHASE	{ }	= limitation for homogeneous recursiveness
PC	= PURCHASE CLOSURE		
F	= FINIS		

At the beginning of the analyses of the collected post office, small shop and travel agency texts (see Ventola, in preparation) Hasan's buying/selling SP was taken as a starting point. Although Hasan's structure is specifically only for the social context of 'at the greengocer's', it was assumed that the above mentioned service encounters would have an SP that was roughly corresponding to, although not the same as that hypothesized by Hasan. This seemed reasonable, as the values for mode and tenor appeared to be the same for Hasan's genre and for the three types of texts collected. Even field value 'economic transaction' seemed to be the same, although it was obvious that the three types of situations differed in more delicate terms of field not only from Hasan's further field values, but also from the field values amongst the three discourse types, being respectively 'postal matters', 'souvenirs/jewellery purchase' and 'travel matters'. Following Hasan's argumentation (see Hasan, 1978:239; Halliday and Hasan, 1980:82), if the contextual configuration values lead to a change in the inventory of the elements of an SP, those

variations in values must be genre-defining. It had to be thus concluded that in Hasan's terms these post office, shop and travel agency-texts had to be considered to be representing different genres with specific SPs, as such elements as POSTING and BOOKING (elements will always be written in upper case writing), for example, could be seen to be forming a part of the discourse in the post office- and travel agency-genres respectively. But at the same time it was hypothesized that remarkable similarities could be predicted in the SPs of these three different discourse types due to the similarities in mode and tenor values. It was envisaged that in all of the three types of social contexts the participants would be greeting each other, negotiating turn-taking, making sale request which then would be complied with, and that when something was actually bought an exchange of money and goods could be expected, and so on (cf. Hasan's SP above). Therefore, the three discourse types/genres could be described with linear representations of their respective SPs not very much unlike that of Hasan's. However, when trying to construct such linear representations for the collected texts following the generic structuring perceived to be realized in texts, problems occurred. It is worthwhile to discuss these problems one by one (some of which have been mentioned cursorily in Ventola, 1983a, 1983b).

2.1. Limitations Due to Linearity

First of all, linearity seems to impose much stricter sequencing of elements than seems to be the case in natural data. For example, according to the given SP, all SALE REQUESTs and SALE COMPLIANCEs must be realized before the exchange of money will take place. Frequently, however, the interactants initiate a 'second round' of SALE REQUESTs and SALE COMPLIANCEs after having already completed SALE, PURCHASE and PURCHASE CLOSURE (payment). The sequence is started all over again as the customer, for example, remembers an item which he has initially forgotten. Thus, Hasan's sequencing SR^SC^S^P^PC needs to be relaxed.

Secondly, it seems that recursion in natural data is a more extended phenomenon than can be represented linearly. Interactants are given possibilities to repeat practically every stage of the social process over again, except perhaps greeting and saying goodbye. If it is accepted that SALE REQUEST and SALE COMPLIANCE can be recursive, as described above, then SALE, PURCHASE and PURCHASE CLOSURE must also be considered recursive. The customer may initially reject the service offer, but after having browsed around and found something that he may potentially buy he approaches the server and initiates the encounter anew, as happens in the following extract:

S: can I help you at all
C: no I'm just looking at the moment thanks very much
S: okay

/a long pause follows, during which C continues looking around and S organizes jewellery at the counter, then C turns back to S and addresses her/

C: sorry can you help me with some watches

It would seem logical to assume that in such interaction as that found in service encounters all the elements would be seen as products of a joint effort or co-operativeness. It has been noted by several researchers (see Mitchell, 1957/75; Merritt, 1974, 1976; Bachmann and Cohen-Solel, 1980) that linguistic activity in service encounters is typically realized by speech acts that on one hand can be assigned to the customer and on the other hand to the server. Such speech acts are typically expected to follow the principle of adjacency pairing (see Schegloff et al., 1974). In other words, one expects the construction of text structure elements to reflect a kind of co-operativeness, whereby an activity that is realized in an element is initiated by one interactant and completed by another. Hasan's elements are not consistently motivated in this way. Some elements are co-operative, whereas in others the activity is linked to the social role of either a customer or a server.

Co-operative: (both interactants play a role in the realization)	Role-related: (only one interactant plays a role in the realization)
GREETING	SALE REQUEST
SALE INITIATION	SALE COMPLIANCE
SALE ENQUIRY	SALE
FINIS	PURCHASE
	PURCHASE CLOSURE

Table 1. Co-operativeness vs. Role-relatedness in Hasan's Elements

For example, SALE INITIATION in Hasan's text (see Halliday and Hasan, 1980:18) is realized by who's next - I think I am as 'a co-operative adjacency pair'. But a similar type of adjacency pair I'll have ten oranges and a kilo of bananas please - yes represent to Hasan two separate elements, SALE REQUEST and SALE COMPLIANCE respectively, and are thus role-related elements, the former to the role of a customer and the latter to that of a server (the anything else - yes is included in the realization of the SALE COMPLIANCE by Hasan, but does not, in my opinion, form a part of the element in question, but rather functions as a means of inviting recursion and thus more effectively is to be interpreted as part of the dynamics of service encounters). Also the payment stage is seen as being role-related in Hasan's SP. SALE that'll be two dollars sixty-nine please seems to be something that only the server does, whereas PURCHASE I can give you nine cents is an element solely the responsibility of the customer. In the realization of PURCHASE CLOSURE yeah ok thanks eighty, a hundred, three dollars and two is five thank you it seems odd indeed that the acceptance of the customer's nine cents should be a different part of the social activity than the actual offer of the nine cents (PURCHASE) or the original request for payment (SALE). Therefore, as proposed below, these three elements discussed are more appropriately considered as parts of one and the same element (PAY). This

wavering between co-operativeness and role-relatedness in the representation of the functions of SP is avoided in the flow chart representation, as both aspects are necessarily incorporated in the creation of the social process that the flow chart represents (see below).

A further aspect clearly highlighted by the collected service encounter data is the need to somehow come to grips with including the non-verbal realizations of elements (or parts of them) in texts. In Hasan (1978:239) the non-verbal realizations of elements are recognized, but in Halliday and Hasan (1980:26) Hasan chooses to take a 'linguist's stand' concentrating only on those parts of the social events which are linguistically realized. The primariness of the linguistic realizations is then projected (perhaps unintentionally) onto the setting up of elements for SP. For example, handing over the goods to the customer is taken to be part of SALE COMPLIANCE and is not given an independent status as an element of SP, as it is only realized non-verbally (see Hasan's text in Halliday and Hasan, 1980:18). But frequently the server hands the goods over to the customer only after the payment has already been completed. This being the case, it must be concluded that GOODS HANDOVER in service encounters is a necessary separate element, in spite of the fact that it frequently totally lacks linguistic realization.

Above certain problems due to the linearity in representing SP have been presented. In the next section the second issue, usefulness of defining genres in terms of obligatory elements, will be treated.

2.2. Are Obligatory Elements Genre-defining?

According to the SP formulation given above, the presence/absence of obligatory elements in a text functions as a criterion for classifying texts into a particular genre. Thus, if 'at the greengrocer's' texts do not include the obligatory elements portrayed by the SP of that genre they must be either incomplete or non-texts. Analogously, it was proposed above that due to the field value 'travel' the element BOOKING must be included in the inventory of the travel-agency texts. But there are frequently occasions when the customer is not satisfied with the products the greengrocer offers for sale, finding them perhaps too poor in quality or too expensive, and thus he decides to walk out. Politely he may take leave by excusing himself by I think I'll leave it until later or some such phrase. Similarly, when the customer goes into a travel agency he does not always buy a ticket.

SPs offer a synoptic and static view (see Martin, in press, for a discussion), a view that expects all texts to be carried out as we as members of the culture typically perceive them to be staged. But, in fact, our social behaviour is not as rigidly tunnelled as the linear representation of SP would seem to suggest. What Hasan's formulation about the relationship between SP and a text

does not take into account is that at almost any stage of the social process the interactants may opt out from realizing an element by skipping it, although it might synoptically be considered an obligatory element. For example, one may enter a travel agency to get some information or brochures (see the texts in Ventola, 1983a, 1983b, in preparation), without ever realizing the synoptically necessary BOOKING element. Similarly, in a shop the customer may simply decide not to buy any of the items that the server has been showing to him/her, thus making the obligatory elements SALE, PURCHASE and PURCHASE CLOSURE non-applicable. Or she/he may opt out as early as at SALE INITIATION: can I help you? - no thanks I'm just looking, in which case all the suggested obligatory elements are non-applicable. Yet one can say that, even though short, such a text is fully functional to the interactants.

But is it a buying/selling text? The first initiating part seems to be realized in exactly the same way as in many service encounter texts where buying is completed. Does the customer's decline of service offer make the text a non-service encounter text or, further still, a non-text? A decision to be made in all such instances is whether a text where buying is not effected is to be considered equal with a text where it is effected. Somehow the generic structure representations must take into consideration the fact that even obligatory elements may not be realized in texts without letting it affect the classification of the text as an instance of the genre in question.

The problems presented above have largely to do with the fact that even slight changes in the contextual configuration will cause changes in the inventory of the elements of SP. Hasan (1978:234-236) points out how a mode difference +/-visual contact leads us to consider telephoned medical appointment applications as a different genre from those made face-to-face, each having their own specific SPs, but perhaps sharing some of the elements. Similarly, the post office, shop and travel agency-texts must belong to different genres simply because of the delicate values assigned to field.

To take an example, in a study of casual conversations by Ventola (1979) tenor and mode changes in the contextual configuration lead, when cross-classified, to setting up four different SPs. If tenor values are chosen to be the end points of the social distance cline (see Hasan, 1978 and Ventola, 1979), i.e. 'friend to friend' or 'stranger to stranger', the structural consequences are the following: friends are expected to greet each other, whereas it is optional for strangers; friends may launch into a personal or a contextual APPROACH, whereas strangers are expected to start with a contextual APPROACH (so-called 'safe topics', like the weather, things in the immediate surroundings) and so on. If the mode values (mode being here something like 'sociability') are chosen to be the end points of the degree of social involvement cline, i.e. 'mere contact' or 'greater social involvement' (minimal and non-minimal casual conversations in Ventola, 1979:278-279), the structural consequences

are that in 'mere contact' the interactants never get to the element of CENTERING, whereas in 'greater social involvement' such an element is realized. Further, in the former, participants need not take leave of each other or say goodbye, but after 'greater social involvement' not doing so would be considered rude and impolite (for details, see Ventola, 1979).

But in spite of these structural differences one may ask whether texts which actually realize such four different SPs truly belong to four different genres. Similarly, it is questionable whether post office, shop and travel agency texts represent three different genres, each with separate SPs. The similarities both in elements of SPs as well as in the linguistic realizations of these elements are so great that to classify such texts as belonging to separate genres means a loss of generalization in the description of the relatedness of these genres.

A loss of generalization is inevitable in Hasan's formulation as redundancy is permitted in her description of genres. The elements are seen as part of separate SPs, although they might be shared across genres:

> Since the values of CC control the elements of the structural formulae [SPs], it is obvious that some elements will be shared across some genres...variation across registers [i.e. genres] is not absolute... registers cannot be totally 'sealed off' one from another; the difference is not a yes/no difference but a more/less difference. Thus CC2 resembles CC1 more closely than does CC3; the degree of similarity is determined by the extent of similarity in the values - by what is common to both situations. To accept such indeterminacy as part of one's description of register does not mean that the model is inadequate or that the concept of register is incorrectly expounded. The indeterminacy must be expected because it exists; it is inherent in the data (Hasan, 1978:241)

But it seems that there are ways of clearing this 'fuzziness'. What is left inexplicit in Hasan's presentation is the question of how to model the differences and similarities in the contextual construct which have structural consequences in SPs of genres. The genre relatedness can perhaps best be described synoptically if genres are represented as systems, forming networks which capture the agnateness of genres in terms of more delicate choices (giving a more economical representation than Hasan's), as suggested by Martin (in press) and by a flowchart representation which will allow considering genre descriptions from a more dynamic point of view, as suggested by Ventola (1983a).

3. Genre Agnation

Martin (in press) approaches text semiotics from the point of view of three separate communication planes: genre, register and language.

These planes stand in a realizational relationship so that register is considered to be underlying language, and genre, in turn, is seen underlying register (or genre is realized by register which in turn is realized by language). Each plane is organized in terms of system and structure cycles. The system choices on the plane of genre generate Schematic Structures (SS). SS is similar to Hasan's SP in the sense that it is correlating with the variables field, mode and tenor, but whereas for Hasan the determining relationship runs from the variables to SP, for Martin it runs from SS to the variables, see Figure 2 below. In other words, elements of SS are seen to be making their appropriate choices from field, mode and tenor networks. This is necessary because genres do not combine with just any choices from the field, mode and tenor networks. Genre seems to constrain the combinatorial possibilities of field, mode and tenor in a culture (for a discussion and examples, see Martin, in press). Further, it seems that as the SS unfolds the elements portray their own combinations of field, mode and tenor. Such combinatorial changes have emerged in the linguistic analyses of the service encounter data collected in post offices, shops and travel agencies (see Ventola, in preparation). For example, in travel agencies when information is given to the customer there is a noticeable shift in mode (dialogue to monologue). Further, as the main service activity ends and a pay sequence starts, for example in post offices, there is a clear shift in field, crudely put, from 'postal matters' to 'money matters'.



Figure 2. Genre - Schematic Structure - Register

Prior to a discussion of genre networks one needs to raise again the issue of the role of the non-linguistic systems in texts. Martin speaks of genre as 'how things get done, when language is used to accomplish them' (Martin, in press:3) and as 'verbal strategies' (see p.1). But if one only considered the verbal activities in service encounters, half of the activity in these social contexts would be lost. Many linguistic acts function as second parts to initiating non-linguistic acts, e.g. thank you as a response to handing over the goods or the change. It would seem odd then to claim that thank you without the non-verbal action realizes the element GOODS HANDOVER. Besides, as already pointed out, GOODS HANDOVER is frequently totally realized by non-linguistic systems in service encounters, but still it must be considered a stage to be performed in these encounters. It seems that it is the non-verbal realization that is primary in the

realization of this element rather than the linguistic realization (cf. SERVICE). Therefore, it seems appropriate to reinterpret genre as a social process whose realization may be linguistic or non-linguistic (see Ventola, in preparation, for a more detailed discussion).

In Martin (in press) a tentative network, intended to capture the agnateness of service encounters, has been presented. It will be reproduced here for easy reference.



Figure 3. Martin's Network for Service Encounters Illustrating Genre Agnation (Martin, in press:6)

[encounter]	+Greeting; +Good-bye
[service encounter]	+Service; +Resolution; +Closing
[appointed]	+Wait (Won't you have a seat; the doctor will be with you in a moment.)
[not appointed]	+Service Bid
[goods]	+Pay; +Goods Handover
[across counter]	+Turn Allocation
[intermittent]	+Sales Pitch (persuasion to buy); +Reassurance (assertion of goods goodness if bought)
[major]	+Delivery (arrangement of transportation or pick-up)
[negotiable]	+Bargain (negotiation of price)

Table 2. Martin's Realization Statements for service encounter features (Martin, in press:7)

What a genre network seems to do more efficiently than the linear representation is to show the agnateness of genres. This is achieved by allowing variation in the realization of SSs of texts on the scale of delicacy. For example, such SS elements as GREETING and GOODBYE may occur in any face-to-face encounter whereas SERVICE (see below) as an SS element occurs only in service encounters. SERVICE BID (see below) is only assigned to texts which have selected the feature [-unappointed] in the

network (i.e. no server in particular has been appointed to serve the customer). Elements like BOOKING and POSTING occur in texts as very delicate choices indeed, in travel agency and post office texts respectively. Further, theoretically even the shortest service encounter (e.g. can I help you? - no thanks) would still be described as an instance of the service encounter genre; it simply has not reached the same level of delicacy as some other texts which include such elements as PAY or POSTING. Thus, post office, shop and travel agency-texts would be considered to belong to the same genre - service encounters - but as the delicacy is increased they come to be defined as separate sub-genres.

The network and its realizational statements presented in Martin (in press) must, however, be considered as an illustrative attempt to describe what genre networks might look like (work in this area is just beginning). It is relatively easy to find examples from natural service encounter data which go against Martin's realization statements. For example, the network would specify the following elements for a post office text:

[encounter]↘+GREETING, +GOODBYE; [service encounter]↘+SERVICE, +RESOLUTION, +CLOSING; [unappointed]↘+SERVICE BID; [across counter]↘+TURN ALLOCATION; [goods]↘+PAY, GOODS HANDOVER.
But the post office text presented below has no GREETING, no GOODBYE, no SERVICE BID and no RESOLUTION. How do we skip these elements?

S: yes please
C: uhm could you tell me how much it costs to post those please /hands over the letters; 6 secs. pause, while S weighs one letter/
S: one is forty-five
/5 secs. pause, while S weighs the other letter/
S: air mai- air mail to Japan /rising tone/
C: uhuh
/10 secs. pause, while S looks up the price/
S: about forty cents each...it's a dollar twenty-five altogether thank you/ 'thank you' said with the request for money/15 secs. pause, while S gets the stamps/
S: there we are/S hands the stamps over/
C: thank you/hands over the money/
S: dollar twenty-five/said when the money received/
C: do I have to post these
S: I'll take care of them
C: okay
/11 secs. pause, while S gets the change/
S: dollar twenty-five dollar thirty sixty eighty two dollars three five and five's ten thank you very much
C: thank you
/C leaves/

Further, the genre network does not specify sequence, i.e. what the acceptable sequencing of stages of the social process are in

a culture. Any visitor to a foreign society can anecdotally recount their experiences of such generic sequencing differences. I, for example, when I first entered a bank in Australia to do my first withdrawal from my bank account, took my pass book to the clerk behind the counter telling him that I wanted to withdraw such and such a sum. I could not help feeling embarrassed when the bank clerk instructed me of the proper banking sequence in Australia where one has to fill out a withdrawal slip first and then take that to the clerk, whereas I had expected the clerk to do all that for me as is typically the case in Finland (perhaps putting on a strong accent helps in these situations as at least then you are forgiven your 'stupidity' due to your 'foreigner status').

Finally, the realization rules presented by Martin for the genre network seem analogous to Hasan's obligatory elements. That is, the selection of a feature from the network is always expected to lead to the realization of the element. But not all elements need to appear in the actual text, although the features seem to be selected. We, as members of the society, do not always go through the social process exactly in the same way or we may not even go through the whole social process but only some parts of it. But our view of the social process remains as if we always did. This is the synoptic view of social processes. What then is needed is a way of looking at a text both from the point of view of it being a product and a process at the same time (see Martin, in press). Considering a text as a process is to take a dynamic view of its generation. If choices in a genre network represent the synoptic systems involved in text creation (text as a product) then the choices in the flowchart, which will be discussed next, will represent the dynamic systems in text creation (text as a process).

4. The Flowchart

Above it has been stated that Martin's genre agnation network of service encounters with its realization rules does not seem to be generating structures which correspond to natural data. Although a more 'realistic' network will not be attempted below (more extensive data than available at the moment need to be collected and analyzed for such a pursuit), Martin's hypothesis about a genre network that incorporates a scale of delicacy in it will be accepted. In other words, in the study of post office, shop and travel-agency texts it will be assumed that synoptically they share certain elements on the least delicate level(s) of genre agnation. These are the SS elements that mark them all as instances of the same genre. They are GREETING (GR: good morning - morning), ATTENDANCE-ALLOCATION (TURN-ALLOCATION in Ventola, 1983a and in Martin, in press) (AA: who's next - I am), SERVICE BID (SB: can I help you? - yes), SERVICE (S: could I have 'x'? - yes sure), RESOLUTION (R: I'll take these - okay), PAY (P: it's three fifty - right), GOODS HANDOVER (GH: here you are - thanks), CLOSING (CL: thanks very much - thank you) and GOODBYE (GB: byebye - bye)

(it must again be emphasized that although above the elements have been exemplified so that both interactants have a verbal part in the realization of an element, this must by no means necessarily be so in many of the texts; for more details, see Ventola, 1983a: 245).

But, as already mentioned, all these elements need not be realized in an instance of a genre (i.e. a text) simultaneously. Therefore, it is necessary to represent the generation of these elements in texts more dynamically, which not only allows the skipping of elements as the social process flows but also allows more variation in organizing the elements sequentially as the text unfolds. This is done by representing the 'synoptically-shared' elements of the service encounter genre as a flowchart. Such a flowchart has appeared in Ventola, 1983, Appendix I; note that in that article 'functional tenor' equals genre; the former was used in the early development of genre as a communication plane,(see Martin and Rothery, 1980; Gregory, 1982). Therefore only a section of it, namely PAY, will be reproduced here to illustrate how an element is represented dynamically and how the unfolding of the social process is perceived to take place.



Figure 4. The Schematic Structure Element PAY of Service Encounter Genre

It is probably necessary to go through the reading instructions or tactics of the flowchart representation cursorily. In service encounters the social process is created co-operatively by both participants. This social process is represented in the flowchart by the two centre lines leading downwards. The elements are symbolized by oblong circles (PAY), which are labelled accordingly. In the creation of the social process both the server and the customer have their roles to play in the realization of each element. Therefore, one of the centre lines is the server's (on the left) and the other is the customer's (on the right). Occasionally their paths may meet when a joint decision concerning the progression of interaction is taken. But the interactants also have to make independent decisions about the creation of the social process. Then the participants will 'sidetrack' by choosing the paths leading away from the centre line of the social process. The decisions the participants have to make are symbolized by diamonds. If a diamond appears on the line of only one of the participants, the decision concerns only this participant. The decision arrived at is indicated by the answer 'yes/no' and this then directs the action of the participant. According to the decisions taken, 'work to be done' (verbal or non-verbal) will then be assigned to the participants. The work to be done is symbolized by squares, and the particular task is written in upper case writing within the square. Whenever within an element of the SS an assignment has been carried out, the element has been realized. The other type of square, the wavy square, does not realize elements, but simply indicates flowchart directions to the participants, i.e. to recurse or to skip an element (GO FORWARD/ BACK TO...).

Naturally there are points in the development of the social process when one of the participants has to, so to speak, wait for the fellow participant to catch up with him. What is being done and said often depends on what decisions and assignments the other participant has taken immediately before. At this stage of the flowchart representation these principles have not been developed (it most likely is a matter of incorporating decisions concerning the actual flow of interaction by blocking some activity until some other activity has been performed). Similarly, the way in which the flowchart 'negotiates' with the genre networks and the field, tenor and mode networks need to be developed in the future (it is assumed that some such 'talking' between the planes of genre and register takes place at the beginning of each element, in the oblong circles, thus allowing each element its own specific field, mode and tenor choices which then are realized as specific structures on the discourse, lexicogrammatical and phonological strata of the plane of language).

The flowchart seems to handle the problem of sequencing of SS elements more satisfactorily than the linear and the network representations do. With the notation of the wavy square participants are allowed to skip forwards or backwards at various stages of the social process (see e.g. how, if the goods have been

handed over - a decision made earlier - the interactants may skip forwards to CLOSING after PAY). Recursion is easily handled by the same notation by looping back to the beginning of the element in question. Further, role-relatedness/co-operativeness of the elements presents no problems as the elements are perceived simultaneously as role-related (each participant having a role to play) and co-operative (the element being perceived as a joint effort). Moreover, both linguistic and non-linguistic systems are taken into account, as 'work to be done' squares, which realize the social process, can be acted out verbally or non-verbally. Finally, there is no longer a need to define genres in terms of obligatory elements, because the flowchart representation shows how the realization process of a text may by-pass practically every obligatory element.

5. Uniformity and Diversity of Generic Structures

The SS elements and the flowchart as they have been discussed and presented currently (here and in Ventola, 1983a) for the genre of service encounters assumes that these elements and the flowchart are shared across the realized service encounter processes. In other words, the elements and the flowchart together represent the uniformity found in the generic structures of the service encounter texts studied. But there is in these texts also diversity which so far has been unexplained in the representation of the elements and the flowchart.

It was stated above that as the scale of delicacy increases in the genre agnation network such elements as BOOKING and POSTING in travel-agency and post office texts respectively are seen to appear synoptically. These are the elements according to which more delicate subgenres of service encounters are recognized. But again a dynamic approach to their realization is needed, as they by no means appear in every single text. How then are such subgeneric SS elements handled in the flowchart?

Drawing flowcharts for each subgenre would obviously be too elaborate and, more importantly, uneconomical and unnecessary (cf. the linear representation). The subgeneric SS elements can easily be generated by side-programming in the flowchart. To represent these more delicately synoptic choices in the dynamics of genre, it will be necessary to add to the flowchart presented in Ventola (1983a), at appropriate places, a decision diamond to the effect 'is a subgeneric element 'X' applicable?' and if the answer is 'yes' the wavy square notation will give instructions to both participants to step out of the main social process flowchart and enter a sideprogramme (or possibly enter an element in another flowchart representing a totally different genre, see genre-mixing below). Here such side-programmes will not be drawn. Let it suffice to say that the side-programmes are envisaged to be of the same general shape as the flowchart proposed so far for the main social process of the service encounters.

There is yet another type of phenomenon found in the service encounter data which also contributes to the diversity found in the generic structuring of these social processes and which cannot be explained in terms of scale of delicacy in the genre network, but which could be handled by side-programming in the flowchart dynamics. What is being referred to is the kind of 'side-sequencing' typically found in texts of all kinds. The extract below will illustrate the point being made:

C: what package holidays do you have...uh to Bali... two week*two week
S: *two week /*=simultaneous speech; rising tone/
C: two week /falling tone/
/4 secs. pause, while S gets some brochures/
C: it's lovely and warm in here
S: hm isn't it
C: actually it's not actually cold it's just that it-
S: the wind gets into you
C: yeah
S: yeah always the way
C: hm
S: all right
/2 secs. pause; S starts leafing through the brochures/
C: what is the best tim- what is the cheapest time to go to Bali

This phenomenon will here be called genre mixing, for want of a better label. It seems that here an element from a completely different genre, casual conversation, has been 'borrowed' for the social process of service encounter. The extract above is very similar in realization to the contextual INDIRECT APPROACHES of casual conversations (see Ventola, 1979). What causes such genre mixing has obviously something to do at least with the tenor values operating on the scale of social distance (see Hasan, 1978; Ventola, 1979). Sometimes genre mixing involves only 'borrowing' one element from another genre, as shown above, but often it may involve embedding whole other genres within a text. Examples from real life in anecdotal form are again relatively easily found. I still recall having been given a recipe by a local greengrocer when I bought my first zucchinis in Australia. Not having seen zucchinis before, let alone eaten them, I naturally enquired 'how do you eat them?', which then inspired the greengrocer to explain to me how they are best cooked. In other words, he moved momentarily to another genre, to that of a recipe (if it is accepted that a recipe is another genre). After finishing giving me the cooking instructions he switched back to 'service talk'. What could possibly have caused such an embedding of another genre within a service encounter can perhaps best be explained in terms of field choices. It is a fact that 'zucchinis' play a part in fields of both genres. In other words, they can as objects of activity, be cooked as well as bought. What also frequently happens is that an official will tell you a story in the middle of a service encounter transaction (perhaps again such sidesequencing

is a result of the fact that certain field choices can play a part in more than one genre). Whenever such 'borrowed' elements occur in texts as a result of genre mixing they will make their own selections of field, mode and tenor on the register plane.

It is envisaged that such genre mixing as has been described above can also be handled by side-programming in the dynamics of genre. But now, instead of stepping from the main social process into a subgeneric side-programme, the interactants are directed to enter into a totally different genre, to some specific element(s) of another genre (usually if one participant chooses to sidetrack the other is forced to follow, at least for a moment).

At present, it is not possible to say much more about the nature of genre mixing and its relations to the dynamics of genre. Genre mixing must, however, be considered a source of richness and diversity in our conversations. To capture its exact nature descriptions of various genres, both in terms of synoptic and dynamic systems, must urgently be developed. Representing genres dynamically as flowcharts is still at its initial stages (the only other attempts that I am aware of are a description of 'ordering a meal in a restaurant' in Ehlich and Rehbein (1972) and Merritt's (1976) representation of the typical sequencing of speech acts in 'small notions store' service encounters, which can be considered a mere approximation of a flowchart representation).

6. Conclusion

This paper has discussed the various possibilities of representing genres, i.e. generic structures in texts (or, more widely interpreted, in social processes).

First, the linear representation of genre proposed by Hasan, who has largely initiated the present interest in generic structuring of texts among systemicists, was reviewed. It was demonstrated that the linear representation faces several problems in handling the data collected in such service encounters as post offices, small shops and travel agencies. Sequencing of elements in the linear representation proved to be too rigid. Recursion can be shown to be a more extensive phenomenon. There also seems to be inconsistency in the motivation for establishing the elements: some are co-operative, activity being carried out as a joint effort of the participants, whereas others are role-related, activity being carried out only by one of the participants. Further, the role that non-linguistic systems play in realizing the activity in social encounters can be shown to be necessary for establishing SPs of genres. Finally, the linear representation seems to be an un-economical way of representing the relatedness of genres to each other.

Then a more recent formulation of genres and their structuring, presented by Martin, as a system network showing agnateness of genres, was examined. It was found that, although Martin's

genre agnation network captured the principle of text-relatedness, when set against evidence from natural service encounter data, his hypotheses seem to represent a too synoptic view. Realization and sequencing of elements as assigned by the realization rules does not seem to correspond to the facts found in natural data.

Finally, a more dynamic representation of text generation process, presented earlier in Ventola (1983a) in the form of a flowchart was contrasted with the above mentioned representations. Support for a dynamic representation in descriptions of generic structures is provided by demonstration of the ways the flowchart not only handles more efficiently the areas which cause problems to the linear and network representations, but also can explain much of the uniformity and diversity in our everyday interaction.

Footnotes

1. Page references to Martin (in press) are to the manuscript.

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PERCEIVING AS MAKING IN THE POETRY OF WALLACE STEVENS

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> ...'the process of perception in art is an aim in itself and must be prolonged: art is a way of experiencing the making of a thing..'
> (Shklovsky, 1917)
>
> ...'Reality is not what it is. It consists of the many realities which it can be made into'
> (Stevens, 1957:178)

The controversial status of the poetry of Wallace Stevens is in part the result of his critics' being unable to relate the lexico-grammatical organisation of individual poems to his pre-occupation with the ambivalence of experience and with the role of language in the construction of reality. All too often since the publication of his first volume of poems (Harmonium: 1923) the tendency in Stevens criticism has been to neglect the analysis of individual poems in order to discuss the metaphysical system which critics impute to the poems collectively (Kermode, 1969). While more recently there have been attempts to reverse this bias (e.g. Vendler 1969 and Keyser 1976), the problem of discussing the œuvre coherently without turning it into philosophy, and hence removing its quality as verbal art, has persisted.

Systematic grammatical analysis - at least when such analysis is conducted through a grammatical model based on semantic options - contributes dramatically to explicating the coherence of the œuvre. But this coherence is based on a consistency of aesthetic perspective rather than of philosophical theory. Such analysis brings out how Stevens was committed to 'quiz all sounds, all thoughts, all everything...' (Collected Poems, p.16), and the ways in which he sought to break out of the 'cliche' of reality through metaphor: 'metaphor creates a new reality from which the original appears to be unreal' (Opus Posthumous, p.169). It is the bringing together of these two commitments that is at the centre of many of Stevens' poems. However, the combination produces a paradox. Stevens analyses experience through the synthesis of texts - in order to examine the equivocal character of phenomena he constructs the phenomena according to different textual strategies. Through an analysis of two poems, 'Tattoo' and 'The Load of Sugar-Cane', the following discussion will exemplify in detail what is meant by textual strategy, and what is involved in the paradox of analysis through textual construction. While the two poems share a number of attributes (e.g. length; period of composition; the subject matter of natural phenomena), as the analysis deepens, it becomes apparent that the texts realize contradictory perceptions of natural events.

In the following account of these two early poems by Stevens, the more brief, general observations on 'Tattoo' provide the introduction for the analysis of 'The Load of Sugar-Cane'. The description of the latter poem also brings out, with respect to the theme of perceiving as making, the pervasive semantic organisation which I have elsewhere referred to as semantic 'drift' (Butt, 1983). This form of lexico-grammatical and semantic patterning has been discussed throughout the tradition of functional descriptions of language in verbal art, for example, in Hasan's notions of 'symbolic articulation' and 'consistency of foregrounding' (1971; 1979).

TATTOO

I The light is like a spider.
II It crawls over the water.
III It crawls over the edges of the snow.
IV It crawls under your eyelids
V And spreads its webs there -
VI Its two webs.

VII The webs of your eyes
VIII Are fastened
IX To the flesh and bones of you
X As to rafters or grass.
XI There are filaments of your eyes
XII On the surface of the water
XIII And in the edges of the snow
(Collected Poems p.81)

There is an instantial relationship established by the opening relational clause. Perhaps the vast wiring between eye and brain, its intricacy and fragility, is also suggested by the image of the webs 'fastened to the flesh and bones of you'. More important, however, is that through the instantial equivalence of the opening simile, the light is authorised to assume the role of Actor in the sequence of material processes: crawls (II); crawls (III); crawls (IV); spreads (V). This strategy re-interprets the character of the perception - the reader does not find the roles of Senser and Phenomenon. Instead there is the transitivity of movement and location. The process crawls is one participant or middle. Initially, then, it is as if the action of the light extends only to itself as participant and to a delimited Circumstance, with the minor processes (the prepositions over and under) also having the potential to imply motion. So in lines I-IV there is directionality but the eyes function more as the implied destination rather than as Goal or Recipient. With spreads in 1.V the transitivity of the clause exhibits a second participant, although its webs appears to refer to the effectum of the light (on the analogy of spider's web as to spider). The movement of crawling and spreading actually bestows the internal structure of the eyes: the webs of your eyes have been spread by the spider of light. The phenomenon of the light is rendered, then, in a way that suggests that the eye has been shaped by the character of light. Such a description is congruent with the theory, expressed by Popper for example (1972:145),

that the evolved structure of the human body is a bundle of virtual hypotheses concerning the structure of the external world. Popper himself makes use of an analogy involving the spiders' web. In general, the transitivity of the lines I-VI is notable for the emphasis it gives to an external world, an 'out there' separate from the eye or mind. The role of a Senser, Cognizant, or observer is correspondingly diminished. Therefore, to this point in the poem the meanings run counter to the philosophical Idealism often associated with Stevens.

The pattern revealed in lines I-VI of 'Tattoo' undergoes a reversal in lines XI-XIII. Here we find that an element of the eye is 'located' in the two circumstances already cited as external to the eye: on the surface of the water and the edges of the snow. One familiar with Empedocles and Democritus might suggest certain parallels between the poem and the doctrine of effluvia or eidola. The gist of this doctrine was that an element in the external world can only be perceived by a similar element in the body. Democritus conceived of tiny copies of sensible things which leave their impression on the atoms of the mind. This is to say that there needs to be something shared by the eye and the object in the world, even if that object is a surface of water and an edge of snow (i.e. an aspect of the material rather than just the materials water and snow). On the other hand a filament is a tungsten wire from which electrons emanate. The word introduces the idea of the eyes having an egressive capacity - a going out to the world. In so much as lines I-VI present light as Actor, and since lines XI-XIII suggest that there are filaments or emanations presumably from both the eyes as well as the water and snow, the process of vision is represented as a form of reciprocal exchange: what is 'out there' has determined its own interpretation; yet filaments in the existential clause lines XI-XIII implies that the eye both acts on, and is inherent in, the external world.

'Tattoo' exhibits the following aspects of organisation:

(a) A strong network of co-referentiality with chains of light (6 tokens); your (4 tokens); eyelids/eyes (3 tokens); and webs (3 tokens). Also crawls (3); edges (2); and water (2) and snow (2) are instances of lexical repetition which could be interpreted as co-referential or, in the case of crawls, as co-classification.

(b) A series of 4 single α clause sentences with 2 small complexes as Sc.4 and Sc.5. In the case of Sc.4 the clause complex involves a minor clause as a paratactic elaboration: $1\alpha + 2\alpha = 3\alpha$. In Sc.5 there is also a minor clause; this time hypotactic and enhancing: $\alpha^{x}\beta$.

Some further points that are useful for the comparison with 'The Load of Sugar-Cane' are:

(a) There are no non-finite process items.
(b) The instances of Location come out much like Range in the transitivity of the poem because the Material Processes are in fact metaphoric.

(c) Issues of volition and agency do not seem to arise in the poem.
(d) The simple present is consistently selected in tense.
(e) There is a variety of process types (i.e. from relational through material to existential).

An aspect of the lexico-grammar which is crucial to the following comparison with 'The Load of Sugar-Cane' is the way the unitary character of a perceptual experience has been represented as a series of discrete units or stages. The separate clauses of lines I-VI constitute increments in the perception of light. One might say that as a result of the way the text has 'made' the representation, the actual phenomenon of vision undergoes a form of breaking up - the textual synthesis produces a form of experiential analysis. This situation in 'Tattoo' illustrates how reality can be constructed according to the representational potential of the linguistic system: since a clause models a process (Halliday, 1982:Ch.5), if one presents a phenomenon as a number of clauses, then it follows that the phenomenon is being seen as a number of processes.

By contrast to the explicit references to 'light' in 'Tattoo', 'The Load of Sugar-Cane' does not explicitly address the process of vision, the demarcation of the phenomenon, and the role of the Senser. The subject matter of 'The Load...' suggests that the orientation of its meanings is more towards the internal structure of a Phenomenon (i.e. the 'going of the glade-boat...'), with different ways of looking entering the poem indirectly or implicitly.

THE LOAD OF SUGAR-CANE

I The going of the glade-boat
II Is like water flowing;

III Like water flowing
IV Through the green saw-grass,
V Under the rainbows;

VI Under the rainbows
VII That are like birds,
VIII Turning, bedizened,

IX While the wind still whistles
X As kildeer do,

XI When they rise
XII At the red turban
XIII Of the boatman.
(Collected Poems p.12)

The analysis begins with separate descriptions of the rhetorical, the cohesive, and the structural arrangements in the poem. Note that 'rhetorical organisation' is defined in a limited way in this discussion: as the use of metaphors and similes and the inter-relationship of these metaphors and similes. The findings of the

three descriptions are then related to certain consistencies uncovered in the grammatical selections below the rank of clause. All this material, that is both the global and the micro-linguistic, is then interpreted in a detailed statement of what Stevens has achieved through the lexico-grammatical organisation of the poem. Finally, the textual strategies of 'The Load of Sugar-Cane' and 'Tattoo' are compared and the significance of their differences is considered.

(a) Rhetorical Organisation

The centrality of metaphor, in this case simile, becomes immediately apparent in the reading of the poem. Although consisting of only one orthographic sentence the text involves five comparisons. These comparisons or analogies are set out below:

	The compared.	The realization as process.	Quality.	
(A) Cl.1 ll.I-II	The going of the glade-boat	is	(like)	→ water flowing
(B) Cl.2 ll.III-V	ellipsis	ellipsis	(like)	→ water flowing...
(C) Cl.3 l.VI	ellipsis	ellipsis	ellipsis...	under the rainbows...
(D) Cl.3.1 ll.VII-XIII	the rainbows	are	(like)	→ birds...
(E) Cl.3.4-3.5 ll.IX-X	while the wind still whistles	-	(as)	→ kildeer do

They constitute a kind of recursive metaphor i.e. simile applied to simile applied to simile...etc.

(b) Cohesive Organisation

The following diagram shows how the five divisions of the orthographic sentence are virtually stitched together by relatively overt signals of cohesion. Only the inferential link between boatman line XIII and glade-boat



line I has an oblique character. Since the cohesion is realized by devices with a relatively high degree of visibility - e.g. the repetition of wording as in lines III and VI - the reader's initial impression could well be of a series of messages with an appositional or additive character. This series, it appears, has been 'stitched' together with the devices listed (a)-(g). Each of the line groupings seems to contribute a new focus of experiential meaning: the going of the glade-boat (I-II); the rainbows (III-V); birds turning (VI-VIII); the wind that whistles (IX-X); and the kildeer that rise (XI-XIII).

But when one arrives at the inferential anaphoric tie (h), the act of decoding the poem is forced into a new phase. The overt cohesive ties (a)-(g) do not represent the whole situation with respect to the cohesion. The drawing up of Experiential Similarity Chains (Hasan, in press a)and the mapping of their interaction indicate that there is a great degree of integration of experiential meaning in the poem, that is, more than might have been expected on the basis of five events 'stitched' together. (See the lexical interaction diagram below). Of the 33 tokens in the poem 32 are relevant to the formation of chains and only one (Load) is peripheral.

It needs to be mentioned, however, that there are a number of problematic issues to confront in analysing the lexical relations of the poem. One of these is the fact that the short poem makes heavy use of ellipsis; another is that some of the important relations are instantial (resulting from the similes); while the last is that the links between rainbows and red/green, between bedizen and red/green, and between sugar-cane and water cannot be netted in by the sense-relations which normally guide the description of lexical chains. The tenuousness of the overall picture is not incidental to the impact of the poem on the reader. There appears to be a significant gulf between the relatively overt signals of cohesion (i.e. (a)-(g) and the more fugitive, backgrounded network

Lexical Chains



Relevant Tokens = 32



Marginal Chains with some semantic affinities with the semantic sets defined by the lexical chains.



of lexical relations revealed by the chains. Yet the effect of the cohesive organisation only becomes evident when it is compared with the poem's structural organisation.

(c) Structural Organisation

By any comparison, and particularly by comparison with the more overt cohesive ties, the structural relations within the single sentence are not easy to assimilate. (See pages 134 and 135).

(d) Comparison (1): Cohesion and Structure

When one compares the cohesion of the poem with its structural organisation, the strategy of the text begins to emerge. Note how, when the reader arrives at the last word of the poem - boatman - an inferential link between boatman and glade-boat (1.I) brings one full circle to the opening clause of the poem. This creates a surprise since the textual organisation suggested that the relationship expressed in the first clause had been relinquished for the discussion of rainbow, birds, and the more specific kildeer. In fact, the inferential link and the turning full circle challenge the reader to re-examine the entirety of the poem. What one discovers is that the poem has encouraged two distinct acts of decoding: a cohesion based and a structure based. And it is only in the second act of decoding that the structural complexity and the structural unity become visible.

The poem makes use of the fact that relationships of structure are not as easily perceived by 'listeners' as are the other units of the level of form: namely, words. It could even be claimed that the overt lexical repetition in the short poem helps to obscure the actual character of the syntagm. Mukarovsky emphasised that the semantic units of which the sentence is composed are perceived in a continuous succession regardless of the complex architecture of 'syntactic subordination and superordination' (Mukarovsky 1977, p.51). It is this phenomenon of 'semantic accumulation' that is enhanced by the cohesive devices (a)-(g) and the arrangement into groups of lines.

(e) Comparison (2): The Structural and the Rhetorical Arrangements.
Observations on the relationship between the clauses of the poem and the similes.

The five analogies vary systematically across a number of grammatical characteristics; but in particular they vary with respect to the grammatical status of the clause in which each comparison is presented: Simile A = 1α; simile B = 2α; simile C = 3α; simile D = $[\alpha]$; simile E = $[[\beta\beta^{x}\beta\alpha]]$

The result of this is that while the similes are easy to understand in themselves, their relationship to one another is not easy to envisage. This overall situation can be represented by diagrams of concentric circles and epi-cycles. Viewed from one perspective, the poem appears to consist of two elliptical clauses (2α and 3α) which expand or extend an initial comparison presented in 1α:



But as the clause complex diagram indicates (page 134)the embedded material in this extension creates an imbalance in the representation of the expanding analogy:





Clause Complexing



THE LOAD OF SUGAR-CANE

(1) The going of the glade-boat
(2) Is like water flowing;

(3) Like water flowing
(4) Through the green saw-grass,
(5) Under the rainbows;

(6) Under the rainbows
(7) That are like birds,
(8) Turning, bedizened,

(9) While the wind still whistles
(10) As kildeer do,

(11) When they rise
(12) At the red turban
(13) Of the boatman.

As the presupposed element of the ∝ clauses becomes greater (as the ∝ clause, in one sense, shrinks) the embedded clause extends. In 3α the embedded clause has become a clause complex involving finite processes which are not merely relational but which shift subtly towards the material: are 1.VII → whistles 1.IX → do 1.X (substitute for whistles; but marked as a form of doing) → rise 1.XI. Thus a greater amount of the text is related, in the first instance, to the qualification of the circumstantial periphery of the initial comparison repeated in 2α and 3α. Ultimately, of course, through the embeddings and presupposed elements in 2∝ and 3∝ all the clauses of the poem go back to expand the primary clause of attribution: 1α . But this syntagmatic or structural relationship is very difficult for any reader to perceive on the first reading, structural relationships being in general less transparent than wordings or sounds. The reader's experience of the text is dominated by the attribution that compares rainbows 1.VI to birds...11.VII-XIII. This situation can be diagrammed:



The first three circles are concentric because, in this diagram, each circle stands for a clause which realizes a comparison. The largest circle corresponds to the simile that are like birds...; and it is epi-cyclic because, as an embedding to the preceding Circumstance, it is at one remove from the similes of the ∝ clauses. This peripheral status is indicated in the diagram by placing the centre of 3.1... on the circumference of the clause 3α. The fourth circle (3.1...) is the largest since it is extended by three clauses before a further simile occurs in the poem. The final simile - As kildeer do (Cl...3.5) is also part of the circumstantial periphery of an analogy which precedes it (i.e. 3.1...); so it too has been represented by an epi-cycle.

The pattern of this involved relationship between rhetorical structure, in this case the similes, and the structure of the clause complex has been characterised as follows: qualifying, circumstantial material

from one simile becomes, itself, the nucleus of a subsequent simile. Elements which have only a non-nuclear grammatical status are lifted up and amplified by the poem's rhetorical structure. As a result the reader experiences a form of illusion - it becomes difficult to decide on the main thesis or proposition of the sentence. The clause undergoes an unusual form of semantic pressure - the reader has the impression that the text has progressed from the initial relational process. The embedding prevents the reader from closing off the clause; but it becomes increasingly difficult to keep the clause open. Only with the last of the embedded clause complexes it becomes apparent that all the transitivity of the poem applies to a unifying process and contributes to the description of only one landscape, just as the grammatical structure constitutes one matrix clause (along with its elliptical repetitions). The grammatical structure itself appears to be an artistic metaphor for the unity the poet apprehends in the phenomena.

(f) Patterns below the Rank of Clause

There are a number of lexico-grammatical patterns which complement these two acts of decoding. We must add these to our description in order to understand the semantic organisation of the poem. They are particularly important because they constitute forms of continuous development across the poem. So, while I have been to this point looking at 'counter' patterns - patterns which have opposing semantic consequences, at least in the first analysis - the patterns below the rank of clause supply continuity and development. Nevertheless, these continuities still contribute to the double act of decoding discussed under the comparison of cohesion based and structurally-based descriptions. Such multi-valency in textual patterns might seem to constitute a paradoxical claim in itself. Yet the polyphonic character of text actually makes it possible for patterns to be contributing as relata within a number of more global patterns. This difficult concept can be illustrated by examining the selections of process type and finiteness, and the patterns of deixis and tense in 'The Load of Sugar-Cane'. Being able to envisage the polyphony of lexico-grammatical patterning is reminiscent of the wider problems of 'ways of seeing' discussed so far. The similarity lies in the fact that what one 'sees' in a pattern and what one 'sees' as a pattern depend on the perspective from which one begins and the purpose of one's analysis.

(g) Process Type and Finiteness

The poem has the following process items:

Primary:		Derived through ellipsis:	
going	(I)		
is	(II)		
flowing	(II)		
flowing	(III)	going	(iii)
are	(VII)	is	(iii)
turning	(VIII)	going	(vi)
bedizened	(VIII)	is	(vi)
whistles	(IX)	flowing	(vi)
do	(X)	= whistle	(x)
rise	(XI)		

Even over this short text, the pattern of encoding processes undergoes an unequivocal, consistent reversal. All the process items down to line IX other than relational processes are nominalized or non-finite. In line IX there is a finite behavioural process - whistles. From that point in the poem, there are no non-finites or nominalizations. Nor, in fact, are there any relational processes. In place of the early pattern, the processes become finite and shift towards the material. Hence one has a 'drift' in the experiential representation whereby the processes move away from being presented as relationships (i.e. through relational process clauses with nominalizations and non-finites).

The non-finite processes in the text are the two instances of flowing (ll.II, III) and the items turning and bedizened which make up line VIII - a line which functions as a kind of axis line in the shifting organisation of the grammar across the text.

l.II	flowing	imperfective / material / doing
l.III	flowing	" " "
l.VIII	turning	" " "
l.VIII	bedizened	neutral / relational / being

These items contribute a sense of processes 'in medias res', of actualised phenomena. In general, the imperfective form (V + ing) of non-finite suggests a process in a state of emergence or unfolding whereas the perfective form (to + infin.) views the process from the perspective of its off-on state, typically unactualised (Halliday, 1982). By the selective use of the non-finites the poet has been able to create a gradient from the beginning of the poem to the end in which finiteness and material process type only co-occur with rise (l.XI) in the final hypotactic clause within the embedded clause complex. The gradient has the form shown on page 139.

Between the extremes of the nominalised going of line I and the finite-material process of line XI: rise, the poem seems to variously postpone the coming together of finiteness and material process type. Even between whistles (behavioural line IX), do (behavioural substitute line X) and rise (line XI), one can discern a gradual shift. Behaviourals are themselves between mental and material processes in their grammatical characteristics. By adopting the verbal substitute do (line X) the process of whistling is repeated in the meaning of the poem yet marked as a form of doing (that is, shaded more towards the material process type).

One needs to ask, however, how it is that these grammatical consistencies with respect to process type and finiteness relate to what has already been found in the cohesive, structural, and rhetorical descriptions of the poem. In general, one can say that the most realis pattern of encoding occurs deepest within the complex of similes. This is to say that the processes become more concrete (material) and more definite (finite) as the layers of simile increase. There is something paradoxical about this situation, perhaps because one's prejudice may be to assume that metaphors will exhibit an irrealis pattern of grammatical

Finiteness + Process Type Continuum

I	II	II		III		VII	VIII	VIII	IX	X	XI
going /	is /	flowing /	E /	flowing /	E /	are /	turning /	bedizened /	whistles /	do /	rise
nominalization	finite + relational	non-fin. + material	going/is	non-fin. +material	going/is/flowing	finite - relational	non-fin. - material	non-fin. - relational	finite - behavioural	finite - behavioural (subs. as doing)	finite - material (actual doing)

encoding. At the least a strange effect is produced when the heuristic Attributive elements of a series of similes have more deictic impact than the Carrier from which the similes began. Certainly in some religious and philosophical texts it might be expected that similes might combine an abstract Carrier with a more concrete Attribute; but a chain of such similes is unsettling when they are addressed to the mundane topic of a 'Load of Sugar-Cane'. It may be, as suggested above, that the difficulty is related to a common prejudice about metaphor - namely, that a simile is a figure of speech, that it is heuristic, and therefore to be distinguished from 'referential' language. Stevens' poem goes to remind us, then, that language creates its own order of existence. Hence it is on the basis of the character of the encoding that one comes to make distinctions between the actual and the potential, or between the real and the heuristic. When the kildeer 'rise / At the red turban / Of the boatman' there is a stronger quality of the here and now than in the statement of similarity from which the poem begins.

(h) Deixis and Tense

The semantic patternings of deixis and tense in the poem are even less obtrusive than the grading of the relationship between process type and finiteness.

Deixis: There are nine instances of the definite article in the poem (these being the only realizations of deixis in the N.Gp's). But a subtle form of variation is produced by Stevens in that the textual meaning of these items changes even though the realization appears to remain constant. This is to say, the nine instances are not all of the same 'the'. While the general function of 'the' is to declare the availability of information on the head word within the nominal group, the different sources from which that information might need to be drawn vary the textual force of the definite article. The following list gives the nominal groups and the referential type/ source which they appear to involve:

T	The Load of Sugar-Cane	Cataphoric
I	The going of...	Cataphoric
I	the glade boat	Cataphoric
IV	the green saw-grass	Cataphoric/Homophoric
V	the rainbows	Homophoric
VI	the rainbows	Homophoric
IX	the wind	Homophoric
XII	the red turban	Cataphoric
XIII	the boatman	Anaphoric

The poem begins with cataphoric forms of (deictic) reference. In itself, this is a very common pattern in English texts. It needs to be added, however, that the kind of 'defining' information that the reader might typically expect from such use of the definite article does not emerge in the text - the reader awaits specifications that do not arrive. Implicit in such a reader-text relationship is that the reader already has the knowledge necessary. In this poem, then, the statements of the opening lines make more than 'typical' demands on the reader's imagination. From line IV, however, the pattern changes: the green saw-grass, the rainbows (x 2), and the wind (particularly rainbows and wind) are all items which do not call for further specification. They are homophoric not because they are members of a class of one (nor because they are generic), but because they are general to the point that they approximate 'the sun', 'the stars', etc. Having claimed this, it should be added, nevertheless, that the 'the' in lines IV, V, VI, and IX could be interpreted as the kind of verbal pointing that would be exchanged when, say, two people were considering a picture together (instantial exophoric: see Hasan, in press b). Whatever the status of the example in line IV, a pattern emerges in which the final two nominal groups of the poem have a strong affinity with the opening of the poem and not with a central cluster of items in the text. In fact, the definiteness of 'the boatman' is an oblique form of anaphoric in that the reader feels that it refers to information established earlier within the text. (Of course, a boatman has not been mentioned; but 'the glade-boat' seems to effectively imply the existence of the boatman). The deixis develops throughout the poem from particularising to what could be interpreted as general phenomena of the natural world and then back to the particularising. A change occurs, however, when the reader gleans that the anaphoric boatman indicates that the whole poem refers to one landscape. What had been interpreted as homophoric (on the basis of being part of a generally shared background of natural phenomena) suddenly undergoes re-interpretation. The homophoric definite articles are retrospectively interpreted as instantial exophorics.

Tense:

The pattern of tense follows the same cycle of particularizing and generalizing meaning. There are five selections of tense - all of the simple present.

l.II	'is'	'The going'	(A)
l.VII	'are'	'the rainbows that...'	(B)
l.IX	'whistles'	'While the wind still...'	(C)
l.X	'do'	'Where they rise...'	(D)
l.XI	'rise'	'at the red turban'	(E)

The semantic consequences of these selections only emerge where one reflects on the 'deictic' properties of tense, and when one relates the deixis in the nominal group to the verbal group meanings. Essentially, the five instances of tense are omni-temporal - they are timebound but temporally unrestricted. (See Lyons, 1977).

Even in the case of the relationals('is', 'are') the clauses are not of the generic or gnomic kind (which can seem timeless or non-deictic, respectively). But the 'unrestrictedness' of temporality is consistently qualified by the presence of other time or deictic information within each clause.

In lines I-II the relational process is particularised by The going: the event as a nominal appears to be part of the 'here and now' of the speaker. This need not be the case, however. Even with the definite article, the going could be iterative. Yet, given the definiteness of the poem's title ('The Load of Sugar-Cane'),the reader is more likely to view the discourse as a description of one particular going. 'While the wind still whistles' (line IX) involves a number of temporal-deictic possibilities. The particularisation occurs in this instance from the word 'still'. The omni-temporality is modified by 'still' because it can suggest that certain times are excluded from the process of the wind whistling. Again, this is not an absolute exclusion - 'still' could be used to mean the wind never ceased to whistle. But, typically, the selection of 'still' implies a division in time between process 'on' and process 'off' (even though only one of the time phases needs to have been actualised).

At first, the clause 'As kildeer do' appears to be a general claim about a species of bird,hence a generic use of the present tense. And such a claim is consistent with the following line (line XI): 'When they rise...'. Both 'do' and 'rise', then, give an initial impression of this 'generic' meaning. But a temporal particularisation emerges as the reader moves deeper into the 'when...' clause. Lines XII and XIII are both definite and particular - they bring the 'generic' possibilities of lines X-XI back to the single detail: 'the red turban/ Of the boatman'. The preposition'At' has the force of a minor process - the kildeer rise when the red turban appears over the marsh-grass. Through the preposition then, a further event enters the poem (indirectly); and the generalising potential of the tense (which peaks at lines X-XI) is dramatically narrowed to one 'event'. With the last line comes an understanding that the poem has been consistently expanding the description of one complex phenomenon. And following from this, one's understanding of the selections of present tense has to be modified to accommodate the idea of a phenomenon immediate to the utterer of the poem. The situation with respect to tense then parallels what was found in the survey of deixis.

(i) Interpretive Comment: The Load of Sugar-Cane

Stevens, in his writings on metaphor, expressed the view that 'poetry increases the feeling for reality' (Opus Posthumous p.162). For him it was not a means of escape into Yeats' 'artifice of eternity', nor into the exercise of fancy:

> I know no magic trees, no balmy boughs,
> No silver ruddy, gold vermilion fruits.
> (Collected Poems, pp.16-17)

As has already been noted, poetry for Stevens achieved an escape from the 'cliche' of reality (1957:179). And more specifically, with respect to metaphor, Stevens noted that 'metaphor creates a new reality from which the original appears to be unreal' (Opus Posthumous, p.169). This quotation might well have been a comment on the reader's experience of 'The Load of Sugar-Cane'. The 'reality' of the metaphors dominates the original landscape. Eventually, when one is awakened to the fact that the original landscape has not been relinquished at all during the poem, there is a peculiar sense of having discovered that landscape for the first time. It is as if the metaphoric description has aided in the penetration of reality.

As with the various impossible objects of psychologists, the famous duck-rabbit (), and the experiments of object-ground reversal, in 'The Load of Sugar-Cane' the mind is pushed to a double experience of 'seeing as'. Ultimately, with the poem, however, the seeing ceases to be a situation of either-or; the similes can be accepted as many facets of one phenomenon. When it emerges that the similes were a method of creating one scene, one landscape, one complex idea, the reader gleans something of what it must be like to 'live in the world but outside the existing conceptions of it'. (Opus Posthumous, p.164).

Comparison: 'Tattoo' and 'The Load of Sugar-Cane'

The two poems 'The Load of Sugar-Cane' and 'Tattoo' exemplify the way Stevens could use metaphor to construct or reconstitute reality. There is no sign of an attempt to create the aesthetic retreat of dandyism - something often associated with his poetry. His textual strategies are part of the project to display 'the relation of men to facts' (1957:179). Stevens regarded the central role in the development of his enquiries to be that of the imagination: for 'to be at the end of fact is not to be at the beginning of the imagination but at the end of both' (1957:175).

In the poem 'Tattoo' one finds the unitary quality of a phenomenon broken down into discrete elements - a kind of phenomenological atomism. These components of perception are themselves examined for properties of transitivity: namely, directionality, location, and metaphoric correspondence (as in the case of the spider's webs as the network of optical nerves in the eyes). When one turns to 'The Load...', however, an opposed orientation to phenomena is evident. In 'The Load...' the tendency to see disparate elements in the description is countered by the unifying lexico-grammatical structure of the single sentence of the poem. The embedded hypotactic clause-complex and the cohesive signals combined to re-unify what the reader may have been ready to perceive as elements separated out. The grammar functions as a metaphor for the unity 'out there' in the field of the observer, a field in which observing is a mode of participation: the Cognizant's perspective makes the rainbows into birds turning; while for the kildeer the angle of seeing includes only the red-turban.

The range of relationships which occur in the texts of a natural language are so great, and their permutations are so numerous, that it is understandable that poets may achieve textual patterns which

clearly display relationships between the mind and an external world which are not generally 'visible' to the members of the speech community. This is to say that the habitual patterns of activity and encoding in a community may obscure certain perspectives on experience. By exploring different textual strategies, in the way Stevens does in 'Tattoo' and 'The Load of Sugar-Cane', the poet's work can create a way of looking which has not been hitherto one of the possibilities of 'seeing-as' in the culture. In such an alternative way of seeing something is highlighted of the mind's part in constructing our world.

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DEONTIC, AXIOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMIC DISTANCE IN GRAHAM GREENE'S THE HONORARY CONSUL

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I. Theory

In recent years there has been a growing number of studies of ideological point of view. Downes (1978) has analysed the political ideology of MacCarthyism; Tannen (1979) has studied cultural ideologies, bringing out the differences in expectations between Greeks and Americans; and I myself (Weber 1982a) have looked at the social-personal ideology of Joyce's Eveline, which is at the same time the ideology of a 'paralysed' Dublin.

However, the related concept of ideological 'distance', though widely used in a rather loose sense, has not yet been subjected to a rigorous, linguistically-based analysis. The present article is a first attempt at adumbrating the study of this important concept of literary criticism. More specifically, I will suggest that the concept of distance can be related to the logical systems of deontic, axiological and epistemic modality, and that the relationships between characters, narrator, implied author and reader in a literary work can be discussed in terms of deontic, axiological and epistemic distance.

The locus of study of ideological distance is the 'narrative metatext', which, according to Dolezel (1976a:140-1), 'creates an "ideological superstructure" of the narrated states and events, proposing various immanent (that is, text inherent) interpretations of the narrative'. In Weber (1982a:3-5) I have argued that this metanarrative background structure of the novel consists mainly of unrealized (hedged, negated and presupposed) units, which provide clues to the speaker's (or someone else's) assumptions, norms and values. The unrealized units form a continuum, ranging from hedged units, which encode an explicit mention of the assumption, via negated units to presupposed units, where the assumption is implicit and has to be inferred by what Leech (1981:434) calls 'second-instance implicature': 'The unit refers to one or more propositions which "exist in the context", i.e. usually in the speaker's or the hearer's mind, as an assumption.' [1]

An analysis on this 'metapropositional' (Leech 1981:426) level is concerned with the speaker's commitment to, or evaluation of, the content of the proposition that he utters. For example, in a sentence like:

(1) I don't regret that Harry left - in fact, he didn't leave at all
(Lakoff 1982:62)

many traditional linguists have argued that the first part of (1) presupposes that Harry left, whereas the second part denies it. The speaker is thus committed to two contradictory assumptions:

(2) Harry left
(3) Harry didn't leave

and sentence (1) should, therefore, be ruled out on purely logical grounds. However, what these linguists have missed is that proposition (2) is one of two propositions which (the speaker of (1) assumes) exist in the hearer's mind as assumptions:

(2) Harry left
(4) The speaker regrets that Harry left

The speaker denies assumption (4) in the first clause of (1) and assumption (2) in the second clause of (1). There is thus no contradictory assumption on the speaker's part, as was thought by the traditional presuppositionalists, but only a contradiction - or 'distance' - between what the speaker assumes and what the hearer assumes, which is perfectly acceptable and hence explains the well-formedness of (1).

The question of the speaker's commitment to the content of the propositions that he utters is, of course, the subject-matter of modal logic, and it is to this branch of logic that we now turn in order to throw further light on our problem. According to Dolezel (1976b:7), modal logic can be subdivided into four basic modal systems:

a. the alethic system of possibility, impossibility and necessity

b. the deontic system of permission, prohibition and obligation

c. the axiological system of goodness, badness and indifference

d. the epistemic system of knowledge, ignorance and belief

However, as Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1978:56) suggests, in narrative analysis alethic modalities can always be reduced to one of the other modalities, since no fictional utterance is ever analytically true, but is always true from someone's (e.g. the narrator's) point of view, or[2] true in the world of the narrator (out of all possible worlds).

We are thus left with three modal systems, the deontic, the axiological and the epistemic, which can be correlated with the three basic dimensions of meaning in Graham Greene's The Honorary Consul in the following way:

modal system	dimension of meaning (see Lenz 1977)	representative character
deontic	social	Saavedra
axiological	religious	Leon Rivas
epistemic	erotic('love')	Fortnum

What I hope to show is that at the beginning of the novel, the hero, Dr. Plarr, is in a relation of 'modal discord' (Dolezel 1976b:8) with the committed men listed above: he is deontically distant from Saavedra, the committed writer, axiologically distant from Leon, the committed priest, and epistemically distant from Fortnum, the committed lover.[3] Dr. Plarr is the cynic realist, whose only standard of values is derived from his memory of his dead father. But his growing involvement, which ultimately leads to his death, is enacted for the reader in the linguistic background structures of the narrative.

Thus, in the next section, our analysis of hedged, negated and presupposed units will reveal Plarr's gradual change from lack of commitment to commitment, and the concomitant closing of the gaps - respectively deontic, axiological and epistemic - between Plarr and the other characters.

II. Analysis

Ikegami (1978:129) distinguishes between two basic narrative modes, the 'will-mode' and the 'must-mode'. He suggests a possible correlation of the will-mode with an agent-oriented, active, personal mode of expression, and of the must-mode with an agent-suppressed, passive, impersonal mode of expression. Ikegami's distinction is obviously reminiscent of Halliday's (1970:345-6) classical study of modality, in which he labels WILL as the active, uncommitted modality and MUST as the passive, committed one.

These distinctions between WILL and MUST can be applied to The Honorary Consul in order to clarify the relationship between Plarr and Saavedra. Saavedra is the exponent of the must-mode, under the guise of his machismo-ideology. Indeed, the quintessential element of this ideology is a mixed sense of determinism, of duty, of obligation, and of total commitment to this obligation. Saavedra is, figuratively speaking, addicted to decntic modality.

It is this sense of determinism that annoys Plarr in Saavedra's novels:

> Dr. Plarr felt quite certain of what would happen there. Julio Moreno would encounter the labourer in a bar of the city and then there would be a fight with knives, won of course by the younger man (p.16)[4]

Its effect is so strong that Plarr himself is aware of it in his real-life dealings with Saavedra: he 'found the novels of Doctor Jorge Julio Saavedra hard to read, but he regarded the effort as part of his medical duties. In a few days he would have to take one of his regular dinners with Doctor Saavedra at the Hotel Nacional and he must be ready to make some comment on the book' (p.14). Such imposed deontic restrictions can easily be resented, as in the case of the young novelist Montez:

> Was he revenging the patronage which Saavedra had once shown him, all the boring counsel to which he had probably been forced to listen? (p.159)

But the deontic sense of self-imposed restrictions is particularly evident in Saavedra's own life and in his conception of the role of the novelist in society. The key word here is 'discipline': even his weekly visit to the brothel is a disciplinary visit (p.54). And there is a veritable proliferation of must/have to unrealized units:

p.53. I haven't had to buy a new suit in ten years

p.53. I have to force myself day after day to sit down pen in hand

p.56. (The writer) has to transform reality

p.56. My characters must symbolize more than themselves

p.57. (A political novel) must be free from all the petty details that date it

p.57. The true novelist must always be in his way a poet

p.154. A novelist has to stand at a distance from his subject

p.154. I had to see exactly what would lie in his view

p.154. When my doctor calls I have to obey

p.156. In a letter like this we have to move the reader

p.157. One has to strike the right tone

p.157. I have had to cross out almost every other word

p.162. To write one must have a home

p.162. (The novelist) has to live with his subject

p.164. Even his hair must be cut regularly

p.166. And then I had to drop her, because she was saying too many things which were unsuitable

The most striking feature about all these unrealized units is that, once we apply them directly to Saavedra, we find that they can be immediately transformed into realized units:

> 'I haven't had to buy a new suit in ten years' means in fact that Saavedra hasn't bought a new suit in ten years.
>
> 'I have to force myself day after day to sit down pen in hand' means that he does indeed force himself, etc.

In other words, Saavedra has fully accepted these deontic restrictions, both in his life and in his work, and has found a certain fulfilment in them, even though his eventual reward may only be, as Plarr points out, a 'footnote' in the history of Argentinian literature (p.164).

Plarr can admire Saavedra in his determination, but he cannot share it and he claims for himself the freedom of choice:

> Life isn't like that. Life isn't noble or dignified... Nothing is ineluctable. Life has surprises. Life is absurd. Because it's absurd there is always hope. (p.16)

And yet Saavedra's deontic ideology turns out to be correct in the end. Plarr is forced to admit the total defeat of what Ikegami has called the 'will-mode':

> It's not how I intended things. Nothing is ever what we intend. They didn't mean to kidnap you. I didn't mean to start the child. You would almost think there was a great joker somewhere who likes to give a twist to things. Perhaps the dark side of God has a sense of humour (p.237)

And Plarr's final act, which will be discussed in greater detail below, could well be interpreted as an act of machismo. We may conclude then that the deontic distance which initially separated Plarr from Saavedra has been reduced to virtually zero at the end of the book.

Leon suffers from a sense of determinism and obligation similar to Saavedra's, though here the reader's attention is focused on the different causal factors behind it. For example, when Leon says,

> I had to read (the Gospels) out to them. (p.116)

the reader understands him to be 'under pressure from some social norm or from his own conscience' (Sørenson 1979:277). In this case, the implied causal factor is the authoritarian church which Leon has since rejected.

In Leon's famous speech about the double nature of God, the implied causal factor is his own conscience:

> Some men, I think, are condemned to belief by a judge just as they are condemned to prison. They have no choice. No escape.(p.226)...The God I believe in must be responsible for all the evil as well as for all the saints. He has to be a God made in our image with a night-side as well as a day-side.(p.228)

Note that here the unrealized must/have to units, unlike Saavedra's, are and remain unrealized; in fact, they are unrealizable! Framed as it is by the constant repetition of I believe, Leon's speech thus takes us into the axiological realm of values and disvalues. It reflects Greene's typical concern with the axiological values of good and evil; and so the distance between Plarr and Leon is axiological, too, rather than deontic.

Finally, there is a third set of unrealized must/have to units, the implied causal factor of which is the guerilla ideology which stipulates that Leon must kill Fortnum if the guerillas' demands are not met:

> I pray all the time I shall not have to kill him...A saint would only have to pray, but I have to carry a revolver. I slow evolution down (p.229)

> I was praying I would not have to kill him (p.245)

> I never believed I would have to take a life (p.246)

Leon is aware of the contradiction between the demands imposed upon him by the guerilla ideology and the values of his own conscience, according to which being a murderer is an axiologically negative state. It is this contradiction which is exploited by Plarr and which makes Leon more vulnerable to Plarr's irony, e.g. in the following passage:

> So I suppose you'll be prepared to hear the stranger's confession and give him absolution before you kill him? Charley Fortnum's Catholic, you know. He'll appreciate having a priest at his deathbed...He will even be glad of a married priest like you, Leon (p.34-5)

At the end of the story the contradiction is resolved, and Leon's personal ideology wins over the guerilla ideology:

> I heard the shot. I had to come...I am safe now... Quite safe. I could not kill a mouse...You were right, Eduardo. I was never made to be a killer (p.252)

Leon has finally achieved an axiologically positive state, because he need not, indeed he cannot, kill Fortnum any longer.

But more surprising is the fact that Plarr also falls into the linguistic must/have to determinism in the description of the motivation for his final act:

> I've got to do something for the poor devil in there (p.250)
>
> He was vaguely aware that there was something he had to discuss with someone (p.252)
>
> I have to talk to Perez (p.253)

Plarr feels that he 'has to' carry out a final attempt to save the lives of Fortnum and the others, even though it will lead directly to his own death. His closeness to León's point of view, at this stage, is metaphorically represented by their dying side by side. And so, just like the deontic gap between Plarr and Saavedra, the axiological gap between Plarr and León has all but closed.

Finally, Plarr is epistemically distanced from the loving husband, Charley Fortnum:

> Since the morning months ago when he had begun sleeping with Charley Fortnum's wife, Doctor Plarr found he was ill at ease in the Consul's company; perhaps he was plagued by primitive sensations of guilt; perhaps he was irritated by the complacency of Charley Fortnum who appeared so modestly confident of his wife's fidelity. He talked with pride rather than anxiety of his wife's troubles in her early pregnancy as though they were a kind of compliment to his prowess until Doctor Plarr was almost ready to exclaim, 'But who do you suppose is the father?' (p.12-3)

The important information about Plarr sleeping with Fortnum's wife is backgrounded and presupposed, as if it were common knowledge. The reader is thus invited to share Plarr's epistemic vantage point and to have a laugh with Plarr at the expense of the 'complacent' cuckold, Fortnum. It is this 'epistemic partitioning' (Pavel 1980:109) of the plot which gives rise again and again to irony. In his own doxastic world, Fortnum naively believes that his wife is faithful and that the child she is expecting is his. His emotional involvement has made him blind to reality:

> They might have been talking, Doctor Plarr thought, about two different women - one was the woman whom Charley Fortnum loved - the other was a prostitute from Mother Sanchez's house who had waited in his bed the night before (p.187)

The irony cuts particularly deep when Fortnum says to Plarr:

> I wish you knew her a bit better. A doctor sees only the outside - oh, and the inside too, I suppose, but you know what I mean (p.197)

What Fortnum is doing here is claiming shared knowledge between himself and Plarr, whereas in fact the knowledge is shared between Plarr and the reader, with Fortnum painfully excluded from it, so

much so that at a later stage in the same conversation Plarr even feels 'a savage desire to tell him the whole truth' (p.197).

However, Plarr finds himself getting more and more involved with Clara and the (yet unborn) baby, despite his best intentions of holding aloof. A question of Clara's which he had not answered and which he cannot remember now lingers on his mind. And the baby becomes more and more real to him:

> He wondered with an unpleasant itch of anxiety and curiosity about his child. The child too was the result of an error, a carelessness on his part, but he had never before felt any responsibility...He thought of the tangle of its ancestry, and for the first time in the complexity of that tangle the child became real to him - it was no longer just one more wet piece of flesh like any other torn out of the body with a cord which had to be cut. This cord could never be cut (pp.211-2)

His gradual emotional involvement heralds the end of his epistemic superiority. In the next chapter, Fortnum overhears Plarr telling Leon about his affair with Clara, and he is thus able to meet Plarr for the first time on the level of epistemic equality. The almost even distribution of the verbs think and know in this scene (pp. 236-8) reflects the newly-established epistemic equilibrium between the two men.

Plarr's loss of epistemic superiority also entails a partial loss of narrative control on his part in the final scene leading up to his death. First, the reader for once feels superior to Plarr when he reads:

> The voice said a word which sounded like 'Father'. Nothing in their situation seemed to make any sense whatever (p.253)

The situation does make sense to the reader, who realizes that Leon is praying to God the Father. Secondly, note the backgrounding of the important event in:

> He didn't hear the shot which struck him from behind in the back of the right leg (p.252)

where the agent is left unrealized; and at the end of the scene the final killing of Plarr and Leon by the paras is left completely unrealized.

As for Fortnum, the consequences of his newly-acquired knowledge are equally ominous. His whole world has been destroyed. In Eco's (1979:244-5) words, Fortnum 'cannot reformulate his world. He has to throw it away. A good reason to go mad'. Or to embrace death:

> I know you think I am a coward, Plarr, but I'm not much afraid of dying now. It's a lot easier than going back and waiting at the camp for a child to be born with your face, Plarr (p.237)

But Fortnum eventually and almost miraculously comes out of his predicament unscathed. He even grows in what might be called narrative stature, since with Plarr dead it is Fortnum who assumes the narrative point of view in the last chapter - which is also the final vindication of the title. The book thus ends on a note of survival, of acceptance and of hope, with the factivity of the verb in the last sentence reinforcing the optimism of the ending:

> He realized that never before had she been so close to him as she was now (p.268)

This brief article has had a twofold aim. First, I hope it has given an insight into the meaning of Greene's novel. We have traced Plarr's odyssey from total detachment into deeper and deeper involvement, thus witnessing the approximation of Plarr's point of view to Saavedra's deontic ideology and to Leon's axiological ideology, a process which paralleled the loss of his epistemic superiority over Fortnum. Secondly, our more theoretical aim has been to lay bare the pragmalinguistic foundation of the critical concept of ideological DISTANCE, which was found to reside in unrealized units expressive of deontic, axiological and epistemic modality.

Footnotes

1. A similar 'metalinguistic' approach has been used to account for irony: see Sperber and Wilson (1981) on irony as 'echoic mention'.

2. 'Tout énoncé est rattaché à une source L. Ce qu'il y a derrière ce L n'est pas toujours clair. Mais ce qui est sûr, c'est qu'un énoncé n'est jamais "vrai tout court", il est d'abord L-vrai. En d'autres termes: dans une perspective linguistique, les modalités aléthiques doivent toujours être reformulées en termes de modalités épistémiques.' (C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1978:56). Obviously, alethic modalities may also be interpreted in terms of deontic or axiological modalities: if something is necessary according to L, it may mean that according to L it should be done (deontic), or it may mean that according to L it is desirable (axiological). See e.g. Lyons 1977: 791.

3. See J.P. Kulshestra (1977) on the importance of the theme of commitment in The Honorary Consul.

4. Page references are to the Penguin (1979) edition of The Honorary Consul. All italics and bracketed words are mine.

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GRAMMAR AND WRITTEN DISCOURSE: INITIAL VS. FINAL PURPOSE CLAUSES IN ENGLISH

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1. Introduction

It is by now well-known that there are a number of differences between formal written and spoken language, which are directly related to differences in the way in which communication functions in these two modes (for discussion, see e.g. Chafe (1980a), Ochs (1979), Ong (1982) and Tannen (1982a, b)).[1] Pawley and Syder (to appear) suggest, in fact, that constructions typical of one modality but not the other may well have been 'selected for' by the demands of the modality.

In this paper, I intend to explore a particular grammatical problem within the context of the relatively stressful circumstances of formal written communication. Following some suggestions of Ong (1982) and Pawley and Syder (to appear), I propose that written language is a very special form of communication in which the resources of spoken language have been stretched to accommodate the stressful fact that the interlocutors are not in face-to-face contact. This means, among other things, that the writer may not know who s/he is addressing, and that the ordinary means of guiding the addressee's attention, such as gestures, intonation, pitch, volume, intensity, and speed are not available. I hope to show that these facts play a large role in shaping the actual grammar of one's formal written language.

2. The problem

The issue which this paper addresses, as suggested by the title, is that of the position of purpose clauses in English texts. The problem can be stated in two ways, depending on one's perspective. We will state it first in an apparently appropriate fashion, but as the story unfolds, it will become clear that another formulation will in fact be much more revealing in capturing the discourse functions of the purpose clauses' position.

From the point of view of sentences in isolation, purpose clauses, like other subordinate clauses in English, appear to be able to occur either preceding or following the main clause with which they are associated, as suggested in examples 1 and 2:[2]

1. To cool, place the loaf on a wire rack
2. Place the loaf on a wire rack to cool

In fact, the 'moveability' of such subordinate clauses in English has sometimes been taken as a criterion for their status as grammatically subordinate (see e.g. Andersson (1975) and Quirk et al (1972)). Given this apparent moveability, then, one way to state our problem might be: What discourse factors determine whether a purpose clause will be placed before or after its main clause in English texts? As we will see, however, initial and final purpose clauses in English are doing radically different jobs; for this reason, stating our problem as if it were a matter of one clause type with two possible positions is a misleading way of approaching it. Rather, we need to ask what types of discourse functions are being performed by initial vs. final purpose clauses, and then ask what similarities and differences follow from these functions.

3. The Data Base

The texts which I examined included, in their entirety, three narratives, two procedural texts, and one M.A. thesis, as follows:

The narratives included:

1. The Brendan Voyage (=BV) by Timothy Severin. An account of Severin and a crew replicating in 1976-7 the crossing of the Atlantic in a leather boat by St. Brendan and a group of Irish monks in the sixth century.

2. Oriental Adventures (= OA) by Timothy Severin. A chronicle of early European explorations into East Asia.

3. Nim (= Nim) by Herbert Terrace. The story of Terrace and his research group's efforts to socialize and train the chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky to use American Sign Language.

The procedural texts included:

1. The Joy of Cooking (= Joy), sections on meat and bread.

2. Auto Engine Tune-up (= Auto). A manual for professional mechanics.

The M.A. thesis was by Cecilia Ford, 'The influence of Speech Variety on Teachers' Evaluations of Students' (= thesis).

I counted as 'purpose clauses' only those infinitive clauses (either with in order to or with to) which could be paraphrased with 'in order to'; infinitives such as those governed by verbs or adjectives (e.g., wanted to leave or happy to oblige) were not counted.

Table 1 shows the number of initial and final purpose clauses collected from each text:

	Initial	Final
BV	18	236
OA	18	271
Nim	38	135
Joy	31	32
Auto	70	135
thesis	10	15
	185	824

Table 1.

From Table 1 we can see that the number of initial purpose clauses is much lower than the number of final purpose clauses. Adding the two columns together, we have a total of 1009 purpose clauses, of which 18% are initial and 82% are final. This fact suggests that in terms of frequency it would be reasonable to consider the final purpose clause as 'unmarked', and to try to determine under what conditions a purpose clause appears in initial position. I will suggest that these conditions have to do with a notion of thematicity as developed by Peter Fries.

4. Thematicity and the function of purpose clauses

4.1. Historical overview

The earliest work I know of on the question of the function of the position of purpose clauses is that of Golkova (1968). Working in the Neo-Prague school tradition founded by Jan Firbas (see e.g. Firbas (1964), (1965), and (1971)), Golkova examined a large number of written English texts and concluded that the position of purpose clauses correlates with the degree of 'communicative dynamism' (CD) which they express in a given context, where this term describes the extent to which a given part of a sentence 'contributes to the further development of the information'. Thus, Golkova found that final purpose clauses tend to be higher in 'CD' than do initial purpose clauses. The problem with this characterization of the function of position in purpose clauses, of course, is that there is no effective way to independently verify whether something is 'contributing to the further development of the information'. Another difficulty with Golkova's account is that she presents the examples from her data base in isolation rather than in terms of the contexts in which they occur, so that it is difficult for the reader to determine whether the hypothesis is valid or not. As I hope to show, a more revealing level of understanding can be achieved when the position of purpose clauses is considered in terms of the organization of texts.

In his well-known papers on theme and transitivity, Halliday (1967) proposed the term 'theme' for 'the point of departure of the clause as a message' (p.212) and suggested that 'theme' is typically realized by the initial element (word, phrase, or clause) in an English sentence. Thus, in a sentence such as 3, the underlined portion would be the theme:

3. Tomorrow we have to get up at 6

However, while it seems clear that Halliday had discourse considerations in mind in associating a 'theme' function with the initial element in a sentence, in the 1967 papers he did not pursue the discourse implications of this association.

4.2. Fries' development of the notion of 'thematicity'

Fortunately, however, Fries (1983) took it upon himself to do just this. Fries suggested that Halliday's 'theme', realized by the initial element in a sentence in English, has a direct discourse correlate: tracking the themes within a text will turn out to provide essential clues to the reader as to the method of organization of the text. This is especially clear for those sentence-initial elements which can be called 'marked themes', that is those which are not subjects, subjects being 'unmarked themes' in English. Thus, for example, in a 'tour guide' text, such as some of the apartment layout descriptions of Linde and Labov (1975), it is the themes of the successive sentences which guide our attention through the apartment:

4. As you open the door,...
When you get past there,...
If you keep walking in that same direction,...
And on the right side,...
And even further ahead of the dining room....
And in the back...
In other words,...
Now, if you turn right...
And if you kept walking straight ahead,...
And on your left

Similarly, Fries shows, in a 'compare and contrast' text, it is precisely in the successive themes that we find all the information which reveals that the text is organized in terms of comparing and contrasting. Thus, from S.E. Morison's The Two Ocean War, we find the following passage:

5. Although the U.S. participated heavily in WWI, the nature of that participation was fundamentally different from what it became in WWII.

The earlier conflict was a one-ocean war for the Navy and a one-theater war for the Army;

the latter was a two-ocean war for the Navy and one of five major theaters for the Army.

In both wars a vital responsibility of the Navy was escort-of-convoy and anti-submarine work,

but in the 1917-1918 conflict it never clashed with the enemy on the surface;

whilst between 1941 and 1945 it fought some twenty major and countless minor engagements with the Japanese Navy.

American soldiers who engaged in WWI were taken overseas in transports and landed on docks or in protected harbors;

in WWII the art of amphibious warfare had to be revived and developed, since assault troops were forced to fight their way ashore.

Airpower, in the earlier conflict, was still inchoate and almost negligible;

in the latter it was a determining factor.

In WWI the battleship still reigned queen of the sea, as she had, in changing forms, since the age of Drake,

and Battle Line fought with tactics inherited from the age of sail;

but in WWII the capital naval force was the aircraft carrier taskgroup, for which completely new tactics had to be devised.

What these examples show us, then, is that in written English, the choice of which element in a clause is to be the 'theme', that is, the element in sentence-initial position, is strongly determined by the way in which the discourse is organized. As example (5) shows, this is, again, especially true for the 'marked themes', those initial elements which are not the subject.

A very similar claim can be found in Longacre's contribution to Longacre and Thompson (to appear); in his discussion of a travel guide to Mexico, he states 'By skillful use of adverbial clauses in various functions, the author of this discourse is constantly reminding the reader of the you're-on-a-journey perspective of the entire discourse'.

While this claim seems to be well-supported for the text types which Fries considered, those whose organizing principle is easily identified, it is not so obviously valid for the narrative

and procedural texts of the type which provided me with the purpose clauses I was investigating. Interestingly enough, however, even in these texts I think that Fries' claim can shed light on the function of initial purpose clauses.

5. Towards an explanation

5.1. Initial Purpose Clauses

In the texts I considered, it seems fairly clear that the initial purpose clauses were not functioning to provide clues to the 'method of development' of the text. These texts, all much longer than those Fries used to illustrate his claim, in general had no 'method of development' beyond a temporally or logically sequential one. But the initial purpose clauses are still 'marked themes' and they do seem to be functioning to guide the reader's attention, albeit in a somewhat more subtle fashion.

I suggest that an initial purpose clause provides a framework within which the main clause can be interpreted, and that it does this by its role as a link in an EXPECTATION CHAIN. That is,

1. The environment, including the text itself as well as the knowledge which the reader brings to it, creates a set of expectations

2. Within this set of expectations, the initial purpose clause names a goal. Readers are expected to be able to identify with this goal, that is, to see it as a legitimate goal, either because they can identify with the goals of the story participants, or because they have their own goals

3. The purpose clause, in naming this goal, raises further expectations about the means used to reach this goal

4. The following material fulfills these expectations by providing the means by which the goal is to be reached

In this way, the initial purpose clause helps to guide the attention of the reader, by signalling, within the portion of the text in which it occurs, how the reader is expected to associate the material following the purpose clause with the material preceding it. The final purpose clause does not play this role. In Hallidayan terms, the difference could be stated by referring to the three functions of language: ideational (content), textual (text-organizing), and interpersonal (pragmatic); while final purpose clauses serve at the ideational level, initial purpose clauses operate simultaneously at the ideational and at the textual levels (Halliday, 1973a).[3]

To falsify this hypothesis, it would be necessary to find cases of initial purpose clauses which did not serve this function. Among the 186 initial purpose clauses which I examined, I did not find any such cases.

This description, while hopefully accurate, is, however, somewhat abstract. Let us get down to cases to illustrate. Consider first a portion of text from Brendan Voyage in which Brendan, caught in a storm, is rapidly veering off course:

> 6. Brendan was rushing madly farther and farther out to sea. To slow her down we streamed a heavy rope in a loop from the stern and let it trail in the water behind us to act as a brake, and, hopefully, to smooth the worst of the wave crests. From the stern also dangled a metal bucket; only twenty-four hours earlier we had been using it to cook an excellent meal of Irish crabs. Now it clanked mournfully every time a wave broke against it. BV8

The hypothesis is nicely supported by this example. The text preceding the sentence containing the initial purpose clause To slow her down creates a set of expectations, namely that the crew are in a dangerous situation since the farther out to sea the boat goes, the less likely it is that they will reach their destination before their water and food supplies run out. The initial purpose clause To slow her down names a goal compatible with this set of expectations which readers are expected to be able to identify with: how to slow the boat down (since they cannot control its direction). To the extent that readers are taking the goals of the crew members as their own for the duration of the story, this is an easy goal to identify with. Naming this goal in turn raises expectations about means for reaching it, which it is the function of the text following the purpose clause to provide.

For contrast, let us compare the final purpose clause near the end of 6: to cook an excellent meal of Irish crabs. Here there is no set of expectations created by the environment; there is nothing in either the preceding text or the knowledge which the reader brings to the text to suggest anything about cooking Irish crabs. By the time the purpose clause is mentioned, the means for attaining that goal have already been given. The clause to cook an excellent meal of Irish crabs simply provides, in a very local way, the purpose for which the metal bucket was used.

This pair of examples illustrates very nicely, then, the difference between the discourse function of an initial purpose clause and a final purpose clause in terms of setting up a chain of expectations: by naming a goal, the means to attain which then need to be presented, the initial purpose clause clearly sets up a chain of expectations which are missing with the final purpose clause, where the goal is named after the means for reaching it have already been presented.

Here is another example from a later portion of the same book, a description of the opposite sort of situation: a lack of wind. The air is too calm to make any progress and, unlike the storm situation in 6, where the crew have their hands full, there is really nothing for them to do:

7. Tedium became our new enemy. Once or twice we glimpsed enough sun to make it worthwhile to hang the sleeping bags in the rigging and to try to dry out our clothes. But usually the weather was too foggy or too damp for any success. And it was so cold that the next migrant to land on Brendan, another water pipit, also failed to survive the night and perished. To pass the time, there was a shipboard craze for fancy rope work, and Brendan's rigging sprouted complicated knots and splices, intricate lashings, and every item that could possibly be embellished with a Turk's head was duly decorated. BV214

The paragraph theme, as illustrated by the sentences preceding the underlined purpose clause, is the sheer boredom of the situation. The problem which this situation gives rise to is that of what to do about it; the purpose clause to pass the time names this problem, one with which any reader can identify, and the main clause following it names the solution: a craze for fancy rope work.

Here is an example from Nim. The author, Herbert Terrace, had happened upon a currently unused house owned by Columbia University, which he hoped to use as living and training quarters for Nim and his teachers:

8. After learning about the funding from the Grant Foundation, I asked Laura Petitto, who was outstanding among the volunteer teachers, whether she would assume Carol's job as Nim's full-time sign teacher. Laura had already made plans to go to graduate school in psychology, but she was also aware of her skill in working with Nim and believed strongly in the future of the project. Fortunately for Nim and for the project, Laura agreed to accept the only full-time job on the project and to postpone her graduate education until the following year. To show my appreciation of that decision, I offered her the master bedroom. Nim 99

The expectations raised by this paragraph involve the personal sacrifice which Laura would be making by putting off her graduate education for a year to work with Terrace. Within the context of that set of expectations, an appropriate goal for Terrace, again, one with which readers can readily identify, is to express his gratitude to her. The initial purpose clause to show my appreciation of that decision names this goal, and the main clause following it names the means for reaching it.

Our next example comes from the Ford M.A. thesis:

9. (Chapter on Methods) Speech Samples. My first step was to collect speech samples of elementary school children from one age group, both with and without Spanish influenced speech. Since these children had to come from the same socio-economic background, it would have been ideal if I had been allowed to record children from an elementary school class. Such children would all have been the same age and come from the same neighborhood, an indicator of socio-economic status. Unfortunately, the time involved in obtaining official permission to enter a classroom to gather speech samples was prohibitive. Therefore, I went to public places to record children. I used a Sony TC-520CS with a Superscope Electret condenser microphone. Speech samples were collected in two cities of about 75,000 inhabitants each. One city was in Southern California and the other in Southern Oregon. To find informants, I placed myself near schools or at parks and approached children asking them for help with a school project. If the parents were present, permission was obtained from them as well. Each child stated his or her age and parents' occupations. Thesis 13

Here the first sentence in the paragraph describes a problematic situation, creating a set of expectations relating to the goal of finding an appropriate set of children to interview. After a discussion of potential alternatives which were not available, the goal is stated in the purpose clause To find informants; the main clause following it then states how this goal was reached.

Let us take an example from The Joy of Cooking:

10. (Section on 'Carving Meat')...Keeping the knife blade sharp and under easy control is important. But of equal importance to the successful carver is keeping the V-edge true by the use of a steel. And the following procedure should precede the use of the knife before each carving period. The steel, which should be magnetized, realigns the molecular structure of the blade. To true a blade, hold the steel firmly in the left hand, thumb on top of handle. Hold the hand slightly away from the body. Hold the knife in right hand, with the point upward. Place the heel of the bladeagainst the far side of the tip of the steel, as illustrated. The steel and blade should meet at about a 15' to 25' angle. Draw the blade across the steel. Bring the blade down across the steel, toward the left hand, with a quick swinging motion of the right wrist. The entire blade should pass lightly over the steel. To start the second stroke, bring the knife into the same position as in the first, but this time the steel should lie behind the blade, away from you. About twelve strokes are enough to true the edge. Joy 403

The text preceding the underlined purpose clause in this example is about sharpening a knife blade; the expectations which it raises, then, have to do with the goal of getting the blade sharp, particularly with maintaining equal angles on both sides of the 'V' formed by the edge of the blade ('keeping the V-edge true'). Within that set of expectations, the purpose clause To true a blade names the obvious goal; the material following it provides the means for attaining it. In fact, embedded in that procedure is another set of expectations, within which another goal is named, this time coming entirely from inferences from the text rather than from the text itself: expectations that there must be a 'second stroke' arise from inferring that a 'V-edge' can only be maintained if both sides of the knife blade are alternately drawn against the steel. Thus the purpose clause To start the second stroke states the goal created by this embedded set of expectations, and the clause following it presents the means for achieving it.

There is an important implication of the hypothesis which is illustrated by this example: looking again at the problem named by the purpose clause To true a blade, we see that this is the first example in which not just the main clause associated with that purpose clause, but the entire rest of the paragraph is devoted to providing the means for reaching the goal. In other words, this purpose clause clearly functions in the discourse to give the motivational orientation for a whole series of actions. The fact that the 'subordinate clause' is functionally associated with much more than just the main clause with which it forms one punctuated sentence suggests very strongly that the whole question of 'grammatical''subordination' must be re-examined from the point of view of its function in discourse. We will return to this point later in this paper.

Our final example of this type is from the Auto Tune-up book.

> 11. (Chapter on Batteries, section on 'Self-discharge of Battery'). All automotive batteries will slowly discharge when not in use, and will discharge faster when warm than when cold. They will also discharge faster when fully charged than when only partially charged. To minimize the extent of battery self-discharge, store wet batteries in cool place, away from hot air ducts or radiators in winter, and shielded from direct sunlight in summer. Wet batteries used for display purposes or stored in unused cars must not be forgotten and neglected. They should receive a boosting charge whenever the specific gravity falls .05 below the specific gravity figure for a fully charged battery. Auto 53-54

The material in this paragraph preceding the underlined purpose clause clearly raises expectations about how to keep one's

battery from self-discharging. The purpose clause, which any reader who owns or services a car can identify with, states the goal: To minimize the extent of battery self-discharge. Again, as with the previous example, the entire rest of the paragraph fulfills the expectations created by naming this goal, giving a series of suggestions by way of advice about how to attain that goal.

Earlier it was mentioned that the expectations which give rise to a particular problem need not be stated explicitly in the text. Each of the next three examples illustrates just such a situation: the expectations arise entirely from inferences from the text.

The first two examples are from The Joy of Cooking:

12. (Section on 'To Broil Meat')....Broiling time depends so largely upon the thickness of the meat, the length of time it has been hung, its fat content and the degree of doneness desired. If you use a thermometer, rare steaks are broiled to an internal temperature of 130'; medium to 160'. Lamb chops are broiled to 155' for rare and to 170' if well done. Ham is cooked well done. The time for broiling bacon is influenced by personal preference as to crispness, but to keep it from curling, the heat should be low. Joy 400

Here no mention has been made anywhere in the preceding text of any issue of bacon curling; in fact in this rather clumsily written paragraph there has been no previous discussion of bacon curled or flat. Yet anyone who has ever cooked bacon can infer a potential curling problem (though many people, of course, would not consider it a problem) from the set of expectations raised by the reference to time required for broiling it, and can identify with a possible goal of preventing the curling from happening. The means for achieving this are stated in the main clause: keep the heat low.

The next example, also from The Joy of Cooking contains a purpose clause mentioning loaf for the first time:

13. (Section on 'About Yeast Bread Making'). Meanwhile get your pans ready. Glass and enamel pans require a lower temperature than darkened tin or dull aluminum ones. Any of these will give you a well-browned crust. To form the loaf, throw down onto the board one of the pieces of dough which have been resting. You may use a rolling pin or your palm to press it evenly before forming... Joy 566

Once again, given a culture where the unmarked form in which bread appears is a loaf, no mention of loaves needs to have been made in the preceding text in order for the purpose clause To form the loaf (with a definite article) to be an appropriate statement of the goal which arises in the context of making bread.

Our last example of expectations arising from outside the text itself comes from the Auto Tune-up book. This example is striking partly because the purpose clause occurs not only in paragraph-initial position, but in section and in fact chapter-initial position:

14. (Chapter: 'Carburetor Fundamentals'; section: 'High-Speed Circuit'). In order to ensure economical and smooth running engines, some control of the amount of gas present in the gas-air mixture is necessary. Auto 105

Here, of course, the expectations which create the goal named by this purpose clause arise by virtue of the subject matter of the book itself. No reader can fail to have a set of expectations within which s/he can identify with the goal of ensuring economical and smooth running engines.

So far, then, we have considered a number of examples which illustrate the part of the hypothesis according to which initial purpose clauses in English function to guide the reader's attention in a very specific way, by naming a goal which arises from expectations created by the text or inferences from it, which the following material, often consisting of many sentences, provides the means for attaining. In the next section, we will examine a number of examples illustrating the second part of the hypothesis, simply that final purpose clauses do not serve this function.

5.2. Final Purpose Clauses

As suggested above in the discussion of to cook an excellent meal of Irish crabs in example 8, final purpose clauses do not serve to guide the reader's attention, that is, that they are not playing any thematic role in the discourse in which they are found. In fact, the role of the final purpose clause can be seen to be a much more local one than that played by the initial purpose clause: it serves simply to state the purpose for which the action named in the preceding clause is/was undertaken. The scope, then, of a final purpose clause is restricted to its immediately preceding main clause, which must name an action performed by a volitional agent. In this section, I present several examples to illustrate this claim.

The first example is from Brendan Voyage:

15. George had always been my first choice for crew. Twenty-six years old, he had served in the army and later gone to the Middle East to train soldiers for an oil-rich sheik. With the money saved from this venture, he had decided to take a couple of years looking around the world and pleasing himself. BV 41

This example provides a striking contrast with those of the initial purpose clauses which we have just been considering. Here there is nothing either in the text or derivable from it which creates any

expectations within which training soldiers for an oil-rich sheik is a goal with which readers are expected to identify. This final purpose clause serves simply to state what George's purpose was for going to the Middle East.

The next example is also from Brendan Voyage:

16. Each of us was reacting to the conditions in his own way. Arthur had decided that the best place to be in foul weather was warmly curled up in his sleeping bag... Neither did the heavy weather take the edge off Edan's enjoyment of life;...Trondur remained absolutely unruffled. He would emerge bearlike from the forward shelter to take his turn at the helm, and on the first wind-swept evening taught us another useful trick. BV 153

Here again, there are no expectations arising from the text which would suggest taking turns at the helm being a reasonable goal. to take his turn at the helm simply names the motivation for which Trondur would emerge from his sleeping quarters.

The next example is from Nim:

17. Since most of Nim's teachers were right-handed and he learned to sign by molding and imitation, it is not surprising that he made most of his one-handed signs with his right hand. When Nim didn't sign with his right hand, it was usually because he was using it for some other purpose, such as holding on to the teacher or some object with which he was playing. Under these circumstances, Nim signed with his left hand. He also signed with his feet! I was once tickling Nim when he was holding on to the branch of a tree with both hands. Nim indicated that he wanted to be tickled again by signing both more and tickle with his feet. On other occasions when Nim's hands were otherwise occupied, I have seen Nim point to an object he wanted with his feet in order to sign that. Nim 213-4

In this example, quoted at some length to provide enough context for interpretation, the final purpose clause provides a motivation for Nim to have pointed to an object with his feet. It does not play any role in an expectation chain, nor does it name any goal.

Here is an example from Oriental Adventures:

18. The emperor himself was impossible to see as he kept to a very rigid routine. He rose every morning at three o'clock for prayers, then read official dispatches until his breakfast at seven. Afterwards he relaxed...At 3 p.m. the emperor dined, and then went to the theatre or to

other amusements before retiring to read privately. By seven in the evening he had invariably gone to his bedchamber attended by a eunuch whose duty was to fetch the lady of the emperor's choice. OA 148

The purpose clause to read privately is not an issue in the portion of the text in which it occurs; there are no expectations to which it responds and there are none which respond to it.

Our final example is also from Oriental Adventures:

19. Life for a Jesuit in China in these years, as in India earlier, was a confusing mixture of extraordinary privilege with intervals of severe and sometimes terrifying oppression...The truth of the matter was that the Jesuits, having entered China in the guise of Occidental technicians, were steadily being caught in a trap of their own invention. More and more they came to depend on their scientific skills to retain the good will of their hosts, and they found themselves having to justify their presence in China by the steady performance of scientific feats. On one famous occasion Verbiest was called to the palace to face a competition against the Chinese astrologers... OA 84

Nothing in the preceding text prepares us for considering a competition between the Jesuit Verbiest and the Chinese astrologers. In fact, until we read that purpose clause we have no idea why Verbiest would have been called to the palace; the purpose clause tells us why. But it does not name a goal arising from the preceding text.

With these examples, we have seen that the role which a final purpose clause plays is quite different from that which an initial purpose clause plays. While the final purpose clause performs a local semantic function, naming the motivation for some particular action, the initial purpose clause plays a much broader discourse role, guiding the reader's attention by serving as a link in an expectation chain.

Having examined some of the data which support this hypothesis, let us turn now to some facts which together form a set of arguments that provide further support for it.

6. Arguments supporting the hypothesis

6.1. Interchanging positions for a purpose clause

Very often, though by no means always, transposing a purpose clause creates a bizarre text. For example, preposing a final purpose clause can result in a strange text because, all other things being equal, the purpose clause raises expectations which are not warranted by the rest of the text. Here is an example from Brendan Voyage:

20. Next morning at dawn, George was making himself a cup of coffee. 'Hey!', he called in delight. 'Ice. I do believe it's ice.' There, floating by like some strange Chinese carnival dragon, was a queerly contorted chunk of ice, bobbing gently like a child's toy. 'There's another chunk, just ahead', George said. We all lined up to watch. BV 215

Preposing the underlined purpose clause in this passage would yield the following sentence in place of the last one given:

21. To watch we all lined up...

The sentence fails to fit this context for several reasons, all having to do with the expectations which are set up by the inappropriate initial purpose clause. The preceding text is not incompatible with the idea of the crew's watching the ice float by, but 'watching' does not constitute a GOAL within the context of that text. By the same token, To watch sets up the expectation that the following text will provide a means for attaining the goal of watching, but 'lining up' is not easily understood as a reasonable set of procedures. In fact, the main clause we all lined up seems to be something of a 'let-down' after the inappropriate 'announcement' of the goal made by To watch.

Here is another example from Brendan Voyage. The paragraphs preceding the purpose clause sentence are about the warm welcome and the offer of shipyard facilities which Brendan's crew received in Iceland.

22. We also rummaged Brendan at the boatyard - the old traditional practice of removing every single item from the boat, cleaning her gear and inspecting the hull... The boatyard cat, however, was dismayed. To the amusement of the shipwrights the cat took one sniff at Trondur's cache of whale blubber and dried lamb, and promptly evacuated the boatyard, not to be seen again until Brendan was reloaded and safely afloat once more.

    The director of Iceland's telecommunications center also came down to offer his help.

Once again, attempting to prepose the final purpose clause in the last sentence of this passage gives it a contextually bizarre appearance.

23. To offer his help the director of Iceland's telecommunications center also came down.

Particularly in the context of the preceding passage about the boatyard cat, the new sentence is inappropriate; there is nothing

at that point which leads to the expectation of 'offering his help' as a goal. Nor does his 'coming down' offer much by way of how to reach it. In fact, what this purpose clause is actually doing in the text at this point is simply describing the motivation for the director's visit to Brendan's crew, hence its position following the verb came down.

It is also possible to create bizarre texts by attempting to postpone an initial purpose clause. Consider this example from Nim:

> 24. Lana's lessons on the proper use of Yerkish were quite similar to Sarah's training with plastic chips. If Lana wanted a particular food, she had to ask the computer to provide it by pressing the proper sequence of lexigrams on the computer console. If Lana wanted a piece of apple, she had to press the sequence please machine give apple. Lana would not receive any apple if she pressed such incorrect sequences as: please machine apple give, or machine please give apple. Rewards such as an opportunity to look out the window or to look at pictures of familiar objects required sequences of a slightly different nature. In order to look at slides, Lana would have to type: please machine show slides. Sequences such as the following would not be rewarded: please machine give slides; please machine give window. Nim 24

In this paragraph, the role of the initial purpose clause is especially clear. Postposing it would yield the sentence:

> 25. Lana would have to type: please machine show slides in order to look at slides.

This sentence, 'grammatical' beyond reproach inside its own boundaries, makes for obviously confusing reading in this context, since the text preceding the purpose clause sentence raises clear expectations about how Lana could get to look at certain things. In the original text, the initial purpose clause at that point names the goal which the environment had led us to identify with, and prepares us for a discussion of how to reach it, which is provided in the main clause. Without the purpose clause to introduce the idea of typing please machine show slides, we feel cheated by having to wait until the end of the sentence to find out that that is indeed how Lana could get to see pictures.

Here is a very similar example from Auto Engine Tune-up, which is from a passage describing the installation of valve springs:

> 26. Installation (or removal) of the valve spring requires the use of a compressor tool. These are available in different designs, many of them being made specifically for a particular make and model of engine. The valve springs can be installed in or removed from most engines

with the cylinder head in place. To do this, the spark plug is removed from the cylinder that requires valve-spring service and a threaded compressed-air adapter is inserted. Auto 123

Just as with the previous example, postposing the initial purpose clause to the end of its sentence gives us a strange text in which our expectations are frustrated. The hypothetical sentence would be:

27. The spark plug is removed from the cylinder that requires valve-spring service and a threaded compressed-air adapter is inserted to do this.

The description of the procedure is much too long and complicated to warrant waiting until it is finished before we find out that it actually is the means for reaching the goal which the text led us to expect, namely installing the valve springs with the cylinder head still in place.

In this section, I have suggested that one piece of evidence that initial and final purpose clauses are performing quite different functions in discourse is that often transposing a purpose clause to the opposite end of its sentence creates an unsatisfactory text in which expectations are falsely raised or inappropriately responded to.

In proposing that displacing a final purpose clause can create a bizarre text, note that I am not claiming that doing so always creates a nonsensical text. Examples can be found in which a final purpose clause can be preposed with no obvious ill effects, simply because that purpose clause does name a possible goal at that point in the text. Similarly, an initial purpose clause can sometimes be postposed with little loss in textuality when failing to name the goal before introducing the means for reaching it is not a gross violation of our expectations. My claim here is simply that those cases in which a strange text does result provide support for the claim that identical morphology in the two positions is serving radically different discourse functions.

6.2. Non-literal initial purpose clauses

One subset of initial purpose clauses which cannot be postposed without disastrous consequences to the integrity of the text are those which do not in any literal sense provide a possible motivation for a main clause action. The fact that such non-literal purpose clauses never occur in final position gives strong support to the hypothesis that purpose clauses in the two positions are doing different discourse work. Let us look at some examples:

From Brendan Voyage we have this passage:

28. For our safety, I tried to report Brendan's position to the shore radio stations, who passed the information on to the Coast Guard. So whenever the sky was clear, I took sextant readings and calculated our position. To set our course, there was only one golden rule: keep sailing west, always west. BV 183

This example of a non-literal purpose clause is particularly convincing since the main clause associated with it there was only one golden rule is an equational clause, absolutely incapable of naming any action at all. Thus the purpose clause cannot possibly name the purpose for which some action was performed. As intimated above, there is no way such a purpose clause can be postposed.

Here is a mildly amusing example from The Joy of Cooking. Concluding a section on a particular method for roasting meat, we find the following paragraph:

29. No basting is necessary in this procedure, there being sufficient fat in the meat. You will get minimal, but very precious, juice in the pan. To make gravy from pan drippings, see p.333. Joy 400

Again, the initial purpose clause in no way provides the purpose for the action named by the imperative see p.333. Seeing page 333 cannot be done for the purpose of making pan gravy. But as a link in an expectation chain (at least for members of the gravy-making subculture in Western cooking), this clause is prototypical: meat juice in a roasting pan leads to expectations of making gravy from them; the purpose clause names the goal of making gravy, and the main clause names the means for doing so; 'seeing p.333' works to tell us how to reach this goal by means of a long but obvious inferential chain.

As a final example of a non-literal purpose clause, I would like to propose the extreme case of a 'speech act' purpose clause. I had no satisfactory examples of this in my data base, but this example from Golkova (1968) will do nicely:

30. To sum up, then, English has a very definite and complex grammar with some variation...Quirk 113,04. (Golkova 123)

Such an example is often described in terms of the illocutionary force of the material with which it is associated. That is, the purpose clause is properly viewed as 'modifying' the assertion made by the following material rather than the material itself (see, for example, Greenbaum (1969) and Halliday and Hasan (1976)), since there is no literal way in which English has a definite and

complex grammar for the purpose of summing up. Of course, the fact that this is possible only with initial but never with final purpose clauses strongly supports my hypothesis that initial purpose clauses serve a reader-orienting function not served by final purpose clauses. Though some readers may question whether To sum up is actually a purpose clause or not, note that this example is a prototypical illustration of the role of initial purpose clauses as links in an expectation chain which I presented above in Section 5: the material preceding the cited sentence presumably raised expectations within which the goal of offering a summary was appropriate. The purpose clause names this goal, and the following material provides a way to reach it, namely the summary itself.

6.3. Larger scope of initial purpose clauses

As I pointed out in Section 5 above, one of the characteristics of initial purpose clauses is that they may have many clauses, and indeed often many sentences, in their scope. That is, as we saw with example 10, the material describing the means for reaching the goal named by the purpose clause often takes several clauses or even sentences to express. Here are two more examples, this time from Oriental Adventures:

31. When Kol'tso and his men first arrived in Moscow, their reputation could scarcely have been lower...he [Tsar Ivan] was enraged that Yermak's Cossack brigade should have gone marching away across the Urals leaving the Russian frontier defenceless...This outburst was at its height when Kol'tso arrived with his gift of Siberian furs in Moscow, and stunned the tsar and his advisers...The Cossack messengers were given money and lodged at the tsar's expense, and to Yermak himself the tsar drafted a special message, praising his successes and granting him and all his followers a full and complete pardon. To seal his bond, Ivan promised to send a force of Russian streltsy under a voevoda or military governor to relieve the hard-pressed Cossacks; and for Yermak himself Ivan sent a silver cup, two suits of body armour and, from his own shoulders, a fur coat. OA 51

32. To teach them a lesson and repay themselves for the trouble, the Cossacks promptly located and looted the Vogul camp before returning to their boats and continuing down the river. OA 46

The initial purpose clause with the largest scope in my data is from Auto Engine Tune-up. Here ten clauses, separated into three written sentences, are under the scope of the underlined purpose clause; the paragraph is in a section on adjusting points on a distributor:

33. Observe the meter reading and adjust the point gap to the proper dwell angle, according to specifications. If the meter reads too low, the point gap is too large. If the meter reads too high, the point gap is too small. To facilitate this adjustment, loosen the hold-down screw and place a screw-driver on the adjusting slot, as shown in Fig. 61. Turn the engine over and adjust the point set while watching the dwell meter. When the proper dwell has been obtained, stop the engine and tighten the hold-down screw. The dwell should again be checked to make sure that it has not changed from its original setting. Auto 134

A final purpose clause, in contrast, never in my corpus has more than a single clause in its scope, namely its immediately preceding main clause. This difference in the number of clauses under the scope of an initial purpose clause as opposed to a final one underscores the discourse role of the initial purpose clause in orienting the reader which is absent in the final purpose clause.

I quantified this distinction by counting the number of clauses in the scope of all 70 of the initial purpose clauses in Auto Engine Tune-up, and found that they had an average of 3.18 clauses in their scope, as compared to the single clause in the scope of final purpose clauses, as shown in Table 1:

initial	purpose clauses	3.18
final	purpose clauses	1

Table 1: Average number of clauses in scope of purpose clause in Auto Engine Tune-up

Related to the fact that the initial purpose clause tends to have more clauses in its scope than does the final purpose clause is the fact that the single main clause following an initial purpose clause tends to be longer than the single main clause preceding a final purpose clause. That fact underlies the fourth argument supporting my hypothesis.

6.4. 'Weighty' main clauses following initial purpose clauses

As I collected data, it quickly became apparent that the main clauses preceding a final purpose clause often consisted of a simple subject and a single-word intransitive verb, which was never the case for the main clause following an initial purpose clause. Here are two examples of maximally simple and short main clauses preceding final purpose clauses:

34. ...and each day we watched to see how much of the pack would still be edible after the seas had been washing over it... BV153

35. At 3 p.m. the emperor dined, and then went to the theatre or to other amusements before retiring to read privately. OA 148

In contrast, we can compare the following two examples of initial purpose clauses, in which the main clause, that is, the material up to the next period, is very long and weighty, each one containing 23 words:

36. To reach it one crosses bog country, marked by clumps of brown peat stacked for drying and occasional tiny fields rimmed with walls of loose rock. BV 18

37. In order to minimize the intrusion of a camera in Nim's bedroom, I removed a section of the wall across from his bed and modified it so that it could be reinserted quietly and securely. Nim 154-5

To determine how general this difference between initial and final purpose clauses was, I took the first 18 initial and the first 18 final purpose clauses in Brendan Voyage and compared the number of words in their main clauses. That is, for each initial purpose clause, I counted the number of words up to the next following period, and for each final purpose clause I counted the number of words back to the next preceding period. The results are presented below:

After initial purpose clause (n = 18):	17.5
Before final purpose clause (n = 18):	7.8

Table 2: Average # of words in main clause in Brendan Voyage

In fact, as I took a closer look at the types of main verbs that occurred with final purpose clauses, I found that roughly half of them were verbs of motion or position. This fact strongly confirms our other findings: not only do final purpose clauses seem to function very locally to provide the purpose for a given action, but at least half of the time, the main verb is one which seems to have been undertaken solely in order to accomplish that purpose; in such a case, then, that purpose is the rhematic information of the sentence, and the 'main' verb expresses incidental information about how the agent came to be in the position to accomplish that purpose.[4]

Example 20 is one canonical example; here is one more, also from Brendan Voyage:

38. I went forward to help him secure the sodden canvas. p.225.

With the initial purpose clauses, on the other hand, while the main verb might well be a verb of motion or position, it is never the only item being presented in that main clause; there is other, clearly rhematic material with it. Here is an example of an initial purpose clause from Brendan Voyage with such a main clause; here the main verb cross is a verb of motion, but the point of the sentence is to describe the trip to Brandon Creek, not to simply say that something is crossed:

39. Brandon Creek lies on the north side of the Dingle, a cleft in the line of massive cliffs that guards the coast. To reach it one crosses bog country, marked by clumps of brown peat stacked for drying and occasional tiny fields rimmed with walls of loose rock p.18

In this section, then, we have seen that, formally, in terms of sheer number of words to the last or next period, the main clause following an initial purpose clause is longer than the main clause preceding a final purpose clause. We have also seen that the types o predication found in the main clauses with final purpose clauses are different from those found in the main clauses with initial purpose clauses, tending to be not only short, but simple verbs of motion or position leading up to the rhematic goal stated in the final purpose clause. In the preceding section, we saw that, in purely functional terms, the number of clauses following an initial purpose clause which were in its scope, that is, which were part of the means to reaching the goal named by the purpose clause, was greater than the number of clauses in the scope of a final purpose clause, which is never more than one. The combination of these three sets of facts provides clear support once again for the hypothesis that the two types of purpose clauses are performing different functions in English discourse: the initial purpose clause raises expectations about the means for attaining the goal which it names, and the discussion of these may often take a number of clauses or even sentences to describe. The final purpose clause, on the other hand, neither raises nor responds to any discourse expectations, but simply provides a motivation for a given action; its main clause needs to be no longer or weightier than is necessary to describe that action.

6.5. Final purpose clause more closely tied to the main clause

A further argument for the more semantic role of the final purpose clause, as opposed to the more textual role for the initial purpose clause can be stated in the form of a prediction: if the final purpose clause is indeed like other adverbial adjuncts of the predicate, such as manner and locative adverbs, for example, then we would predict that it would tend to be written as a unit with the verb phrase, that is, without a comma. Initial purpose clauses, on the other hand, would be predicted to occur much more frequently with a comma, since, in addition to their role of expressing purpose, they also perform a text-organizing function. This prediction was strongly supported by the data: I looked at all the purpose clauses in Oriental Adventures and Nim, and found that out of 406 final purpose clauses, only 6, or 1%, were separated from their main clauses by a preceding comma, while of the 57 initial purpose clauses, 44, or 77%, were separated from their following main clause by a comma, as shown in Table 3.[5]

	number	percent
final purpose clauses (n = 406):	6	1%
initial purpose clauses (n = 57):	44	77%

Table 3: Purpose clauses in Oriental Adventures and Nim separated from main clause by a comma

6.6. More initial purpose clauses in procedural texts

A further argument for the functional difference I have been championing between initial and final purpose clauses in English comes from the fact that the percentage of initial purpose clauses in the three procedural texts I examined is much higher than is the case in the non-procedural texts. Recall that across all the texts, the percentage of initial purpose clauses was found to be 18%. If we divide the texts into two groups, however, according to whether they are procedural or non-procedural, we find that the procedural texts contain a much larger percentage of initial purpose clauses than do the non-procedural, as shown in Table 4:

Procedural		Non-procedural	
Joy	49%	BV	7%
Auto	34%	OA	6%
thesis	38%	Nim	22%[6]

Table 4

Why should the procedural texts have a higher percentage of initial purpose clauses than do the non-procedural texts? The answer I would suggest to this question is that procedural texts are more strongly organized in terms of the type of expectation chains which gives rise to initial purpose clauses than are non-procedural texts. That is, when the purpose of a given text is describing the method for accomplishing a certain end, as is the case with procedural texts, a convenient way to do this is to state at the outset what the intended goal is, and then describe how one reaches it. As we have seen, this is precisely what the initial purpose clause accomplishes.

7. Conclusions

At the beginning of this paper, I noted that the problem with which it would be concerned could be approached in two different ways. An obvious, but less appropriate, way was the statement I offered in Section 2: given two positions, initial and final, for a purpose clause in written English, what are the discourse factors determining which position the clause will take? Such a formulation assumes that the problem can be thought of in terms of a choice on the part of the writer as to whether to place the purpose clause s/he wants to use before or after the main clause. However, as I hope to have made clear in the course of the discussion, the problem is actually much more appropriately viewed in terms, not of one construction potentially occupying two different positions, but rather of two quite different constructions sharing the same morphology which behave in radically different ways and do radically different jobs in the discourse. That is, the actual 'discourse option' here is in no way an option between two different positions for a given purpose clause, but rather an option among various ways

of organizing material in the discourse: the question might be something like: what needs to be made thematic in this discourse in order that the reader's attention be appropriately guided through it? One conclusion, then, which we might draw from this study is that a deeper understanding of the relationship between grammar and written discourse may come from examining the organizational aspects of discourse and attempting to determine what are the grammatical options for accomplishing the goals of the discourse rather than from imagining the existence of an a priori structural opposition and attempting to account for its distribution.[7]

This hypothesis has several interesting implications, which I would like to touch on briefly by way of conclusion.

First, notice that the account given here contrasts rather sharply with one which claims that the position of adverbial clauses in general or purpose clauses in particular is determined by considerations of what is in the immediately preceding context. The initial purpose clause cannot be easily characterized as either directly related or directly unrelated to the preceding context, as many of our examples show. For instance, the Auto Engine Tune-up book has numerous examples of the type given above in 26:

> 40. The valve springs can be installed in or removed from most engines with the cylinder head in place. To do this, the spark plug is removed from the cylinder that requires valve-spring service and a threaded compressed-air adapter is inserted. Auto 123

The initial purpose clause in this passage could hardly be more directly related to the preceding discourse. In contrast, the same book also contains numerous examples such as that illustrated above in 14, where the initial purpose clause is as unrelated as it could be to the preceding context, occurring in chapter-initial position:

> 41. (Chapter: 'Carburetor Fundamentals'; section: 'High-Speed Circuit'). In order to ensure economical and smooth running engines, some control of the amount of gas present in the gas-air mixture is necessary. Auto 105

In the Auto Engine Tune-up book, of the 70 initial purpose clauses, 40 of them, or 57%, were found to be related quite directly to the immediately preceding context as exemplified by example 40 just above, while 30, or 43%, were of the type illustrated by 14 and could not be so related to the immediately preceding context.

The fact that among the initial purpose clauses in my data many examples of each of these types can be found suggests that it is not simply immediately preceding context which plays a role in the position of purpose clauses. The account which I have provided

here seems to be a better candidate for accounting for the fact that initial purpose clauses can occur in environments which are both highly related and highly unrelated to their preceding context: position has to do with whether a discourse-organizing chain of expectations is being established, and these expectations can be, but need not be, related to the immediately preceding text.

Second, it seems quite likely that the thematic role (in Fries' sense) played by initial purpose clauses will turn out to be similar to that played by certain other adverbs and adverbial clause types in English, such as manner adverbs and temporal clauses. However, much more discourse work remains to be done before any such similarities can be assumed. For example, conditional clauses can also appear either before or after their main clause, but the conditions affecting this difference in position do not appear to be the same as those I have proposed for purpose clauses.

Third, another important question arising from the research I have reported on here is that of the behaviour of adverbial clauses and their analogues in other well-developed written languages. Cross-linguistic comparison of these discourse functions seems the obvious next step.

Finally, there is the question of the formal written vs. casual spoken continuum which I alluded to at the beginning of this paper. If my hypothesis concerning the organizing function of initial purpose clauses is close to correct, then we would predict that conversational language would contain very few instances of purpose clauses in initial position. To test this prediction, I counted the purpose clauses in a transcript of a series of conversations between Henry Morganthau, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, and his staff (roughly 43,000 words). I found that of a total of 53 purpose clauses, only 3, or 6%, were initial. Especially given that the participants in these conversations were highly educated people whose speech would be heavily influenced by written English, the low percentage of initial purpose clauses in these conversations presents a striking contrast with the 18% which we found in the written data.[8]

I also alluded to the fact that it is primarily in written discourse that such differences as those between initial and final position for purpose clauses will tend to manifest themselves. I suggest that the necessity to use resources from oral speech, such as a clause naming the purpose for which some action is/was performed, to perform a discourse-organizing function far beyond this more basic local function arises only in a highly developed literary tradition where grammatical and semantic resources have been called into play to do the discourse-organizing work 'normally' done (in face-to-face interaction) by gestures, intonation, eye movement, amplitude, etc. The way in which this appropriation occurs has only begun to be explored (again, see the references mentioned in the Introduction), but viewing written language as

having been developed partially by stretching the resources available from spoken language seems to be a fruitful approach to studying the interaction between grammar and written discourse.

Footnotes

1. I am grateful to the following people for their help in discussing various aspects of this paper with me: Dwight Bolinger, Bill Bright, Joan Bybee, Wally Chafe, Scott DeLancey, Jack Du Bois, Jerry Edmondson, Barbara Fox, Peter Fries, Talmy Givon, Carol Lord, Bill Mann, Christian Mattheissen, Edith Moravcsik, Andy Pawley, Russ Tomlin, and Benji Wald. None of them, of course, is responsible for the way in which this paper reflects my interpretation of their advice. I would also like to thank Marie Huffman, Ellen Jackson, and Tom Payne for their help in collecting data.

2. It is possible to think of sentences, as Dwight Bolinger has pointed out, in which the purpose clause occurs medially, within the main clause to which it is an adjunct, as in Sally, in order to maintain her composure, closed her eyes and counted to ten; in my corpus, however, there were no examples of this type, and I will not be discussing them further here.

3. See Chafe (1984) for further discussion of the function of initial adverbial clauses in English as what he calls 'guideposts' to guide the reader's attention through the text.

4. My thanks to Wally Chafe for pointing out this possibility to me.

5. See Chafe (1984) for similar conclusions for English adverbial clauses in general.

6. Note that the percentage of initial purpose clauses is higher for Nim than for the other non-procedural texts. This may be due partly to the fact that Nim is a story about the way in which the Nim project was designed and the training of Nim in sign language; there is, then, a great deal of procedural discourse in the Nim book.

7. I am grateful to Paul Hopper and Manny Schegloff for helpful discussion of this point. See also Schiffrin (forthcoming) for discussion of 'discourse options' in expressing causal relationships in English discourse.

8. Benji Wald and Andy Pawley have pointed out that the low percentage of initial purpose clauses in speech may be related to the terseness of that device as compared with other devices which can be used to state a goal, such as if clauses (e.g. If you want to reach it...), or main clauses connected by so (e.g. I wanted to minimize the intrusion...so I removed...).

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