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'PERSONAL' AND 'INDEFINITE' REFERENCE: THE USERS OF THE PRONOUN ONE IN PRESENT-DAY ENGLISH

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Introduction

Pronominal reference of all but the third person pronouns has been rather cursorily treated by contemporary grammarians, but it is a field worthy of closer attention. In a recent article (1977), Lodge attempted to elaborate the distinctions of personal reference which had been set out by Halliday and Hasan (1976) chiefly in terms of 'Speech' and 'Other' roles, notably by giving prominence to 'endophoric' and 'exophoric' functions. While Lodge's own discussion was confused, he was right to indicate the importance of this distinction for any detailed classification of pronominal reference, for it nicely separates the third person pronouns from the first and second: the former, typically endophoric, referring to persons in the text (textually deictic); the latter, typically exophoric, referring to persons in the situation of 'discourse', speaker and addressee, in the immediate context of situation (contextually deictic). Contextual reference of necessity being vaguer than textual reference, the actual relations between pronouns and exophoric reference are by no means clear-cut, for there is considerable overlap between one pronoun and another in function; and the distinction between speaker (first person) and addressee (second person) reference is frequently blurred. Further, as Halliday and Hasan make clear (1976:5, 57), there is a 'generalized' kind of exophora which covers all contexts of situation and which is typically served by the indefinite pronouns, and by you and we also. This 'generalized' exophora is comparable to that kind of reference designated 'homophoric' for some of the functions of the definite article (page 71); but it must be stressed that for pronouns, the boundary between 'specific' and 'homophoric' reference is frequently hard to distinguish: you, we, and one all exhibit varying degrees of generalization. Not surprisingly, the flexibility of exophoric reference lies behind the multiplicity of functions which characterize the 'discourse' pronouns in present-day English; and those of we in particular I have described elsewhere (Wales, 1980). But even at its most generalized, exophoric reference, far from being vaguely 'indefinite', can still be considered, like specific exophoric reference, to be discourse-orientated; characterized by oppositions which can be seen to have speaker/addressee connotations, especially proxemic modulations of 'nearness to' [+ ego] and 'distance from' [+ voc] the speaker.

'Modulation' as Lyons defines it (1977:65) can be considered an aspect of 'modality'¹; and in this article I want to try and show how factors relating both to phoric reference and modality must figure prominently in any close analysis of the field of reference for the pronoun one (henceforth designated ONE). In Halliday's terms (1970:335), modality derives from the 'interpersonal' function of language, language as 'expression of role'; but critical emphasis has largely been placed on its exponence by the verb phrase, with a corresponding neglect of the contribution played by other linguistic features such as pronouns, and their interrelations with verbal categories such as tense, aspect and mood.

Traditionally labelled 'impersonal', 'indefinite' or 'generic', in its functions with their varying degrees of generalized and specific reference, ONE has come to overlap with, and also clash with, the functions of the other,

so-called personal pronouns, notably YOU and I. The situation can be represented diagrammatically in the following Table:

Fig. 1

TEXT [endophoric]				CONTEXT OF SITUATION [exophoric]					
sg.	"3rd Persons" [-ego] [-voc]			Immediate context of situation ['specific exophoric']		Context of culture ['generalized exophoric'/ 'homophoric']			
	human		non- human	"1st & 2nd Persons"		"Indefinite/Impersonal/Generic"			
	m	f	n	Speaker	Addressee	[+ego]	[+voc]	[-ego]	[-voc]
								human	non- human
	<u>he</u>	<u>she</u>	<u>it</u>	<u>I</u> [one 3]		[one 2]		<u>one</u> f	[it]
					<u>you</u> 1		[you]		
pl.	<u>they</u>			<u>we</u> 1			[we 2]		
								[they]	

Notes to Table

- (i) I am not here concerned with the use of ONE as a 'numerical' or as a 'replative' (Quirk et al, 1978:221-2), since these roles are outside the scope of personal exophoric reference.
- (ii) In the Table we 1 appears to overlap with it and they, but I am simply indicating here both 'inclusive' we ([+ ego] [+ voc]) and also 'exclusive' we which refers to a third person ([- ego] [- voc]) as well as the speaker [+ ego]. We 1 can be used with speaker [+ ego] or addressee [+ voc] reference only.

The diachronically prior roles of the pronouns are indicated by the underlinings alone, and developed roles by the additional square brackets; the numerical postscripts are for ease of reference below. This notation can help to show how exophoric reference is not clearly divided into that which refers to the participants in the immediate conversation, and humanity in general: speaker and addressee are also a part of that race, and what applies to them applies to others. WE and YOU have accordingly acquired generalized functions; and, conversely, ONE has become more specific, more 'personal' and more egocentric. But a strong pull towards subjectivity in generalization is to be noted overall; like the strong pull towards egocentricity in discourse, as Fig. 1 shows. Homophoric you 2 has acquired such strong features of egocentricity that it overlaps considerably with one 2; and ONE itself for many educated speakers is used with specific exophoric 'I' reference (one 3).²

It is in fact now possible to isolate three major types of exophoric ONE, each with their own reasonably distinct functions and associated grammatical constructions, although it is not always easy to distinguish one type from another. A detailed analysis of these three types has two main benefits: it can clarify or even improve upon many existing grammatical descriptions of the pronoun ONE; and it can help to define more clearly its relations with other pronominals. Evidence for the behaviour of the pronoun has been largely gathered from the corpus of material in the Survey of English Usage files at University College, London (to which the numbered references in brackets apply); and also from elicitation tests: since, as Greenbaum and Quirk express it (1970:7), 'corpus' and 'introspection'... 'both need supplementation by experimental evidence'. I should like to record here my gratitude to Professor Quirk for inviting me to consult the Survey files; to Dr. Jan Rusiecki (Warsaw) for his help in preparing the elicitation tests; the undergraduates in English at both Royal Holloway and University College for their responses; and the University of London Central Research Fund Committee for their financial aid.

The three types can be labelled:

- (i) one 1 = 'indefinite' one: includes 'impersonal' as well as true 'generic' uses: common in educated speech and writing;
- (ii) one 2 = 'generic/egocentric' one: includes speaker; common in educated speech and writing;
- (iii) one 3 = 'advanced egocentric' one: a direct equivalent of I; prevalent among 'upper class' speakers.

Rather surprisingly, grammatical descriptions of the pronoun ONE are generally brief, but in toto they would cover such a classification. The drift towards egocentricity of reference is especially commented upon. For example, Quirk et al's description (1978:222) is vague, but covers (i) and (ii): 'Indefinite one means 'people in general', in particular with reference to the speaker'. Curme (1935:35) has an 'Absolute Indefinite' one, whose reference is quite 'indefinite and general'; but on page 36 he does note the tendency to use one instead of the 'sharply precise' I or me. Jespersen (1961:156) calls the 'Generic person' a 'singular form of the third person', but notes how it often disguises a first person. Fowler (1965:416f) distinguishes an 'impersonal' one, and that which he, disapproving, calls the 'false first-personal pronoun', corresponding to one 3; although he admits the distinction is 'rather fine' in practice. Lodge (1977) discusses one 3 in terms of social distance; it is opposed to a 'generalized human' one which is socially 'neutral' (p.40-42).

'Indefinite' One

Many historical grammarians have little, or indeed nothing, to say about the development of ONE as an indefinite pronoun: e.g. Wright (1924 rep.1962) and Wyld (1914, rep.1963). In origins it was not indefinite, but definite (third person), derived from the OE adjective ān 'a certain'. But even this meaning can be seen as partly indefinite: for example, if we know that a 'certain person' translated a work, but we do not know his name: what Quirk and Wrenn (1958:71) call 'strong indefiniteness'. In OE and ME, as in modern German, the pronominal man (> me) not only had the indefinite meaning of 'people', 'anyone' etc., but also this strong indefiniteness; it was thus extremely common in active constructions which in NE would more naturally be expressed by the passive, with possible deletion of the agent, e.g.

- (1) Eadwerd man acwealde 'a certain person/someone killed Edward'
= 'Edward was killed'.

With the development of the passive voice and the decline of the man- construction such a strong indefinite use seems to have come to be carried by ONE, and in this role it thus overlapped with pronouns such as somebody/one, etc.³ With this sense it survives in constructions where it is followed by a clause or phrase or noun in apposition, and is usually stressed:

- (2) Dinah lit a cigarette in the manner of one taking calm stock of past catastrophe (The Survey Corpus 6.1.29-2)
- (3) Like one moving in a ...rite of dedication she stepped forward (6.1.28-4)
- (4) I remember one Charlie Brown at school (Quirk et al; under 'numerical' one, p.222)

In its use as part of a construction equivalent to the passive, it was especially appropriate in formal or 'impersonal' contexts where as grammatical subject it provides a convenient means of denoting human agency, but of weak valency: in passive paraphrases normally and naturally deleted. Its no doubt popular use in theoretical or hypothetical contexts probably hastened its shift to true indefinite reference, since it comes to have the 'generic' meaning associated with pronominals such as everyone, anyone, people, etc. So in NE one is commonly used in clauses of 'non-fact': in conditional clauses, and 'formulaic' utterances involving verbs such as think, imagine, tell, etc. plus a modal auxiliary it is also commonly used with the present tense to indicate universal truths (generic propositions), and also general truths (gnomic propositions), the latter also expressed by one + must or should.⁴ In some contexts one seems more obviously to include the speaker, but simply because he is also part of the human race. In many cases, these constructions could be replaced by the passive with the subject deleted:

- (5) but in this context of amplitude modulation-- one would normally refer to the inner wave as being the carrier wave... (S.10.9a.45)
- (6) in theory one could say the University of London is the last place in the country... (S.11.2.42).
- (7) He was very helpful as one would expect after that (W.7.2.12)
- (8) I think what would tend to mitigate one's condemnation of him as a devil is the fact that he's--caught up in a chain of events (S.3.5b.56).
- (9) one may well ask what sort of oscillations are possible in such a system (W.1.2b.3).
- (10) they bob down into what one might think of as a typical crouch position (S.10.8a.74).
- (11) but so far as one can tell (S.10.8c.43).
- (12) strong dangerous - and - I'm sure faster than one would imagine (S.10.3.21).
- (13) Whatever one may think of Kenneth Williams I thought he did a very good rendering (S.2.8b.40).

- (14) It is hard to fault her in any of the qualities one looks for in a member of an academic staff (W.7.6.18).
- (15) What one calls social conscience is often and why not a way of equating the need to give... (W.5.2.24).
- (16) one does not in all cases either love or hate, for there are some cases where one does both at once... (W.9.4.60-2).
- (17) as Ted has said one doesn't know enough about the motives of the Croydon Council (5b.1.23).
- (18) ...invisible until one penetrates to the far side of the courtyard (W.1.5b.10).
- (19) just down the road one can enter the...world of the honey coloured villages (W.1.5b.4).
- (20) one can go by a lane (W.11.3.79-1).
- (21) I think - it is essential that one preserves discipline (S.5.7.49).
- (22) what this example does is to illustrate the point I think that one mustn't look at areas in isolation... (S.6.1c.23).

One 1's relationship with you 2 an 'indefinite generic' is complex, although there is no question but that you 2 coincides with one 1 in this function. In an elicitation (selection) test, (which I shall call Test No.1), I asked undergraduate informants to replace one in the 'gnomic'- type sentence found in Quirk et al (1978:222) by another word which they felt 'could function as an acceptable substitute'.

'One should always be careful in talking about one's finances'

The test generally followed the model and procedure outlined in Greenbaum and Quirk (1970). The batteries contained a variety of items for testing in addition to pronominal ONE, in order to 'prevent subjects from having the feeling that there is repetition' (p.10). Of those informants who produced relevant responses, 66 out of 106 selected you (=62%); the next popular response being people (21;=20%).⁵ Examples of 'indefinite' you from the Survey Corpus include:

- (23) I wonder if there's some theoretical point a price at which you could sell it very cheaply (S.4.6a.81).
- (24) ...grants whatever you like to call them (S.11.2.19).
- (25) ...but those of us who thought that you should postpone the age at which irrevocable decisions were taken about a child's education... (S.11.2.71).
- (26) if you don't have perspective you can represent time in a way that you can't if you do have perspective (S.1.3-22).
- (27) no no it goes when anybody presses it you see you press the button (S.2.14.61).
- (28) the banner of the Cinque Ports--which flies with great vitality--in this rather strong wind as you come to the top of the hill (S.10.5.24).

It is popularly held that YOU is the 'informal' equivalent of 'formal' ONE (cf. Quirk et al, p.222; Leech and Svartvik 1978:57; and Fowler 1965:418). This neat dichotomy suggests that the fields of reference do not overlap; that the two forms are used in a kind of stylistic complementary distribution; but this is by no means the case, and it would therefore appear that the labels 'formal' and 'informal' need to be reviewed. It is true that you2 has connotations of immediacy and vividness that can be associated with informality, which seem to originate in its discourse origins, and which at times also reflect an audience awareness and 'distance' from speaker [+voc]: consider, for example, the following instances (and consider the difference in 'modulation' if replaced by we2):

(a) (from public speaking):

- (29) and the lesson is not that you should break treaties- but that you shouldn't sign treaties you can't keep (S.12.58).
- (30) and if you know in a seaside place that there will be a holiday camp...and you know that a certain number of people will be coming into your area I would have thought that that would give a little more stability... (5b.16.62).
- (31) if you look at the steel industry you see that the steel industry was not nationalized (S.11.5.53).

Jespersen (1961:154), mindful of the discourse origins of you2 says that you is 'preferred' for the generic person if referring to the hearer, and therefore 'could not very well be used with ought to and should'. The Survey files seem to show no such restrictions, although there are cases where a more specific [+ voc] reference is involved, as I show below, and where ambiguity could result. So too when Milton Shulman on Stop the Week (Radio 4, 12.1.80) began an utterance with 'You are always being attacked for using prestigious-' there were surprised cries of 'Who is?' from the other speakers. and he began again 'One is...'

(b) Consider also you2 + remote past time reference:

- (32) ...movement across country...could be appallingly difficult so you ran the risk of plenty at one end of a country and famine at the other end (S.4.95a.33).
- (33) [stately homes] used to have enormous fires- they didn't keep you very warm more than about ten feet away (S.1.13.68).
- (34) now it had to be a well because you could not build a house in those days without digging the well (S.12.6.8).
- (35) women who did funny things...weren't really witches you didn't have to duck them into ponds (S.5.95b).

Jespersen (p.153), again mindful of you2's origins, and stating clearly that it cannot be used 'except when there is a possibility of applying what is said to the hearer or reader', says therefore that it would be impossible to translate on a vu by 'you have seen', though in 'hypothetical' expressions it is possible to say

- (36) 'In 1604, you might have seen Shakespeare playing the ghost in Hamlet'

Jespersen's example with the perfective aspect is misleading, however, since the examples quoted from the Survey files show clearly that you2 can be used with time reference to a remote past, and that the [+voc] features have simply been muted. If we were to apply Jespersen's logic, moreover, to the homophoric pronoun we2, that also presumably could not be used to refer to a time when the speaker was not alive; but this is not the case: cf. examples of what I would call 'patriotic' we which mean 'this country/nation to which I belong':

- (37) sixty years ago we felt that having a large navy was the solution to most of our problems (S.2.8a.47)
- (38) well in the First World War it cost us over a million men on numerous occasions (S.2.3.67)

It is true that in these examples the speaker may have been alive at the time to which he refers; but examples of references to much earlier centuries are not inconceivable. With we, however, emotive 'modulations' of warmth, familiarity, etc. [+ ego] seem additional to those of simple vividness which the you- examples quoted reveal.⁶

In certain situations you2 seems to retain its [+ voc] feature more strongly in that it suggests an ambiguity between potential reader/audience and 'universal' reference cf. for example, instruction manuals:

- (39) With a symmetrical spinnaker when you gybe all you have to do is move the sail across (W.10.2.68-8)
- (40) If you are approaching a marker to windward your tacks should... become shorter... (W.10.2.60-2)

and two people discussing a route in ordinary conversation:

- (41) you cross a major road you cross the main one

(contrast, however, with change to progressive aspect:)

- (42) no you're going too you're going back on your tracks a bit like that (S.1.11b.52)

While such examples as those quoted above well illustrate that you2 can 'replace' one1 and that, in addition, in many contexts it has quite specific connotations of 'informality', nonetheless it is by no means the case that one1 is the 'formal' equivalent. It is true that it is frequently found in 'formal' registers, but even here it is not as 'stiff' or 'cold' as the label suggests (Quirk et al p.22); and as the examples quoted so far reveal, it freely occurs in ordinary conversation, in 'normal' and even 'informal' writing and speech. Moreover, if one1 is 'formal' how do we explain the frequent alternation of you2 and one1 in speech, between sentences and clauses:

- (43) there are some subjects where you can involve yourself in practical activity...it is possible to involve oneself in studies...(S.5.7.45)
- (44) well if one makes that sort of compliment to a person they're going to fall for you so to speak (S.1.8.108)

- (45) and if one keeps low and comes through a bit quickish if you're on the back foot you've got to be awful quick to come down on it (S.2.7b.32)
- (46) If one is speaking to someone who is of a social distance to you then the language will be more formal (student teacher; College of Higher Education)
- (47) and one's expected to have a car - and you can pick up a car for nothing (S.6.2.54)
- (48) well so much of one's life nowadays especially in a highly civilized world is a preparation for when you're really grown up (5b.2.18)

It seems hard to explain this kind of fluctuation in terms of 'formality'-switching; and while other (grammatical) constraints may well be present in some cases, to which I will return, these do not alter the fact that the two forms can co-occur in the same medium, register, conversation and sentence with little difference of tone. One₁ in fact, far from being 'formal' is often simply 'neutral' ([-ego] [-voc]), or 'unmarked': precisely the qualities that Quirk et al ascribe to 'normal' or 'common core' English (p.24), and which bears 'no obvious colouring that has been induced by attitude'. You₂ in contrast, can often appear 'marked': avoided in highly formal registers, and sometimes preferred because of its special connotations of vividness and immediacy [+voc] (cf. also we₂).⁷

A similar pattern of behaviour is discernible for (ii) 'generic/egocentric' one, but new factors arise, all of which, however, render variations of 'formality' less obvious: notably, the emergence of I as a possible alternative, and potential (social) dialectal variation amongst educated speakers: a factor of even greater significance for one₃.

'Generic/egocentric' One

It is easy to see why generalized exophoric pronominals should acquire egocentric features, and it is therefore frequently difficult to distinguish indefinite from only partly indefinite reference: a speaker's observations on life will invariably be coloured by his own subjective attitudes and experience: thus, a sentence like 'One should always be careful in talking about one's finances' becomes a very 'loaded' statement when uttered by a man who has been robbed by a close friend. More particularly, a speaker's modesty, the delicacy of his subject matter, false pride, embarrassment, etc., may make him wish to mute the egotistical note which his own personal observations might suggest. So too in these examples from broadcasting, ONE replaces YOU to avoid direct criticism:

- (49) again you see one's generalizing when one says a lot of people (S.5.10.77)
- (50) there is one- there is one thing- if one may be serious again for a moment (5b.16.68)

Conversely however, a speaker's egotism may well be the reason for his choice of a non-I form: with the implication, for example, that observations personal to him are of more general interest and importance to the community at large. While the speaker's motivation in such cases may be philanthropical, fraternal,

pedagogical, or simply because we all like to believe that our lives have deeper, symbolic significance, the generalization may acquire the pejorative aspects of egocentricity, and appear pretentious or pompous.⁸

However, in many cases, one is simply 'neutral', and so can serve useful stylistic and rhetorical functions. In scientific 'demonstrational' registers, for example, it closely approximates to one₁ in that, although it can be seen to refer to the speaker who is 'demonstrating', it is yet understood that he is merely a representative figure, an agent, a spokesman for all scientists, and the human race: what he is demonstrating amounts to a 'general' truth if not 'universal'. It is true that homophoric you and we are popular in such contexts, the latter increasingly so: but connotations of familiarity and audience-awareness on some occasions may be felt to be inappropriate, particularly if the speaker wishes both to minimize his own role and to stress the universality of his actions:

- (51) If one removes it - - one must replace the small glass stopper (S.10.9b.35)
- (52) one now opens - the tap - and fills up the cannula by placing one's finger over the end (S.10.9b.29)
- (53) it is necessary to remove - - - the inhering fat pad and normally one has taken out some major pulmonary vessels - - which one has to remove - - one doesn't hold the heart in one's hand (S.10.9b.26)

Another variant of the 'representative' role of one₂ is found in reports and discussions, particularly in writing, where it is found with stative verbs denoting mental states. This particular 'class' of usages comes close to that of one₃ in that the verbs are stative (see below) and in that I, rather than you, is the most plausible alternative: but it is also clear that the speaker sees his views as typical of others; and his choice of one₂ confirms not only this 'generic' interpretation, (cf. also the present tense), but also has connotations of non-bias and rationality: cf. these examples culled from letters to The Times, reports, etc.:

- (54) One is aware of the dangers of confrontation...
- (55) One sympathizes with Mr. S. in his efforts to maintain law and order
- (56) Much as one appreciates Mr. C.'s new resolve...
- (57) Even though the paper was fair, one does sense that there were too many questions...

More typically, one₂ is introduced by, or followed by, explicit phrases or clauses which indicate clearly that generalizations are being made on the basis of personal experience: e.g. verbs of 'feeling' and 'thinking' + that-clause:⁹

- (58) One has the feeling that Cooper feels it more than Miteff does (S.10.3.73)
- (59) I think that could be done by negotiation with whoever one was teaching it with because presumably one wouldn't be teaching it single-handed (S.3.6.24)

- (60) though I think teaching Chekhov would be like teaching Jane Austen - it'd be a dreadful expose of one's of one's crudity (S.3.6.105)
- (61) A. ...the-the feeling that there isn't much time to achieve the things one's dreamed about
 B. well you must do it then (W.5.2.110)
- (62) but it really is most annoying when one has no answer back at all... and one's made to feel in the wrong (S.2.5b.67)
- (63) Sir Winston had a great sense of occasion and one feels that all this is as he would have wished (S.10.5.17)

cf. examples with you2:

- (64) I find that if you project known trends forward you realise that life is much more predictable than you realize (S.1.45.11)
- (65) when you start training for a job in the middle years of your life then you think it would be for something you've always wanted to do - I know I felt a strong urge to... (W.1.5c.1)
- (66) you feel - I I don't know perhaps I'm totally wrong but I feel he was - he had a certain code.... (S.5.8.51)

and with co-reference of one2 and you2

- (67) I don't feel that one can ever be a therapist to somebody that you are so closely involved with emotionally (S.6.5.85)
- (68) the whole thing with book tokens as a present one feels that... to get anything worthwhile you do want a penny or two (S.4.4.58)

Also common with 'generic/egocentric' one are constructions involving the present tense which reinforce the generality of the statement; or markers of universal condition-concession and time, etc.

- (69) it's a bit of a skive really I mean - I - one goes for the experience you know rather than for anything academic (S.6.2.41)
- (70) I do really want a father figure, however English and awful it is of one to do so (W.16.6.175.1)
- (71) I used not to like cowboys, but they do take one out of oneself (W.16.6.168-4)
- (72) But really, for me, it's been a devilish time ever since I was born. But for the fact that when one's got a job on, one ought to go through with it, I'd prefer to be dead any minute. (D.H.Lawrence: Letters, Summer 1912: The Guardian 8.9.79)
- (73) No matter what one chooses to wear, one is always stared at by men...Even if one went out wearing a coal-sack some man would find it attractive (letter to The Guardian, 20.9.79)

cf. these examples with you₂:

- (74) but - in a subject like mine which is literature - it's perhaps relatively easy to achieve some kind of intimacy so that you're talking about uniqueness (S.5.7.43)
- (75) Wherever a woman goes, she has to conform to standards...which she has not succeeded in altering...You get served in a Pub in a certain way, you get a bill from parliament in a certain way (W.11.2a.9)
- (76) it only seems to work and be happy when you manage or have been in phases where you delay some of the other problems like when your brother is away in America (S.6.5.90)

and with co-reference of one and you₂:

- (77) I enjoy it and it's a great challenge...but it also does sort of make one slightly nervous and very open to doubts as to whether you've made the right decision... (S.6.4a.69)
- (78) [B. has commented on how tired A's mother looks:] Yes one notices when you don't see them for a while (S.5.8.73)
- (79) One can't go into any real scholarly work - having penetrated so far your penetration is forced to stop because you suddenly put away your Milton (S.3.6.38)
- (80) The advantage of seeing a play on the stage is that you can see how much further you can go in that direction or whether you need to change direction...You don't really know until you hear the actors speaking the words. One holds fire...(Peter Barnes: The Guardian 18.9.79)

In many of these examples an egocentric point of reference or departure seems very obvious (cf. also the frequent alternation of one/you with I), and confirms the strong subjective basis of the general truths of every-day conversation. Both 'indefinite' one and one₂, like you₂, are closely associated with the modality of habitual activity: but if one₁ can mean something like 'people are in the habit of', one₂ means 'I am, and other people are/would be, in the habit of'. But there is yet another aspect of this mode which is more personal still: where one₂ can mean 'I am/was in the habit of', with just possibly hints in the direction of a more universal application. Such an aspect, in which one₂ plays a part, can be called the 'reiterative': it indicates generalizations of a low order, simply a collection or re-iteration of personal experiences. It is marked grammatically by (a) the frequent use of always, which serves not only as a marker of universality and general habituality, but also of personal habitual behaviour; (b) other phases denoting frequency; (c) the use of the progressive aspect;¹⁰ (d) reiterative modals; and, (e) quite commonly, the preterite tense, which distinguishes this type of sentence from the more generalized kind. As Lyons states (1977:681), there must be no confusing general truths with notions of present time; 'we can base our assertion of a general truth upon the evidence of our past experience: hence the use of the past...tense...in certain languages'. It is precisely this 'past experience' which is being verbalized here, in these 'primitive' or 'low-order' generalizations: the one₂ as it were, anticipating the further generalizing process, at the incipient stage. The patterning with (a) always is particularly interesting. The sentence

'One should always be more careful in talking about one's finances' cited above (Test No.1) illustrates its more generally habitual use. Quirk et al (1978:496-7) note only the use of always with generic subjects, and how the sentences can thus be paraphrased by those with quantifiers; cf. 'Good novels are always worth buying' and 'All good novels are worth buying'. Such a paraphrase is possible with 'gnomic' utterances: 'All (i.e. everyone) should be careful in talking about their finances'. However, when always occurs with ONE with 'habitual' or 'characteristic' (personal) reference, no such paraphrase is possible: cf.

- (81) 'One is always careful in talking about one's finances'
= ? 'Everyone is careful in talking about his finances'

In such cases the adverb modifies the predicate (the verbal activity) rather than the subject. (See also Test No.2 below). So in the Survey files, a sentence like

- (82) One always has friends like this doesn't one? (S.4.3.34)

has a generic subject, not a personal subject. Examples from the Survey Files with 'reiterative' one2 include:

- (83) the bad thing about living in London is that - one doesn't travel enough...one always expects [people] to come to one... one sits here and expects to be visited (S.1.9.13)
- (84) one finds one I I I find myself adopting phrases (S.1.10.46)
- (85) I you know one just sort of kept thinking... (S.2.11a.7)
- (86) I always used to...and one did work Saturdays and when everybody else is one doesn't mind (S.15.20)
- (87) I remember it over Aunt Matty: one was always having to find out how many steps there were in places before one knew whether one could take her there... (S.2.14.54)
- (88) I was working in the claims department and one noticed the tremendous number of claims against the department... (S.1.9.22)
- (89) we only meet four evenings a week and Marie Helene has to know..., which means that she can't do anything about it, but one feels that she's there all the time (W.16.6.175-1)

cf. examples with you2:

- (90) it always rather shook me when I first got married in London you'd be carrying away practically buckets of that every day (S.1.13.56)
- (91) the fire was always laid in Braemar so that even in the middle of the summer if you came in and you were cold... (S.1.13.52)
- (92) [I would write and say] what I'd done in the week...and eventually there's be so much you'd find great difficulty in saying what it was (S.4.14)

- (93) it worked out terribly cheap because you had your own little electric ring for cooking (S.2.7.124)
- (94) You know you'd see her sometimes when she had a lot of cases you would see her literally at eleven o'clock at night (S.1.8.105)
- (95) ...a kind of cylinder with...a top you had to fill up with a jug every so often (S.12.6.11)

and with co-reference of one2 and you2:

- (96) ...but I you lunch one just sort of went into and there were all the undergraduates and then you clambered up on the platform (S.1.3-31)
- (97) even if one walked to one's work in the morning you would find people drunk (S.6.4a.51) (the speaker is 'reminiscing')

Despite the obvious alternation of one and you, the egocentricity of reference seems clear, and the alternation of one/you with I, indeed, can be noted in many of the examples above. In another selection test (No.2) informants were presented with a variant of the sentence used in the first test, showing a simple change of modality: 'One is always careful in talking about one's finances' (81). The differences in results were striking: 13 out of 42 relevant responses selected I as an alternative to one; people (7), you (6), and we (5) came close together with only 17%, 14% and 12% respectively. A similar trend can be noted in the results obtained from a selection test (No.3) in which the sentence for operation stressed the 'reiterative' aspect more:

'Because of Joan's disability, one was always having to slow down'

Out of 38 relevant responses, 19 (50%) selected I; 8 (21%) selected we; and 5 (13%) you. It would seem then, that although overlap of one2 and you2 occurs for 'generic/egocentric' reference in all its various aspects, as the examples reveal, nonetheless other alternatives are possible, notably I. The citation of you examples is chiefly, indeed, to show the difficulty of maintaining any clear distinctions of 'formality' and 'informality', and that such distinctions, in fact, are largely irrelevant for this function. However, in the more egocentrically biased examples, the 'reiteratives', the use of one2 may well be felt by many people to highlight the weightiness of what in essence is not, or only potentially, weighty; and which the use of you2, equally general, but discourse-deictic, does not do; so that it is highly probable that some educated speakers may avoid one2 because it appears 'pretentious'. In which case, there is the possibility of a difference in distribution for one2 and you2, not in terms of formality, but in terms of dialect: one2 simply avoided by some educated speakers at least. The question of dialectal differences becomes more of an issue for one3, the markedly egocentric variant; and it is just possible, therefore, that 'reiterative' one2 is also avoided by some educated speakers, influenced by the social connotations of one3.

'Advanced Egocentric' One

Reiterative action of a personal kind than can be associated with one2 is obviously close to, and overlaps with, the field of reference of 'advanced egocentric' one; and it seems highly probable, therefore, that one3, which seems to have developed rapidly during this century, has evolved as much out

of the personal reiterative mode as from more obvious generic or gnomic functions. (Jespersen [d.1942]) makes no special mention of it, nor does the OED and the 1933 Supplement). But it is often difficult to distinguish any of its functions one from another; and ONE's 'generalizing' nature seems likely to have played an important part in its development in this role.

The more clearly and definitely a sentiment is understood to be related to the speaker alone, the more egocentric the pronoun will appear to be. This would be particularly noticeable, for example, where there is described a unique event that took place in the speaker's past; or when an action is about to be, or can only be, performed by the speaker alone: for example

(98) 'Last Saturday one talked about one's finances to the bank manager'; or

(99) 'Next week one is going to talk about one's finances to the bank manager'.

The Survey files show few examples of one₃, but some constructed examples in Fowler (1965:416) of this 'false' first person have past time reference:

(100) 'One knew better than to swallow that'

(101) 'He asked me to save his life, and one did not refuse'.

Without a context, these are by no means unambiguous in reference.¹¹ One would expect egocentricity to be markedly revealed, however, where the verbs are those normally restricted to co-occurrence with first person forms and/or in the present tense, or which have special senses in this context: e.g. (i) the so-called 'private verbs' (Palmer, 1974:71), or verbs denoting 'dispositions or mental operations' (Benveniste, 1971:228-9), such as suppose, believe, conclude, smell, be pleased, like, etc. and (ii) the so-called 'performatives' (Austin, 1962), where the saying of the word constitutes the performing of an action.¹²

Lodge's illustration of one₃ shows the type of construction characteristic of its use with verbs of disposition, etc.: (1977:40):

(102) 'One is very pleased to be here'

Given the selection test sentence (No.4)

'Although it seems far-fetched, one supposes it's true'

14 out of 34 informants chose I (41%); 7, you (20%) and 5, we (15%). Out of a context, of course, the possibility of ambiguity remains (as the percentage of you responses suggests).¹³

When such verbs are reinforced by contexts which seem to exclude ambiguity of reference, then the egocentricity of reference is clearer; or is it? An example of the verb suggest plus the modal will is quoted by Fowler (p.417):

(103) His later poems have their great limitations, as one will presently suggest. (cf. also Curme, 1935:36 for the same quotation)

Examples are found in the Survey Corpus, e.g.

- (104) one must make some preliminary observations (W.9.4.51-4)

These seem to me, however, to show a special kind of advanced egocentric one usage, which is related to the 'representational' use of one2 mentioned earlier. Moreover, they seem directly comparable to the WE's of 'critical idiom' (Wales, 1980) which shade from advanced egocentric variants of the 'exclusive' we (cf. 'editorial' we), to egocentrically-biased variants of 'inclusive' we: out of modesty, and out of a desire to suggest the general applicability of the speaker's remarks, I is avoided. Fowler, in fact, ascribes the development of one3 in general to its use by the 'self-conscious writer', but this seems unlikely. It is not a popular choice even in serious writings, and the development and dissemination of one3 in colloquial speech seems more likely to have arisen out of the generalized and reiterative uses of ONE noted above. However, its possible relations to other variants of 'exclusive' we I will return to below.

A strong test of one3's 'arrival' as an acceptable and synonymous alternative to I would be its patterning with 'performatives'; when, for example, money is exchanged with the words

- (105) 'One promises to pay it back next week'

or a ship is launched with the words

- (106) 'One names this ship Arcadia'

but I have, unfortunately, no evidence of such usages, and I suspect that, as yet, these are unacceptable amongst one3 - users. As Austin notes, 'performative' verbs can cease to be performatives even with the first person and in the present tense: cf.

- (107) 'I promise only when I intend to keep my word'

Here we have the personal generalization made on the basis of reiterative actions noted above; and so also with the progressive aspect + always:

- (108) 'I'm always promising to give up smoking'

Informants presented with sentences containing one and promise seem to have resisted even the egocentric reference that might be considered still possible in such constructions. Given the sentence (Test No.5) '(Even though it's very difficult to stop smoking,) one always promises to stop' 39 out of 90 informants chose you (43%), and only 6 (7%) chose I; (people drew 17 responses: 19%). Even with an aspectual change, the results were similar: (Test No.6)

'(Even though it's very difficult to stop smoking), one is always promising to stop'

17 out of 43 informants chose you (40%); only 3 chose I (7%); 8 chose people (19%). That the resistance to egocentricity of reference may have something to do with the general nature of the statement is a possibility: presented with Test No.7 the results were strikingly different:

'(Despite Dad living a long way from London), one always promises to go and see him'

18 out of 39 informants chose we (46%); 13 chose I (33%); and only 6 (15%) chose you. The egocentric options now prevail, but the popularity of we is especially interesting: it seems to reflect a compromise between the generalizing force of always + present tense, and the personal context ('Dad'); or a reference for one comparable to 'exclusive' we, i.e. 'the speaker + others (in the family group)'.¹⁴

Such an interpretation of one₃ seems highly likely to have contributed to the popularity of its use by many speakers, as well as the influence of other, more general, connotations. In this connection, we may consider that, while

(109) *'One names this ship Arcadia'

(110) *'One swears to tell the truth'

(111) *'One promises to return the money' etc.

seem unacceptable as 'performatives' (as yet), sentences like

(112) 'We name this ship Arcadia'

(113) 'We swear to tell the truth'

(114) 'We promise to return the money', etc.

do not, if they are taken as illustrations of the 'royal' we, used to replace I. The origins of 'Royal' we lie in the exclusive plural; and it may have maintained its popularity amongst monarchs because of its potential implications of modesty, that the king was speaking on behalf of himself and his advisers; but its almost unique use by people of authority and power meant that the intimations of modesty never really exerted much assuaging influence, so that it continued to underline the monarch's special status. It is tempting, therefore, to see a relationship between 'royal' we, and one₃ especially since the latter seems to have become strongly associated in popular opinion with the upper-classes and the royal family, particularly Princess Anne! (Lodge 1977:40) says a sentence with first person one 'is the sort of response frequently given to a television interviewer by members of the Royal Family...'; he adds that it 'may, in fact, be singular or plural'. He may have 'royal' we in mind here: in his Table II (p.42), as well as singular 'speaker' one there is plural we/one.¹⁵ Its popularity in such circles may well lie in the fact that, like 'royal' we it can out of modesty implicate others (members of the family, group of friends); or, more generally, express 'a diffused and amplified person'¹⁶ with its other implications of more generalized reference; and at the same time it can serve to reinforce the speaker's sense of belonging to an 'exclusive' group ('power') who share his interests ('solidarity'). Just as 'royal' we represents the acme of the 'exclusive' we scale, so ONE in social terms shows the same development; from a 'representative' use to an 'exclusive group' use (professional, family, etc.); and to its use by an individual with some measure of 'royal' status. Note these 'intermediate' examples:

(115) A. You seem to have altogether too much on hand-
B. One does tend to in media because there's so much of it
(s.1.10.140)

(116) One was always told in the nursery to eat up you were never allowed to leave bits...we had brown bread instead of white (s.6.46.19)

(In the following example, one is egocentric, but the speaker [Toby Robertson] is possibly thinking of himself as not only a member of the theatrical profession, but of a particular company, and with a particular role in that company:)

- (117) [For each production] what I don't want to do is start all the time from an ad hoc basis. A strong root of it all is a very personal relationship with the people around one. I've been working with Timothy West...since 1964, and this autumn he's joining one in the artistic direction of Prospect. I think we should be in fewer places more often... (The Times 18.8.75).

Intrinsically there is no real reason why one₃ should have acquired its particular high social status: in French the interchange of on/nous is a characteristic feature of working-class speech; but there is no doubt but that in English one₃ has become very fashionable amongst people of wealth and influence, and so presents a special socially 'marked' variant of I: it is 'advanced' not only in terms of egocentricity, but also in terms of social grouping. My use of the term 'advanced' is thus comparable to Gimson's use of it (1970:88) in his descriptions of varieties of RP: One₃ seems distinctly analogous to those phonetic variations characteristic of 'advanced RP' which is

'mainly used by young people of exclusive social groups - mostly of the upper classes, but also, for prestige value, in certain professional circles...[and is] usually judged 'affected' by other RP speakers... '.

One results of this, however, seems to be the extension of its 'power' status to the pronoun ONE in general, for it is certainly obvious that users of one₃ use ONE frequently as a generalizing term. 'Generic/egocentric' one seems particularly prominent in these examples: a reporter wrote of Lady Solti in The Sunday Telegraph (19.8.79)


- (118) She will occasionally lapse into the first-person impersonal much favoured by Princess Anne...to intimate that one's private life is very previous, and if one is to be judged by it it should surely be on one's performances rather than one's private jet, or lack of same

In the London Evening News (17.1.80) a lieutenant colonel in the Coldstream Guards was asked his reaction to the news of his daughter's engagement:


- (119) I haven't met him but obviously one is delighted if one's daughter marries someone she's desperately in love with.

Other educated people are beginning to associate ONE with such speakers, and some may even try and avoid it altogether as a result. Thus the effect of (i) in Fig 2a could well be (ii):

Fig. 2a.



→ (ii)




Viewed in another light, however, ONE's progress towards unique egocentricity of reference can be seen as inevitable, and one₃'s use by a certain group of educated speakers simply a foretaste of what will eventually be a common usage: cf Gimson (cited above) on 'advanced RP':

'Advanced pronunciations...may well indicate the way in which the RP system is developing and be adopted in future as general EP...'

Hence the effect of (i) in Fig.2a above could well be (iii) in Fig. 2b:

(1) → (iii)



A Note on ONE's Correlatives

Curiously, throughout its history ONE in general, unlike other pronouns, seems never to have been universally adopted in standard English: in each of its main areas of reference it is but one of a series of alternatives, ranging from the passive to I; and its value in each role has been chiefly stylistic, if increasingly social, also.¹⁷ An interesting reflection of its non-universality is the fact that repetition of ONE in its subjective or oblique cases, either between clauses or within the clause, seems to many people to sound more obviously 'affected' than the single use of ONE; and this may be one of the reasons why shifts from ONE to YOU commonly occur. In the Survey material examined, such shifts occur more frequently than those from YOU to ONE. Fowler (1965:417-8) comments on the repetition, but he dislikes even more what he calls 'mixtures': which include not only shifts within a sentence (most 'heinous') but the alternation of ONE and other pronouns between sentences ('slipshod'). Historically speaking, the oblique forms of ONE are a late development: at first non-subjective roles were filled by his and him, reflecting ONE's third person status. The 'gaps' in the paradigm arose because its original function as an alternative to man demanded a subject-agent role only in passive-equivalent constructions; later, when more 'indefinite' meanings arose, other case forms became necessary. In German, as in Swedish and French, man, etc. still has no oblique cases, but alternative pronominals must be used here: cf. German ein, Swedish en, etc. The subjective bias for ONE can still readily be discernible, since it is overwhelmingly used in subject roles, rather than object. In a 'compliance' test (Test No.9) informants were asked to change a passive sentence into an active. The sentence, based on an actual utterance taken from the corpus (116) was:

'One was told by grown-ups to eat everything'

While it was expected that most of the informants would 'obey' the instruction, it was hoped that a significant number would 'resent' the move of one from subject position and replace it by another form. In the event, 58 out of 105 (55%) obeyed; and 47 (45%) did not. (Interestingly, of these, 77% chose 'egocentric' forms: 19 chose me and 17 us).¹⁸

The increased egocentricity of the pronoun ONE in some of its usages (which in turn no doubt heightened the 'masculinity' of his, him) seems to have led to the replacement of the third person forms by one's, one at least in British English: according to Quirk *et al*, the others are still used in American English. No examples of co-referential he/his/him were found in the Survey Corpus. Leech & Svartvik (1978:57) say he is 'formal' in American English: yet Quirk *et al* seem to assign it to non-formal, but not informal usage; repetition of ONE, strangely, is 'formal'. Both works assign correlative ONE/YOU forms to 'informal' American English. Correspondence in the Times Literary Supplement between the 18th June and 2nd July 1970 testifies to the fluctuation of objective oneself/himself between sentences in American English.

There are signs, however, albeit scarce, of the use of you(r) for the oblique cases of ONE, as utterances from the Survey reveal: e.g.

- (120) ...if one makes that sort of compliment to a person too they're going to fall for you so to speak (S.1.8.108)
- (121) then one really tears one's hair and say [sic] well it really isn't your fault (S.2.2a.124)
- (122) one can't go into any real scholarly work--having penetrated so far your penetration is forced to stop... (S.3.6.38)

However, all these examples show correlation between clauses, not within the same clause. Nonetheless along with the correlation of subjective ONE and YOU between sentences, this would confirm the acceptability of ONE as a variant of YOU in normal educated English. The frequent interchange of the two pronouns may well lead to an increased use of oblique you(r) as correlatives to the subjective ONE, at least in non-'advanced' uses. Strangely, however, not even the correlation of subjective ONE and YOU between clauses is acknowledged by Quirk *et al*, or Leech & Svartvik, although as noted above, they see it as a possibility in 'informal' American English. It would thus seem that in British English a reputation of 'formality' is still very much attached to ONE, despite its dissemination in non-formal, even informal registers, and its increased 'neutrality' in tone.

Conclusion

In general we can see that the relationship of the pronoun ONE to you², and indeed I, is by no means straightforward, and hence not easily reducible to a one-sentence summary of the kind frequently found in grammar-books. In this article I have tried to show how ONE is best regarded as having three main areas of reference, although there are numerous ramifications, and clear distinctions are difficult to establish. With its different roles are associated other pronominals with varying degrees of overlap; relations with these, however, are often dependent on other linguistic features to do with medium, register, tone, modality, dialect, etc. Very roughly, its relationships can be represented as in Figure 3. Even that Table, despite its crudity, can I think help us to avoid the kind of sociolinguistic

ONE	Label	Meaning	Phoric reference	(Pronominal) alternatives	Social dialect	Medium	Modulation	Modality	Tense	Examples
<u>One1</u>	'indefinite'	'anyone/ everyone'	generalized exophoric (homophoric)	impersonal constr. passive <u>people</u> , <u>anyone</u> etc. <u>you</u> ; <u>we</u>	educated (standard) English	Writing Speech	impersonal formal non-formal neutral	generic hypothetical gnomic	 PRES.	'If one talks about finances, it is essential to be careful' 'One should always be careful in talking about one's finances'
<u>One2</u>	'generic-egocentric'	'I + anyone else/ others' 'I (+ anyone else)'	generalized - specific exophoric	<u>You</u> <u>We</u> <u>I</u>	educated (standard) English	Writing Speech	neutral neutral-informal personal (non-familiar)	representat. - generic reflective - gnomic habitual reiterative	PRES. PAST	'One is always careful in talking about one's finances' 'One was always careful in talking about one's finances'
<u>One3</u>	'advanced egocentric'	'I (+ others, same as me)'	specific exophoric	<u>I</u> 'royal' <u>we</u>	upper classes; certain social groups	 Speech	personal distant	cognitive factive	PRES. PAST FUT.	'One is pleased to talk here today about one's finances' 'One is going to talk about one's finances'

Fig. 3

generalizations that Bernstein makes about ONE in his writings (collected in Bernstein, 1971). A confusion of register and dialect seems to lie behind his assertion that 'elaborated code' (itself a confused concept) is marked by a frequent use of impersonal pronouns as subjects (such as ONE and IT), whereas 'restricted code' is not (p.42f): the two codes being 'accessible' to the middle and working classes respectively. It is difficult to ascertain what he precisely intended by such a characterization since he also states that RC makes use of generalizing WE, YOU and THEY at the expense of the pronoun I and 'egocentric sequences' in EC (p.45f; p.98f; p.11f; cf. fn.9 of this article). But it is probable that his assertion about impersonal ONE was simply based on his recognition of the prevalence of one₁ in formal writing, and his awareness of one₃ amongst certain educated speakers. (On p.110, in fact, he notes how ONE, 'contrary to expectations', was not used at all by the middle class group in his experience). Since YOU is also prevalent amongst 'educated' speakers as a generic/impersonal, and since ONE can carry with it implications of group solidarity to some speakers, Bernstein's remarks about ONE, and their implications, have no real value at all, sociolinguistically or philosophically.

In general, the gradual shift of reference both from generalized to specific exophora, and from indefinite to egocentric, provides an interesting case-history for analysis. Undoubtedly, the egocentric viewpoint of the speaker has been the prime source of ONE's shift of reference: 'contaminating' generalizations on the one hand, and creating them on the other. Despite its increased use as a first person pronoun, however, its original 'universal' features have left their mark on the modulation of utterances in which it occurs: for it lacks the features of discourse-deicticness which homophoric we and you retain: hence it lacks the familiarity, the 'nearness' [+ ego] of we₂ and the immediacy of you₂ (for despite its 'distance' [+ voc] from the speaker, you₂ at least gestures towards the addressee). ONE, however, need not take any cognizance of the immediate context at all, and so is even more 'distant'. In its indefinite uses, such 'distance' can acquire the connotations of formality because of the nature of the registers in which it is used; but it can simply appear 'neutral' ([-ego] [-voc]). Even when it is used with egocentric reference (one₂) it has maintained its neutrality of tone: while freely interchanging with you₂ it yet lacks in some contexts the immediacy of you₂; on the other hand, when it is used in contexts where I would be a likelier alternative, it is non-familiar. In its 'advanced' egocentric use, its 'distance' has acquired social implications. Its original 'universal' reference also has produced a specific kind of reference that is characteristically fuzzy: a 'loaded' egocentricity, in its implications that the speaker speaks for the rest of humanity, or a group of people.

In one sense, exophoric reference presents not a spectrum or a scale, but a structure, divisible into immediate constituents. In von Humboldt's terms (1963:336-7) the universe is divided into an 'I' and a 'not-I', and the 'not-I' into a 'Thou' and a 'not-Thou' (i.e. 'He'). The pronoun ONE reflects this division, since it refers hyponymously to the whole (one₁), 'I' and 'not-I' (one₂), and 'I' (one₃). It serves, therefore, as an appropriate symbol both of the unity of consciousness and also of the proposition expressed in von Humboldt's further dictum (p.272), namely, that 'we have not the remotest realistic inkling of a consciousness which is not self-consciousness'.

FOOTNOTES

1. cf. R. Fowler's definition (1977:13): 'Modality covers all those features of discourse which concern a speaker's...attitude to, or commitment to, the value or applicability of the propositional content of an utterance, and concomitantly, his relationship with whoever he directs the speech act to'. Modulation, or 'attitudinal colouring' in Lyons' paraphrase, can indicate the speaker's involvement and also his desire to convince the listener. On the implications of modulation as a prosodic device for homophoric you and we, see Wales (1980).
2. The striking number of pronouns with 'I' reference in NE offers an interesting parallel to the situation amongst the traditional Shetlanders, where the pronoun I tends to be little used. As a result, Shetlanders feel that non-Shetlanders are 'immodest and gross' (Goffman, 1972:355 fn.5). Motives of modesty, etc., have undoubtedly contributed to the situation in British English; but the egocentricity of 'deep' reference continually re-asserts itself. On the egocentric bias of discourse, see Lyons (1977:638).
3. The OED's earliest reference for 'indefinite' one is 1477; and last examples of man/me forms range from 1375 to 1484. Strang (1970:199) seems to ascribe ONE's gradual decline in definiteness to its growing popularity as a 'prop' form, i.e. anaphoric substitute; and ascribes the decline of man > me to the latter's homophony with the oblique case of the 1st person pronoun. ONE's role as a replacement of man may well have been influenced by French on.
4. On the difficulty of maintaining a clear distinction between 'generic' and 'gnomic', see Lyons (1977:680-1). The particular combination of one₂ + must is noted by Halliday & Hasan (1976:53), an addendum to remarks on ONE otherwise taken from Hasan (1968). They think that one in such contexts has the implication of 'any self-respecting individual'.
5. We produced 10 responses (=9%); I, 5; a person, 2 and He, 1. Interestingly, one response involved a complete paraphrase using the passive; and 2 other paraphrases involved 'impersonal' it.
6. cf. the opening paragraph of Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities, describing the events of 1785:
 'It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness,...we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way-...'
 Here the familiar 'patriotic' we merges with the we of Free Indirect Speech, of an apparent quotation from contemporary journalism.
7. Lodge (1977:40) assigns to generalized you an 'intimacy' between speaker and addressee; whereas to one₁ 'distance' - but in largely social terms. Later (p.41) he revises his remarks: one is 'neutral' in respect to group distinction.
8. cf. the correction made by a tutor to a student teacher's course work essay, which I recently had to moderate: the statement (with its implications of 'general' truth) 'In my accent of English one does not find the aspirated [kh] sound' had been corrected to 'I cannot'.
9. Bernstein (1977:98f) associates parenthetical I think sequences with his 'elaborated code' (cf. my 'Conclusion' below); 'egocentric' they indeed are; but grouped with others of a kind mentioned here they do not provide evidence of a clear opposition to the 'sympathetic circularity' (Sociocentric) sequences supposedly characteristic of the 'restricted code' (p.97). Both types show the same shift

from narrative to reflection (p.112); the same 'semantic uncertainty' (as he admits, p.113); and it is surely open to question whether a sentence which includes 'I think' 'facilitate[s]...the development and elaboration' of communication any more than one which ends with a tag-question or parenthesis ('you know') (p.114).

10. On the general relationship between specific reference and progressive aspect, see Quirk et al (1978:148), and Lyons (1977:714).
11. Even where a context is supplied (cf. Curme, 1935:36), specific reference is by no means clear. So in his example from Thackeray, one suggests a 'reiterative' action: i.e. 'kept on squeezing':
'I think I should have liked to have been with them - for it was very close in the room with that great Mrs. Roundhead squeezing up to one on the sofa'.
12. Albeit in very different ways, Austin and Benveniste draw attention to the moment of speech ('discours') and the dominance of the speaker. For Benveniste, 3rd person pronouns typically refer to the moment of event ('histoire'). This distinction between the pronouns, and one to which endophoric and exophoric reference can be related (cf. my 'Introduction'), is ignored in many descriptions of English pronouns, but it is one which has interesting repercussions for other aspects of grammatical structure: with constraints, for example, not only on the kind of lexical verbs to be colligated, but on the behaviour of associated modals. So Palmer (1979) pays particular attention (ch.4) to 'deontic modality' and speaker 'reference'; but his book passim provides other examples, if on an ad hoc basis, of constraints according to pronominal person, or degree of 'definiteness'.
13. One informant responded both with I and an impersonal paraphrase. Some informants may not use the more explicitly egocentric variants of ONE themselves. It is to be noted that He produced the same number of responses as you: which at least confirms a degree of definiteness for one, even if these responses suggest a confusion with numerical ONE.
14. In another Test sentence (No.8), where one is found with another verb and past tense reference, and where egocentric reference is normally likely, the presence of Dad seems to have been responsible for the following results also:
'Because of Dad's disability one had to slow down'
55 out of 104 chose we (53%); I, 22 (21%) and you, 20 (19%).
15. Seen scrawled at the end of a 'debate' on existentialism in various hands on the wall of a University cloakroom:
'One gets an awful lot of high-class graffiti in University loos, doesn't one?'
A recent advertisement on Capital Radio for a Home Movie Camera enacted an argument between two obviously 'upper-class' speakers about a past winter holiday in Scotland with their dogs. 'One remembers it clearly', carefully intoned the woman - with unmistakable implications of identification.
16. Benveniste's phrase for plurality of person (1971:202), in a discussion of the overlap of je, nous and on in different French dialects.
17. Strang (1970:199) hints at its restricted circulation when she speaks of the loss at the end of the ME period of the 'universally accepted man'. She adds: 'All speakers are conscious of the gap it has left, but they have not, in the whole NE period, come to any settled usage by way of replacement'.
18. In the London Evening Standard (13.2.80), the reviewer of Jilly Cooper's Valentine anthology implicitly equates the affectation of her remarks with her post-propositional ['reiterative'] one by the added parenthesis: ...'every undergraduate without fail would quote "Oh my America, my Newfoundland" before he pounced on one'. (How tiresome for one!)

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SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CANTONESE CLASSIFIER¹

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1.0 The term 'classifier' in general linguistics and in Chinese linguistic studies

The term 'classifier' in general linguistics has been discussed at length in Greenberg (1972), Allan (1977) and briefly in Lyons (1977), so it will need no further introduction to the general linguist. However, different linguists will disagree as to what constitutes a 'classifier' (for which different names have been given (Greenberg 1972:8) and what salient features can be seen as categories for classification. For the moment, we can say that a classifier in the modern Chinese language belongs to a class of words, a member of which is usually obligatory after the deictic or quantifier and before the noun head in the noun phrase.

Other terms besides 'classifier' have been used by sinologists and general linguists concerned with Chinese linguistic studies. Again, these terms do not always designate the same linguistic phenomenon, a problem which we will not go into now. Among the terms used in Chinese linguistics are liang2tz'u2 'measure word' (Wang 1958, Liu 1962, 1965), 'measure' (Kratochvil 1968:114, Huang 1970, Chao 1968:584ff.), 'numery adjunct' (Mathews 1966), 'determinant' or 'numeral adjunct' (Forrest 1958:72), 'numérale' or 'particule numérale' (Coyaud 1973), 'classificateur' (Coyaud 1973, Rygaloff 1957/8). The term 'particle' as used in Dobson (1974) includes classifiers, which are then subdivided into 'enumerating auxiliaries', 'auxiliaries of approximate number', 'numerical group markers' and 'collective and restrictive auxiliaries of number' (Dobson 1974:14-16). The term 'classifier' is used by Cowles (1965), Forrest (1958), Karlgren (1962), Simon (1964), and mentioned as an alternative term in Mathews (1966).

1.1. Kinds of classifiers

A useful distinction has been made by Lyons (1977:463) between sortal and mensural classifiers, a distinction not made hitherto in any of the general literature on classifiers, although a near-parallel distinction has been made for Chinese in Wang (1958:234). According to Lyons:

'A sortal classifier is one which individuates whatever it refers to in terms of the kind of entity that it is...A mensural classifier is one which individuates in terms of quantity. The function of mensural classifiers is comparable with that of such words as 'pound' or 'pint' in English (cf. 'two pounds of butter', 'three pints of milk').'

In Cantonese, it is convenient to recognise three main distinctions among mensural classifiers: collective, container and measurement classifiers.

Examples of collective classifiers are jung2², baan1, gaal, doey3, as in 'yii jung2 silsiong2' 'this kind of thought', 'yii jung2 yan5' 'this kind of person', 'yad1 baan1 say3man1jay2' 'a group of children', 'yad1 baan1 cag2' 'a band of thieves', 'go2 gaal yan5' 'that family (of persons)', 'yad1 doey3 haay5' 'a pair of shoes'. Examples of container classifiers are buy1, gun3, aang1, as in 'liong3 buy1 caa5' 'two cups of tea', 'gey2 gun3 yaw5' 'a few cans of oil', 'saam1 aang1 baag4yaw2' 'three bottles of soya sauce'. Examples of measurement classifiers are bong4, cuen3, maa3, as in 'yad1 bong4 ping5go2' 'a pound of apples', 'sab4 cuen3 sildaay2' 'ten inches of ribbon', 'bun3 maa3 caw2' 'half a yard of silk'. Among the collective classifiers in Cantonese is a kind of classifier (let us call it the generic classifier) which individuates in terms of genera, as exemplified by jung2 (mentioned above), ting2 and did1. More will be said about mensural classifiers in 1.3.3. (p.129)

1.2. Morphological and syntactic features of the classifier

1.2.1. Definition of the classifier by morphological and syntactic criteria

The classifier, whether sortal or mensural, can be defined according to morphological and syntactic criteria. It can occur either as a word made up of a simple root, or it can occur as a reduplicated word (Killingley 1977:85). The reduplicated classifier³ word, which means 'every noun to which the classifier refers', can either occur by itself as one word or as more than one word in an endlessly recursive phrase. The unreduplicated classifier word can only occur in combination with at least one of several elements in various possessive, limiting (Killingley, forthcoming:6.5, 6.7) and Wh-interrogative phrases. These elements are the possessive pronoun, the deictic word or the Wh-word (but not both), and the quantifier. The syntactic features of the classifier can be summarized in the following phrases, using the conventions given below:

round brackets () denote optional selection of elements

braces { } (a) denote that at least one of the enclosed elements is obligatory;
(b) denote alternative choices of elements

unenclosed elements are obligatory

Adj=adjective; Cl=classifier; Clmens=mensural classifier;
Clred=reduplicated classifier; Dc=deictic; DRelCl=downgraded relative clause; N=noun; n(as superscript)=repeated n times;
Posspn=possessive pronoun; Pn=pronoun; Q=quantifier (which includes the numeral); Wh-wd=Wh-word; ≥ = greater than or equal to.

(i) The possessive, limiting, and Wh-interrogative phrase:

$$\left\{ (\text{Posspn}) \left(\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Dc} \\ \text{Wh-wd} \end{array} \right\} \right) (Q) \right\} \text{Cl} \left(\left\{ \begin{array}{c} (\text{Adj}^n) \\ \text{DRelCl}_2 \end{array} \right\} (\text{DRelCl}_1) \text{N} \right)$$

(ii) The reduplicated classifier phrase:

Clredⁿ, where n ≥ 2

- (iii) The post-reference appositive noun phrase:
N (Pn) Q + Cl (N)

1.2.2. The possessive, limiting, and Wh-interrogative phrases

In this string of elements,

$$\left\{ (\text{Posspn}) \left(\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Dc} \\ \text{Wh-wd} \end{array} \right\} \right) (Q) \right\} \text{Cl} \left(\left\{ \begin{array}{c} (\text{Adj}^n) \\ \text{DRelCl}_2 \end{array} \right\} (\text{DRelCl}_1) \text{N} \right) \right\},$$

one of the obligatory elements, the possessive pronoun, has its possessive suffix deleted at surface structure if the possessive pronoun occurs immediately before the classifier. Thus, although in a non-classifier possessive phrase we can say 'koey3ga ug1' 'his house', using a possessive pronoun with a surface structure possessive suffix -ga, we cannot say '*koey3ga gaan1 ug1; we have to say 'koey3 gaan1 ug1' 'his house'. The deletion of the possessive suffix, probably a phonological rule, must not mislead us into thinking that the possessive pronoun in this phrase is a plain pronoun in spite of its surface resemblance to the pronoun in the post-reference appositive noun phrase. However, when the possessive pronoun is separated from the classifier by some other element, either the form with or without -ga may be used (see examples (6) (9) and (10) below).

The downgraded relative clauses include the relative phrases mentioned in Killingley (forthcoming:6.7). DRelCl₁, which, if selected, must occur with a noun, has a relative suffix which is pronounced [gə] (spelt -ga); DRelCl₂ occurs as a phrase-final form without a noun and is pronounced [gæ] (spelt -ge3). This matter is more fully discussed in Killingley (forthcoming:6.7.1).

Examples of possible realizations of possessive, limiting, and Wh-interrogative phrases:

- (1) koey3 gaan1 ug1 'his - Cl - house' (his house) (Posspn + Cl + N)
- (2) yi1 go3 'this - Cl' (this, this one) (Dc + Cl)
- (3) bin1 go3 'which - Cl' (which? which one?) (Wh-wd + Cl)
- (4) sey3 go3 'four - Cl' (four) (Q + Cl)
- (5) koey3 jeg3 'his - Cl' (his) (Posspn + Cl)
- (6) koey3(ga) bin1 liong3 go3 'his - which - two - Cl' (which two of his?) (Posspn + Wh-wd + Q + Cl)
- (7) yi1 sey3 doey3 daay4 hung5 ji3waa4 maay3 -ga haay5
'this - four - Cl - big - red - just - buy - relative affix - shoe'
(These four pairs of newly-bought big red shoes)
(Dc + Q + Cl + Adj + Adj + DRelCl₁ + N)

- (8) go2 sey3 go3 go2 yad4 ley5 -ge3 'that - four - Cl - that - day - come - relative affix' (those four who came here on that day) (Dc + Q + Cl + DRelCl₂)
- (9) ney3(ga) bin1 seng5 pol coy3 'your - which - whole - Cl - vegetable' (which whole vegetable of yours?) (Posspn + Wh-wd + Q + Cl + N)
- (10) ngo3dey4(ga) gey2 doey3 'our - few - Cl' (our few pairs) (Pn + Q + Cl)

As we shall see in 1.3.1, in counting and reckoning, we can select either Q + Cl or Q + Cl + N.

All classifiers, whether sortal or mensural, can occur as stated above, but when certain mensural classifiers (Cl_{mens}), like doey3 in examples (7) and (10) above, occur together with the adjective daay4 'big' or say3 'small' (Adj'), a variation is seen in the order of elements. The order of the classifier and the adjective can change, with a subsequent grammatical change in the modifying function of the adjective. Instead of just being able to modify the noun, it can also modify the mensural classifier. This alternative position of the mensural classifier in many cases probably points to the unsettled classifier/noun status of mensural classifiers. No downgraded relative clause occurs and there can be only one occurrence of the adjective (Adj'), which denotes size or quantity, depending on the context. This variation of phrase (i) is given below:

$$\left\{ (\text{Posspn}) \left(\left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Dc} \\ \text{Wh-wd} \end{array} \right\} \right) (Q) \right\} (\text{Adj}') \text{Cl}_{\text{mens}} (N)$$

Examples of possible realizations of phrases involving mensural classifiers:

- (11) yi1 doey3 'this - Cl_{mens}' (this pair) (Dc + Cl_{mens})
- (12) sey3 hab4 'four - Cl_{mens}' (four boxes (of something)⁴) (Q + Cl_{mens})
- (13) ngo3(ga) daay4 doey3 haay5 'my - big - Cl_{mens} - shoe' (my big pair of shoes) (Posspn + Adj' + Cl_{mens} + N)
- (14) ngo3 doey3 daay4 haay5 'my - Cl_{mens} - big - shoe' (my pair of big shoes) (Posspn + Cl_{mens} + Adj' + N)
- (15) koey3(ga) bin1 daay4 doey3 haay5 'his - which - big - Cl_{mens} - shoe' (which big pair of shoes of his?) (Posspn + Wh-wd + Adj' + Cl_{mens} + N)

1.2.3. The reduplicated classifier phrase

The reduplicated classifier phrase, Cl_{red}ⁿ, where n ≥ 2, tends to be used for rhetorical purposes (such as to emphasize comprehensiveness), enumerating nouns to which references have been made, with the meaning 'every (noun1) and every (noun2) and every (noun3)...'. A possible realization of this phrase is the following:

- (16) tiw5tiw5 jeg3jeg3 go3go3 faay3faay3 baa2baa2 gaw4gaw4 doey3doey3 ... [bin3saay3] 'every noun1, noun2, etc. [had changed]'

1.2.4. The post-reference appositive noun phrase

The post-reference appositive noun phrase, N (Pn) Q + Cl (N), is a favourite construction type in most (if not all) the modern Chinese languages. It is homophonous with items in a list construction and this can hide differences in deep structure. An example of such homophonous phrases is given below in Cantonese:

post-reference appositive noun phrase

- (17) gay1jay2, sey3 jeg3 [maay4saay3] 'chicken - four - Cl - [sold]'
'the chickens, all four of them, [have been sold].'

list construction

- (18) [ngo3 yiw3] gay1jay2: sey3 jeg3; ngaab3jay2: lug4 jeg3; ngo5: ng3 jeg3
'[I need] chicken - four - Cl; duck - six - Cl; goose - five - Cl'
'[I need] chickens: four; ducklings: six; geese: five.'

A member of a list construction is not expandable and it has a restricted syntactic function because potentially, it can only be the complement or object of a verb (or deleted verb). But in addition to these functions, the appositive noun phrase has other syntactic functions, besides being potentially expandable. We shall now examine the syntax of the appositive noun phrase. In the appositive noun phrase, the pronoun, which can occur either before or after the first noun, has specific deictic function. Possible realizations of this phrase are given below, together with suitable contexts, where necessary, in square brackets:

- (19) low3yan5 ng3 go3 [ley5] 'old people - five - Cl [come]'
(old people, five of them, [are coming]) (N + Q + Cl)
(20) low3yan5gaa1 ng3 go3 yan5 'old people - five - Cl - people'
(old people, five of them) (N + Q + Cl + N)
(21) seng5 go3 [baaw3jo2] 'all - Cl [has cracked]'
(all of it [has cracked]) (Q + Cl)
(22) [ngo3 maay3] faa1 koey3 seng5 po1 '[I'll buy] flowers - it - all - Cl'
([I'll buy] the flowers, the whole plant) (N + Pn + Q + Cl)
(23) low3yan5 ngo3dey4 liong3 go3 [ciong5meng4] 'old people - we - two - Cl
[have long lives]' (we two old people [have long lives]) (N + Pn + Q + Cl)
(24) [fug4si4] koey3dey4 low3yan5gaa1 liong3 go3 yan5 '[look after] they -
old - people - two - Cl - people' ([look after] these two old people)
(Pn + N + Q + Cl + N)
(25) ney3dey4 low3yan5gaa1 liong3 go3 yan5 [jow2 taw2] 'you - old people -
two - Cl - people [should go to bed early]' (both of you old people
[should go to bed early]) (Pn + N + Q + Cl + N)

- (26) daan1 san1 jay2 ney3 yad1 go3 yan1 [seng5yad4 waan2] 'bachelor - you - one - Cl - person [always enjoys life]' (a bachelor, all by yourself, [will always enjoy life]) (N + Pn + Q + Cl + N)

1.3. Do classifiers have meaning?

1.3.1. Greenberg's hypotheses

Both Greenberg and Allan (see also 1.3.2) are interested in semantic undersals but they differ in some basic assumptions about classifiers. Greenberg (1972:34) recognises that classifiers are sometimes semantically redundant, a point which will be developed in 1.3.3, while Allan (1977:285) says that

'classifiers...have meaning, in the sense that a classifier denotes some salient perceived or imputed characteristic of the entity to which an associated noun refers (or may refer).'

This is one of his two defining criteria for classifiers. We note from this and from his seven categories of classification that Allan's explanation of classifiers is very much tied to the linguistic interpretation of perceived natural phenomena. Greenberg (1972:7), although recognizing that in many instances of classification the mode of classification can be explained in terms of observed phenomena, points out that in certain cases no such explanation can be given.

Greenberg (1972:1) sets out his three working hypotheses concerning classifier languages, based on his study of material from a hundred classifier languages. The first hypothesis states that:

'Numeral classifiers involve the overt expression of one kind of quantification, namely counting by units.'

This appears to be well borne out in Chinese, for the original function of Chinese classifiers seems to have been largely centred on counting and reckoning (Dobson 1974). At this point, a distinction will be made between counting (or enumerating) and reckoning in Chinese. Counting involves an actual deictic process [Cantonese sow2], but reckoning involves assessment and calculations, e.g., in business transactions [Cantonese gay3]. Counting is often tied to a deictic process while reckoning is a more abstract mathematical process used in business and other transactions. In straightforward counting, in Chinese, as in a non-classifier language, numbers are used in a series, without any classifier. This would also be the case when we count items which all share the same classifier; but in counting items which do not share the same classifier, we would need to use a classifier after each numeral in the series, e.g.:

- (27) Cantonese 'saam1 jeg3 [ping5go2]' 'three - Cl - [apples]' (three [apples]);
'sey3 tiw5 [gung1jiw1]' 'four - Cl - [bananas]' (four [bananas]).

In reckoning, which often results from counting, special classifiers (we could call them 'reckoners') are used, such as Cantonese daa1 'dozen'. This difference between classifiers used in counting and classifiers used in reckoning is analogous to Greenberg's distinction between unit-counters like 'sheet' and 'non-unit counters' like 'ream' in English, a non-classifier language (Greenberg 1972:12).

In addition to these functions of the classifier, we should include a further function - that of pointing out generic groupings in nouns, as in the use of the generic classifiers ting2 and jung2.

As Greenberg's second hypothesis⁵ involves diachronic considerations, with which we are not directly concerned in this paper, we shall pass on to his third hypothesis, which states that:

'The classifier in a numeral classifier language has the same function as a singulative does in a language with a collective-singulative distinction.'

The collective-singulative distinction is difficult to draw in Cantonese mainly because of the existence of generic and other mensural classifiers which can express collectivity as well as 'instances of' an entity. This hypothesis, if it can be applied to Cantonese at all, would be truer of the sortal classifiers, but even so there are problems, as we shall see towards the end of 1.3.3.

1.3.2. Allan's seven categories of classification

Allan's findings will undoubtedly influence future work on classifiers, and we shall now consider his seven categories of classification (Allan 1977:297) in relation to the problem of semantic content in Cantonese. These seven categories of classification, suggested by Allan as language universals, are:

- (i) material (ii) shape (iii) consistency (iv) size (v) location
- (vi) arrangement, and (vii) quanta.

Greenberg (1972:34) notes that the second of these, shape, 'has been singled out for attention by some analysts'. These seven categories are further divided into subcategories by Allan and they are said to overlap in function. The first category deals with the subcategories animacy, inanimacy, sex and the classification of abstract and verbal nouns. The second category is concerned with whether the referents of nouns are long, flat, or round, and whether they are perceived as being uni-, two- or three-dimensional, a point also noted by Greenberg (1972:34). The third category, consistency, has subcategories depending on whether objects are flexible, hard (or rigid) or non-discrete. The fourth, size, is concerned with the categories 'big' and 'small'. The fifth, location, overlaps with the first category in classifying nouns like countries and land in some languages since 'they classify according to the essential [i.e. material] meaning of the noun, which just happens to be locational' (Allan 1977:303). The sixth, arrangement, involves identifying specific and non-inherent configuration, involving size, shape, and consistency, as in the classification of pleats and folds in Burmese. It also involves identifying specific position in conjunction with location, as in Navajo classifiers for 'objects in parallel'. Thirdly, it identifies objects in some specific non-inherent distribution, as in 'bunch' or 'herd', intersecting with the category of quanta. Quanta, the seventh category, identifies subcategories like grammatical number, collection and measurement.

Of these categories, Allan (1977:303) relates at least the first four to perceived or imputed characteristics of the noun:

'The first four categories of classification, i.e., the material and configurational categories, all refer to the salient inherent characteristics of entities as perceived in them or imputed to them by the speaker (at least, when he is conscious of classifying). The same is true for some, but not all, instances of the fifth category, location.'

As we saw in 1.3.1, Greenberg and Allan are not in total agreement over the question of whether classifiers 'have meaning'. Allan's second criterion for defining classifiers states quite strongly that classifiers 'have meaning', though their denotation seems to be a part of the reference of the nouns which they classify. Furthermore, as we see from the above quotation, Allan seems convinced that noun classification reflects the speaker's views of the observable universe 'at least, when he is conscious of classifying'. Allan (1977:307-8) further says that:

'There can be no doubt that classifiers reflect perceptual groupings, and that reclassification can be used to indicate the speaker's evaluation of what he perceives as unusual. To say that a classifier has meaning is to say that it indicates perceived characteristics of the entities which it classifies; in other words, classifiers are linguistic correlates to perception, and when the perception of a given object changes, the classifier may change concomitantly - though there are constraints on how this may come about.'

1.3.3. Classifiers and sensory perception

Is there a direct link between classification in a language and sensory perception, interpretation, and grouping of natural phenomena? While Greenberg (1972:7) rejects a strong interpretation of such a hypothesis, semantic interpretation of phenomenal data is criterial to Allan's view of classifiers (Allan 1977:285). Let us examine this problem in relation to three Cantonese classifiers: gaw4, faay3, and tiw5. gaw4 is usually 'translated' as 'piece, lump' (e.g. Huang 1970:386, Cowles 1965:367) and is sometimes said to be used for classifying objects which are perceived as discrete lumps. This seems to be largely borne out by the facts of the language, gaw4 being used to classify nouns like the following, which refer to discrete objects which are obviously 'lump-like': gog4gway1 '(a piece of) Malay or Chinese cake', gig1 '(a piece of) cake', taan3 'coal', nay5 'earth', seg4gu2 'stone', faan1gaan2 'soap', yug4 'meat, flesh'. Furthermore, if one is not certain what a lump of something is, gaw4 is used to classify the noun ye3 'thing' referring to the unknown object, as in 'ney3 tay2haa3 yil gaw4 ye3' 'just have a look at this (lump-like thing)'. faay3 is usually 'translated' as 'a flat piece' (e.g., Cowles 1965:137) and is sometimes said to be a classifier for things which are 'flat and spread out' (Cowles 1965:137). This again is largely borne out by the fact that faay3 is used to classify nouns like the following, which refer to 'flat' and 'spread out' objects: dey4 'land', tin5 'rice-field', ji2 'paper', min4geng3 'mirror', min4gan1 'face flannel', bow3 'cloth', yib4 'leaf', pey5 'skin', jam1baan2 'chopping-board', baan2 'plank', min4baaw1 '(slice of) bread', beng2 'biscuit'. As in the case of gaw4 vis-à-vis 'lump-like' objects, faay3 is used to classify a noun referring to an unknown flat object, but with a narrower field of reference. The object concerned would have to be fairly thin and small, and probably something that one could potentially handle. But faay3 is also used to classify a few of the nouns which are classified by gaw4,

e.g., gog3gway1 'malay or Chinese cake', gig1 'cake' and yug4 'meat, flesh', even when they refer to the same objects denoted by noun phrases using the classifier gaw4. This makes it difficult to be certain when a speaker is viewing such objects, say, a piece of cake, as a 'lump' or as a 'flat object'. tiw5 is usually 'translated' as 'long object', as in Cowles (1965:1060): 'Anything long or slender. Cl(assifier) for such.' Yet again, this seems to be largely borne out by the fact that tiw5 is used to classify nouns like the following, which can be said to refer to objects having linearity or to abstractions which have linear sequence in time or space: taw5faad3 'hair (of the head)', mow5 'body hair', sin3 'thread', mey3 'tail', mow5gan1 'towel', min4gan1 'face flannel', saw2gan1 'handkerchief', bow4 'cloth', fu3 'trousers', suen5 'boat, ship', gaay1 'street', low4 'road', ho5 'river', maaw1 'cat', ngaw5 'cow', gu2 'story', go1 'song', man4tay5 'problem', meng4 'life'. Yet again, as in the cases of gaw4 and faay3 vis-à-vis 'lump-like' objects and 'flat' objects respectively, tiw5 is used to classify a noun denoting an unknown long object. However, tiw5 is also used to classify nouns which are not obviously 'long', such a hoy2 'sea, ocean', something which, like ricefields and land, can be thought of as being 'spread out'; yet hoy2 is not classified by faay3, the classifier for tin5 'ricefield' and dey4 'land'. Looking back at our lists of nouns which can be classified by faay3 and tiw5, we find an oddity in the fact that while min4gan1 'face flannel' and bow3 'cloth' can be classified by faay3 and tiw5, saw2gan1 'handkerchief' can only be classified by tiw5, and mow5gan1 'towel' can only be classified by tiw5. Surely, from the point of view of perception, towels, handkerchiefs, face flannels and cloth ought to belong together?

Thus we see that although it is often possible to explain noun classification in Cantonese in terms of sensory perception, it is not always possible to do so in every case. Furthermore, there are cross-linguistic problems which concern the multilingual speaker of Cantonese, especially if he is literate in more than one Chinese language. For such speakers, who are operating two or more linguistic and graphic systems which must necessarily impinge on each other, it is even more difficult to argue that their use of classifiers is directly related to sense perception. A person who is bilingual in Cantonese and Mandarin and who is also literate in both languages cannot but be aware of the fact that in Mandarin, the classifier k'uai4 塊 (i.e., with the same graphic shape as Cantonese faay3) is often 'translated' as 'a lump' (e.g. Mathews 1966:523, A new English-Chinese dictionary 1975:762). Some of the nouns classified by k'uai4 in Mandarin are classified by all the three Cantonese classifiers mentioned above, e.g. 'i4 k'uai4 shih2t'ou2' 'a stone' (cf. Cantonese 'yad1 gaw4 seg4gu2'), 'i4 k'uai4 t'ien2' 'a ricefield' (cf. Cantonese 'yad1 faay3tin5'), 'i4 k'uai4 mao2chin1' 'a towel' (cf. Cantonese 'yad1 tiw5 mow5gan1'). As the speaker could be referring to the same objects in both these languages, we would not like to have to say that his perception of each of these objects changes as he switches from one language to the other. Of course, the literate speaker who is bilingual in Cantonese and Mandarin is not always a reliable informant on what a classifier 'means' because he cannot help being influenced by what the corresponding graphic form in Mandarin could 'mean'. This is seen in Cowles' first comment on Cantonese faay3: 'A clod or lump' (Cowles 1965:137), thus contradicting his later entry that it is a classifier for things which are 'flat and spread out'. No illiterate monolingual Cantonese speaker or one not aware that Cantonese faay3 and Mandarin k'uai4, being cognate, both share a common character (塊), would have glossed faay3 as 'a clod or lump'.

The fact that a bilingual speaker uses three different Cantonese classifiers (gaw4, faay3, tiw5) to classify certain nouns but only one classifier (k'uai4)

to classify those very nouns in Mandarin casts some doubt on generalizations about the mental picture or concept of reality said to be shared by speakers of a language or cognate languages. Surely we would not like to accept a hypothesis whereby the same speaker, just because he is switching from one closely-related language to another, is said to change his concept of reality. Do we really want to say that objects which a Cantonese speaker perceives as being 'lump-like', 'flat', and 'long' respectively are all re-categorized as being 'lump-like' in Mandarin? According to Whorfian ideas of language and reality, this would not be a very satisfactory explanation. Furthermore, what can we say about the 'correctness' of interpretation when two monolingual speakers see the written phrase 一塊田 which could be in either Mandarin or Cantonese? Would we say that the Cantonese speaker (reading 塊 as faay3) interprets it to 'mean' 'flat' while the Mandarin speaker (reading 塊 as k'uai4) interprets it to 'mean' 'lump-like'? Such a situation gives us good reason to suppose that the speakers are not really concerned with the actual sizes and shapes of objects when they classify them, though this is not to say that there may not be seen in classifiers summaries of meaning categories. Most discussions about which classifier to use (e.g. in the schoolroom or during parental correction) draw on post-hoc rationalizations of why a certain classifier is the 'right' one for classifying niu2 'cattle' because cattle have heads; I have also heard others argue that tiw5 in Cantonese is 'right' for classifying ngaw5 because cattle are 'long'. However, if we dispense with such justifications we can see that certain classifiers are 'right' or 'wrong' merely because the corresponding speech community have sanctioned or rejected their use. This is surely parallel to the way in which gender (1.6) is understood by linguists. Most of the time the idea of sex can be ignored, but now and then some correlation between sex and gender can be seen in terms of natural classification. This correlation (say between French fille and feminine gender) is then irrationally extended by some non-linguists to a correlation between the curves of a round table and the feminine gender of French table, conveniently ignoring non-curved tables.

Yet, whatever the position regarding phenomenal observation (or experience) and linguistic interpretation in terms of classification, we cannot dispute the importance of nouns in influencing meaning in (or even supplying meaning to) the classifier. Greenberg (1972:34) proposes that a major area yet to be investigated is 'the semantic changes of the classifiers in terms of changes in the nouns that they classify'. This implies a belief on Greenberg's part that semantic content is being provided to the classifier by the noun. Yet he does not believe that classifiers always have meaning, since he states quite firmly on the same page that 'in the vast majority of instances they are semantically redundant.' Earlier, Greenberg (1972:7) had also referred to the difficulty of always explaining classification by appealing to meaning:

'In our example, we employed a gloss of the type frequently found in grammars of such languages, namely, 'five flat-object book'. Taking such a translation at its face value, we can justifiably state that we have classification in the semantic sense because, indeed, a book is a kind of flat object. The word for 'tail' is sometimes used as a classifier for animals (e.g. ekor in MALAY) but we cannot consider a dog a kind of tail though of course we can devise a property 'having a tail'. On the other hand we could define the class meaning of ekor in MALAY as that which is common to all nouns which take ekor as a classifier.'

The languages to which Greenberg is referring here are South-east Asian languages (Greenberg 1972:5) and he has given us a typical grammar-book explanation of the classifier for 'book'. But in fact it is not always that 'a book is a kind of flat object'. In Indian-influenced areas of South-east Asia one might be familiar with books made of palmyra leaves strung on a string; in areas influenced by Chinese culture a book could be identified with scrolls and blocks of jade or stone. Incidentally, Greenberg's example might explain why Lyons (1977:461) glosses the Mandarin classifier ben as 'flat object'; ben is usually glossed in dictionaries as 'root' or 'fundamental', a practice followed by Coyaud (1973:27) in his gloss of ben as 'racine'. There are etymological reasons for this (see Lu 1965:96).

It is possible that we may be able to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable view that classifiers are 'meaningless' and that they have semantic features. Perhaps if one removed all the classifiers from the language but substituted a classifier x, that x would only be 'meaningful' because it was being fed with semantic information from the surrounding or inferred context(s). The language as a whole would not 'lose' any semantic content. We see too, that Allan's and Greenberg's views of meaning and the classifier (although differing in details) are both noun-centred. What we may have to consider is the possibility that the classifier (in itself semantically redundant) has been fed enough semantic information in so many contexts that it appears to speakers to have meaning, and that this partly accounts for the way in which we are often able to supply a semantic interpretation of a classifier out of context. What I would also suggest is that the semantic information is not entirely noun-centred, but that it comes from the deictic (accounting for Allan's location), the numeral (accounting for Allan's quanta) and the various adjectives and downgraded relative clauses which can modify the noun (accounting for the rest of Allan's categories). An exception to semantic redundancy is found in the case of the mensural classifiers which appear in the variation of phrase (i) given in 1.2.2 (see p.121)

Apart from the semantic information on quanta stemming from the quantifier, the reduplicated classifier phrase in Cantonese is semantically marked for + PLURAL, while mensural classifiers always include an area of identification involving semantic number. For instance, baaw1 can have the reading - PLURAL or + PLURAL, depending on the noun which it classifies - whether that noun is mass (with singular reference) or count (with plural reference) (see 1.4): e.g., in yad1 baaw1 hey3 'a bag of air', baaw1 would be - PLURAL; but in yad1 baaw1 seg4gu2 'a bag of stones', baaw1 would be + PLURAL. From this last example we see that even with the numeral 'one', a mensural classifier can have the semantic reading + PLURAL.

As we saw in 1.3.1, (Greenberg (1972:1) has a third hypothesis which states that:

'The classifier in a numeral classifier language has the same function as a singulative does in a language with a collective-singulative distinction.'

The collective-singulative opposition is found in languages in which the collective cannot be used with numerals but is opposed to a singulative which is marked for grammatical number. Grammatical number usually has two terms (singular and plural), but in languages like Arabic, it has three

terms (singular, dual and plural). The collective is distinct from the plural of the singulative. An example of the collective-singulative contrast is seen in the forms 'Irish/Irishman/Irishmen' where 'Irish' is the collective and 'Irishman/Irishmen' are the two items of the singulative (Greenberg 1972:25). Greenberg (1972:26) further states that:

'The classifier is an individualizer which performs the same function as a singulative derivational affix in languages with the collective/singulative opposition.'

For a similar view on Early Archaic Chinese, he cites Dobson (1962:28):

'it is not a feature of 'substantival quality' that it distinguishes class and number, between the genus itself and 'an instance of' or instances of...In EAC certain of the distinctions are made when a noun occurs in a syntagma in which the elements are distributed as enumerated noun/number/quantification...'

Whatever the semantic and grammatical status of the quantifier in Early Archaic Chinese, we can see that in Cantonese the function of the classifier is not always 'an instance' of a genus. The classifier itself could be a generic one, e.g., 'sey3 jung2' 'four kinds', the head noun not necessarily appearing. Since the unclassified noun can sometimes have generic reference (1.4), depending on context, when a generic classifier (1.1) is used with a noun, the generic classifier denotes, as it were, a genus within a genus, but it still does not function as a singulative with singular/plural distinction. A generic classifier can be said to be a collective which (in its classification of count nouns, at any rate) always has a semantic plural because it has plural reference. Some mensural classifiers are sometimes semantically singular, depending on whether their classified nouns are semantically plural or singular. For example, bong4 in yad1 bong4 ping5go2' 'a pound of apples' has plural reference while bong4 in 'yad1 bong4 soey2' 'a pound of water' has singular reference. Other mensural classifiers are always semantically plural, since they always have plural reference, for example, doey3 in 'yad1 doey3 haay5' 'a pair of shoes'. Reduplicated sortal classifiers are always semantically singular, referring only to single units, as in go3go3 'each, everyone'; but in the reduplicated classifier phrase (1.2.3), it is always semantically plural, referring then to plural units. Some reduplicated mensural classifiers can be semantically plural or singular, depending on whether the noun implicitly or explicitly classified is a mass or count noun. In bong4bong4 soey' 'every pound of water', bong4bong4 is semantically singular since it refers to a (non-plural) mass noun, but in 'bong4bong4 ping5go2' 'every pound of apples', bong4bong4 is semantically plural since it refers to more than one unit of a count noun. Some reduplicated collective classifiers are semantically plural whatever the noun classified since they always classify nouns with plural reference, e.g. 'doey3doey3 haay5' 'every pair of shoes', 'doey3doey3 mad4' 'every pair of socks'. We see, therefore, that in Cantonese, the collective-singulative functions of classifiers are not clearly distinguished.

1.4. Generic reference and deixis

In Cantonese, there are at least two ways of expressing generic reference, i.e. the kind of reference seen in sentences which assert a timeless proposition about a whole class, not about a particular member or group belonging to that class (see Lyons 1977:193ff.):⁶

- (i) by using an unclassified noun;
- (ii) by using a generic classifier.

Thus we may have in Cantonese:

(28) yan5 how2 'man - good' (men are good);

(29) yi1 jung2 yan5 how 'this - generic classifier - man - good'

(this kind of person is good; such people are good).

The unclassified generic noun is like Allan's 'collectivized noun' discussed in Allan (1976) which, in English, is singular in form but has plural reference, as in 'he sighted two giraffe'. Such nouns show plural verb concord, as in 'two giraffe...which were coming down to the water's edge...' and in 'hippo are hardly worth considering' (Allan 1976:99). In this respect, Cantonese is like Vietnamese and Arabic (Greenberg 1972:25-26), where unclassified nouns have generic reference; but additionally, when generic classifiers are used in Cantonese, we can express a genus within a genus. Here we are still concerned with generic reference, although by using a generic classifier, the class is made smaller; but whatever is asserted about the smaller class is timeless and is still true for all the members of that class.

The generic/non-generic distinction in Cantonese is sometimes blurred by the neutralization of the categories mass and count in nouns. This can blur the surface distinction between generalizations (involving generic reference) and deixis (involving actual individual entities). Such a distinction is easily made in both the larger textual and non-linguistic contexts, but without these contexts, the distinctions are blurred.

Let us take the Cantonese example yan5 how2. This can mean either 'Man is good' (a generalization involving generic reference) or 'this man is good; that man is good, etc.' (deictic function involving specific reference). If it means the latter, the speaker could be physically pointing to somebody, supplying a suitable non-linguistic context; or he could have just said 'I'm going to talk about a certain man', i.e. supplying a suitable linguistic context. To mean the former, we would need a linguistic context in which various categories of beings were being referred to, e.g. 'apes, snakes and men'. The sentence yan5 how2 immediately following such a sentence could then only have generic reference as part of a generalization.

Generic reference can also be indistinguishable from individual specific reference in a sentence like yad1 go3 yan5 how2 mun4 'one - Cl - person - very - bored (somebody is very bored; a person (or 'one') gets very bored; it is very boring to be by oneself). Clearly, when the sentence means 'somebody is very bored', it has specific reference, but when the sentence means 'a person gets very bored' or 'it is very boring to be by oneself', it has generic reference. Again, the role of context is important in distinguishing the individual and the generic meanings.

1.5. The unclassified noun with a quantifier

As we have just seen, the unclassified noun can be used in Cantonese to express either generic reference or specific reference in relation to nouns.

Further, a quantifier can occur with nouns semantically related to parts of the body to form an adverbial construction which expresses concomitant causative function. But this kind of adverbial function will not be dealt with in this paper (see also fn. 3).

The absence of a classifier in a noun phrase in which a quantifier occurs could be a significant indicator of style. Greenberg (1976:6) refers to Khmer, in which 'the expression without the classifier is stylistically less formal'. In Cantonese, when this happens, the speaker is either quoting from an ancient text or improvising a saying with deliberate archaic syntax, and the result is the opposite of the situation in Khmer, being much more formal. For example, in the Cantonese saying which I have made up below, I have not used jeg3 to classify fu2 'tiger', and this helps to make the style sound more formal. One could use such a made-up saying as an aphorism to end a children's story:

(30) sey3 fu2 hon1 mun5 'four - tiger - guard - door'
(when four tigers guard the doors),

(31) cag2 bad1 hey2fun1 'thief - not - happy' (the thief is not happy).

1.6. Gender

How apt is the term 'gender' when applied to classifiers in Cantonese? In the discussion of the category 'gender' in Lyons (1968, Section 7.3), it was suggested that noun classification using classifiers is similar to gender.

In some ways it is true that noun classification by means of classifiers is like grammatical gender. First of all, all nouns are potentially classifiable although they often appear in a non-classified form. This is like the situation in languages where all nouns belong to at least one of two or more genders. However, gender is usually restricted to two or three terms, although there may be as many as six terms, as in the case of Swahili. The situation concerning classifiers is much looser as there can be a few hundred classifiers in a language, some of which might only classify one noun, while others can be used for lots of different nouns. No typical gender system has yet been found to be so uneconomical as to provide one term in order to classify just one noun. That is to say, we would not expect any gender language to have two terms, say, feminine and masculine, as well as a third category, say, 'senile', just for one noun. Yet Cantonese jaaw2 seems only to classify dang1lung5 'lantern'.

We need to consider whether the term 'gender' can be applied to a fairly large class which is probably changing in size and semantic structure when viewed over a given time span. At any fixed point in the language, speakers might feel that the class of classifiers, unlike the class of nouns, was fixed in its membership and that the categories for grouping nouns must thereby also be fixed. If this were true we might be justified in thinking of classifiers as belonging to a large gender system. However, we know from the history of the language that classifiers once had a limited usage and that their distribution and semantic system have changed with time (Greenberg 1975, Wang 1958, Huang 1964). Although typical gender systems do change, they strike us as being obviously closed systems, and the changes to which they are subject are very infrequent. In the case of the classifiers,

we are uncertain as to whether they belong to a closed system or an open class, and the number of terms could be fluctuating all the time. If we regard noun classification as a kind of gender system, Chinese, in this respect, seems to have developed in the opposite direction from English. English has lost its inherent gender system as far as the nouns are concerned, retaining only a few vestiges of the system and retaining a fairly full set of distinctions only in the case of the pronouns, while Chinese has built up an increasing set of noun distinctions from comparatively little.

If we believe that classifiers are semantically redundant we are more able to argue that they are gender-markers. It is well-known that although 'natural' gender sometimes plays a part in languages with grammatical gender, it is by no means the most important element in gender identification. That is to say, in a language where the two gender terms are masculine and feminine, it is expected (though not vital) that females will belong to the feminine gender and males to the masculine gender. Exceptions, however, can be seen in German Mädchen (neuter), Old English mægden (neuter), wifmann (masculine), and Latin copiæ (Feminine), turma (feminine). However, if we believe (as Allan does) in a strong link between the perception of real phenomena and noun classification, we would be less able to argue that noun classification is a kind of gender. It would be interesting to examine closely the relevance of the term 'gender' to classifiers in classifier languages. It may be the case that some classifier systems are more 'gender-like' than others.

1.7. Componential analysis as a possible approach

In spite of its many drawbacks, componential analysis (see, for example, Bendix 1966, Bierwisch 1969, 1970, Langendoen 1969, Lyons 1968, 1977, Nida 1975 and Kempson 1977) is one useful way in which we can examine classifiers. In connection with this approach, three terms are used which need explanation: 'semantic specifications', 'semantic features' and 'semantic components'. The term 'semantic specifications' is used to designate either 'semantic features' or 'semantic components'. The term 'semantic feature' (or 'variable') is used to refer to those specifications which involve a positive or a negative value, as in the characterization $\pm$ MALE. Each of these two oppositions is referred to as a semantic component (or value), e.g. + MALE and - MALE. In this I largely follow Lyons (1977:323). However, I also use the term 'value' or 'component' to include choices involving the $\pm$ symbols as a short-hand way of notating the fact that a classifier can sometimes have either plus or a minus value, as in the case of the classifier for san5sin1 'immortals', mentioned in 1.8.

But let us first look at some of the drawbacks of componential analysis. It is a well-known fact that when a word is used in different contexts its meaning is changed, making it impossible to specify all the potential semantic features of a particular word in isolation. In componential analysis we are often forced into the artificial exercise of having to view the semantic structure of a word in isolation when we know that that word, when used in a phrase or sentence, will lose certain features, or may need certain others which may not be apparent when the word is viewed on its own. A second problem is that of isolating lexemes. This remains a problem even if we try to stick to just one part of speech (say, nouns).

A third problem, raised in Lyons (1977, Section 9.9) is that of having identical terms in the object language and the metalanguage: e.g. in order to explain 'human' in the object language we are forced to use HUMAN in the metalanguage.

The first drawback can be demonstrated with a few semantic values for school and nursery:

<u>school</u>	<u>nursery</u>
+ 5 YEARS UPWARDS	- 5 YEARS UPWARDS
- INFANTILE	+ INFANTILE
± CO-EDUCATIONAL	± CO-EDUCATIONAL
± FEMALE INSTRUCTORS	+ FEMALE INSTRUCTORS
± EXAMS	- EXAMS
etc.	etc.

If we were doing a limited analysis of these words denoting two kinds of educational establishments in England, we might want to posit the semantic features given above for school and nursery. Obviously, we are thinking here about the noun school, not the verb school. But even if we could keep out of the semantic specifications of school (noun) those features which would be posited for school (verb), we find that because the noun school can be used in a variety of contexts, the semantic specifications given above do not always hold. The same can be said for nursery.

This takes us to the second drawback - the problem of isolating lexemes. If we think of school as in school rules, the set of features cited above for school do not seem to reflect the semantic content of the word, for possibly features such as ± RIGID or ± IRRATIONAL ought to be included. That is to say, school in school rules does not appear to be the 'same' as the school that we have been looking at, though they are obviously related. Similarly, nursery in nursery tea and nursery language are two different kinds of nursery, neither of them requiring the semantic specifications involving instruction or examinations. Furthermore, the nursery in nursery language would have a value not shared by any of the other cases of nursery, namely, + DELIBERATELY INFANTILE.

Although we can explain away these difficulties by saying that each of the instances of school and nursery cited is a different lexeme having its own set of semantic features, the fact remains that we cannot easily exclude all the other homophonous lexemes of the same word class in a componential analysis. If we try to do a componential analysis of English nouns alone, i.e., isolating, for instance, the noun school from the verb school, we would still be left with the problem of having to isolate lexemes within the big class of nouns. Since this problem is hard enough to solve when we look at a mere handful of nouns, we can well imagine the size of the problem when we think of all the nouns in a language. Of course, this problem is inherent in a language where parts of speech are not rigidly fixed by inflection and where there is a great measure of freedom in the formation of endocentric noun compounds - using nouns as modifiers or heads of noun constructions. In this way, Cantonese is very like English, and one would expect the same difficulty to crop up in the case of the classifiers.

However, I have found the opposite to be the case. Classifiers lend themselves very well to componential analysis because their syntactic distribution is strictly limited, and their grammatical status (as classifiers) is clearly defined, as we saw in 1.2. Thus, although there are problems involving certain classifiers and the possible nouns which they may modify or replace in a given noun phrase, and although there are problems involving homophonous classifiers, these problems can be contained. They are not insuperable problems when compared to the problem of metaphorical extension in English, when a whole set of semantic features must be replaced by another. For example, if we take cruel in isolation, perhaps most people would specify, among other features, the following: $\pm$ HUMAN AGENT $\pm$ FEMALE AGENT $\pm$ MALE AGENT $\pm$ INTENTIONAL. However, these features would have to be abandoned in the metaphorical use of cruel in cruel sea. Again, without wanting to overstate the case, these difficulties make it an almost impossible task to satisfactorily account for most of the semantic features of even one part of speech, using componential analysis. And this problem holds true for Cantonese as well as for English.

Now, the case of the classifiers is altogether different. As we saw in 1.2, they are morphologically and syntactically well-defined, so it is relatively easy to isolate the classifier and associate it with certain semantic features which are not easily invalidated.

Applying componential analysis to the study of classifiers also obviates the problem of having identical terms in the metalanguage and the object language, a point mentioned in Lyons (1977). For example, in English we have to use the term HUMAN to explain the class 'human', and the term LONG to explain the class 'long'. But where the classifiers are concerned, we can use two separate sets of terms. The classifier itself need never be used in the metalanguage. We can, for instance, posit the value + LONG or + LINEAR for tiw5 when it is used to classify nouns like sin3 'thread', mei3 'tail', fu3 'trousers' and sing2 'string'. And we can posit the value + HUMAN for go3 when it is used to classify nouns like yan5 'person', sin1saang1 'teacher', hog4sang1 'pupil', noey3yan2 'woman', and posit the value - HUMAN when go3 is used to classify nouns like wog4caan2 'slice (used in cooking with a wok)', gog3gaa1 'country', faalyuen2 'garden'. Perhaps another way of saying this is that the lexicalization of a set of semantic features or values for any classifier does not require us to use any of those features or values as a lexical item, at least, as far as classifiers are concerned, although such features or values will be lexicalized elsewhere in the description of the language. If we were doing a componential analysis of nouns or adjectives, we would find it hard to avoid using identical terms to express a lexeme, its meaning, and its hypothetical semantic component, without recourse to symbolic representation of the semantic component. For instance, using the terminology and notational conventions in Lyons (1977:334), where we are reminded of the difference between 'human' (the lexeme), 'human' (its meaning) and HUMAN (a hypothetical sense-component), we would get the corresponding sets for the Cantonese noun daay4yan5 'adult' and the adjective ciong5 'long', if we used Cantonese instead of English as our metalanguage:

<u>Lexeme</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Sense-component</u> (i.e. 'semantic component' as used elsewhere in this paper)
'daay4yan5'	'daay4yan5'	DAAY4YAN5
'ciong5'	'ciong5'	CIONG5

In the area of classifiers, however, we are able to avoid having identical terms for the lexeme and the sense-component, while the 'meaning' of the classifier (if we wish to express it at all), may be expressed as the relationship between a selection of its sense-components and its syntagmatic potential. For example, the classifiers tiw5 and go3 may be viewed thus:

<u>Lexeme</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Sense-components</u>
'tiw5	"selection of components in relation to syntagmatic potential"	C1ONG5 (i.e. LONG) etc.
'go3'	"selection of components in relation to syntagmatic potential"	YAN5 (i.e. HUMAN) etc.

However, componential analysis still does not explain how we know either the 'meaning' of the classifier or the 'meaning' of any sense-component.

1.8. Universal and non-universal semantic features of classifiers

Let us look at the nature of the semantic features of classifiers. First of all, are the semantic specifications which we set up for certain classifiers applicable to all the classifiers? Although it might at first seem foolish to repeat what might be a universal semantic feature over and over again for each classifier, resulting in a great deal of redundancy, we find that in fact all that we need to do is to posit only a small number of universal semantic specifications for all the classifiers. Then, at another (non-universal) level, we can sort out the finer semantic distinctions between classifiers, when we would be dealing with non-universal semantic features. Those oppositions which appear to be applicable to every classifier are treated as universal oppositions in the language and are prefixed with UNI-.

Earlier, in 1.3.3 (p.128), I suggested the possibility that the classifier itself could be semantically redundant, but that it appears to have meaning through being fed semantic information from other elements in the noun phrase. Let us look at the distribution of one classifier, baa2, in relation to the class of nouns potentially classified by it and in relation to the numeral which it follows. From this kind of examination, we should be able to draw up a set of universal and non-universal semantic features for baa2 in isolation, combining the semantic specifications of the numeral and those of the class of nouns classified.

Nouns classified by baa2 are always inanimate but they can be either concrete or abstract, i.e., such nouns have the semantic components - UNI-ANIMATE, $\pm$ UNI-CONCRETE. baa2 can occur with any numeral, e.g., yad1 'one', liong3 'two', gey2 'a few', i.e. with numerals which have the semantic feature $\pm$ UNI-PLURAL. Nouns which can be classified by baa2 include those given below, which fall into five sub-sets, with the following salient characteristics:

- (1) nouns which denote sound-producing instruments, with or without musical output
- (2) nouns which denote a part of the body
- (3) nouns denoting weapons

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- (1) nouns which denote sound-producing instruments, with or without musical output
- (2) nouns which denote a part of the body
- (3) nouns denoting weapons

- (4) nouns denoting domestic equipment which could be used as instruments to inflict pain
- (5) nouns denoting relatively harmless domestic equipment

In a detailed examination of these nouns, it is found that a small number of recurring semantic specifications can be set up for them. These are included at the end of each group of nouns below. The component -UNI-ANIMATE is taken for granted and is not included:

- (1) taay5kam5 'violin', sengl 'voice'
± UNI-CONCRETE + PURPOSIVE ± MUSICAL INSTRUMENT + SOUND POTENTIAL
± LARGE + LINEAR
- (2) sowl 'beard', haw2 'mouth', joey2 'mouth', saw2 'hand, arm'
± UNI-CONCRETE ± PURPOSIVE + BODY PART ± SOUND POTENTIAL
- (3) ciong1 'gun, rifle, firearms, etc.', gim3 'sword, dagger',
j1n3 'arrow', gung1 'bow'
+ UNI-CONCRETE + PURPOSIVE + WEAPON ± LARGE + LINEAR ± CUTTING
SURFACE ± SOUND POTENTIAL
- (4) dowl 'knife' (this includes kitchen knives), co5taw5 'hoe',
fu2taw5 'axe', gaaw3jin2 'scissors', goey3 'saw', saw2goey3
'hand-saw', lay5 'plough', coey5 'hammer', jel 'umbrella',
sow3baa2 'broom', kim2 'pincers', faay3ji2 'chopsticks',
fo2 'fire'
± UNI-CONCRETE ± UNI-PLURAL + PURPOSIVE + DOMESTIC ± WEAPON
± SOUND POTENTIAL ± CUTTING SURFACE ± LARGE + LINEAR

The feature ± UNI-PLURAL is included to show the contrast between faay3ji2 'chopsticks' and the other nouns in this set, since chopsticks are semantically plural while the others are semantically singular. This shows that the information concerning semantic number can sometimes come from the noun, although we normally derive such information from the numeral. The feature + WEAPON applies to chopsticks as well as to the other nouns on the list since chopsticks have been known to be used for hitting the knuckles of a child who is not using his chopsticks in the prescribed manner.

- (5) sol 'comb', so2si5 'key', so2 'lock', suen3pun5 'abacus',
din4sin3 'electric fan', sin3 'hand-fan', fo2low5 'stove'
+UNI-CONCRETE + PURPOSIVE + DOMESTIC - WEAPON ± LARGE ± LINEAR
- CUTTING SURFACE ± SOUND POTENTIAL ± MUSICAL INSTRUMENT

The feature ± MUSICAL INSTRUMENT is included to show the contrast between sol 'comb' and the other nouns in this set.


Apart from the case of faay3ji2 'chopsticks', the semantic feature of ± UNI-PLURAL will be inferred for baa2 from the numeral, as mentioned above. From such a disparate set of nouns we are yet able to produce a fairly small set of semantic oppositions. As suggested above, the combination of semantic specifications from the nouns classified, together with other semantic specifications in the noun phrase (here we are only taking the numeral into consideration), has imbued the classifier with meaning. We are thus able to identify semantic specifications of the

classifier even when we think of the classifier in isolation. We can categorize some of the specifications of baa2 in isolation as follows:


-UNI-ANIMATE ± UNI-CONCRETE ± UNI-PLURAL ± PURPOSIVE
 ± LARGE ± CUTTING SURFACE ± SOUND POTENTIAL ± LINEAR (i.e.
 in dimension or time sequence) ± DOMESTIC EQUIPMENT ± WEAPON
 ± MUSICAL INSTRUMENT ± BODY PART

When baa2 is used in different noun phrases, its semantic components are more specific, depending on other elements in the phrase. In a noun phrase which consists only of Q-Cl-N, for example, the semantic components of the classifier will be dependent on Q and N. The following diagrams map possible semantic specifications which are fed into the node for classifier, generating the required instance of baa2 in each noun phrase:

(i) To generate baa2 in 'yad1 baa2 sol1' 'a comb':




(ii) To generate baa2 in 'sey3 baa2 seng1' 'four voices':



The question marks after the components - WEAPON and + MUSICAL INSTRUMENT are a departure from standard practice in componential analysis. They are there to indicate the fact that although a voice is not, strictly speaking, a weapon, it can be used as such (e.g. on henpecked husbands); a voice is a musical instrument used in singing, but it need not be used as such (in the way that a recorder can be used unmusically); and a comb, an instrument for combing one's hair, can also be used as a musical instrument, together with paper. The classifier baa2, when used with so1 'comb' and seng1 'voice', has to take these considerations into account.

(iii) To generate baa2 in 'yad1 baa2 sow1' 'that beard':



It seems pointless to posit the opposition + SOUND POTENTIAL and - SOUND POTENTIAL as a general opposition for all classifiers when it only seems to operate in the case of some classifiers (like baa2). In more specific occurrences of baa2 (as in the context Q-CL-N), we can select the semantic component + SOUND POTENTIAL (as in 'sey3 baa2 seng1' 'four voices') or the semantic component - SOUND POTENTIAL (as in 'go2 baa2 sow1' 'that beard').

The universal oppositions, ANIMATE vs. INANIMATE and CONCRETE vs. ABSTRACT, appear to be information fed from the noun in a given noun phrase, while the set of universal oppositions SINGULAR vs. PLURAL appears to stem from information fed to the classifier from the quantifier. However, this last observation is not completely satisfactory because when some reduplicated collective classifiers occur in isolation, they always have the semantic value + PLURAL (see page129).

An important point to note about the universal semantic features is that they are very much smaller in number (and therefore more powerful as a generative device) than the total list of classifiers in the language. If we had found that we had more universal semantic features than the total number of classifiers, we would have suspected the model of being a weak one. By means of a small limited set of universal features and a larger limited set of non-universal features, we should be able to generate all the classifiers in the language.

As we saw earlier, there appear to be only three universal semantic features, namely, $\pm$ ANIMATE $\pm$ CONCRETE and $\pm$ PLURAL, but there are many more finer semantic features, of which only a few are discussed in this paper. These finer semantic features appear to operate as oppositions at some lower level of semantic interpretation as non-universals.

So far we have only been considering binary oppositions, but sometimes the generation of one classifier versus another, or the generation of the same classifier for two different nouns, may depend on multiple oppositions involving more than two semantic features. For example, we could say that pad1 (when it classifies maa3 'horse') has the values + ANIMATE + CONCRETE + EQUINE - WOVEN MATERIAL, while pad1 (when it classifies bow3 'cloth') has the values -ANIMATE + CONCRETE - EQUINE + WOVEN MATERIAL. There is thus a set of multiple contrasts here involving the values ANIMATE, EQUINE and WOVEN MATERIAL (while the value CONCRETE is neutralised in this particular case).⁷ However, in the case of generating the classifiers jeg3 and go3, we need only to set up a binary opposition, namely, between - HUMAN and $\pm$ HUMAN, since jeg3 has the values + GENERAL - HUMAN $\pm$ CONCRETE $\pm$ ANIMATE, while go3 has the values + GENERAL $\pm$ HUMAN $\pm$ CONCRETE $\pm$ ANIMATE.

Lastley, we need to note the non-absolute nature of any set of semantic features which we might posit for the classifiers. A semantic interpretation often depends on the nature of the referent. Let us take the case of the specifications - CONCRETE and + CONCRETE: if the spiritual world is referred to, the referents (though 'unreal', to many people), must be regarded in some sense as being 'real'. Or perhaps we might explain this better by saying that whether real or unreal, these referents are by their very nature capable of being referred to. Thus, although the semantic specifications for an immortal (san5sini) might include the reading - CONCRETE for some people, for some other people, they might have to include the reading + CONCRETE. We would thus include the semantic feature $\pm$ CONCRETE, which, happily, fits the general semantic description of the classifier go3. (A finer distinction could then be made between go3 and way2, since some people feel that way2, the 'polite' classifier, might be more appropriate as a classifier for immortals). But the general problem is too familiar in every language for us to dwell on it at any length; if we take, for instance, the semantic interpretations of words like God, body and blood (in the Eucharist), from the points of view of non-Christian speakers and Christian speakers of different denominations, we can see that choosing between CONCRETE and ABSTRACT is a fairly common difficulty.

1.9. Closing remarks

Numbered among scholars interested in Chinese classifiers are people interested in classifiers from the point of view of language universals. It is unavoidable that in a situation in which a language universal is being discussed as a linguistic abstraction, linguists will be unable to know as much as they would wish about every language cited to exemplify that abstraction. Therefore, the more information about individual languages one can get, the more likely it is that inaccuracies will be eliminated from this important area of study. More needs to be known about Chinese classifiers, and this knowledge will provide linguists who are interested in language universals with useful material on which to test their hypotheses about the nature of the classifier as a general linguistic phenomenon.

The by now established use of the term 'Chinese classifier' can mislead us into thinking that classifiers in all the Chinese languages are basically the same. We may find, however, that even syntactically, classifiers can behave differently

in different Chinese languages. Semantically, there can be no doubt that such differences exist. Comparative studies can only be undertaken on the availability of studies of classifiers in different Chinese languages, particularly in non-Mandarin languages, on which relatively little has been done. It is hoped that this paper on Cantonese classifiers will lead to useful examinations of other classifier systems by interested scholars.

FOOTNOTES

1. Among the many kind people who have helped me with this paper, I would like to thank Dr. Th. Bynon in particular; I am, however, solely responsible for any remaining faults. I am also indebted to Professor J.H. Greenberg for his kindness in sending me private papers on classifiers.
2. Because I found none of the existing romanization systems used for Cantonese satisfactory, I devised an economical and easily interpreted system which I proposed, with a phonological justification, in Killingley (1972:Ch.3). There are five tones, as follows:
Tone 1 high level tone
Tone 2 mid-rising tone
Tone 3 mid-level tone
Tone 4 low level tone
Tone 5 very low level tone.
3. The reduplicated classifier can also have adverbial function, e.g. 'ngo3dey4 paay5paay5 co3' 'we sit side by side'. In addition, certain combinations of numeral and classifier denote adverbial function. However, adverbial function in the classifier is not dealt with in this paper. See also 1.5.
4. This should be distinguished from 'four boxes', which would be 'sey3 jeg3 hab4' 'four - Cl - box' (Q + Cl + N).
5. This states that 'The numeral classifier construction is modelled after the measure construction with mass nouns and hence arises in languages with previous mass-count noun distinction'.
6. Lyons' convincing treatment of generic reference is not invalidated by Dahl's criticisms, which stem mainly from Dahl's objection to Lyons' treatment of 'timelessness' and 'tenselessness'. Dahl says that sentences like The lion is a friendly beast, which Lyons says can be used to assert a generic proposition, 'clearly refer to the present time, and would thus be time-bound' (Dahl 1979:205). But surely the answers to this criticism are to be found in Lyons 1977, section 15.4. We need to distinguish between the tenselessness of sentences and the tenselessness of propositions (Lyons 1977:679). So a sentence with grammatical tense might still assert a tenseless proposition. A sentence like The lion is a friendly beast, being in the form of an English declarative sentence, has to have grammatical tense (in this case, the non-past tense). The non-past tense is semantically unmarked in English and (like the traditional 'present tense' of gnomic utterances) has nothing to do with present time (Lyons 1977:681). I am grateful to Professor Lyons for corroborating this.
7. The question of whether pad1 is one lexeme or two need not concern us in this paper.

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THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S GAMBIT:
NOTES ON THE ENGLISH VERBAL GROUP

by

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"In a terrible confrontation General Lowry Cole was severely wounded and his men put to flight. At this critical juncture Wellington was ready, as always, to plug the hole. He brought up the 6th division...".
(E. Longford Wellington: the Years of the Sword).

1. Introduction

The English verbal group may have been being described in the way we propose here for many years. But if it has been (?being), we have been unable to discover a description precisely comparable to the one we propose, and readers may therefore find this article useful.

We developed the description initially in connection with an introductory course on syntax at first year university level. The English verbal group provides a problem with which students can make significant progress on their own, but it is complex enough to be interesting. It is an area of English syntax which is clearly very highly organized, but if one includes, for example, strings which contain catenatives (e.g. he kept talking), then it is not obviously a small self-contained problem with a unique solution. The topic is therefore a very good one for illustrating concepts such as: structure and constraints on surface sequencing; syntactic tests for word classes (e.g. modals); the value of treating a syntactic problem entirely formally with no initial reference to meaning; and so on.

Beyond this, the problem of the English verbal group leads directly into major syntactic problems which have been widely debated, particularly within transformational grammar, over the past ten years. These include: whether the distinction between auxiliary and main verbs can be motivated; whether the verbal group can be motivated as a syntactic constituent; whether syntactic categories should be discrete or allow gradience; and the question of universal syntactic categories.

In this paper we will first present our description and then discuss it in relation to some of the main points at issue in those debates. It is our intention that the first four sections of the paper should be intelligible to students just beginning a study of syntax. In the later sections of the paper we assume knowledge of transformational grammar, particularly knowledge of those papers most relevant to the debate over auxiliaries and main verbs (e.g. Pullum & Wilson, 1977; Akmajian, Steele & Wasow, 1979).

2. Introductory definitions

Many of the basic facts about the surface syntax of the English verbal group are set out in standard discussions of English grammar such as Halliday (1966), Palmer (1974), Quirk et al (1972), Sinclair (1972), and many other textbooks.

This article attempts to provide an explicit model only for the basic verbal group in standard English. By basic, we mean a finite declarative verbal group, which contains only modal, auxiliaries and one main verb; but no items such as to, negative, or other main verb between the subject and the main verb which ends the group. We therefore intend to deal primarily with strings such as:

- (1) may have been being described
- but not
- (2) would seem to have been chased
- (3) is to come
- (4) may be going to hit
- (5) keeps writing
- and so on.

The English verbal group is notorious for the idiolectal and dialectal variation which it displays. Strings such as:

- (6) ?he didn't used to come
- (7) ?he mayn't come

are judged grammatical by only some speakers of standard British English. And non-standard dialects of English have many forms which are ungrammatical in the standard dialect, e.g.:

- (8) he do be coming
- (9) he might could come

Forms such as (8) occur in non-standard British dialects. And double modals, as in (9), occur in southern dialects in the USA (Butters, 1973). We will have to ignore such complications here.

2.1. Definitions of the word-classes

We require definitions of the word classes modal auxiliary, auxiliary verb and main verb, and ways of referring to the morphological forms they take. There is no dispute about the surface morphological and syntactic facts on which such distinctions are usually drawn, but, as we have already indicated, there is considerable debate about the significance of such facts.

We take the modals to be: must, can, could, will, would, shall, should, may and might. Tests for modals are well-known and are set out in many places, including Palmer (1974), Pullum and Wilson (1977), and Radford (1976a). These tests include:

- (a) negative cliticization (mustn't; *wantn't).
- (b) subject-verb inversion in interrogatives (should he?; *goes he?), and after pre-posed negative phrases (not only will he...; *not only sleeps he...).
- (c) no do-support (*we don't must; we don't think).
- (d) occurrence in tag-questions (you would, would you?; *you eat, eat you?).
- (e) occurrence in certain elliptic constructions (he may go, and so may she; *he goes, and so goes she).
- (f) no 3rd person singular concord (*he shoulds; he wants).
- (g) defective paradigms with no past tense, ing-forms or to-forms (*musted, *musting, *to must).

Auxiliaries are have and be. These pass tests (a) to (e), but they do have 3sg concord (he has; *he have; he is; *he am/be), and they are not defective (had; was/were; having; being; to have; to be). Do is sometimes treated as an auxiliary, but in describing syntagmatic relations in the verbal group, it must be treated separately from have and be, since do generally co-occurs only with main verbs and not with have, be or modals.

Main verbs are any verbs which are not modals or auxiliaries. We will use therefore these terms and abbreviations: modal (M), auxiliary (Aux), main verb (V). And we are dealing with structures which include: M Aux; M Aux Aux V; and so on.

2.2. The morphological forms of the verbs

We also require a convenient way of referring to morphological forms of the verbs. The following scheme is adapted from Sinclair (1972:176) and should be self-explanatory.

Name:	ing-form	base	n-form	d-form	s-form
Symbol:	η	ϕ	n	d	s
	taking	take	taken	took	take(s)
	walking	walk	_____ walked _____		walk(s)
	coming	_____ come _____		came	come(s)
	hitting	_____ hit _____			hit(s)
	being	be	been	was/were	am/is/are
	having	have	_____ had _____		have/has
	doing	do	done	did	do/does

3. The structure of the verbal group

Here then are our rules for the English verbal group. Two basic structures are involved, a 5-place and a 2-place structure:

	1	2	3	4	5
(a)	M	have	be	be	V
(b)	do				V

An example of (a) with exponents in all five places is

(10) he must have been being examined

An example of (b) is

(11) he does examine

Structure (b) indicates that the auxiliary do does not co-occur with any other auxiliary verbs or modals. This is true of the basic verbal group as we have defined it, but not of imperative or interrogative sentences such as

(12) don't be left behind

(13) why don't you be seen to be working

(cf Hudson, 1976:163). The auxiliary do behaves uniquely in various ways: it is, for example, semantically entirely empty (cf further below). The reason for representing (b) as a structure 1 + 5 will become clear below.

Separately we require to specify the morphological forms of the exponents in those places in structure as follows:

	1	2	3	4	5
(c)	s d	∅	n	ŋ	n

If all five places are filled, (c) already correctly specifies the forms. Modals do not take concord, so the s-forms do not differ from the base form. We must, however, specify that s- and d-forms occur in place 1 to deal with verbal groups with no M, including exponents of (b) such as (11) above or

(14) he did examine

It is, of course, not necessary to have exponents in all five places of (a). One or more items may be omitted, in any combinations, as long as the remaining items retain the same sequence as in (a). It is then necessary to specify the forms of the remaining items. The basic rule is:

Rule 1 The left-most remaining item, which itself has a gap to its left, is moved as far left as possible, to occupy an empty place, and takes the form associated with the place which it moves to. Other items do not move.

The procedure for generating verbal groups is therefore:

1. pick any combination of items from (a) or (b), retaining their sequence;
2. apply Rule 1;
3. attribute the endings from (c) according to the places in which the items are distributed after the movement rule.

For example:

	1	2	3	4	5	Places filled before movement rule
	s d	∅	n	ŋ	n	
(15)	should	have	been	taking	←	1, 2, 3, 5
(16)	has	←	been		taken	2, 3, 5
(17)	may	be	←		taken	1, 3, 5
(18)	must	take	←			1, 5
(19)	takes	←				5

Rule 1, without any alteration, accounts for the base-forms of V after do:

	1	2	3	4	5
(20)	does did	take	←		

Do acquires its correct form by being in place 1 from the start. V acquires the correct base form by being moved left into place 2. We could generate the correct base form of V whether it starts off in places 2, 3, 4 or 5, but it is reasonable to have it start in the same place as V in structure (a). If we start with do in a place other than 1, it will be moved left and acquire the correct form, but V will remain where it is, and be left with the wrong form; e.g. (supposing do starts in place 3),

	1	2	3	4	5
(21)	does	←			*taken

Rule 1 generates the correct form in the majority of cases, but it will not suffice as it stands. First, it does generate two related ungrammatical forms:

	1	2	3	4	5
(22)	has	←		*being	taken
(23)	has	←		*being	

We could handle these forms by a rule which specifies that have is always followed by an n-form. This is a valid generalisation, but it is a rule which is very different in form from Rule 1, and it is therefore inelegant to set up such a rule to account merely for two closely related examples such as (22) and (23).

Rule 1 also generates two further strings which are marginally ungrammatical for some speakers, and are normally replaced in use by other forms:

	1	2	3	4	5
(24)	must	have	been	being	
(25)	has	←	been	being	

There appears to be a constraint on been + being unless there is a following V. Forms such as (24) and (25) are normally replaced as follows in elliptical sentences:

(26) Must he have been being examined? Yes, he must have been (?being).
 (27) Has he been being examined? Yes, he has been (?being).

For the moment, we will allow (24) and (25) to be generated on the grounds that they are grammatical but usually unacceptable.

A further defect of Rule 1 is, however, that it does not generate three related forms, which contain an ing-form of V, since this would require two items to be moved to the left:

	1	2	3	4	5
(28)	is	←		breaking	←
(29)	may	be	←	breaking	←
(30)	has	←	been	breaking	←

We require therefore a rule which prevents ungrammatical strings such as (22, 23), and which does generate strings such as (28, 29, 30).

Rule 1'. Check if it is possible to move two items left-wards into empty spaces. If it is, first move the right hand of the two items as far left as is possible without bumping into or jumping over another item which is present. Then, whether Rule 1' has applied or not, apply Rule 1.

Rule 1' will only apply when these items are present:

1	3	5
2	3	5
	3	5
2	4	5
2	4	
2		5

Readers may find it helpful to think of such structures as having 'gaps' in them. Applying these two rules to our problem sentences, we have:

	1	2	3	4	5	Places filled before movement rules
(22')	has	←	been	←	taken	2, 4, 5
(23')	has	←	been	←		2, 4
(28')	is	←		taking	←	3, 5
(29')	may	be	←	taking	←	1, 3, 5
(30')	has	←	been	taking	←	2, 3, 5

A string such as has taken (2, 5) will be correctly generated by Rule 1 on its own or by Rule 1' plus Rule 1.

4. List of exponents

We have set out for reference on the accompanying table all the possible exponents of the basic verbal group with must as M and take as V. The procedure for generating strings is: fill any combination of places in the structure, apply Rules 1' and 1, and attribute forms according to the place an item occupies after the movement rules.

Note that some pairs have identical surface forms (3 and 4, 6 and 7, 18 and 19, 25 and 29), although they were generated differently due to the different point of origin of be in either place 3 or 4. Semantically, we are dealing with two different be's which might be labelled progressive and passive, and the two different derivations of these pairs account for the difference between active and passive interpretations of the ambiguous surface strings.

Note also that the be (passive) must be blocked from co-occurring with an intransitive V (*he must have been died); and be (progressive) must be blocked in some cases with stative V (*he is knowing).

	1	2	3	4	5	Places filled before movement rules
	M	have	be	be	V	
	s	∅	n	ŋ	n	
	d					
1.	must					1
2.	must	have				1, 2
3.	must	be ←				1, 3
4.	must	be ←				1, 4
5.	must	take ←				1, 5
6.	must	have	been			1, 2, 3
7.	must	have	been ←			1, 2, 4
8.	must	have	taken ←			1, 2, 5
9.	must	be ←		being		1, 3, 4
10.	must	be ←		taking ←		1, 3, 5
11.	must	be ←			taken	1, 4, 5
12.	must	have	been	being		1, 2, 3, 4
13.	must	have	been	taking ←		1, 2, 3, 5
14.	must	have	been ←		taken	1, 2, 4, 5
15.	must	be ←		being	taken	1, 3, 4, 5
16.	must	have	been	being	taken	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
17.	has ←					2
18.	has ←		been			2, 3
19.	has ←		been ←			2, 4
20.	has ←		taken ←			2, 5
21.	has ←		been	being		2, 3, 4
22.	has ←		been	taking ←		2, 3, 5
23.	has ←		been ←		taken	2, 4, 5
24.	has ←		been	being	taken	2, 3, 4, 5
25.	is ←					3
26.	is ←			being		3, 4
27.	is ←			taking ←		3, 5
28.	is ←			being	taken	3, 4, 5
29.	is ←					4
30.	is ←				taken	4, 5
31.	takes ←					5

5. Are auxiliaries really main verbs?

It will be evident from our definitions that we are regarding modals and auxiliaries in the way implied by the traditional labels: modal auxiliaries are a subclass of auxiliary verbs, which are in turn a subclass of verbs. As we have mentioned briefly above, a large number of articles have been published recently, primarily within the transformational approach, which argue that there is no genuine distinction between auxiliary and main verbs. The original paper in favour of the main-verb-hypothesis was by Ross (1969), and many papers developing the hypothesis have followed. The traditional distinctions have not, however, been entirely abandoned by any means. For example, Palmer (1979) has put forward many arguments to show 'why auxiliaries are not main verbs'. The details of this debate are largely irrelevant to our purpose since, as we shall show, our aims and priorities are different from those of most of the disputants. However, it is clearly necessary for us to distinguish the main points at issue and to state our position regarding them.

We will first discuss points of disagreement which appear to relate to the aims and priorities of different types of description, and then move on to some of the points of substance which have been debated within particular approaches.

5.1. Descriptions of individual languages versus universal linguistic theory

A peculiarity of linguistics as a discipline is that it has to be concerned both with first-order theory (the description of particular languages) and also with second-order theory (the theory of the nature of human language). (This distinction is discussed by Sampson, 1976). Some versions of the main-verb controversy seem to have arisen, at least in part, as a result of a conflict of interests between linguists who give priority to the description of individual languages and linguists who are more concerned with linguistic universals.

This seems to be particularly true of the debate between Palmer (1974, 1979) and Huddleston (1976a, 1976b, 1980). Huddleston (1976a:213) comments dismissively:

'The differences on which the classification (of auxiliaries versus main verbs) is based are very much idiosyncratic to English: classes defined on this basis can hardly be claimed as universals.'

See also Huddleston (1976b:333-334). Palmer (1979:6) counters with:

'Languages are idiosyncratic in the way they mark their grammatical categories. One would hardly deny that Latin has a future tense because its formation is idiosyncratic. ...if English has a peculiar way of saying 'this is an auxiliary' that is no matter for surprise, or for dismissing it as irrelevant'.

We would argue that there is room for both points of view, that it is desirable that there should be descriptions of a language whose main aim is to display as clearly and simply as possible the regularities peculiar to the language, as well as descriptions of the language whose main aim is to account for the regularities that the language shares with other languages. In the Palmer-Huddleston debate, our sympathy is with Palmer. It does sometimes seem that in current linguistics everyone is in pursuit of grand monolithic theories of universals, and that there is a consequent lack of interest in lower-level descriptive theories which can accommodate the characteristics of individual languages. Our description of the English verbal group is one attempt to redress the balance.

5.2. Surface versus deep syntax

Similarly, there seems to be some conflict between those who give priority to arguments from surface syntax and those who give priority to arguments from deep syntax. This conflict is often related to the previous one. Often, a concern for surface syntax goes with a commitment to displaying the characteristics of individual languages, while a concern for deep syntax goes with the pursuit of linguistic universals. Thus Palmer (1979:3-4,13,24) complains that Huddleston is attacking him with arguments from deep syntax, these being irrelevant since Palmer himself is concerned with the description of English and is consequently more interested in surface phenomena.

However the priorities are not always aligned in this way. In the papers by Pullum and Wilson (1977) and Akmajian, Steele and Wasow (1979), both sets of authors are concerned with the motivation or lack of motivation for the category AUX and the implications of this for universal linguistic theory. Yet Akmajian, Steele and Wasow attach a much higher priority to accounting for surface phenomena of the kind that interest Palmer, than do Pullum and Wilson. For Akmajian, Steele and Wasow (1979:17)

'the facts to be accounted for can be stated quite simply: an English sentence can contain any combination of modal, perfective have, progressive be, and passive be, but when more than one of these is present, they must appear in the order given, and each of the elements in the sequence can appear at most once.'

Pullum and Wilson (1977:774-780) do attempt to account for these facts, but they do so in a piecemeal fashion and in a way that obscures the original facts. It was dissatisfaction with such accounts that originally motivated Akmajian, Steele and Wasow's analysis, an analysis which they themselves regard as being more 'straightforward' and consequently more satisfying (Akmajian, Steele and Wasow 1979:15).

As it happens, we agree with Palmer (1979:9-11,20-21) and Akmajian, Steele and Wasow (1979:17-20) that further criticisms are possible of Pullum and Wilson in that there are problems with much of the data and many of the arguments which they cite in favour of their approach. However, the point we are making here is that, even if Pullum and Wilson's case were water-tight, we would still welcome Akmajian, Steele and Wasow's description alongside that of Pullum and Wilson since it does give a more straightforward account of the surface phenomena.

We are once again asking for acceptance of the view that a variety of different types of description is desirable. At present each new article is written as if it were superseding all previous accounts. Surely a more reasonable view is that each new article complements previous accounts. Pullum and Wilson and Akmajian, Steele and Wasow each account for certain facts that the other is not able to account for. Each accounts for certain facts straightforwardly, for other facts in a more devious fashion. We do not see that there is really any way of saying that one approach is better than the other. We are glad that both exist.

In this article we give a high priority to the facts stated by Akmajian, Steele and Wasow in the passage quoted above. This, as we shall explain later, is for reasons connected with the purpose for which we originally designed our description. We would emphasise, however, that we would not always attach such a high priority to facts of this kind. It seems to us that different types of description are suitable for different purposes.

3 Morphology versus syntax

In the Syntactic Structures (Chomsky, 1957) analysis of Aux, syntactic facts and morphological facts were presented alongside each other, as if they were of equal importance. In some more recent accounts, however, the impression given is that what is really important is accounting for the syntactic facts; morphological matters can be left to be tidied up afterwards when one has nothing better to do. Akmajian, Steele and Wasow (1979:45) dismiss in one short paragraph 'verbal affixes and their role in analyzing the auxiliary system'. Pullum and Wilson (1977:765-772) devote more attention to this topic and provide what appears to be a workable analysis. However, they do so by means of small

local rules which lose sight of the generalisations captured by Chomsky. That morphology is of secondary importance to Pullum and Wilson is shown by the slighting reference in the introductory section of their paper (1977:742) to 'English, in which certain morphological facts and minor syntactic phenomena have undeniably obscured the picture'.

We assume that there is a set of morphological facts analogous to the set of surface syntactic facts stated above: in English, there is a set of verbal affixes - s/d, ϕ , n, η ; there are constraints on the order in which these may occur in a sentence (clause); there are constraints on the number of occurrences of each which are possible in a single sentence (clause). It is the relation between this set of facts and the set of surface syntactic facts stated above that is our particular concern in this article.

5.4. Sentence-based grammars versus grammars of lesser scope

Another point of disagreement between Palmer and Huddleston, though neither seems to be fully aware of the fact, is that Huddleston is assuming a transformational approach in which the sentence is always the unit under consideration, while Palmer is restricting himself to a discussion of the verbal group, or as he calls it the verb phrase. Thus Huddleston (1979:340) regards the 'TNP' (tense, negation and passive) tests as 'more interesting' than Palmer's other criteria because they relate to questions about clause (sentence) boundaries. The constraints on surface ordering of the auxiliaries within the verbal group are treated by Huddleston (1976b:337-339) in the same cavalier fashion as by Pullum and Wilson. (In fact Huddleston cites the same flawed arguments as Pullum and Wilson. See above). All this in spite of the fact that Huddleston is reviewing a book by Palmer in which Palmer (1974:13) himself has clearly stated his terms of reference:

'It would have been reasonable to entitle this book The English verb phrase since the limits of discussion are set by what is defined as the verb phrase. We shall not deal with the classification of the verbs in terms of the kind of grammatical structure with which they co-occur in the sentence. We shall not, for instance, be concerned, except incidentally, with the fact that 'verbs of reporting' occur with that clauses, but we shall be concerned with their function within the verb phrase as defined here.'

It seems to us to be a useful exercise to do as Palmer has done, to attempt to isolate certain sets of facts and to consider them on their own terms, under the microscope as it were, only referring to other sets of facts when absolutely bound to. One should not have to feel that one's grammar must always be accountable to the sentence as a whole. A grammar describing verbs/verb phrases in isolation is likely to be very different from a grammar describing verbs/verb phrases from the point of view of the parts they play in sentences. Both types of grammar are of value. (Huddleston (1976b:331) does in fact pay tribute to the value of Palmer's book.)

However, by restricting the description in this way, one is at a disadvantage when it comes to discussion of such matters as whether auxiliaries are really main verbs, since one is ignoring many of the relevant facts. Most of the most convincing arguments for and against the main verb hypothesis have involved reference to parts of sentences other than verbs, as well as to the verbs themselves. In fact the debate is essentially a debate about the initial structure of sentences. It was perhaps rather rash of Palmer to allow himself to be drawn into such a debate.

Like Palmer, we have restricted ourselves to consideration of the verbal group. In fact we have restricted ourselves even further than Palmer: to just two sets of facts about the verbal group and the interaction between these. We recognise that we are ignoring many facts relevant to the auxiliaries-are-main-verbs issue and we accept that any contribution we might make to this debate will thus be limited.

5.5 Pretheoretical versus theoretical description

Palmer (1979:3-4) stresses that he does not wish to

'merely reach a position in which we are essentially arguing about the merits or demerits of particular models.'

Huddleston (1980:103) attempts to meet him halfway on this point and agrees to discuss the matter 'pretheoretically', since

'it is desirable to resolve the issue by arguments that do not depend on long chains of reasoning within a single model'.

Huddleston does not entirely succeed, however, in divesting himself of the theoretical approach to which he is accustomed. For instance, he regards Palmer's argument based on selectional restrictions as 'a very strange argument' (Huddleston 1980:111). By implication, because it is strange, he also regards it as bad. His reason for so regarding it, is apparently that it is not the kind of argument that he is used to meeting in transformational grammar. It seems to us to be a very strange argument to say that Palmer's is a very strange, and therefore bad, argument, just because it is a kind of argument not usually found within Huddleston's own theoretical approach. (Huddleston does go on to produce rather more valid arguments against Palmer's argument. It is his first argument, based merely on strangeness, that surprises us).

For the purposes of this article we have adopted a 'pretheoretical' approach. We are probably, however, drawing the boundary between 'pretheoretical' and 'theoretical' in a different place from that implied by Huddleston (1980:103). For Huddleston 'pretheoretical' also seems to mean 'preformalisation'. We do attempt to formalise; we agree with Huddleston that 'formalising alternative descriptions makes it possible to compare them more precisely and decisively'. The important point is that our formalisation is not in the terms associated with any particular theoretical model. The advantage of this is that our description can be understood by people not acquainted with the long chains of reasoning within particular models to which Huddleston refers. (We develop this point further below). The disadvantage is that we are not then in a position to contribute directly to the debates being carried on within particular approaches. The long chains of reasoning are usually so tightly linked, that it is difficult to break into them from outside in any meaningful way.

From the point of view of all the differing aims and priorities that we have discussed so far, Palmer and Huddleston are on opposite sides. It is not surprising therefore that the Palmer-Huddleston version of the auxiliaries-are-main-verbs debate is a rather dissatisfying one. When reading the relevant papers (Palmer 1979, Huddleston 1976b, 1980), one feels as if one were watching two boxers attempting to engage in a boxing match from opposite sides of a river.

Much more satisfying are those versions of the debate which are between linguists who share the same basic assumptions and are working within the same descriptive framework. In these versions of the debate real issues are discussed.

We now turn to these, but we give warning in advance that we can contribute only indirectly to these issues since for the purposes of this paper, we, like Palmer, are on the opposite side of the river from the main disputants.

5.6 Generative semantics versus autonomous syntax

The debate over whether auxiliaries are really main verbs was originally associated with the debate over generative semantics versus autonomous syntax (Ross 1969). This is a debate to which we certainly cannot contribute, since we are concerned with surface syntax and morphology rather than with deep syntax and semantics, since we are concerned with the facts of English rather than with linguistic universals, since we have limited ourselves to the verbal group itself and are consequently ignoring much of the relevant evidence, and since we are not working within the framework of transformational grammar. In any case, since Pullum and Wilson (1977) it is no longer possible to assume that arguments in favour of auxiliaries as main verbs are necessarily also arguments in favour of generative semantics. The two debates have become separated.

5.7 Motivation versus lack of motivation for the category AUX in universal grammar

Since Pullum and Wilson's article, the argument over whether there is or is not motivation for the category AUX in universal grammar has become an issue of importance in its own right (e.g. Akmajian, Steele and Wasow 1979). This again is a debate from which we are debarred from contributing in any significant way owing to the limits which we have set ourselves for the purposes of this study. We would, however, comment that, whether or not the category AUX is strictly necessary in universal grammar, it is useful in a description of English to assume more than one initial position for verbs and to allow hopping between these, as this makes it possible to account explicitly (and clearly, simply and straightforwardly) for the fact that English verbs behave in different ways on different occasions. In our description we are able to account in this way for the fact that English verbs take different affixes on different occasions. Akmajian, Steele and Wasow (1979:18) also show the value of this approach in accounting for the variable syntactic behaviour and morphological forms of English verbs. They point out for instance that

'On the MV analysis...both the modal need and the main verb need are underlying main verbs, and it is simply a curious coincidence that the occurrences of need which exhibit auxiliary behaviour are precisely those lacking inflections.'

A hopping analysis makes explicit the relation between these two sets of facts.

5.8 Discrete versus non-discrete categories in linguistic theory

The auxiliary/main verb question has been seen as an instance of another larger issue: whether non-discrete categories should be admitted into linguistic theory. This has been debated by Radford (1976a,b) and Pullum (1976a,b). The auxiliaries of English are generally agreed to be gradient phenomena; the problem is how best to handle such phenomena. Radford argues that the facts of the English auxiliaries are best captured by a 'squish'; Pullum rejects this view and argues instead for treating all auxiliaries, including modals, as main verbs, the peculiarities of the erstwhile modals and auxiliaries being 'accommodated quite appropriately as lexical irregularities or susceptibility to certain minor rules of the syntax' (Pullum 1976a:21). Which of these two views is the healthier

for linguistic theory it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss. However, from the point of view of the description of English, Radford's approach would seem to be the better way of displaying the facts of the language. Both Radford and Pullum are concerned with 'the search for regularity in syntax'. But regularity, like beauty, would appear to be in the eye of the beholder. In our eyes, English syntax is neither as regular as calling all auxiliaries main verbs would suggest; nor as messy as would be suggested by the number of lexical irregularities or small local syntactic rules which would be necessary to accommodate this view. Radford's squish captures both the true regularities and the true irregularities and places them in perspective.

When confronted with gradient phenomena in the description of a particular language, the commonsense way of proceeding would seem to be to establish the pattern for the clearcut cases and then to use this to adjudicate in the unclear cases. We have therefore confined our description to the least controversial of the modals and auxiliaries, in the first instance. Other verbs can then be assigned to categories on the basis of the extent to which they pattern like the clearcut cases. Ought, for instance, could thus be regarded as a modal since it is like the modals on the basis of four or five of Radford's six criteria. It is also mutually exclusive with the other modals and, like them, it can only occur in the first of our five positions.

6. The place of our description in introductory courses on syntax

The positions we have taken in this article are explained by the purpose for which we originally developed our description. As we have said, this was in connection with an introductory course on syntax at university level. We have in fact made use of our description in courses for two different types of student: students of linguistics, and students of English. The latter included both students whose native language was English and overseas students for whom English was a second or foreign language. The needs of students of linguistics and students of English are rather different, so we will discuss these two groups separately.

6.1 Courses for students of linguistics

Under this heading we would make the following points:

1. The basic aim of linguistics is to account for the facts of language. This is a view which, in our experience, students take to more easily, if the facts which they are asked to account for early in their courses, are facts which are within their own experience. It is for this reason that we have concentrated on the facts of English; English is the language which all our students have in common. From this they can later be led to a consideration of the similarities and differences between English and the other languages with which they are acquainted, and eventually to an interest in linguistic universals.

It is also for this reason that we have concentrated on surface syntactic and morphological facts. It is important that the earliest facts that students are asked to account for should be facts which they themselves readily recognise as facts. They have almost certainly not thought about the constraints on surface ordering of modals, auxiliaries and affixes, but once these have been pointed out to them they do accept that these are indeed facts which need accounting for. We can imagine the incredulous stares with which students just beginning a course on syntax would greet news of some of the more abstruse 'facts' for which Pullum and Wilson account.

2. The method of developing an argument in which a hypothesis is proposed, counter-examples are searched for and found, and a new or revised hypothesis is then put forward, is so fundamental to linguistics that, in our view, it should be introduced to students as early as possible in their university careers. In our experience, nothing in their school studies will have prepared them for this way of thinking and it takes them some time to grasp. The earlier they can be made aware of this form of argument, the better. It is for this reason that we adopted a 'pretheoretical' approach in our description. We did not want to wait until the students had been initiated into the mysteries of any particular theoretical approach, before introducing them to a way of arguing which is common to linguistics generally. By proposing our Rule 1, encouraging the students themselves to look for counter-examples, and then modifying Rule 1 by the addition of Rule 1', we are able to illustrate this approach. And although, as we point out below, our description bears accidental resemblances to some of the model-based approaches, the students' understanding of our argument does not depend in any way on prior knowledge of these models.

The time-factor is not the only advantage of a 'pretheoretical' approach. We would wish to emphasise to students that this way of arguing is common to (most) linguistics generally, and not just the property of one particular school. Students introduced to linguistic argumentation via Akmajian and Heny (1975), for instance, excellent though we consider this textbook to be, receive the impression that only transformationalists argue in this way.

3. A second fundamental feature of linguistic argumentation is the comparison of two analyses, both of which are considered to be observationally adequate, in such a way as to show that they differ in the number and type of linguistic generalisations that they capture. This again is something that we would wish to introduce to students as early as possible in their courses.

Up to now there have been two problems with this line of approach. The first problem has been the scarcity of analyses intelligible to students just beginning a study of syntax. One analysis which we have found to be within the grasp of first year students is the Syntactic Structures (Chomsky, 1957) account of the auxiliaries and their affixes. But up to now there has been nothing suitable for first year students to compare with this account. Our analysis does provide an alternative account of the same facts and it is also within the grasp of first year students. We suggest below some points of comparison between the two accounts which first year students might discuss.

The second problem has been that even in textbooks suitable for rather more advanced students, the analyses which students have been invited to compare have been too similar for the students at first to see the point of comparing them. We are reminded of the old political poster which asked 'Which twin is the Tory?' For the sake of those of our readers too young to remember this poster, (for example, most of our students!) we should perhaps explain that the implication of the poster was that the policies of the Conservative party and the Labour party were at the time so similar that it was impossible to distinguish between them except in matters of the minutest detail. As we discuss below, our description is comparable with the Syntactic Structures analysis of auxiliaries and affixes, in that it does account for the same facts, but it is very different in its form and general implications.

4. Discussion of points 2 and 3 leads on very naturally to more general discussions of motivation, and of observational, descriptive and explanatory adequacy. Also relevant would be discussion of the nature of a linguistic fact and the nature of a linguistic rule.

5. As well as indicating the facts that our description could account for, we should of course draw students' attention to some of the facts for which it could not account. In this connection we would suggest that the students be asked to consider modifications to our description. They could, for instance, be asked to consider the advantages or disadvantages of allowing verbs from positions 2, 3, 4 and 5 to replace do, instead of replacing the modal as at present, and the advantages or disadvantages of generating do in an extra position between the present place 4 and the present place 5. Such discussions could still be carried on without the students needing to know anything about transformational grammar as such, though the arguments of Emonds (1976:211-216) would obviously be relevant in the case of the first modification, and the arguments of Pullum and Wilson (1977:775-777) would obviously be relevant in the case of the second. In time we would hope that such an approach would lead to an interest in some of the model-based approaches and in the debates to which they contribute.

6.2 Courses for students of English

1. It is just as important for students of English as for students of linguistics that the facts for which they are first asked to account should be surface syntactic and morphological facts, so that they will readily recognise them as facts.
2. It is even more important that the descriptions with which they are presented should be descriptions which give priority to displaying the facts of English. English is after all what they are studying.
3. It is again even more important that the approach should be 'pretheoretical'. Most students of English never are going to be introduced to the details of particular theoretical approaches, and the facts of English must be presented to them in such a way that their understanding does not depend on knowledge of such approaches.
4. A further point is that most students of English are going to be interested in working with texts. For such a purpose an approach which insists on structural trees of the kind given by Pullum and Wilson (1977:778) is going to be extremely cumbersome. Whether or not the verbal group can be motivated as a constituent in the initial structure of sentences, it is a useful unit to consider when analysing texts. For instance, it can be shown that radio cricket commentaries divide into sections, such that one type of section is characterised by verbal groups containing just main verbs, another type of section is characterised by verbal groups containing have (perfective) and/or be progressive plus main verbs, and another type of section is characterised by verbal groups containing modals or other auxiliaries plus main verbs. The types of section are predictable from the point reached in the game of cricket under consideration. For students engaged in such a study, it is obviously an advantage to be presented with a description which isolates the facts of the verbal group and presents them in these terms.

Since we are writing from a pedagogic point of view, we will conclude this section by mentioning that we find our description very amenable to visual presentation. Rules 1' and 1 in particular lend themselves to a dynamic presentation, with arrows showing items shifting inexorably to the left, as though sucked by a great force. This is impressive enough on the blackboard (the only place we have tried it), but colleagues who prefer

more sophisticated pedagogic techniques might try animated cartoons or computer simulations with a visual display. The possibilities are endless - unlike the verbal group. Even at the chalk-face, the trick may provoke cries of wonder from mesmerised students who suddenly exclaim: 'Isn't grammar wonderful!'

7. Comparison of our description with the Syntactic Structures analysis

A full comparison of our description with the Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957) analysis is of course beyond the scope of this article. We would, however, draw attention to the following points:

1. The most obvious formal differences between the two analyses are: (a) that, whereas the Syntactic Structures analysis hops the affixes, we hop the verbs; (b) that, whereas the Syntactic Structures analysis generates verbs and affixes together, we generate them separately. From the latter point of view, our description is more like a systemic grammar than a transformational grammar, since effectively we are proposing two simultaneous layers of structure and then mapping them on to each other. This is the only way, however, in which our description does resemble a systemic grammar.

2. The formal differences mean that the two analyses capture different types of linguistic generalisation. The Syntactic Structures analysis captures the fact that certain affixes go with certain uses of verbs; for instance, -en goes with perfective have and -ing goes with progressive be. Our analysis does not make this relationship explicit.

On the other hand, our description demonstrates the Duke of Wellington's hole-plugging principle at work in language; whenever an item is missing from a particular position, another item moves up to fill the gap. We hope in a later article to show that the English verbal group is not by any means the only manifestation of this principle in language. We would draw on facts relating to the nominal group in Old English and in other Germanic languages. We would also claim that the passive in various languages can be seen as an instance of this principle. In each case we would claim that there is movement in order to fill a gap, and in each case the item that moves takes on the affix associated with the position at which it arrives.

3. Both analyses are able to account for the facts for which they set out to account, the facts relating to the surface sequencing of auxiliaries and their affixes. In addition, our analysis can be used to account for another set of facts for which, as far as we can see, the Syntactic Structures analysis would not be able to account. This can be taken to be independent motivation for our analysis.

We claim that our analysis can be used to predict the grammaticality of verbal groups which contain inserted adverbs. Consider these two superficially similar sentences, only one of which is grammatical:

- (31) John may be always beating Harry
- (32) *John has been always beating Harry

Clearly, the grammaticality is not predictable solely by the position of always in the surface structure: in both (31) and (32) it occurs between the third and fourth verbs, and between be and an ing-form of V. A solution is to assume that a factor is the relative position of always and the auxiliaries before the left-movement rules operate.

For example, (32) could be generated from a structure in which always originally occurs between places 3 and 4. But in (31) always could originally have occurred between places 2 and 3: be from place 3 then moves across always.

	1	2	3	4	5
	2	ø	n	ø	n
(31')	may	be always	beating		
(32')	*has		been always beating		

We predict therefore that where always occurs between places 1 and 2 or places 2 and 3 before the movement rules, this will result in grammatical sentences. But where always occurs after place 3, this results in ungrammatical sentences. These predictions are subject to other more general constraints: for example, always cannot occur after the last verb actually present:

- (33) *John may beat always Harry
 (34) *John beats always Harry

It is difficult to set up examples where extraneous factors do not enter into the grammaticality judgments. For example, verbal groups with always after the third or fourth occurring verb are very long and awkward, and it becomes difficult to separate grammaticality from acceptability. Also the selection of main verbs is restricted: we have chosen beat as a main verb since it can appropriately take animate subjects and objects; otherwise grammaticality judgments on actives versus passives are affected. But we present below a list of relevant forms on which our predictions can be checked.

1. John is always beaten by Harry (e.g. at squash)
2. John is always beating Harry
3. John has always beaten Harry
4. John may always beat Harry
5. *John has been always beating Harry
6. John has always been beating Harry
7. *John has been always beaten by Harry
8. John has always been beaten by Harry
9. John may be always beating Harry
10. John may always be beating Harry
11. *John is being always beaten by Harry
12. John is always being beaten by Harry
13. ?John may be always beaten by Harry
14. John may always be beaten by Harry
15. John may have always beaten Harry
16. John may always have beaten Harry
17. *John has been being always beaten by Harry
18. *John has been always being beaten by Harry
19. John has always been being beaten by Harry
20. ?John may be being always beaten by Harry
21. John may be always being beaten by Harry
22. John may always be being beaten by Harry
23. *John may have been always beaten by Harry
24. John may have always been beaten by Harry
25. John may always have been beaten by Harry
26. ?John may have been always beating Harry
27. John may have always been beating Harry
28. John may always have been beating Harry
29. *John may have been being always beaten by Harry
30. *John may have been always being beaten by Harry
31. John may have always been being beaten by Harry
32. John may always have been being beaten by Harry

One of our students has in fact carried out some informant testing to check our intuitions (Collins, 1980). Although the grammaticality judgments were far from clear cut, there did seem to be some support for our views. For instance we would predict that (35) would be grammatical, and that (36) would be ungrammatical.

- (35) John may be always being tortured by Harry
- (36) *John has been always being tortured by Harry

In Collins' survey, 12 out of 20 informants regarded (36) as ungrammatical, while only 2 out of 20 regarded (35) as ungrammatical.

(The ungrammaticality of (36) can not be explained on the basis of any incompatibility between have and always, as all twenty of Collins' informants considered both (37) and (38) to be grammatical.

- (37) John has always been torturing Harry
- (38) John has always been tortured by Harry)

8. Our description and other models

As we have said, the limits we have set ourselves for the purposes of this study preclude our making any direct contribution to the debates associated with other models. We would, however, make the following comments:

1. Although our analysis was developed independently of that of Akmajian, Steele and Wasow (Akmajian & Wasow, 1975; Akmajian, Steele & Wasow, 1979), it does bear some resemblance to theirs in that we, like them, have two sets of hopping rules, our rule 1 being very roughly equivalent to their do replacement, and our rule 1' being very roughly equivalent to their be/have shift rules. It could in fact be said that our data on adverb positions in the verbal group provide further support for hopping analyses over other analyses. It is not clear to us that Pullum and Wilson, for instance, could account for our data.
2. In spite of the rough resemblance between our analysis and that of Akmajian, Steele and Wasow, our rules are not precisely equivalent to their rules. To account for our data on adverb positions, an extension to their be shift rule would be necessary. We not only need to assume that passive be and main verb be shift in the absence of progressive be. We also have to assume that progressive be shifts in the absence of perfective have.

9. Caution: work in progress

We have been cautious in this article about making over-enthusiastic claims about the general implications of our model for linguistic theory and have largely restricted our discussion to pedagogical points. However, we hope to develop some of the theoretical arguments more fully in forthcoming work. One of our readers who may have been being plagued by just what those implications are, may also have some answers, and may be able to tell us.

?* Mayn't s/he?

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A NOTE ON THE MEANING AND USE OF ENGLISH PROXIMITY PREPOSITIONS

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Although the semantics of English locative prepositions have been paid a reasonable amount of attention by linguists and psycholinguists in recent years (cf. Durkin, 1978a, for a review), a lesser part of this effort has been given to the study of those prepositions which describe the imprecise and highly context-dependent relations of spatial proximity. In this note, I will attempt to summarize some of the interesting features of this small group of prepositions, outline the semantic relations they encode and indicate the problems of defining these, and explore some of the complexities of the ways in which these terms are actually used.

It should be remarked first that many English locative prepositions are neutral with respect to the semantic property of proximity. I will not venture here into the delicacies of the semantics/pragmatics distinction, but will maintain as a working hypothesis the probably controversial assumption that (a) words have meanings, and (b) words are used in contexts. On these grounds, I assume further that a word such as above can be taken as meaning something like 'locative higher' (cf. Bennett, 1975:57); and is semantically neutral as to whether a relation of spatial proximity is involved, though it may of course be used in a context where a referent is located higher than a relatum, and is also within the proximity of that relatum. Similarly, I assume such prepositions as in front of, behind, between, etc. to be semantically neutral with respect to the relation of proximity. This assumption might not be unanimously agreed, but it is made explicit to indicate why I propose there is a semantic distinction between these prepositions and others such as near, next to, close to, beside and by, with which we will be concerned here, and which all seem to describe directly relations of proximity. I am not claiming that these are the exclusive subset of proximity prepositions - among others, at and with could have been included but these words have further complications which are not particularly pertinent to the present discussion (cf. Bennett, 1975; Lindkvist, 1950; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Durkin, 1978a, b) - but I am merely selecting near, etc. as prime examples of the terms of interest.

I have already defined near, next to, close to, beside and by as sharing a semantic component which seems best described as 'proximity' (or 'locative proximity'; cf. Bennett, 1975, and reviews by Bates, 1976, and Miller, 1976, for discussions of this detail of Bennett's componential approach). Two immediate and obvious problems arise in connection with this minimally informative description. One, as already noted, the concept of proximity is highly context-dependent, and its evaluation is often subjective (Bates, m.s.; Leech, 1969; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Lyons, 1977; Wood, 1967). Two, the description is obviously too broad to account for the semantic distinctions among these prepositions. The nature of these problems may be considered further in a brief description of each preposition.

Near appears to be one of the most useful English locatives in terms of its descriptive flexibility and range of application. As Bates (m.s.) notes, it conveys a general notion of proximity without being axially oriented.

Intuitive evidence, as well as evidence from the language of young children (Durkin, 1980), suggests that this utility is reflected in a relatively high frequency of occurrence of near in spatial description.² Colloquial usage of near to describe spatial relations as diverse as those of objects on a table or countries on the globe (in this connection, cf. especially studies of cognitive mapping strategies in adults, such as Wilton, 1977) illustrates its semantic scope. However, this generality of application renders near simultaneously an informationally limited and imprecise description - taking a remark of Lindkvist's slightly out of context, he felicitously summarizes its meaning as 'denoting proximity but emphasizing the nearness' (1950:129). The semantics of near make it a vague and indefinite word for the first language learner to acquire, leading to some subtle developments in young children's comprehension of the term (Durkin, in preparation). One particular aspect of the indefiniteness of near which I wish to examine here is whether or not it can acceptably be used to describe relations of contact.

The few linguists who have paid attention to this preposition have generally concluded that near cannot describe relations of contact. Schibbye (1970:362), for example, finds that it cannot, and similarly Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976:392) include separatedness as a semantic condition on near. It may be that the answer to this question varies with speakers' intuition. The present author, for example, finds sentences such as (1) - (4) semantically acceptable:

- (1) John sat near to Violet. In fact, he had his arm around her.
- (2) Max drove his moped so near the kerb that he scraped his front wheel.
- (3) Of course Switzerland is near France - they share a border.
- (4) Clive dances so near his partner that he treads on her toes.

The issue remains open to further analysis and empirical investigation. The expression a near miss is particularly interesting in this context, as this seems to mean 'a miss which almost made contact' (and consider nearly missed). It does seem that the contact sense of near does not transfer to temporal usage - 'it's near(ly) six o'clock' cannot mean it is exactly six o'clock. (Also of interest here is the constraint that the nearness can only refer to points prior to six: this restriction would not apply on a spatial line). Thus, while it seems correct to take 'proximity' as describing the meaning of near, it is clear that the interpretation of this meaning is subject to a range of contextual considerations, not least the range of factors determining whether or not the preposition may be used to describe relations of contact.

Next to has similar characteristics to near in terms of the imprecision of its inherent notion of proximity. In addition, however, it usually specifies immediacy in order, so that there can be no intervening entity: e.g. 'the house next to mine', 'next to the church', etc. (This is not true of near). There is a problem here, however, in that it is possible to say 'the house next to the church', referring to a domicile separated from the church by an intervening alley, or road (or perhaps even a desert - this seems to be another relativistic, indeterminate feature), and further, this expression might be possible even when the alley (or whatever) might contain say, a bicycle or car. Once again, there seems to be an interaction of semantic and pragmatic factors, so that while it is possible to recognize semantic content in next to as, roughly, 'immediate proximity in sequence', the scale and character of the sequence is pragmatically determined. This seems to be the only way to account for the possibility that we could have a quite large intervening object, such as a furniture van, and yet still refer to the house next to the church, whereas if we have a skyscraper intervening the expression

is no longer acceptable. Even this, however, does not fully capture the complexities of the way next to might be used. As Bruce (personal communication) has pointed out to me, this description is itself contingent upon categorial organization. Further amendments as in 'the last house next to the church' (possibly with stress on house) might enable us to tolerate even a skyscraper. Hence, while we cannot ignore context in determining the meaning of a particular usage of next to, we can no less overlook the fact that part of the context is the utterance itself.

Close to is very similar in meaning to near. Very few linguists discuss close to - even Wood (1967) omits it from his comprehensive survey, though his definition of near implies some interchangeability (as do dictionary definitions). Schibsbye (1970:362) holds that close to can express relations of contact, giving the example 'she held the baby close to her breast' (but note that even this could be said in a context where there was actually no contact). The expression 'a close shave', in both literal and metaphorical usage reveals something of the vagueness of the term since, literally understood, contact is obviously involved even if finality of the action is recognized as impossible, while in metaphorical use, the expression implies (just about) escaping contact with the potential danger. Close to would appear to be interchangeable with near in sentences (1) - (4) above. Yet though difficult to detect, it seems that there are differences between the two, often reflected in the inapplicability of near in colloquialisms in which close to can occur, such as close shave, but also in expressions such as 'John and Cynthia are very close these days'. It is interesting to note that we can describe the climate as close (but not near) when it is impinging upon us. Intuitively, the difference between near and close to seems to lie in the degree of proximity each indicates. All other things being equal, I would surmise that close describes a closer relationship (after Lindkvist, it emphasizes the closeness). However, given the frequent interchangeability of the pair, this leads to the point where the two semantically very similar and equally context-dependent words are differentiable only on criteria which are themselves highly context-dependent. And that is as close as I can get to grounds for distinguishing them.

Beside seems to be more easily distinguished from the other prepositions of proximity, in that it specifically indicates horizontal orientation relative to the sides of the relatum. The etymological features of beside are quite transparent (cf. Curme, 1931:562; Cooper, 1968:24), and still relevant to its contemporary meaning. Bates (m.s.) suggests that in locative use, beside may well be more common than the almost (but not quite; see below) synonymous by, because of the diverse other uses of the latter. There are of course other uses of beside(s), as in the expression of exception and addition (cf. Jacobsson, 1977:47f.), but in locative use it does seem to be one of the least problematical of proximity prepositions, and its meaning seems adequately captured as 'proximity side'.

Somewhat less straightforwardly described is the closely related by. By has a great many functions in English, but its locative meaning seems indisputably to contain the component 'proximity' (cf. Bennett, 1975:58f.). The problem here arises in specifying the semantic relations between this preposition and beside. Some authors have proposed that the two are in fact synonymous. Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976:393), for example, suggest that the concept 'side' is inherent in a by-relation. 'Side' is intended by these authors as a superordinate term including 'top' and 'bottom', but in the specification of by they explicitly add the further condition that

the referent and relatum are both in the horizontal plane, so that by is semantically indistinguishable from beside. However, this seems to be too strong a claim. It is difficult to see, for example, how Miller and Johnson-Laird's analysis would account for expressions such as 'by the corner' or 'don't light a cigarette while standing by a gas leak'. In addition, in some British English dialects (including mine) it is perfectly permissible to describe say, a bee hovering above a flower as 'by the flower' - this description is less precise than that employing the vertical term but is semantically well-formed and descriptively acceptable. Perhaps the clearest example might be the simple contrast between Figs. A and B, below. If X can be agreed to be by the relatum Y in Fig. A, does the rotation make this description unacceptable for Fig. B?




Fig. A




Fig. B

Speakers' intuitions may vary, but informal testing has supported my view that by is acceptable (if not the readiest production) for Fig. B. Cresswell (1978:16) also describes by as a term of general proximity, meaning 'adjacent area though not inside'. Young children occasionally use by to describe relations of vertical proximity (Durkin, 1980). Hence, by seems to be very similar in meaning to near, as a general term denoting proximity. Interestingly enough, the distinctions between them do not seem to be primarily semantic or pragmatic (though such differences clearly exist), but syntactic - consider by, for example, in place of near in sentences (1) - (4), above.

These observations on this small group of semantically related prepositions suggest some of the limitations of a componential approach to semantic description, in that they indicate several points where proposed components can convey only limited information about the way the terms are actually used. At the same time, there seem to be a number of problems associated with the description and delimitation of spatial proximity that would seem to defy any purely semantic formalism, whether in terms of a more elaborate componential description or some other framework. The present paper has merely attempted to outline some of these problems, and incidentally to indicate some of the reasons why these prepositions are more complicated lexemes for the child to acquire than has hitherto been recognized.

Footnotes

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²Again, this depends of course on what is being described, and why. In a study of people's descriptions of apartment layouts, Linde (1974) reports very little use of terms of general proximity, most of her subjects concentrating on specific points and positions, producing descriptions such as left, right, back of, etc.

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REVIEW of V.J. Cook

Young Children and Language,
London: Edward Arnold, 1979
pp.88. £2.25

Alan Cruttenden

Language in Infancy and Childhood
Manchester University Press, 1979
pp.193. £4.60

Both these books have numerous virtues particularly in terms of the audiences for which they are primarily written. But they also share one principal drawback. The view of language (and hence of language development) adopted by the authors is so confined to one or may be two main linguistic levels that less than justice is done in places to the necessary interpenetration of different levels of linguistic organization in the determination of meaning.

Young Children and Language by V.J. Cook is explicitly directed at a 'non-academic audience'. Books introducing current work in child language are to be welcomed and there is much here in the detailed yet accessible exposition of such work which makes the book exemplary of an all too rare genre. To be especially praised is the structure of the book in so far as references are given at the end to enable readers with a more academic interest to research sources cited in the text. The references thus do not intrude although some indication of a hierarchy of relevance or difficulty might help. The book is devoted to language development in the under-5's and contains a broader theoretical chapter on 'different kinds of English' as well as a rather brief account of language development after five. Both these chapters make some concession to a sociolinguistic frame for the analysis of language but the prevailing concern is with a more language-internal discussion of children's construction and production of 'sentences'. In this area, there are a number of clear, well-exemplified accounts of word order, verbal group organization, question formation, use of comparatives, in particular.

However, although attention is drawn to some of the functions of different grammatical moods, the concentration on syntax and sentence-based description of language tends to preclude any full treatment of 'beyond the sentence' linguistics and its application to child-language development. There is thus little on 'child discourse', that is, on the acquisition of interactive properties and uses of language or on the pragmatic development of conversational skills. Admittedly this is a relatively new field and much interesting work has appeared since the publication of the book (most recently Reeder, 1980; Dale, 1980) but it is one which has developed steadily through the seventies (e.g. the work of Gordon Wells at the University of Bristol's Centre for the Study of Language and Communication, and work edited by Ervin Tripp and Mitchell-Kernan (1977)) and it is one which requires the kind of treatment Viv Cook has given to syntactical development. As far as play group organization is concerned, it would seem to be an area of language development which can involve the observer directly, can be relatively easily studied given some frames of reference, and which is a central feature in the development of a child's social and communicative skills - something which most play and pre-school groups are concerned to foster. While on the question of the absence of a multi-faceted view of language, it should be recorded that there is also little in the book on phonological acquisition. There could also usefully have been some consideration of the different kinds of language functions required of children in school classrooms. All concerned could benefit from some awareness of what is going on in the transition from home to play school to school. A useful introduction to this whole area is to be found in Willes (1979).

These 'omissions' apart, I found the book to be well-written and generally well-conceived. My main complaint that the book could have been more systematic in language description and more attentive to different linguistic levels depends on precisely what is understood by a part of the audience being described as 'professionally' concerned with language development, and what kind of use students of child language could make of it.

Alan Cruttenden's book is a most useful contribution to its field. Its particular strengths lie in the lucid and cogent description of the main developments in the study of phonology and syntax in relation to child language development. Throughout a good balance is maintained between examples and their theoretical underpinning. There is an outstanding chapter, contributed by Katharine Perera, on 'Reading and Writing' which, though now in several respects superseded by Stubbs (1980), is a model of how to present linguistic knowledge and should be compulsory reading for all teachers. A glossary is provided which is ample, clear and helpful. The book would make an excellent text book for first year linguistics students, for all students of language and education and for teachers in training.

Criticisms could be levelled at the book similar to those mentioned in relation to V.J. Cook's book (above). There is very little on child discourse or the pragmatics of language development. Wells, Montgomery and Maclure (1979), though published after this book went to press, is a good example of the relevance of discourse as a linguistic level to the study of child language. This work and earlier work by Gordon Wells, Bruner (1975) and Dore (1975), is an essential complement to Halliday's contributions to child language study, although accounts of Halliday's work - as is material generally definable as socio- rather than psycholinguistic - are not particularly substantial in the book. Again there is little on adults talking to children at home and at school or on the development of communication as described by Waterson and Snow (1978). Lexis as a level of language in its own right rather than as a component in 'semantics' tends to be underplayed.

Needless to say, it is easy for anyone to make lists of what books do not contain. I feel both these books suffer from a rather one-dimensional approach to language but within their defined limitations both work very well. Cruttenden's in particular, is a book which will be very widely used and will serve its readers in an unobtrusively meticulous way.

One final thought might be to remind ourselves how little work has been done in terms of linguistic study of literary competence. Both books mention children's books, fiction and non-fiction, as a contributory factor in language development. But research does not yet appear to have followed the lead so clearly put recently by Herrnstein Smith (1978):

'...the child actually learns two sets of linguistic convention, that which governs natural and that which governs fictive discourse: the distinctive features, the distinctive occasions, and distinctive consequences of each. (see esp. pp.128-135 of this book)'

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