




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Becoming Political: How Marching Suffragists Facilitated Women's Electoral Participation in England.*

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Abstract

Previous research identifies that women politicians facilitate other women's political participation. Can women's political activism also spur women's electoral participation? Through the study of the British suffragists, we argue that women activists paved the way for other women's political participation at the time when women politicians were virtually absent. Constructing a novel micro-level dataset of geocoded data from electoral registers, we leverage a unique historical case of the 1913 Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage. Using a Differences-in-Differences strategy that compares polling divisions based on the proximity to the Pilgrimage across England, we provide evidence that exposure to the suffragists marching for parliamentary suffrage increased registration of women eligible to vote in local elections. Analyzing contemporary news articles, we then document the pathways through which the suffragists incited other women's political interest and therefore electoral participation. These findings have implications for the realization of substantive representation after suffrage.

Keywords: women's suffrage, suffragists, political development, turnout

Word Count: 9,281

1 Introduction

The first women voters at the turn of the twentieth century had to overcome severe barriers to political socialization. They faced difficulties in developing an interest in politics, whilst their political competence remained questioned long after suffrage (Merriam and Gosnell 1924, ch. 5; Norris and Inglehart 2001). Early women voters were less likely to vote, join political parties or male-centered voluntary associations, such as trade unions (Wolbrecht and Corder 2020; Morgan-Collins 2023). This relative absence of women from established political organizations increased the cost of politicians to mobilize women. Whilst women politicians had the potential to help lower such costs by effectively tapping into women's networks and more credibly gendering their campaigns, they continued to be largely absent for decades to come (Wolbrecht and Corder 2020, chap. 3). Women-centered voluntary associations, on the other hand, flourished in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, attracting a sizable pool of the first would-be women voters who were eager to enter the public sphere once and for all. In this paper, we explore the extent to which the suffragists facilitated women's political socialization, and therefore spurred their electoral participation.

Contemporary research identifies the crucial role of women politicians for other women's political socialization. Women politicians can serve as role models for other women (e.g. Barnes and Burchard 2013 on Africa; Beaman et al. 2009 on India; Liu and Banaszak 2017 on 20 democracies; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007, 2017 on the U.K.; but also see Clayton 2015 on Africa and Liu 2018 on Asia) and are better positioned to mobilize women into parties and at the time of elections (Goyal 2021 on India and Brazil; Herrnson, Lay and Stokes 2003 on U.S.; Reyes-Housholder 2018 on Chile and Brazil). In turn, historical gender scholarship largely focuses on inclusive institutions (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006a, 2016 on registration laws; Kim 2019 on direct democracy; Skorge 2021 on proportional representation). These effects are typically attributed to lower costs of women's mobilization (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006b, 2016 on U.S.; Morgan-Collins and Natusch 2022 on Sweden; Morgan-Collins 2023 on Norway, Sweden, Austria and New Zealand; Skorge 2021 on Norway). However, we know much less whether women's

organized networks, regardless of favorable institutional contexts, facilitated women's political socialization.

Bringing together theories of women's historical and contemporary political engagement, we contribute to recent debates through the study of how historical women's activism for equal suffrage spurred political participation of women who were already eligible to vote. Building on theories that highlight the importance of women's networks, role models, and mobilizational strategies, we argue that suffragists' mass campaigning for the vote facilitated women's political socialization and thus fostered their propensity to participate in elections. Suffragists activities 'on the ground' provided the opportunity for women to internalize a view of politics as suitable for women, to join a network that advocated for women's political presence and to feel symbolically and substantively represented. Much like women politicians in contemporary research, the suffragists thus helped to spark women's political participation through means that were less accessible to men politicians and men-dominated party and voluntary organizations.

To test our argument, we leverage a unique historical experiment. The 1913 Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage was a nationwide march in support of women's parliamentary suffrage in England. It was organized by the largest non-militant suffrage organization, The National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, to boost public support for parliamentary suffrage in both established hotspots and relatively uncontacted places. Importantly, during this period, middle-class women had the franchise in local elections, conditionally on property or residential qualification. Therefore, we can leverage variation in registration to local elections to measure women's electoral mobilization before and after the march. Our empirical strategy is a canonical Differences-in-Differences design, whereby we compare the change in registration patterns between polling divisions that were along the march route and those that were not.

Using data from British Electoral Registers from 1911 to 1914 in four diverse counties intersected by the march, we proxy women's registration as a share of local electors (the only category where women could register) among all electors who registered for any

elections. We validate this measure with a database of 20k individual-level records that we manually collected for a random sample of divisions. Our baseline results align with our expectations: 'exposure' to the marching suffragists led to a significant increase in the share of local electors and that these results are robust to dropping the most urban and connected localities. We also show that the march only boosted registration in divisions with a close proximity to the march (up to 2km) and did not mobilize men, thus further demonstrating the importance of in-person women-to-women interactions that spurred women's electoral mobilization.

We strengthen our results with a battery of additional analyses that refute the biggest threats to our identification. We confirm the plausibility of an underlying parallel trends assumption by verifying the absence of pre-trends in two years before the march took place. The absence of pre-trends, together with a lack of significant interaction with urban locations, provides evidence against the concern that our results reflect a more urban character of divisions intersected by the march. We also run additional placebo tests using roman roads that run across the actual path of the march, thus casting doubts on the possibility that the effects of the march are driven by the suffragists strategic placement of the route along the most connected roads. We demonstrate that our results are robust to a variety of robustness checks that use alternative specifications, variable definitions, samples and standard errors.

Finally, we provide qualitative evidence in support of the theorized mechanisms. Analyzing newspaper articles that reported on the ongoing march, we demonstrate that suffragists and pundits perceived the pilgrims as role models, a living proof of women's political capacities even under the harshest of conditions. We then document how various contact activities along the route effectively reinvigorated existing support network and recruited new members into the movement, and therefore into the idea that women belonged to politics. We also show that the suffragists positioned themselves as the sole representatives of women's interests not sufficiently addressed by men politicians, thus more effectively recruiting some women to join political activities.

These findings have implications for the vast literature on women's representation

(e.g. Kittilson 2008; O'Brien and Piscopo 2019 on women politicians; Weeks 2022 on gender quotas). To the extent that the quality of women's substantive representation reflects women's propensity to vote, our findings imply that women's activism has the potential to improve women's substantive representation even in a context where women politicians and quotas are virtually absent.

2 Literature Review: Women Voters, Activists and Politicians

In this section, we review three largely independent literatures on women's political engagement and highlight how, bringing these literatures into conversation, we contribute to extant debates through the study of suffragists' mobilization of early women voters.

Early women voters. Recent gender scholarship uncovers the importance of institutional and electoral context for electoral participation of early women voters (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006*a*, 2016 on registration laws and competition; Kim 2019 on direct democracy; Morgan-Collins 2023 on competition; Skorge 2021 on proportional representation). Scholars typically attribute these effects to politicians' incentives to mobilize women, but strong social networks also further politicians' incentives to mobilize women. Namely, the strength of the suffrage movement informs politicians about women voters and therefore enables politicians to more effectively electorally mobilize women in favorable institutional and electoral contexts (Skorge 2021 on Norway; Teele 2018 on U.S., U.K. and France). Whilst we know that the suffragists' information and petitioning campaigns boosted women's turnout and ability to coordinate at the polls (Carpenter et al. 2018 and Morgan-Collins, 2021 on U.S.), it remains unclear whether the suffragists shaped women's political participation independently of politicians' incentives to mobilize women.

Women politicians as role models. Vast gender scholarship demonstrates that women politicians stand as role models to other women and therefore pave the way for other women's political engagement (Barnes and Burchard 2013 on Africa; Beaman et al.

2009 on India; Karp and Banducci 2008 on 35 countries; Desposato and Norrander 2009 on Latin America; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007 on the U.K.; but also see Clayton 2015 on Africa and Liu 2018 on Asia). Being more 'similar' to women voters, women politicians are more likely to ignite feelings of being effectively represented (Barnes and Burchard 2013), spark political interests by bringing new issues and frames (Atkeson, 2003; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2017) and by demonstrating that politics is 'not just a men's game' (Liu and Banaszak 2017). However, it remain unclear whether women activists at the periphery of formal politics can also spark women's interests by serving as role models, therefore facilitating women's political socialization.

Women politicians as agents of women's political mobilization. Another strand of gender scholarship suggests that women politicians can mobilize women into politics more effectively than men. Women politicians can better rely on support of women's groups, better tap into women's networks of voters and co-partisans, and more credibly advocate for women (Goyal 2021 on India and Brazil; Reyes-Housholder 2018 on Chile and Brazil). Whilst 'gendering' electoral and intra-party campaigns strategies is often necessary to comply with public expectations (Herrnson, Lay and Stokes 2003 on U.S.; Franceschet, Piscopo and Thomas 2016 on Latin America), women who run on 'women's issues', primarily target women and successfully mobilize women into parties have enjoyed greater career, electoral and fundraising success from some donors (Goyal 2021 on India and Brazil; Thomsen and Swers 2017; Schaffner 2005 on U.S.). However, it remains unclear whether women activists can also mobilize women by better tapping into women's networks and conveying more credible advocacy for women.

In this paper, we contribute to these debates by exploring the extent to which the suffragists, like women politicians in the years to come, facilitated women's political socialization and therefore enhanced women's future propensity to participate in the elections.

3 Theoretical Framework: How Suffragists Facilitated Electoral Participation of Women

We argue that the suffragists helped the already enfranchised women to break through barriers to political socialization that hindered women's participation in elections. Through mass recruitment and campaigning activities for women's suffrage, the suffragists facilitated the development of women's interest in politics, fostering women's participation in the election through three channels: demonstrating that politics is for women, mobilizing women to demand access to formal politics and claiming to symbolically and substantively represent women. In the remainder of this section, we discuss each pathway separately.

[1] **The Suffragists Demonstrated that Politics Was for Women.** We argue that the suffragists became the prototypes of the 'new' politically active women, a living proof that women were capable, interested and suited to the public sphere. Much like women politicians in the years to come, the suffragists facilitated development of other women's interest in politics by demonstrating that politics was not just a men's game. The more anti-suffrage politicians, pundits and activists casted the suffragists as the minority among women (Grimshaw, 1987, ch. 8 on New Zealand; Pugh, 2000, ch. 2 on the U.K.; Blom, 2012, on Nordic countries), the more the suffragists could serve as role models to other women. Whenever the suffragists organized recruitment, campaigning and dissemination activities, they demonstrated to other women that women had skills and capacities to participate in political activities and debates, that women belonged to the public sphere. By demonstrating that they were interested and capable to make sound political demands and to organize in support of those demands, the suffragists spurred other women's propensity to vote.

[2] **The Suffragists Mobilized Women to Support Women's Active Role in Politics.** We argue that the suffragists' efforts to mobilize women into the suffrage movement spurred women's interest in politics. Much like women politicians in the years to come, the suffragists facilitated women's political socialization through effective cam-

paingning and recruitment of women into their organizations. The suffragists' success depended on their ability to mobilize women into the movements, and women activists could do so effectively by tapping into women's networks (Carpenter and Moore 2014 on U.S.). The suffragists organized public speeches and meetings, petitions, protest demonstrations, parades and marches and sometimes even engaged in militant activism (Banaszak 1996 on U.S. and Switzerland; Graham 1996 on U.S.; Purvis 2019 on U.K.). Whenever the suffragists reached out to women on the matter of suffrage, they mobilized women to support an inherently political cause that demanded women's greater engagement in politics.

[3] **The Suffragists Claimed that they Represented Women.** We argue that the suffragists spurred interest in politics among some women by claiming that they symbolically and substantively represented women. Much like women politicians in the years to come, the suffragists facilitated women's political socialization by positioning themselves as speakers on behalf of women and their interests. Calling for women's fair inclusion and representation in politics, the suffragists advocated for wide-range of issues that were deemed to be of a particular concern to women (Kraditor, 1965, ch. 2 and 3 on U.S.; McConaughy 2013 on U.S.; Valenzuela 1995 on Chile). Whenever the suffragists called for suffrage as a matter of women's protection, they stood as advocates for policies that they defined to be of a special interest to women. Regardless of the actual support for such policies among women, the suffragists gained leverage among some women by claiming to represent women more effectively than male-only legislatures, parties and voluntary societies.

4 Historical Background: The 1913 Pilgrimage and Women's Right to Vote

In this section, we first discuss the context of the 1913 Pilgrimage and its historical success. We then document the extent of women's suffrage in local elections at the time of the march.

The Pilgrimage. The 1913 Great Pilgrimage was organized by the The National

Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS). The NUWSS was the largest suffrage organization, reaching 496 affiliated societies and more than 50,000 paying women and men members by 1914 (Pugh 2000, p. 254). The NUWSS law-abiding tactics contrasted with the militant campaign of the Women Social and Political Union (WSPU) (Hume 2016).

The Pilgrimage was to be a 'giant advertisement', a live demonstration of widespread solidarity with the non-militant constitutional women's suffrage movement that would realistically pressure the government into extending the franchise to women (Crawford 2001, p.549). To maximize support, the organizers devoted significant attention to creating an event that would be deemed acceptable, avoiding public disorder and showing seriousness in their logistical preparation. Attention was devoted to even small details to project a united and confident 'brand'. For instance, marchers were asked to always appear in public showcasing the colors of the society (red and green) in their hat and sash ribbons, recommended 'appropriate' shades of dress (black, white, grey, or navy blue) that would make the colors of the ribbons more salient, a special badge for the event was also designed, and a specific song was written and distributed in advance of the event.¹ The result was a 'huge but orderly' demonstration, which was significant enough for Prime Minister Asquith to consent to meet a delegation of suffragists after the event (Pugh 2000, p. 279). The Pilgrimage marked a stark shift of the NUWSS away from lobby and petitioning to 'public' tactics that sought to mobilize women into the movement. This shift also brought NUWSS closer to working-class women, as they addressed working-class women's issues and forged an electoral alliance with Labour (Teele (2014); Van Wingerden 1999, p.145-8).

The suffragists marched along several routes in England and Wales for six weeks in June and July 1913. The pilgrims travelled up to 10-20 miles a day in any weather, although most joined for only part of the journey. Most travelled on foot, but caravans, horseback and bicycles were also common (Robinson 2018). The pilgrims car-

¹See, e.g, the many articles on behavioral and outfit guidance published in *The Common Cause* in June 13 and 20, 1913.

ried banners, sold the suffragists newspaper, distributed leaflets, placed adverts in local newspapers, held open-air and indoor meetings and attended teas organized by local sympathizers (Crawford 2001, p.550-3; Cartwright 2013, p.180-1). Men of high social standing in local communities often accompanied women suffragist, whilst guest stars of Mrs Fawcett, Mrs Sterling, Mrs Ashton and Mrs Chapman Catt attracted the largest crowds (Crawford 2001, p.551). The march culminated in a demonstration in Hyde Park held on 19 platforms for 70,000 spectators (Pugh 2000, p. 279), with overall collections reaching an impressive £8,325² - £3.4 (5) million in terms of labour (income) value in 2021.

Voting Rights in Local Elections. Whilst the pilgrims marched for parliamentary suffrage, some women have already secured the right to vote in local elections (Richardson 2013). Since the 1867 Second Great Reform Act, men of property and certain occupations could qualify to vote. By 1910, about 2 in 3 adult men qualified (Wright 2002, p.60). However, single and widowed women recovered historical right to vote in local elections only with the Municipal Franchise Act 1869 (Heater 2006, p. 123), and some married women with The Local Government Act of 1894. The 1894 Act continued to impose property qualifications on all electors and required that married women did not qualify with the same property as their husbands. Whilst it is hard to determine the exact composition of the eligible women electorate by class and marital status, married and working-class women certainly faced tighter conditions to register. To qualify as local electors, married women needed to be in a household with more than one qualifying property (e.g. a house and a shop) or that their husband did not register as a local elector. However, single and widowed women of relatively modest professions, such as laundresses, schoolmistresses or dressmakers frequently appeared on electoral registers (Richardson 2013). Despite these restrictions, over one million women had the local vote by 1900 (Hollis 1987, p. 31).

²The Common Cause, August 8, 1913.

5 Data and Variables

In testing our theoretical framework, we seek to establish whether the march for parliamentary suffrage spurred electoral registration of women who were already eligible to vote in local elections. Before proceeding to the empirical strategy, we discuss the measurements of our dependent and independent variables. We present data sources and collection procedures in Appendix B.

Electoral Participation. In order to measure our key outcome, women's electoral participation, we study electoral registration of women who were already eligible to vote in local elections. To this end, we use four consecutive years (1911-1914) of electoral registers in four selected counties: Gloucestershire, Norfolk, Surrey and the West Riding of Yorkshire. The four counties include about 14% of English population, 19% of eligible electorate in 1910 and represent distinct electoral and occupational contexts. See further description of each county in Table A.1). The electoral registers list the number of registered electors in three key categories, that is whether electors qualified to vote in parliamentary elections only, local elections only or both types of elections. Our outcome of interest is the share of local electors over the total number of electors registered at the polling division level.³ That is, we use a 'proportion measure' of gender registration gap that captures the weight of the only category where women could register compared to the overall mass of registered electors.⁴ The main concern with this approach is that observed effects can be driven by the men that registered as 'local electors' along with all women. However, we run several tests in the robustness section below that cast doubts on these concerns. In particular, we collect individual-level data for a subsample of parishes in order to directly estimate the effect of the march on

³The unit of observation is a (smaller) parish in West Riding of Yorkshire. We only refer to polling divisions in the text.


⁴An increase in a 'proportion measure' may not unconditionally indicate a 'narrowing' of the difference between women's and men's registration in a low-registration context. However, we demonstrate that women's registration increased while men's registration did not increase following the march, which provides reassurance that the difference between women's and men's registration narrowed following the march.

women voters. We also show that the march had no effect on the categories of voters that only comprised men. Finally, we demonstrate robustness to using alternative measures that account for the size of women’s adult and eligible population. Altogether, these results clearly suggest that women are driving the observed increase in registration to local elections.

March Path. Our key independent variable captures proximity to the 1913 march. To this end, we recover the names of major cities and towns intersected by the march from an original NUWSS map (Appendix Figure *B.1.*). In the four sampled counties, we establish the path between those cities using the main historical roads connecting these locations. Our preferred definition of divisions intersected by the march is within 1km of Euclidean distance from the centroid of the division to the closest point of the march.⁵ This range captures localities where people most certainly experienced the march in person, whilst providing a reasonably-sized pool of treated observations. In total, our sample identifies 59 divisions intersected by the march, and 915 divisions that were not intersected within 1km. Figure 1 presents the path of the march and indicates divisions that were intersected and not intersected by the march in our sampled counties.

⁵In the analysis below, we demonstrate and discuss that the effect holds up to a 2km range.

Figure 1: Map of the March and Data Availability



Notes: Pilgrimage path in sample is along main roads connecting the scheduled stopping points (see Appendix Figure B.1, and along straight lines outside sample. For polling divisions, which typically encompass a major parish and a few small neighbours, we attribute the observation to the main parish, based on the name. Uncolored parishes in the counties of interest are the small parishes peripheral to the polling division. In the West Riding of Yorkshire, electoral registration is given at the parish level. The map shows parishes for which the centroid falls within 1km of the march path along roads, that is our preferred treatment.

Control Variables. We include a battery of control variables in all models. To this

end, we use data from 1911 census to indicate demographic characteristics of polling divisions, including population and age by gender, indicators on fertility, marriage, and child mortality. We also account for socio-economic structure of the population, namely the share of male population belonging to five out of six social class categories defined by the standard historical international social class scheme (HISCLASS). Finally, we also account for distance to the nearest city and a distance to a nearest main road.

Summary Statistics. Table 1 compares divisions intersected by the march with those that were not intersected. Before the march took place, the share of local electors (the only category where women were eligible to register) was 16.4 percentage points in divisions not intersected by the march and 13.6 percentage points in divisions that were to be intersected by the march. This difference likely reflects the higher concentration of propertied men eligible to the parliamentary franchise in urban locations more likely intersected by the march. This is confirmed by the fact that marched-on divisions' average total electorate size was twice as large as that of those outside the path (7.1 percentage points difference). On average, divisions intersected by the march were larger and closer to main roads. Demographic patterns also follow the expected patterns for more urban locations, with fertility rates being lower, female celibacy rates higher, age at marriage higher, women's share of population higher and share of married women working also higher. It seems plausible that these differences reflect the suffragists' aim to reach London through main roads. However, note that our empirical strategy, together with a battery of additional tests, robustly addresses any concerns that these differences in levels explain away our results.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Outside Path		On March Path		Diff (1)-(3) (5)	P-Val (6)
	Mean (1)	Sd (2)	Mean (3)	Sd (4)		
<i>Electoral Registration Measures, pre-1913:</i>						
Total Electors (100)	6.224	18.162	13.327	18.162	-7.103	0
Local Electors (100)	0.968	1.942	1.497	1.942	-0.529	0.006
Share Local over Total Electors	0.163	0.056	0.135	0.056	0.027	0.129
<i>Electoral Registration Measures, post-1913:</i>						
Total Electors (100)	6.709	18.238	12.506	18.238	-5.797	0
Local Electors (100)	1.042	2.069	1.631	2.069	-0.589	0.005
Share Local over Total Electors	0.161	0.057	0.148	0.057	0.014	0.487
<i>Control Variables:</i>						
Distance to City (km)	10.54	6.61	7.09	6.61	3.45	0
Population (thousands)	3.52	57.64	20.06	57.64	-16.53	0.02
Distance to Road (km)	1.26	0.97	0.49	0.97	0.77	0
Average Age	28.94	1.92	29.04	1.92	-0.09	0.71
Female Share of Population	0.5	0.04	0.52	0.04	-0.02	0
Single Person HouseHolds, pct	6.46	2.3	5.61	2.3	0.86	0
Total Fertility Rate (children per women)	3.09	0.79	2.84	0.79	0.24	0.02
Age at Marriage for Women	26.27	1.45	26.75	1.45	-0.48	0.01
Female Celibacy Rate	15.66	7.4	17.41	7.4	-1.75	0.07
Male Celibacy Rate	13.4	3.95	12.33	3.95	1.07	0.04
Married Women Working, pct	8.38	2.35	7.55	2.35	0.83	0.02
Child Mortality Rate, per thousand	42.58	22.94	43.61	22.94	-1.03	0.73
HISCLASS High Skill Non-Manual, pct	3.18	1.39	4.02	1.39	-0.85	0
HISCLASS High Skill Manual, pct	21.96	5.66	22.51	5.66	-0.55	0.46
HISCLASS Low Skill Non-Manual, pct	12.82	6.11	16.86	6.11	-4.04	0
HISCLASS Low Skill Manual, pct	32.01	16.52	28.14	16.52	3.87	0.08
HISCLASS Unskilled	29.92	14.27	28.24	14.27	1.68	0.38
Observations	968		62			

6 Empirical Strategy

Our baseline empirical strategy is a canonical Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimation.⁶ The treatment group encompasses all polling districts intersected by the march, whilst the control group consists of all divisions not intersected by the march in the

⁶Similar design has been recently used by economists to estimate the mobilizing effects of Nazi propaganda (Caprettini et al. 2022) and the 2017 women’s march in the U.S. (Larrebourg and Gonzales 2021).

sample. Equation (1) describes our baseline specification:

$$\text{Share Local Voters}_{pt} = \alpha + \beta \text{March}_p \times \text{Post}_t + \gamma \text{March}_p + \delta \text{Post}_t + \mathbf{X}'_p \boldsymbol{\lambda}_t + \eta_{c(p)} + \varepsilon_{pt}. \quad (1)$$

Share Local Voters_{pt} is the share of local voters over the total number of registered electors in a polling division p , in year t (1911-1914). March _{p} is a binary variable equal to 1 if a polling division p was within 1 km of the path.⁷ Post _{t} is a binary variable equal to one for the year after the march, and March _{p} × Post _{t} is the interaction between the two terms. The parameter of interest is β , which captures how the 1913 march changed the share of local electors in intersected localities. In all our models, we include fixed effects $\eta_{c(p)}$ for all counties c and a vector of demographic controls \mathbf{X}'_p from 1911 census, as presented in 1. For more flexible specification, we interact all controls with the Post _{t} variable. The flexible inclusion of control variables allows us to account for time-varying effects of the controls. We cluster standard errors at the parliamentary division level. We verify that the results are robust to alternative standard error estimation, in particular wild cluster bootstrap estimation, which may improve inference if there are few clusters (Cameron and Miller 2015)⁸, and clusters using arbitrarily sized grids to account for spatial correlation (Kelly 2019).

7 Results

In this section, we first present our baseline results. We then present evidence that the effect of the march is limited to localities close to the march and not extending to men. Altogether, these results are consistent with our argument that the effects of the march can be attributed to in-person interactions between the suffragists and women.

⁷We analyze the effect of varying the distance buffer to define the treatment in section 7.2.

⁸There are 36 unique clusters, above the standard cutoff of 30 to consider that there is a “small” number of clusters.

7.1 Baseline Results

Table 2 presents the baseline regression results. Our estimated coefficient of interest ($\hat{\beta}$) shows that divisions exposed by the march saw an increase in the share of local voters by about 1.3-1.5 percentage points compared to those not intersected by the march. This is a sizable effect, representing approximately 8-9% of the average outcome and 1.75 standard deviations of the outcome. Consistent with the descriptive patterns presented in Table 1, the results indicate that the march narrowed the difference between divisions on and outside of the march path.

These results are significant at conventional levels and stable whether or not we include controls that capture the urban character of divisions (columns 1 and 2). This provides evidence against the concern that our results are confounded by urbanization. Our results are also robust to excluding the year of the treatment (columns 3 and 4) and to focusing exclusively on the year before and after the 1913 march (column 4). Since Table 1 shows that treated localities were closer to roads and had larger population size, we show robustness to excluding divisions with large population and close to roads (column 5).⁹ This provides additional evidence against the concern that our results can be explained away by the urban character of divisions intersected by the march.

Our estimates are comparable in size to similar research. They are of the same order of magnitude as those estimated by Larrebourg and Gonzales (2021), who studies the effects of the Women’s March of 2017 in the U.S. using a similar empirical strategy and as those estimated by (Carpenter et al., 2018, Table 4), who studies the effect of petitioning success on women’s turnout in the U.S.¹⁰ Finally, our baseline estimates of 9% of

⁹This restrictive specification contains 49 treated divisions and 686 untreated ones, observed from 1911 to 1914.

¹⁰Carpenter et al. 2018 estimate the effect of historical suffrage petitions in the U.S. on the gender turnout gap for the first enfranchised cohort. He establishes that one marginal petition in a state decreases the gender gap in turnout by 1% of the outcome mean. Benchmarking the effects in terms of the outcome mean, we can say that the magnitudes we obtain (8-9% of the outcome mean), thus correspond to the effect of 8-9 additional petitions in their setup, which, in an average state, corresponds to 10 years of petitioning Carpenter et al. (2018, Tables 2 and 4).

outcome mean are within the typical range for Get-Out-To-Vote (GOTV) experiments. For example, Gerber and Green (2000) estimates a roughly 18% of the mean outcome for direct canvassing and 1.3% for mail-only canvassing. The closest GOTV experiment to our setting is Braconnier, Jean-Yves and Pons (2017), who use registration (rather than turnout) as an outcome. They find that canvassing increases the number of new registered by approximately 14% of the mean.

Table 2: The Baseline Effects of the March on the Share of Local Electors Among Registered

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.014** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.013** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.015*** (0.006)
DPost	-0.002 (0.005)	0.203 (0.476)	0.320 (0.509)	0.341 (0.556)	-0.384 (0.692)
March	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.018** (0.010)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,938
R ²	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.250	0.286

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; OLS estimates; unit of observation is polling division; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level; outcome is share of local electors over total electors registered; Appendix Table C.1 shows the estimates for all the control variables.


7.2 The Geographical Reach of the March

If being exposed to the suffragists in person was crucial for the registration-on-march effects as theorized, we would expect the effects to be limited to localities very close to the path of the march. In these localities, women arguably got a first-hand experience

of the campaigns and a direct exposure to the suffragists. To this end, we define different treatments using buffers with varying Euclidean distances from the centroid of the division to the closest point of the march. We present the results in Figure 2. As we would expect, the effects are meaningful in magnitude only for divisions very close to the march, up to about 2km from the march. This is despite the fact that the precision of the estimates increases with distance as we increase the size of the 'treated' divisions. In other words, the march likely mattered in places where reaching the march was effortless (approximately less than half an hour walk). These results thus provide further support for the importance of in-person women-to-women interactions along the route, rather than the mere exposition to information about the event. Information, for instance through local newspapers and word-to-mouth networks, would have travelled longer distances.¹¹

¹¹We can consider an example to illustrate this claim. During the year 1913, *The Weekly "Wakefield Advertiser & Gazette"*, from the Yorkshire town of Wakefield (in our treatment group), regularly covered news of neighboring towns such as Ossett (4.5 km away from Wakefield, 40 articles in 1913); Horbury (4 km away from Wakefield, 52 articles in 1913); or Crofton (6 km away from Wakefield, 17 articles in 1913).

Figure 2: The Effects of the March using Different Treatment Definitions.



Notes: Plots the coefficient of interest $\hat{\beta}$ when treatment is defined using different distance buffers to the march; 1913 is taken as a reference; 90% and 95% CIs; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level

7.3 The Effect of the March on Men

Next, we probe whether the march had any effect on men. If the suffragists spurred women’s mobilization by enhancing women’s political socialization through means not readily available to men political elites, then we would expect the march to mostly mobilize women, not men. This is because the interaction between women and the suffragists is theorized to drive the mobilizing effects, not the interaction between the suffragists, politicians and both women and men voters. To this end, we run our baseline regression with a different outcome that captures men’s propensity to register, defined as the share of parliamentary electors (a category that only allowed men) over the total population of men. As expected, we find that there are no significant differences in the share of parliamentary electors between divisions where suffragists marched and those where they did not (Table 3). In short, we find no evidence that men reacted to the event despite the presence of men at the Pilgrimage and in audiences, providing further support

for the importance of women-to-women interactions in women’s political socialization. The lack of reaction of the male electorate also provides suggestive evidence that the NUWSS succeeded in their objective of creating a unifying and generally acceptable event that avoided male backlash.

Table 3: The Effect of the March on Men

	Share of Parliamentary Voters over Population				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.017 (0.014)	0.008 (0.010)	0.006 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)
DPost	-0.003 (0.006)	0.466 (1.673)	0.723 (2.269)	0.577 (2.133)	-0.861 (1.452)
March	-0.045 (0.031)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.019)	0.014 (0.015)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Sd dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Observations	3,222	3,222	1,620	2,490	2,604
R ²	0.195	0.391	0.403	0.404	0.408

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; OLS estimates; unit of observation is polling division; standard errors clustered the parliamentary division level; outcome is share of parliamentary (men only) electors over total population of men


8 Threats to Inference and Robustness

In this section, we probe the validity of parallel trends and provide additional evidence against the possibility that our results are driven by urbanization or reflect strategic selection of the march path. We also demonstrate robustness to alternative specifications, variable definitions, samples and standard errors.

8.1 Parallel Trends Assumption

The identification assumption of the difference-in-differences specification is that, conditional on observables, the share of local electors would have evolved similarly in treated and untreated divisions in the absence of the march. We assess the plausibility of this assumption by comparing the trends in the pre-march (pre-1913) period. We run the placebo tests for two baseline specifications with full battery of controls, one of which is limited to a smaller sub-sample of divisions that are close to roads and exclude the largest cities (as depicted in Columns 2 and 5 in Table 2). We find that the effect of the march is not statistically significantly different from zero and very small in magnitude for the years 1911 and 1912, whereas a significant jump above zero is recorded in 1914 (Figure 3). This provides strong evidence that the underlying assumption is likely to hold.

Figure 3: Pre-Trends Analysis



Notes: Plots the coefficient of the treatment ($March_p$) interacted with year FE; 1913 is taken as a reference; 95% and 90% CIs; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level; models run separately for full sample and a restricted sample (<15k and within 2 km of a road). Appendix Table C.2 shows the estimates for all the control variables.

8.2 Urbanization

Perhaps the biggest potential concern in our empirical strategy stems from the observation that divisions intersected by the march are more likely to display an urban character (Table 1). In the result section, we have accounted for this possibility by controlling for demographic characteristics of divisions and its proximity to roads and large cities and also by showing robustness to dropping the most urban and connected divisions. The results from pre-trend analysis also provide further evidence against this concern. If (unaccounted) urbanization alone was driving our baseline results, then we would expect to see sizable effects appearing before the march even took place. Here, we go one step further, and consider the possibility that urban centers may have seen a change in

their registration patterns only before and after 1913, for reasons completely different from the march. For instance, heightened suffragist activism throughout the year in urban centers could be driving our results. To discard this alternative assumption, we interact the effect of the march with a binary variable flagging urban centers. We define urban centers as divisions with a population about 15k inhabitants, which represents roughly the 20% largest treated divisions and the 5% largest overall. The results, shown in Table D.1, fail to establish any significant pattern from the interaction with the urban flag variable. If anything, the estimates are higher in magnitude outside urban centers, although not significantly so. Whilst we cannot exclude the possibility that the effects are equivalent in more and less urban locations, the magnitudes of the marginal effects are consistent with an explanation that the impact of suffragists was especially strong in more rural, remote localities where the suffragists were more of a ‘novelty’, and where competition among political organizations and access to information were less likely.

8.3 Strategic Placement of the March

Another potential concern is that the suffragists walked along main roads in order to connect important urban centers. We may worry that for unobserved reasons, these selected places have experienced increase in women’s mobilization regardless of the march. In the result section, we have addressed this concern in part by controlling for potential confounders linked to urbanization and by excluding the most urban and connected divisions. In this section, we go one step further by running a placebo test on alternative main roads that did not experience the march. Since Roman roads had a long lasting effects on urbanization and connectivity (Dalgaard et al. 2022), we select Roman roads that connect main urban centers through a different axis than the path to London chosen by the suffragists. Maps of the march and the placebo march in Appendix Figure D.1. The results exhibit no meaningful or significant treatment effect for the placebo march (Appendix Table D.2), which provides further reassurance that changing trends in women’s mobilization along major road axis cannot explain away our results.

8.4 Robustness Checks

Dependent Variable. We provide further evidence that the increase in the share of local electors is driven by women and not by men. Whilst it is encouraging that we do not find any effects of the march on men (Figure 3 above), and that our outcome is highly correlated with the share of women in the population (Appendix Table C.1), we carry out two additional tests.

First, we demonstrate that the march-on-registration effects depend on the expected size of the potential women electorate. Given that married and poor women faced most substantial restrictions to register, we proxy the potential pool of eligible women with three indicators flagging above median shares in the following categories: (i) never-married women, (ii) single person households (this category is preferred to the former one since it also includes widowed women), and the interaction of these two variables with higher share of upper class individuals. In line with our expectation, we find that the march-on-registration effects are driven by, and substantially higher in, those flagged locations (see Appendix Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3).

Second, we collect individual-level data from electoral registers that allow us to establish a precise indicator of women's share among the total number of registered individuals as local electors (the only category that allowed them). The goal of this approach is to provide reassurance that the observed increase in the share of local electors in marched-on divisions is actually driven by women. Collecting individual records is extremely costly since this has to be done by manually processing each page to retrieve the names of people registered and their electoral category (parliamentary and local versus only local). We compile an impressive database of over 21,500 individual records out of 20 randomly selected group of 20 divisions in the West Riding of Yorkshire. Control group divisions are selected among the placebo routes presented in section 8.3. We present details of data sources and collection in Appendix section B. Appendix section C.2 discusses the results. In sum, we observe that the share of local electors over total electors in the sample of randomly collected divisions is similar to the one observed in the main sample. Secondly, the change in the share of local electors, our proxy measure

for the increase in women's registration, is positively and significantly associated with the growth of women registered in the division (Appendix Table C.4). Thirdly, Figure C.2 shows that there is a stark increase in the probability that locations have a large share of women among local electors in marched-on divisions between 1911 and 1914. In turn, there are no observable differences in the control group. Taken together, these observations provide reassurance that it is women who are driving the increase in local registration in marched-on divisions.

Specification. We show that the baseline results are robust to alternative specifications. First, the inclusion of polling division fixed effects, although the estimates are smaller in magnitude as expected (Appendix Table E.4). Whilst this has the advantage of really absorbing all time-invariant confounders, it is not our preferred specification given that it is prone to attenuation bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp: 225-226). Second,, we verify that the results hold after we individually drop counties, eliminating the concern that our results are driven by a single county (see Appendix Table E.5).

Standard Errors. We show that the standard errors are robust. A potential issue is that control group has significantly more parishes than the treatment group, which could artificially decrease standard errors. For robustness, we restrict the control group to divisions along intersecting main roads (see section 8.3). The effects are larger in magnitude and more precisely estimated (see Appendix Figure E.1). Another concern regarding the standard errors relates to the choice of clustering. Our baseline result is not affected if we cluster using arbitrary clustering units of varying sizes to address concerns of spatial correlation (Appendix Figure E.2), estimate standard errors using Wild Cluster Bootstrap (Appendix Table E.6), or cluster them at the level of the treatment and the county (Appendix Table E.7).

9 The Pathways to Women's Participation: Analysis of Newspaper Coverage

In this section, we provide qualitative evidence in support of the theorized mechanisms

through which suffragists spurred other women's participation. To this end, we analyze newspaper articles that reported on the 1913 march, using the British Library's digital collection of historical newspapers. We present this evidence in support of each theorized mechanism. Throughout the section, we reference the entry line for the source(s) in brackets (see Appendix Section F).

[1] The Suffragists Demonstrated that Politics Was for Women. The Pilgrimage was organized as a tool of mass campaigning, mobilization and fundraising, all of which provided a living proof that women had political skills as orators, organizers and campaigners and even to sustain the harsh environment of public opposition and violence.

The suffragists themselves highlighted the importance of demonstrating own political skills and devotion. Reporting on the Pilgrimage, a suffragist proclaimed *'Now we are proving that we can organize and carry out demonstrations ... and in carrying it to endure hardship...'*. The use of the 'Pilgrimage' term allowed the suffragists to redefine what woman can be outside the home. In the words of the suffragists, the pilgrims left *'sheltered homes'* to *'save own souls by serving others'*, that is women who desperately needed a political voice. [1] The Pilgrimage was thought of as *'an expression of the new spiritual life'* that puts societal before individualistic needs[2] Likewise, the press highlighted political skills of particular women speakers. For example, Reading Standard referred to Miss Sutton, speaker and the first elected councillor in England, as *'an example of the fact that women who are demanding political liberty are the women who are already doing valuable and responsible work for the people.'*[3] Cambridge Independent Press noted that Mrs Cowmeadow showed a *'remarkable talent for keeping the audience interested ...'*[4], whilst Maidenhead Advertiser highlighted the speech by Mrs Snowden, who had a *'would-wide reputation as a speaker'* and everyone *'should make a point of hearing her.'*[5]

The newspapers also reported on the violence encountered by the pilgrims, often demonstrating women's perseverance even in the harshest of political environments. Several reports likened the attacks on suffragists to election riots, emphasizing the political nature of the suffragists' meetings.[6] The boisterous mobs of mostly young men

could render speeches unintelligible[7], whilst it was not uncommon for meetings along the route to require police protection long after the meeting or a dismissal for safety.[8] For example, several meetings of suffragists marching from Bristol were attacked by a violent mob, resulting in injured policemen hit by stones in Bath and a broken up meeting in Marlborough that put suffragists' caravan into the river.[9] In High Wycombe, a violent mob shouted at speakers *'go home and wash your face'*, booing and singing *'who were you with last night'*. The mob then unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the vehicle, threw rotten tomatoes and eggs at the speakers and left several policemen injured. Some pilgrims escaped in taxicabs, hid in private homes and in garages surrounded by a mob for over an hour.[10]

[2] The Suffragists Mobilized Women to Support Women's Active Role in Politics. Encouraging women to join a local suffrage society, donate to its political cause and take part in the march and meetings along the route, the suffragists campaigning activities sought to mobilize women to demand access to formal politics, and in doing so, to de facto participate in a political activity.

The newspaper coverage of the Pilgrimage emphasized the suffragists goal to both demonstrate the strength of non-militant support for suffrage but also to solicit greater support for the cause. Paraphrasing Millicent Fawcett, the news reported that the object of the Pilgrimage was to demonstrate *'the great strength of the nonmilitant movement'* and to *'awaken the imagination of the unimaginative'*. [11] Local societies and news echoed official messages by emphasizing the importance of demonstrating *'eagerness and demands'* for the vote among non-militants, but also to reach out to remote villages where their message *'had not gone'* and the practical necessity to *'collect funds'* for future campaigns. [12] Adverts in local newspapers provided details of the exact local path of the march and associated meetings, and sometimes also details on where to donate and how to join local societies. [13]

The newspapers reported on the successes of *'propaganda work'* carried out along the route. It was estimated that over half a million leaflets was distributed by the pilgrims overall. [14] For example, 960 copies of *Common Cause* were sold and 10,000

leaflets distributed in Cornwall, despite the relatively smaller number of suffrage societies along the path there.[15] Whilst the number of marching suffragists typically did not exceed 50 and sometimes consisted of relatively few pilgrims,[16] open-air and indoor meetings organized along the route in most villages and towns typically attracted several hundred and sometimes even thousands of locals and members of local suffrage and friendly societies, including local women's party clubs, cooperative guilds and temperance associations.[17] For example, meetings were reported to attract 1000 locals in Wymondham (Norfolk); 800 and 400-500 in Hungerford and Maidenhead (Berkshire), 500 in Thame (Buckinghamshire), 700-800 in Cambridge, 600 in Bury St. Edmunds (Suffolk), four figures in each Cornwall town that amounted to a total of 15,000 across the county and over 6,000 in Exeter and Mansfield.[18]

[3] The Suffragists Claimed that they Represented Women. The suffragists engaged with local audiences in heated discussions on suffrage. This often forced the suffragists to respond to anti-suffrage claims and to speak frequently of women's interests as distinct from those advocated by the anti's and men-only legislatures.

The newspapers regularly covered the content of suffragists speeches along the route. Whilst the suffragists arguments highlighted the need for justice, more space was typically spent on expediency arguments that highlighted an urgent need to '*protect*' women's interests in men-dominated legislatures. For example, women speakers in Winchester highlighted the need of tax-paying women to '*have a say in the making of the laws*', voicing the pilgrims' commitment to '*get justice*' but also '*better laws*' for the poorest women. They thought that whilst suffrage '*ought to be given on the ground of justice alone*', men '*would not do that*' without the suffragists demonstrating a specific need.[19] In Tonbridge, a men speaker argued that women were not able to take part in '*alleviation of misery and distress*' without the vote, as no politician would seek to '*rectify conditions under which [women] worked*'. A NWUSS woman executive followed with arguments emphasizing the need to improve poor housing quality caused by low wages, proclaiming that '*If the men would not see to this, the women must go on*'. [20] In Stafford, Councillor Margaret Ashton of Manchester argued that women needed the vote to get attention of

a local MP for improvements of the home, the family and the children. Men, she continued, did not secure *'justice'* and *'benefits'* for women, they only stole *'money of women's [tax-paying] pockets'*. [21]

Suffragists' speeches were often followed by questions from the audience or private discussions with the participants after the meetings. [22] Sometimes, the speeches were interrupted with slogans from the audiences, such as *'keep women out of the vote'* or *'their place is at home'*. [23] The need of the suffragists to engage with arguments against suffrage was often further ignited by a meeting organized against women's suffrage just prior to the arrival of the pilgrims. [24] For example, at anti's meetings in High Wycombe and Reading that preceded the suffragists' meeting the next day, both women and men speakers echoed sometimes contradictory arguments that women did not *'desire the vote'*, were *'not interested'* in politics *'by nature'*, should not manage *'military, mining or the railways'*, already had a *'vast indirect influence through their men'*, and should focus on the interests of the *'home and children.'* The next day, the pilgrims thus spoke of women's superior capacities to work and care for children with their vote [25], positioning themselves as advocates of those interests.

10 Discussion

Through the study of the first women voters in English local elections, this paper makes a contribution to our understanding of how were women incorporated into the electoral process. Previous research documents that the suffragists fostered women's participation by disseminating electoral information (Morgan-Collins 2021) and by enabling politicians to better mobilize women voters (Skorge 2021) at election times. In this research, we uncover how the very act of reinvigorating and enlarging own support network outside of the electoral context facilitates women's political socialization.

The ability of the suffragists to mobilize women into politics is an important precursor for the suffragists' ability to secure women's suffrage and, eventually, for the substantive representation of the suffragists' base. Unless the suffragists demonstrate that they can mobilize *enfranchised* women, politicians may not have an incentive to en-

franchise other women, nor to forge electoral alliances with them (McConnaughy 2013; Teele 2018). Importantly, unless enfranchised women use their votes, politicians may primarily represent the interests of men voters over non-voting women.

Our focus on the first enfranchised women naturally limits generalizability to working-class women who faced greater legal restrictions to vote and had less time to participate in voluntary associations. At the same time, the extent to which women with the best opportunities to participate in politics mobilized should have lasting implications for the incorporation of all women. The rise of the 'new' civic woman with independent means was important for the enfranchisement of all women (McCammon et al. 2001 on U.S.). A quick glance at the history of suffrage movements in the West also suggests that better-off middle class women often supported suffrage expansion to all women, legislation to protect women workers and even mobilized working-class women into politics (Evans 2012, ch.3 comparative; Morgan-Collins and Natusch 2022 on Sweden; Van Wingerden 1999, p.145-8 on U.K.).

One question that remains open is to what extent our findings apply to further electoral years and to other countries. Whilst lack of electoral registers after 1914 prevents us from examining whether the effects of the march were sustained over time, it seems very plausible. If the first enfranchised women did not yet establish voting habits or internalize that politics was for them (Corder and Wolbrecht 2016), then the experience of voting once would have mitigated such barriers in future elections. Likewise, whilst the 1913 Pilgrimage stood out as an internationally-renowned event, suffrage organizations in other countries typically employed a vast array of similar campaigning strategies, such as parades, protests and petitions (Banaszak 1996 on U.S. and Switzerland; Blom 2012 on Scandinavia; Grimshaw 1987 on New Zealand).

Finally, one may wonder whether our findings apply to more recent periods with greater number of women politicians. As full suffrage widened the possibilities of women to participate in politics, emerging women politicians may have become more effective than women activists in spurring other women's electoral participation. However, women politicians not always campaign on women's issues or seek to tap into

women's electorate, and a single woman politician cannot encompass varied experiences and identities of all women (Celis et al. 2008). Whilst women activists face similar difficulties, the collective nature of the organizations provides an opportunity to articulate shared perspectives (Weldon 2002) and therefore the potential to mobilize and represent a wider population of women. This would suggest that women activists have an important role to play in women's mobilization long after women's suffrage.

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Becoming Political: How Marching Suffragists Facilitated Women’s Electoral Participation in England

Appendix

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A Sample Selection

Table A.1: Comparing Sampled Counties with England

	England	Sample	Gloucester shire	Surrey	Norfolk	Yorkshire (W. R.)
<i>Election 1910 (Dec)</i>						
Entitled to vote	4,756,016	911,056	131,879	269,551	98,083	411,543
% Turnout	88.3	81.9	84.3	76.2	94.2	82
% Conservative Vote	48.5	45.5	47.3	53.3	40.8	41.4
% Liberal Vote	43.4	47.3	52.6	46.2	48.4	45.8
% Labour Vote	7.9	7.2	0	0.4	10.8	12.8
<i>Census 1911</i>						
Population	36,070,492	5,125,891	672,570	920,016	488,697	3,044,608
Pop. Density (sq.mi)	620.1	779.5	604.9	1272.8	243.4	1113.8
% pop. in Agric. sub-distr.	18.8	11.8	15.4	0.6	55.5	6.2
% pop. in Profes. sub-distr.	39.4	44.2	36.3	94.7	33.3	29.3
% pop. in Indust. sub-distr.	31.5	34.6	19.6	0	1.9	53.7

Notes: Election data sourced from Eggers-Spirling data set. Election data excludes unopposed constituencies ($N=72$); Census data from 1911 Census, collected and geocoded by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure (CAMPOP); CAMPOP defines registration sub-districts as Agricultural if more than 5% worked in agriculture and density was below 1 person per acre; otherwise as Textile if more than 25% worked in textiles, otherwise as Mining if more than 30% worked in mining or metals, otherwise as Professional and Semi-Professional if more than 7.5% worked in professions; otherwise as Transport if more than 15% worked in transport. Industrial combines units defined as textile, mining and transport. The Table shows that the four counties represent distinct electoral and occupational contexts across England. Surrey was densely populated, highly professional, leaned Conservative and had relatively lower turnout. Norfolk was scarcely populated, agricultural, leaned Liberal, and had above average turnout and support for Labour. West Riding of Yorkshire was densely populated, industrial, leaned Liberal and had above average support for Labour. Gloucestershire's electoral and occupation distribution was perhaps most closely representative of the entire England, although less industrial. Compared to England, the four selected counties leaned slightly more Liberal overall, had a slightly lower turnout, higher population density and were less agricultural. One concern is therefore generalizability of our results to more rural counties, although we do not find that the march spurred women's registration only in urban divisions in the four sampled counties.

B Data Sources and Collection

Further information on data collection of electoral registers.

Electoral registers were first produced under the Representation of the People Act 1832

and continue to be published today (see for example, Carter, Jacquie and Jennie Grimshaw. 2016. UK Electoral Registers and their Uses. Technical report The British Library.) We retrieve the registers from Ancestry.com when available, and from local archives otherwise. We geolocate the registers using 1911 shapefiles from the historical statistical project “A Vision of Britain”, Great Britain Historical GIS Project. 2017. Great Britain Historical GIS. University of Portsmouth. In order to proxy women’s share of total registration, that is the share of electors who registered for local elections only among all electors, we use data from ‘summary pages’ at the end of each register. The summary pages detail the number of electors registered within each voting category at the polling division level for the counties of Gloucestershire, Norfolk, Surrey, and at the parish levels for the West Riding of Yorkshire.

Further information on data collection of the march path.

We recover major cities and towns intersected by the march using an original NUWSS map, published on July 11, 1913 in *The Common Cause* (Figure B.1.). This map establishes the ‘nodes’ of the march, that is the major cities and towns intersected by the march. In our four sampled counties, we establish the full path of the march with historical roads that connect these ‘nodes’ , using the Ordnance Survey of England and Wales (1903-1906) that represents the closest publication to the first year in our sample (1910). Outside of the sample, we establish the path between the ‘nodes’ with a straight line for illustrative purposes only.

Further information on data collection of demographic variables.

Our control variables come from 1911 census. These data were collected and geocoded by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure (CAMPOP) (The Cambridge Group, ‘Population Past: an Interactive Atlas of Victorian and Edwardian Population’, *Local Population Studies* 100 (2018), pp. 77-81.) The CAMPOP data also report proxy measures of broad social class categories defined by the standard historical international social class scheme, HISCLASS (see van Leeuwen, Marco H.D. and Maas, Ineke, *HISCLASS: A Historical International Social Class Scheme Third* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011)). Information of roads in the sample comes from the

1904 Ordnance Survey Maps of the UK, which we georeference and geocode. The location of cities, necessary to compute distance to cities, comes from the Urban Population Database (Bennett, 2012).

Further information on individual-level data from electoral registers.

The sub-sample of 20 randomly selected parishes contains individual-level data from the electoral registers in West Riding of Yorkshire. Using the individual-level entries, we extract the names of all individuals registered to vote in the parish for each voting category. We then establish the gender of each individual in the sample based on their first names and using AI, which we cross validate with the package “Genderize” in R and though the manual verification of each individual record gendered. Note that whilst this approach provides the most precise indicator of women’s share of registration, it is only feasible for a subset of locations and years. Just collecting a sub-sample of 20 parishes in two years produces a dataset of 21,000 individual records. This procedure is extremely time consuming, in particular because the company that owns the picture’s registers (Ancestry.com) does not allow researchers to access to their materials in bulk (through webscraping or an API), which could otherwise have been processed using OCR. Note too that Ancestry’s digital records are fairly accurate regarding names, but are very noisy in their tagging of places, and do not tag the type of electors at all (which we need to separate local electors from the rest). For our research, we thus collected the information on place and type of elector manually form the PDFs. Although time-consuming compared to processing the PDFs with AI, this approach minimizes error which we consider to be a key objective to accurately summarize the characteristics of the 20 parishes considered.

Figure B.1: The March Path



Notes: This is a copy of the maps of the march printed in *The Common Cause*.

C Supplementary Results

C.1 Baseline Regression with all Control Variables

Table C.1: Baseline Regression, All Control Variables Displayed

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.014** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.013** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.015*** (0.006)
DPost	-0.002 (0.005)	0.203 (0.476)	0.320 (0.509)	0.341 (0.556)	-0.384 (0.692)
March	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.018** (0.010)
Distance to City (log, km)		0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)
Population (log, thousands)		-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Distance to Road (log, km)		-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.007)
Average Age		0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.000 (0.006)
Female Share of Population		0.284*** (0.068)	0.270*** (0.068)	0.291*** (0.067)	0.258** (0.133)
Share of Single Person Households, pct		0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Total Fertility Rate (children per women)		-0.003 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)
Age at Marriage for Women		0.004* (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Female Celibacy Rate		0.002* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Male Celibacy Rate		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)
Share of Married Women Working		0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
HISCLASS 1 (High Skill Non Manual, pct)		-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.027** (0.013)
HISCLASS 2 (Lower Skill Non Manual, pct)		-0.005 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.011)
HISCLASS 3 (High Skill Manual, pct)		-0.006 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.016* (0.010)
HISCLASS 4 (Lower Skill Manual, pct)		-0.006 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.017* (0.010)
HISCLASS 5 (Unskilled)		-0.008 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.018* (0.010)
Early Child Mortality Rate (per 100,000)		-0.023 (0.023)	-0.026 (0.024)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.024)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,938
R ²	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.250	0.286

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the parliamentary division level. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. All the controls are described in the text are included in the regression, but the interactions with the DPost variables are not shown for the sake of saving space.

Table C.2: Pretrends Regression, All Control Variables Displayed

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1914 X March	0.006 (0.008)	0.014* (0.009)	0.013** (0.007)	0.017*** (0.007)	0.017* (0.010)
1912 X March	-0.009 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)		0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.008)
1911 X March	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.007)			-0.001 (0.008)
1914	0.002 (0.002)	0.041 (0.432)	0.320 (0.509)	0.361 (0.640)	0.184 (0.493)
1912	0.005 (0.007)	-0.285 (0.426)		0.035 (0.297)	0.747 (0.881)
1911	0.007 (0.007)	-0.320 (0.540)			0.781 (0.979)
March	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)
Distance to City (log, km)		0.007 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)
Population (log, thousands)		0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
Distance to Road (log, km)		-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)
Average Age		0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)
Female Share of Population		0.268*** (0.083)	0.270*** (0.068)	0.312*** (0.070)	0.294*** (0.109)
Share of Single Person Households, pct		0.004** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Total Fertility Rate (children per women)		-0.001 (0.011)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.001 (0.013)
Age at Marriage for Women		0.006* (0.003)	0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
Female Celibacy Rate		0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Male Celibacy Rate		-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)
Share of Married Women Working		0.002** (0.001)	0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
HISCLASS 1 (High Skill Non Manual, pct)		-0.016* (0.009)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.017* (0.010)
HISCLASS 2 (Lower Skill Non Manual, pct)		-0.007 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.010)
HISCLASS 3 (High Skill Manual, pct)		-0.009 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
HISCLASS 4 (Lower Skill Manual, pct)		-0.009 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
HISCLASS 5 (Unskilled)		-0.010 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.009)
Early Child Mortality Rate (per 100,000)		-0.027 (0.024)	-0.026 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.025)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,492	3,486	1,766	2,713	2,909
R ²	0.049	0.263	0.263	0.251	0.289

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the parliamentary division level. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. All the controls are described in the text are included in the regression, but the interactions with the year binary variables are not shown for the sake of saving space.

C.2 Individual-Level Records Analysis

We collect individual-level data for a random selection of 20 parishes in the West Riding of Yorkshire. Figure C.1 maps the parishes that were randomly selected for collection. We collect the names of all electors in each parish (electors entitled to vote in all elections, including parliamentary elections). We then attribute a gender to the names observed in these records through Chat-GPT, which we cross-validate with the algorithm “Genderize”, and manually by going through the attributed genders one by one. Overall, 11% of names in the sample are female, 87% are male and 2% are unknown (due to names that cannot be clearly gendered because they are unreadable or gender neutral). Table C.3 gives the summary statistics of these parishes. On average, the share of local electors in these selected parishes is close to the ones observed in the entire sample (the difference between the selected sample and the entire sample is roughly one standard deviation in both the treatment and control groups). This subsample allows us to provide reassurance on the validity of our preferred outcome variable. First, the share of women in local electors is high (always above 50%). Second, in Table C.4 we show that the growth in the share of local electors between 1911 and 1914 is, despite a small number of observations, significantly associated with the growth of women observed in the register. This provides reassurance that the growth in the mass of the local electorate before and after the march is actually driven by women. Note that the regression coefficient is less than one which could imply that our preferred regression are a conservative (lower bound) estimate in the change in electoral participation of women.

The plots in Figure C.2 show the cumulative distribution function of the share of women in local electors across localities, computed separately for treated and untreated localities. While the distribution of the share of women in the local electorate barely changed between 1911 and 1914 in untreated parishes, we see that the cumulative distribution function of 1914 first order stochastically dominates that of 1911. In other words, the probability of observing high shares of women in the local electorate is higher in 1914 than in 1911 in treated parishes, whereas no visible difference in distribution is

observed in untreated ones. This statistical observation provides reassurance that it is women who are driving the observed increase in local registration in the entire sample.

Table C.3: Summary Statistics of Parishes Selected for Individual Records


	Outside Path		On March Path	
	Mean (1)	Sd (2)	Mean (3)	Sd (4)
<i>Electoral Registration Measures in 1911</i>				
Total Electors	691.09	941.75	309.5	359.95
Local Electors	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.06
Number of Women	90.73	123.03	35.43	31.26
Share Local over Total Electors	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.06
Share Women in Local Electors	0.54	0.16	0.61	0.24
<i>Electoral Registration Measures in 1914:</i>				
Total Electors	699.27	964.41	316.7	378.94
Local Electors	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.06
Number of Women	91.27	123.74	36.86	31.05
Share Local over Total Electors	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.06
Share Women in Local Electors	0.55	0.15	0.68	0.17
N	10		10	

Table C.4: Number of Women and Share of Local Electors

	Share of Local Electors (growth 1911-14)
Women in Register (growth 1911-14)	0.252** (0.114)
Observations	18
R ²	0.234


Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the growth in the share of local electors between 1911 and 1914 and the variable of interest is the growth in the number of women in the register. All the controls are described in the text are included in the regression, but the interactions with the year binary variables are not shown for the sake of saving space.

Figure C.1: Map of randomly selected parishes for analysis at the individual level



Notes: This map shows the location of the randomly selected parishes along the Suffragists March path and the intersecting Roman road used as placebo routes.

Figure C.2: Distribution of the Share of Women in Local Electors



Notes: These plots give the cumulative distribution (cdf) of the share of women in local electors across locations. The cdfs are computed separately for locations along the placebo routes ("untreated group") and for marched-on-parishes ("treated group").

D Threats to Inference

D.1 Urbanization

Table D.1: Heterogeneity of the March on Registration: Effects by Urbanization

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.016** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.007)	0.015*** (0.006)
DPost X March X Urban	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.021)
DPost X Urban	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.222 (0.643)	-0.171 (0.717)	-0.174 (0.768)	-0.458 (0.769)
Urban X March	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)
DPost	-0.045 (0.047)	-0.074* (0.046)	-0.061 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.045)	-0.079* (0.047)
March	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.019** (0.010)
Urban	-0.014 (0.014)	0.005 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.015)	0.004 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	No
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,490	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,985
R ²	0.051	0.262	0.267	0.254	0.284

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Controls are described in the text.


D.2 Strategic Placement of the March

Table D.2: The Placebo March along Roman Roads

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X 'Placebo' March	-0.012* (0.007)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.008)
DPost	-0.001 (0.005)	0.162 (0.546)	0.282 (0.607)	0.215 (0.654)	-0.404 (0.728)
'Placebo' March	0.018 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.000 (0.009)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1912	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,311	3,305	1,672	2,568	2,752
R ²	0.051	0.267	0.273	0.258	0.284

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. The variable of interest is a binary variable equal to one if the division intersects the path of the placebo march. The placebo march runs along main roads that connected the largest urban centers in the county without following the path of the march.

Figure D.1: Map of 'Placebo' March



Notes: This map shows the location of the treated divisions, those along the actual Pilgrimage route, and those along the 'placebo' march path. The 'placebo' march path is constricted by following divisions located along the largest roads connecting the largest urban hubs in the region, but that are not located along the path of the Pilgrimage. In the West Riding of Yorkshire, we use the road from York to Manchester crossing through Leeds, in Gloucestershire we choose the road from Gloucester to Bristol. In Surrey and Norfolk, the major axis go in the direction of London so we chose a path in the direction of London but that is an alternative routes to the suffragists' way, along roads that the direction of historical Roman roads. The shape files are from McCormick, Michael, Huang, Guoping, Zambotti, Giovanni, and Lavash, Jessica, "Roman Road Network (version 2008 available on Harvard Dataverse)", Harvard University (2008).

E Robustness Checks

E.1 Validity of the Outcome Variable

Table E.1: Interaction with High Share of Female Celibacy

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)
DPost X March X High Female Celibacy	0.024* (0.015)	0.026** (0.013)	0.033*** (0.013)	0.028** (0.014)	0.028*** (0.012)
DPost	0.003 (0.003)	0.154 (0.402)	0.176 (0.461)	0.271 (0.483)	-0.461 (0.737)
March	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.033** (0.015)	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.031** (0.016)	-0.028* (0.015)
High Single Female Share	0.045*** (0.013)	0.005 (0.010)	0.012 (0.010)	0.006 (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R ²	0.116	0.255	0.260	0.248	0.283

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Female Celibacy and High Class is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of female celibacy (which excludes widows) above the sample median.

Table E.2: Interaction with High Share of Single Person Households

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
DPost X March X High Single HH Share	0.029*** (0.011)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.009)	0.032*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.010)
DPost	-0.001 (0.005)	0.096 (0.505)	0.256 (0.548)	0.238 (0.578)	-0.500 (0.779)
March	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)
High Single HH Share	0.026*** (0.011)	0.019** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.016** (0.008)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R ²	0.070	0.256	0.261	0.248	0.285

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Single HH Share is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of single households above the sample median.

Table E.3: Interaction with High Share of Single Person Households and High Share of High Class

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)
DPost X March X High Single HH Share and High Class	0.029*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.008)
DPost	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.053 (0.403)	-0.015 (0.438)	-0.058 (0.490)	-0.453 (0.674)
March	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.014* (0.009)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.014* (0.009)
High Single HH Share and High Class	0.015* (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.010)	0.013 (0.009)	0.000 (0.008)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R ²	0.054	0.252	0.259	0.246	0.282

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Single HH Share is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of single households and a share of high class households that are both above the sample median. Results are qualitatively the same when using the share of single women (excludes widows) instead of the share of single households. Not reported to save space, but results are available upon demand.

E.2 Unit Fixed Effects


Table E.4: Unit Fixed Effects

	Share of Local Electors			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DPost X March	0.008* (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009* (0.005)	0.008* (0.005)
DPost	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,494	1,769	2,718	2,916
R ²	0.896	0.951	0.899	0.887

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Regressions include division-level fixed effects.

E.3 Balanced Control and Treatment Size

Figure E.1: Control Group Restricted to Polling Divisions Along Roads.



Notes: Plots the coefficient of the treatment ($March_p$) interacted with year FE; 1913 is taken as a reference; 95% and 90% CIs; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level; models run separately for full sample and a restricted sample (<15k and within 2 km of a road). Control group is restricted to parishes along large roads that connect large urban centres, as described in section D.2

E.4 Dropping Individual Counties

Table E.5: Dropping Individual Counties

	Share of Local Electors			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DPost X March	0.018** [0.05]	0.012 [0.17]	0.018* [0.11]	0.010 [0.11]
DPost	0.475 [0.31]	0.030 [0.95]	2.797 [0.18]	0.003 [0.12]
March	-0.017 [0.13]	-0.027** [0.05]	-0.037** [0.05]	-0.013 [0.42]
County Dropped	GLO	NFK	SUR	WRY
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3016	2922	3121	1405
R^2	0.257	0.305	0.251	0.278

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. p Wild cluster bootstrapped p -values are reported in square brackets. Dropping individual counties decreases the number of clusters below the rule of thumb of 30. Wild Cluster Bootstrap helps diminish the risk of small cluster number bias.

E.5 Standard Error Clustering


Table E.6: Wild Cluster Bootstrap

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.014** [0.04]	0.015* [0.08]	0.013* [0.1]	0.015* [0.07]	0.015** [0.05]
DPost	-0.002 [0.91]	0.203 [0.67]	0.32 [0.51]	0.341 [0.53]	-0.412 [0.6]
March	-0.02 [0.13]	-0.025** [0.05]	-0.023* [0.06]	-0.025** [0.05]	-0.018 [0.11]
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	3494	3488	1766	2713	2918
R^2	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.25	0.284

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Wild cluster bootstrap with parliamentary divisions as clusters is used to estimate p -values (9999 bootstrap iterations), bootstrapped p -values are reported in square brackets.

Figure E.2: Different Cluster Sizes


(a) Baseline Regression with Different Grid Sizes for Clustering Standard Errors



Specification

- Spec (1) – No Controls
- Spec (2) – All Sample, all Controls
- △ Spec (3) – Only 1912 and 1914, all Controls
- * Spec (4) – Exclude 1913, all Controls
- Spec (5) – Exclude Urban Centers and Parishes far from Roads

(b) Number of Clusters



Notes: Figure E.2a shows the OLS estimates of the baseline regression as a function of the size of the grid used to cluster standard errors. The grid is a fishnet of varying size, from $0.1^\circ \times 0.1^\circ$ to $1^\circ \times 1^\circ$. The default size throughout the paper is $0.1^\circ \times 0.1^\circ$. The vertical bars represent the 95% and 90% confidence intervals. The six specifications are also described in the text and in Table 2.

Table E.7: Standard Errors Clustered at the Treatment Level

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.017** (0.008)	0.017*** (0.007)	0.015** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	0.017*** (0.007)
DPost	-0.001 (0.002)	0.153 (0.421)	0.276 (0.504)	0.304 (0.515)	-0.493 (0.552)
March	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.011)	-0.016* (0.009)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,348	3,342	1,692	2,602	2,604
R ²	0.052	0.275	0.276	0.270	0.321

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Standard Errors are clustered at the treatment \times county level.

F References to Newspaper Articles

1. Irish Citizen, *The Woman's Pilgrimage*, July 26, 1913
2. Common Cause, *Pilgrimages Old and New*, July 18, 1913
3. Reading Standard, *Land's End to London*, July 26, 1913
4. Cambridge Independent Press, *Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 18, 1913
5. Maidenhead Advertiser, *The Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 23, 1913
6. Staffordshire Sentinel, *Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 12, 1913; South Bucks Standard, *Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 24, 1913; Gloucester Journal, *The Suffragist's Pilgrimage*, July 19, 1913
7. Oxford Chronicle, *The Women's Pilgrimage*, July 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, *Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 25, 1913
8. Common Cause, *Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 18, 1913; Common Cause, *Special Pilgrimage Number*, July 11, 1913; Common Cause, *Last Days of the Pilgrimage*, July 25, 1913; Tonbridge Free Press, *The Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 15, 1913
9. Windsor and Eton Express, *The Women's Pilgrimage in Berkshire*, July 26, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, *The Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 23, 1913; Western Mail, *Women's Pilgrimage*, July 17, 1913
10. South Bucks Standard, *Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 24, 1913; Oxford Chronicle, *The Women's Pilgrimage*, July 25, 1913
11. Evening Irish Times, *The Non-Militant Pilgrimage*, July 25, 1913
12. Tonbridge Free Press, *The Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 15, 1913; Eastbourne Chronicle, *The Suffrage Pilgrimage*, July 26, 1913; Daily News (London), *Women's Pilgrimage*, July 12, 1913; Daily News (London), *The Women's Pilgrimage*, July 19,

- 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913 ;Birkenhead News, Correspondence, July 2, 1913
13. Reading Observer, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 19, 1913; Warwick and Warwickshire Advertiser, Woman Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 12, 1913; Middlesex County Time, The Watling Street Route, July 23, 1913; Hants and Sussex News, The Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 9, 1913
 14. Staffordshire Sentinel, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 28, 1913
 15. Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 9, 1913
 16. Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913; Oxford Chronicle, Suffragists on Pilgrimage, July 11, 1913; Oxford Chronicle, The Women's Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Staffordshire Sentinel, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 12, 1913
 17. Chelmsford Chronicle, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913
 18. Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Reading Standard, Land's End to London, July 26, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 9, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 16, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 23, 1913
 19. Hampshire Observer, The New Pilgrimage, July 26, 1913
 20. Tonbridge Free Press, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 15, 1913
 21. Staffordshire Sentinel, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 12, 1913
 22. Reading Standard, Land's End to London, July 26, 1913; Wells Journal, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913; Windsor and Eton Express, The Women's Pil-

grimage in Berkshire, July 26, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 23, 1913

23. Taunton Courier, Women's Pilgrimage, July 9, 1913; Hampshire Observer, The New Pilgrimage, July 26, 1913

24. Common Cause, Last Days of the Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913

25. South Bucks Standard, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 24, 1913; Reading Standard, Land's End to London, July 26, 1913