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

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# Immigrant rights expansion and local integration: Evidence from Italy

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# Immigrant Rights Expansion and Local Integration: Evidence from Italy

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**Abstract**

We study how expanding immigrants' rights affects their political and social integration by exploiting Romania's accession to the EU in 2007, which granted municipal voting and residency rights to Romanian immigrants in Italy. Using an event-study analysis at the municipality level, we find three key results. First, enfranchisement increased Romanians' turnout and the likelihood of electing Romanian-born councilors in municipal elections, particularly in competitive races. An instrumented difference-in-differences strategy shows that this effect is driven by the enfranchisement of preexisting immigrants, not by new arrivals. Second, the rate of consent to organ donation among Romanian immigrants increased after 2007, indicating that the expansion of rights extends beyond political representation to prosocial behavior. However, we also find that the presence of immigrants still increases the probability of right-leaning party victories and municipal spending on public security, while reducing spending on social programs. This suggests that native backlash to immigrant presence outweighs the political influence of newly enfranchised immigrant communities in shaping local electoral outcomes.

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# 1 Introduction

Globalization continues to play an important role in shaping the modern world. With a world population of migrants approaching 300 million (World Migration Report 2024), immigration is often a topic at the forefront of political debates in advanced economies. Scholars have argued for decades that free mobility of labor brings economic benefits (Hamilton and Whalley 1984; Clemens 2011; Kennan 2013; Foged et al. 2022). However, many countries have experienced that these economic benefits are often accompanied by rather negative social outcomes such as social segregation and marginalization of migrants (Bauder 2006), as well as political backlash and polarization (Barone et al. 2016; Becker and Fetzer 2016; Halla et al. 2017; Viskanic 2017; Barrera et al. 2020; Tabellini 2020; Koukal et al. 2021; Mayda et al. 2022). It is essential that we understand what measures governments can take to mitigate the negative effects while maximizing the benefits of labor mobility.

Naturalization is often considered a process that expands immigrants' rights and fosters integration. However, in practice, citizenship is hardly a solution in the short run. First, obtaining citizenship via residency is typically a long process for foreigners, with most countries requiring at least five years of residency to be eligible and many requiring at least ten years. Second, reforming the process of citizenship acquisition is generally among the most divisive topics, making it difficult to substantially speed up the process. Finally, naturalization can be very costly for immigrants. Some countries require individuals to renounce their original citizenship in the event of naturalization. Even when this is not the case, citizenship can have consequences on the individual's cultural identity, which may itself generate negative effects (Dahl et al. 2022).

Milder forms of expanding rights for migrants have been adopted around the world. Many countries grant foreign residents the right to vote in local or national elections. For instance, commonwealth citizens who are residents of the UK are allowed to vote in various elections in the UK, including the general election, and can be elected in most political

offices.[0] Moreover, processes of legalization of undocumented migrants have been enacted in most western counties, easing the right to residency. The U.S. has enacted some of the largest legalization programs for migrants (Casarico et al. 2018), in which 2.8 million undocumented migrants could gain permanent legal status. An interesting case of migrant rights expansion, combining local voting rights and residency rights, is the accession of new member states to the European Union and the subsequent acquisition of EU citizenship by their nationals. Citizens of these new member states residing in another EU country gain the right to reside without a visa and to vote and run in local elections.

This paper exploits Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007 to study how the resulting expansion of political and residency rights for Romanians in Italy—the country's largest immigrant group—influenced their local political representation and prosocial behavior, and more in general, how this affected the ideology of the winning party, and local public finance. Following Romania's EU entry, Romanian citizens residing in Italy gained the right to vote and stand in municipal elections, along with enhanced residency rights. We implement an event-study analysis around 2007 to estimate the effects of this rights expansion. Since EU citizens are the only noncitizen residents eligible to vote in Italian municipal and European Parliament elections, to isolate these effects from broader immigrant-related trends, we conduct placebo tests for Albanian and Moroccan immigrants—the second and third largest immigrant groups in Italy—who remained without voting rights in contrast to Romanians. We find an increase in local political representation and organ donation for Romanians but not for other immigrant groups whose rights remained stable.

We first look at political representation. For this outcome, the voting right extension is the most relevant change brought about by the obtaining of the European Union citizenship. The enfranchisement of Romanian immigrants increases the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities that have a higher share of Romanians. Moreover, using triple differences, we find that municipalities that were expecting a competitive

[0]On the effect of immigrant enfranchisement on outcomes other than integration, see Bhatiya (2025), Razin and Sadka (2017), Engdahl et al. (2020), and Ferwerda (2021).

election are more likely to elect a Romanian-born councilor, which suggests that political parties are incentivized to include minority candidates on the expectation of a competitive election to gain votes from their newly enfranchised constituents. Since the event-study analysis only gives us the reduced-form estimates for the effect of Romania's accession to the EU, it is not able to disentangle whether the effect we find is driven by the enfranchisement of the preexisting Romanian population or by the Romanian immigrants that arrived in large numbers after 2007. To address this issue, we instrument the share of newly arrived Romanians using as instrument a combination of the cross-sectoral demand for foreign labor in Italy and the outflow of Romanians to non-Italian destinations. We find that the effects are driven by Romanians who had migrated to Italy prior to the accession.

Next, we investigate whether the effect of obtaining EU citizenship extends beyond political participation. We study whether prosocial behavior, proxied by consent to organ donation, increases among Romanian immigrants in Italy, after 2007. After Romania's accession, Romanians' expectation of being able to reside in Italy in the long run increased; moreover, Romanians could actively participate in local politics. Both changes potentially increased their sense of belonging: we thus hypothesize this would affect the commitment to their locality. Indeed, we observe an increase after 2007 in the number of immigrants from Romania who register as potential organ donors in the given municipality, even after controlling for the number of Romanian immigrants. We do not see such an increase for the Albanians or Moroccans in Italy, suggesting that the increase observed for Romanians is caused by having obtained the EU citizenship.

Since enfranchisement changes the composition of constituents, we study whether the political orientation of the winning party in municipal elections changes to reflect political preferences of those who were granted voting rights. In particular, right-leaning parties in Italy have either advocated for anti-immigrant policies themselves or been in a coalition with those that did during our observation period. However, we find an overall trend of increase in support for right-wing parties in municipalities with more immigrants. In both municipalities

with more Romanians and municipalities with other immigrant groups, such as Albanians and Moroccans, we see a higher likelihood of right-leaning parties winning. That is, the winning party is more likely to be correlated with the presence of any immigrant community than with the presence of an immigrant community with voting rights.[1]

Finally, since local public finances are managed by the municipal government, we examine whether local expenditure patterns change as Romanian immigrant obtain stronger rights. Thus, we are interested in whether expenditure shares increase in categories that are more likely to benefit Romanian immigrants to capture the attention of the new constituents. However, we find that municipalities with a greater immigrant presence see an increase in public security spending and a decrease in social spending as shares of total expenditure. Since there is no statistical difference between municipalities with franchised immigrants (Romanians) and those with immigrants without voting rights (Albanians or Moroccans), we believe that the increase in the likelihood of a right-leaning party winning in municipal elections is driven by the natives' reaction to the presence of immigrants.

Overall, our results show positive effects of immigrant right expansion on immigrant political representation and prosocial behavior. However, enfranchisement is not enough to overpower the electoral backlash against immigrants.

Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on immigrant integration and immigrants' legal rights in their destination country. Legalization of previously illegal immigrants leads to an improvement in their labor market outcomes (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) , Lozano and Sorensen (2011), Pan (2012), and Steigleder and Sparber (2017), a reduction in crime among them (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) and Pinotti (2017)), an increase in tax filing and return (Cascio and Lewis 2019) and an increase in state transfers to regions populated by them (Sabet and Winter (2024)). Moreover, some studies document that naturalization improves social integration (Hainmueller et al. (2017)) and labor market outcomes (Gathmann and Keller (2017), while the timing of opportuni-

[1]Barone et al. (2016) find an increase in votes for the center-right coalition in both national and mayoral elections in Italy due to immigration.

ties for political participation does not affect political integration (Engdahl et al. (2020)). However, to the best of our knowledge, no papers have studied the effect of a combined expansion voting and residency rights. Razin and Sadka (2017) propose a model that suggests possible redistribution outcomes of enfranchisement depending on migrants' skill level and franchise status, and Ferwerda (2021) shows that redistribution changes with immigrants' voting rights. Bhatiya (2025), using text analysis of political discourse, detects that politicians cater to immigrants' needs after they are enfranchised.

We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we show that enfranchisement has immediate effects on political representation. Municipalities with more Romanian citizens are significantly more likely to elect Romanian-born councilors. Second, we find that expanding voting and residency rights promotes integration and altruistic behavior among the immigrants who benefit from it, as seen by the increase in consent to organ donation. Finally, we uncover the mechanisms through which immigrants gain more representation. More specifically, we show that the expectation of a competitive election increases the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor. We also show that the increase in political representation is driven by the preexisting Romanian population that was granted voting rights in 2007, suggesting that our findings are driven by the enfranchisement itself and not the drastic increase in the number of minority constituents.

More broadly, our paper relates to the long-standing literature on enfranchisement. The two most prominent strands of that literature concern women's suffrage and the U.S. Voting Rights Act. Lott and Kenny (1999), Abrams and Settle (1999), Washington (2008), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Funk and Gathmann (2015), Cascio and Shenhav (2020), and Kose et al. (2020) find effects of women's suffrage on the size of government, the amount of social and education spending, and political preferences. Regarding the Voting Rights Act, Cascio and Washington (2014) find an increase in voter turnout and state transfers and Facchini et al. (2020) find a change in policing activities. Further, Bernini et al. (2023) document a backlash among white constituents.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a detailed description of our research setting. In Section 3, we describe the data used in our analyses. The empirical strategy is laid out in Section 4, and the results follow in Section 5. Section 6 presents the robustness checks. Finally, we share our concluding remarks in Section 7.

# 2 Setting

Italy is an ideal setting to study the effects of immigrant right expansion and integration for three reasons. First, it has a significant foreign population. In 2020, there were over five million foreign citizens, which constituted 10.4 percent of the total population in 2019 (OECD 2022). Moreover, since Italy is a member state of the EU, foreign nationals can participate in local elections as long as they are EU citizens. Finally, there are around eight thousand municipalities in Italy, which allows for fine-grained data and large variations.

Since 1990, Italy has constantly experienced net in-migration flows, with migrants coming mainly from Romania, Albania and Morocco.[2] Italy, together with Spain, is the main destination country for Romanian migrants, hosting 300,000 of them in 2005 and almost 1.2 million in 2017 (Figure 1). As can be seen in Figure 2, migrants of all origins tend to concentrate in the northern and central parts of the country, where the majority of manufacturing jobs are located. The regions with the most migrants are the four main northern regions (Lombardy, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, and Veneto) and the central regions of Tuscany and Lazio. Romanians in particular are mainly concentrated in Lazio, Lombardy, and Piedmont. Although the general region of residence is similar for different migrant communities, we still see variation in the specific municipality that has more Romanian migrants compared to the other groups as illustrated in Figure 3.

[2]Source: Istituto Cattaneo

## 2.1 Municipal Governments in Italy

Non-Italian EU citizens who are residents of Italy can vote in municipal elections. Municipalities constitute the lowest level of government in all of Italy. The size of a municipality ranges from a few hundred inhabitants to approximately 2.5 million, although the latter (Rome) is an outlier. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the municipality population. The median municipality has 2,293 residents. To give a sense of granularity of the data, even at the ninetieth percentile, the municipal population is just 12,212.

Each municipality functions as a local government and is managed by a mayor and a municipal council. The size of the latter increases discontinuously with the municipal population. It ranges from a minimum and median of twelve councilors, or ten after 2011, to a maximum of sixty, or forty-eight after 2011. The mayor is directly elected by the municipal population. The candidate whose party or supporting coalition receives the most votes becomes the mayor. The constituents also vote for their most preferred councilor candidate, and the candidates who receive the most votes constitute the municipal council.[3] Municipal elections in Italy have high turnout rates, which always exceeded sixty percent from 2000 to 2020, as depicted in Figure 5. Moreover, despite the decline in overall turnout over time, in most years the municipal turnout rate is comparable to the turnout for the general election.

## 2.2 Romanians' Voting Rights

The Council Directive of the EU requires every member state to extend the right to vote—and to run as candidates in municipal elections—to EU citizens residing in a member state of which they are not nationals.[4] Italy adopted the directive in 1996 and issued a law to allow non-Italian EU citizens access to electoral contests at the municipality level.[5] The law

[3]When expressing their preference, voters can typically find some information about the councilor candidate on the ballot, including age and place of birth. See Figure 21 in the Appendix for example.

[4]Council Directive 94/80/EC of 1994 (EU)

[5]Law 1996, n.197

granted the full right to vote in municipal elections to non-Italian EU citizens, with the sole condition that they register for a special list of non-Italian potential voters who are residents in the municipality. Registration is only required for non-Italians who are voting for the first time. The law also regulates the right of non-Italian EU citizens to run as candidates. Upon providing documentation from the home country proving that the individual indeed possesses the right to be elected back home, they are allowed to run for any municipal office with the exception of mayor or vice-mayor.

## 2.3 Romania's Accession to the EU

Due to the enlargement of the EU, the set of nationalities covered by the aforementioned laws is not fixed over time. When the enfranchisement laws were first introduced, the EU was mainly composed of western European countries. Thus, only western Europeans residing in Italy were initially granted the right to vote for Italian municipal governments. However, as new countries were admitted to the EU, different immigrant groups were granted the right to vote and the right to candidacy. The first wave of expansion of the EU was in 2004 when a large pool of mostly eastern European countries became member states.[6] The second was in 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. The latter expansion was particularly consequential for Italy, as it enfranchised a large part of its migrant population.

Joining the EU meant that Romanians no longer needed a visa to reside in other EU member states. Furthermore, it allowed Romanians to apply for a faster naturalization procedure, which in Italy reduced the residency requirement from ten to four years (with an additional two to three years to receive approval). However, in Italy, only the years of residence accrued after 2007 were considered valid for Romanians for this fast-track naturalization, meaning no Romanian could obtain Italian citizenship through the expedited procedure before 2014.

Joining the EU also meant easier access to the Italian labor market for Romanians.

[6]These include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta

However, complete access to the labor market did not happen with the accession in 2007, but was rolled out gradually over time because the old EU member states were allowed to place restriction on the labor market access during the transition period. Italy did not fully lift these restrictions for Romanians until January 1, 2012. An exception was made for employees in some sectors, such as agriculture, hotels, construction, and domestic work, as well as highly qualified workers who did not need a work permit. The rest of the sectors continued to require a work permit until January 1, 2012.

We use a survey conducted by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) on Romanian Migrants in Italy before and after Romania's accession to the EU to understand the difference in demographic and economic characteristics between Romanians who had migrated to Italy prior to the accession and those who arrived afterward. The survey interviewed a thousand individuals in 2011. We use national weights provided by the survey to obtain nationally representative statistics. Table 1 displays statistics on age, marital status, existence of dependent children, education, income, and voter registration status for those arrived during 2004–2006 and 2007–2011 respectively. Newly arrived Romanians are significantly more likely to be younger, single, and less educated. In addition, they are less likely to have any dependent children or to be registered to vote.

Table 2 shows the employment share of Romanian migrants by sector. We see that the newly arrived are 2.9 percentage points less likely to be employed in hotels and restaurants, and 5 percentage points less likely to be employed in manufacturing. However, they are 6.14 percentage points more likely to be looking for work. Given that the only sectors where they could be employed without a work permit are agriculture, hotels, construction, and domestic work, those looking for work are likely to find jobs in these sectors.

# 3 Data

We combine multiple data sources to construct the dataset for our analysis. The main dataset from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), includes the number of foreign residents and their citizenship status for approximately eight thousand municipalities from 2003 to 2018.[7] The observations are provided at the municipality-by-year level, which is also the level of analysis throughout this paper. The summary statistics of our variables are provided in Table 3.

## 3.1 Electoral Data

We merge our main dataset with data on electoral outcomes to study various political outcomes including political representation and political orientation of the winning party. We use data from the "Anagrafe degli amministratori locali" provided by the Italian Ministry of Interior to gather information on all elected municipal representatives between 1986 and 2020. The dataset provides personal information on all municipal elected officials who are in office on the 31st of December every year. In particular, we collect their office (councilor, mayor, etc.), municipality of birth, level of education, and political party. For representatives born outside Italy, the country of birth is listed instead of the municipality of birth. However, we do not observe their citizenship status. We augment our dataset by adding information on all municipal and regional electoral returns between 2000 and 2020, as provided by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. In particular, we gather information on the exact election date, the total number of registered voters and the turnout in municipal elections, as well as the number of votes gained by every party. Moreover, we use electoral outcomes for regional elections, namely the number of registered voters and votes cast, collected at the municipality level, and compare it to the same outcomes in simultaneous municipal elections.

[7] Because of municipality splits and mergers, the number of municipalities may differ from year to year.

## 3.2 Organ Donation Consent Registry

We use data provided by the Italian Organ Donors Association (AIDO) on the number, municipality of residence, and place of birth of people who give their consent through AIDO to donate their organs after death. Although we do not observe the citizenship status of the individuals consenting, we proxy for their country of origin using their place of birth. In Italy, approximately 10 million people have consented to organ donation; according to the Italian Ministry of Health, 8.5 million of them have indicated their consent during the issuance of their ID card, and the remaining 1.5 million consented through AIDO. Natives are asked for their consent to donations when they obtain their Italian ID card (compulsory after turning 18), but non-Italian EU residents can continue using ID cards issued by their country of origin.[8]

## 3.3 Local Public Finance

The data on local public finance come from the Italian Public Authority Data (AIDA PA). We observe yearly municipal revenue divided by source (for example, tax type or transfer from the provincial government) and spending by municipal governments divided by type of use. We construct revenue shares and expenditure shares for categories of interest by respectively dividing the revenue and expenditure in each category by the total revenue and the total expenditure in the given municipality to make these numbers comparable across different municipalities.

## 3.4 Data for the Instrument

We merge Italian sectoral employment data with data on migration from the OECD to construct our instrument. First, we combine sectoral employment data at the municipality level with nationwide data on foreign employment by sector provided by ISTAT to estimate the

[8]The same applies to non-EU nationals residing in Italy as long as they obtain a residence permit.

share of foreign employment in each municipality. Both datasets are from the 2001 census, the last census before Romania's accession to the EU. The sectoral data provide employment information for seventeen sectors. Next, we are interested in how many Romanians left Romania for destinations other than Italy every year. The OECD migration database provides yearly data on outflows of Romanians to OECD destinations. However, the data are not collected consistently for every destination country. The outflow variable is available for the entire observation period in our IV analysis (2003–2018) for nineteen of the destination countries in the OECD dataset.[9]

# 4 Empirical Strategy

## 4.1 Effect of Romania's Accession to the EU in 2007

The Italian law allows all EU citizens to vote and run in municipal elections and to stay in the country without a visa. Romanian residents obtained their residency right with Romania's accession to the EU in January 2007. We conduct an event study around 2007 to study the effect of such expansion of rights on political representation, social capital, political orientation of the winning party, and local public finance. The following is the specification we use:

$$Y_{mt} = \alpha + \beta Immig_m^{2003} + \Big[ \sum_{s=1986}^{2020} \gamma_s Immig_m^{2003} \times \mathbb{1}_t\{t = s\} \Big] + \eta_p + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{mt}. \qquad (1)$$

Here, $Y_{mt}$ is the outcome variable for municipality $m$ in year $t$ and $Immig_m^{2003}$ is the share of immigrants from a given origin country in municipality $m$ in 2003, the first year for which we have the count of immigrants from each origin country at the municipality level. We fix the share of immigrants at its 2003 level as our time-invariant measure. We argue that the 2003

[9]These nineteen destination countries are Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, South Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

share of Romanian immigrants is exogenous with respect to the event because the official conclusion of accession negotiations with Romania was confirmed by the European Council on December 17, 2004, although Romania had submitted its official application to join in 1995. Our alternative specification includes municipality fixed effects instead of $Immig_m^{2003}$. Finally, $\eta_p$ represents province fixed effects and $\theta_t$ denotes year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level to account for the correlations in the error term among observations in the same municipality.

We estimate equation (1) for Romanians as our main result, but we also estimate the specification for Albanians and Moroccans, the largest immigrant groups after Romanians throughout the observation period, for comparison. This placebo analysis is intended to discern whether the changes we observe are due to a trend among immigrants in general or to the right expansion specific to Romanians. As the Albanian and Moroccan immigrants do not get additional rights in Italy, we use them as our comparison group to separate out the general trend among immigrants.

Although immigrants from other EU states could also constitute a helpful comparison group in theory since they have had the right to vote since 1996, it is difficult to compare our findings on Romanians with immigrants from other EU states for two reasons. First, in most of our analyses, we proxy for the number of immigrants using information on a resident's place of birth, not nationality. However, many residents born in wealthier western EU states, such as Germany or France, have Italian names, indicating that they are likely to be Italians born abroad, not immigrants. This makes it difficult to conduct an analysis for the population that is relevant to our research, since these foreign-born Italians have always had voting rights because they are Italian citizens. Second, the number of those born in Germany or France, which are the two most prominent places of birth among EU countries after Romania, is much lower than the number born in Romania. In contrast, the number of people born in Albania and the number born in Morocco are more comparable to the size of the Romanian-born population.

Importantly, while the EU citizenship strengthens both voting and residency rights, enfranchisement is indeed the most important channel when focusing on strictly electoral outcomes.

## 4.2 Effect of Expanding Immigrant Rights vs. New Arrivals

The event-study specification boils down to a difference-in-differences specification in which we compare the pre- and post-2007 outcomes for municipalities that had many Romanian residents with those that did not in 2003. Although the event guarantees that Romanian immigrants who are not Italian citizens could only vote after 2007, it does not allow us to distinguish between effects arising from the preexisting Romanian population that was granted voting rights in 2007 and those arising from the influx of Romanians who entered Italy with voting rights after 2007. To identify the driving force of the effect on representation, we employ the following instrumented difference-in-differences specification:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{mt} = \beta_0 + \beta^E Early_{mt} + \beta_1 Post2007_t + \gamma^E Early_{mt} \times Post2007_t \\ + \gamma^N New_{mt} + \eta_m + \theta_t + \nu_{mt}. \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Here, $Early_{mt}$ denotes the share of preexisting Romanians and $New_{mt}$ the share of Romanians that arrived after the accession. As an exogenous proxy for $Early_{mt}$, we use the share of Romanian immigrants in municipality $m$ in 2003.

New arrivals after 2007, or $New_{mt}$, present an endogeneity problem. That is, Romanian immigrants may have selectively migrated to municipalities with a preexisting Romanian population for reasons correlated with the outcome variable, which is an indicator variable stating whether a given municipality has at least one Romanian-born councilor in a given year. To address this issue, we find an instrument for the share of Romanian immigrants that captures the new arrivals of Romanian immigrants in a given municipality, but is uncorrelated with the outcome variables otherwise.

### 4.2.1 Identification Assumptions

We instrument for $New_{mt}$, the share of Romanians who arrived after 2007 in municipality $m$ in year $t$ with the following expression:

$$Z_{mt} = \Big( \sum_{sector} EmpShare^{2001}_{m,sector} \times ForeignEmp^{2001}_{sector} \Big) \times Outflow_t. \tag{3}$$

Here, $EmpShare^{2001}_{m,sector}$ is the employment share of a given *sector* in municipality $m$ in 2001 and $ForeignEmp^{2001}_{sector}$ is the number of foreign workers employed in *sector* in year 2000 as a fraction of total workers in the *sector* nationwide. Our data provide the municipal level employment share for seventeen sectors in 2001. The total outflow of Romanian migrants to destinations other than Italy from 2007 to year $t$ is denoted by $Outflow_t$. The idea is to first weight the sectoral employment share in each municipality by how likely each sector's job openings are to be filled by foreign workers. Then, this figure is multiplied by the yearly outflow of Romanians to estimate the amount of foreign employment that is likely to be taken up by Romanians.

The key idea is that in each municipality, there is demand for labor in certain sectors that is more likely to be satisfied by foreign workers than by natives. If foreign labor from one origin country works as a substitute for the labor of another, Romanians fill these posts proportionately, where the proportion is approximated by the outflow of Romanians to various destinations other than Italy. However, we only include sectors for which Romanians could work without a work permit during the adjustment period 2007–2011. This is to discount sectors such as manufacturing or wholesale and retail trade that are large employers of foreign residents but are irrelevant to new arrivals after Romania's accession. In fact, Romanians who arrived after the accession were much more likely to be employed in the sectors that had work permit exemption for Romanians.[10] [11]

[10] See Section 2.

[11] The included sectors are Agriculture, Hunting, and Forestry; Fishing, Pisciculture, and Related Services; Construction; Hotels and Restaurants; Financial Intermediaries; Real Estate, Informatics, Research, Other Professional and Entrepreneurial Activities; Public Administration and Defense; Education; Healthcare and

We make the following assumptions for identification. First, the sectoral employment in 2001 is predetermined and exogenous. It cannot be affected by the Romanian inflow, which mainly occurs years after 2001. Moreover, we do not see a reason to suspect having a greater share of industries that are more likely to hire foreign employees will affect the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor in any other way than through the change in Romanian share in the given municipality. Second, the outflow of Romanians in a given year to a destination other than Italy is determined by the conditions in Romania, such as the country's economic or political circumstances, and not by the conditions in Italy. A remaining threat to identification is that the sectoral composition of a labor market could determine other political outcomes. However, we only employ this IV approach when our dependent variable is whether the given municipality has Romanian-born councilor. We believe that sectoral employment can only affect this specific outcome through determining the share of Romanians in the municipality. Thus, the exclusion restriction is not violated.

# 5 Findings

## 5.1 Romanian Political Representation

### 5.1.1 Romanian-Born Councilors

Figure 6 presents the event-study estimation of equation (1) on whether the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor increased after Romania's accession to the EU in 2007, controlling for the time-invariant share of Romanians in each municipality at its 2003 level. Our outcome variable is a binary variable indicating whether the municipality has a Romanian-born councilor, instead of a continuous variable indicating the total number of Romanian-born councilors, because it is very rare for a municipality to have more than one. We see an insignificant and flat pre-trend before 2007. We display the 1986–2002 period

Other Social Services; Domestic Services for Families; and International Organization. Those omitted are Mining and Quarrying; Manufacturing; Energy Utilities; Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Household Goods; Transportation and Distribution; and Other Public Social Services.

despite fixing the immigrant share at the 2003 level to show that migrants did not select into municipalities that already had Romanian councilors. The point estimate for the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities with a larger time-invariant share of Romanians starts to increase in 2009. The increase begins in 2009 and not 2008 because the cycle for municipal elections is asynchronous. Figure 7 shows that only a few elections occurred in 2008 and the majority of municipalities had elections in 2009. Figure 8 presents an alternative specification with municipality fixed effects, and our finding does not change. In Figure 9, we confirm that collapsing our observations to the electoral cycle level does not change our result. In addition, we show that our finding holds even after controlling for the presence of other large immigrant groups. We extend equation (1) to include the fixed share of Albanians and Moroccans as well as these fixed shares interacted with year dummies. We plot the result in Figure 10 and confirm that the increase in likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor persists.

We perform placebo analyses on the two comparison communities, Albanians and Moroccans. To prevent potential confounding effects from the presence of these other large immigrant communities, we control for the fixed shares of the remaining two immigrant groups and these shares interacted with the year dummies. The results are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12. We do not observe an increase around the time of Romania's accession in the likelihood of having an Albanian-born councilor in Figure 11 or a Moroccan-born councilor in Figure 12. We conclude that no event around 2007 other than Romania's accession increased the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor. That is, we rule out the possibility that the effect we see is due to a confounding event that occurred in 2007 and increased the likelihood of electing a foreign-born councilor.

We have two theories for why we observe statistically significant coefficients for 2019 and 2020 in our placebo analyses. One is that voters in municipalities with more immigrants became more open to the idea of having a foreign-born councilor because of persistent exposure. The other is that over time, Albanian and Moroccan immigrants gained citizenship and

started to support candidates who were born in the same country as themselves, who now have the right to candidacy through naturalization. Figure 13 shows the annual naturalization counts (in thousands) of those whose origin country is Romania, Albania, or Morocco. We can see that the naturalization counts are much larger for Albanians and Moroccans than for Romanians likely because of the timing of immigration. Albanians and Moroccans began to immigrate to Italy in large numbers before Romanians. For instance, many Albanians immigrated following the fall of the Albanian communist regime. Because naturalization requires the applicant to have lived in Italy for at least ten years in most cases, it is not until much after the start of a large influx that we observe an increase in naturalization in the associated community.

In addition to the event-study analysis, we pool the years into two periods—pre- and post-2007—to get an estimate of the enfranchisement effect on political representation. The results are presented in Table 4. The dependent variable in the first three columns is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in a given year. The independent variable in the next three columns is equal to 1 if a given municipality has an Albanian-born councilor in a given year, and the last three columns a Moroccan councilor. Columns (1), (4), and (7) include province and year fixed effects, columns (2), (5), and (8) instead control for province-by-year fixed effects, and columns (3), (6), and (9) include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by municipality.

We find a significant increase in the likelihoods of having Romanian-born councilor after 2007 as well as that for Albanian-born and Moroccan-born councilors. However, the magnitude of the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor is double that of an Albanian-born councilor and almost five times that of a Moroccan-born councilor. Our independent variable of interest is the immigrant share of a given community interacted with the post-2007 indicator variable. A municipality with 1 more percentage point in the Romanian share in 2003 increases its likelihood of electing a Romanian councilor by 0.497 percentage

point; having 1 more percentage point in the Albanian or Moroccan share in 2003 increases the likelihood of electing an Albanian-born or Moroccan-born councilor by 0.237 and 0.096 percentage points, respectively. Thus, although the estimate is significant for all three immigrant communities, the magnitude of the estimate is greatest for the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities with a high share of Romanians. If the positive coefficient estimates for (Albanian share in 2003 $\times$ Post2007) and (Moroccan share in 2003 $\times$ Post2007) are indeed due to naturalization of Albanian and Moroccan immigrants in Italy who arrived earlier than the Romanian immigrants, we expect to detect an effect on their political representation, since they too have been enfranchised.

### 5.1.2 Competitive Elections

In this subsection, we study the mechanism behind the increase in the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor. First, we examine whether the likelihood increases in a competitive election setting. Elections can be competitive as a result of a shift in the composition of candidates. For instance, including a minority candidate could mobilize both minority constituents in support and natives who turn out to prevent the candidate from being elected. Thus, we look at whether municipalities that were *expecting* a competitive election are more likely to have a Romanian-born councilor. The following specification is intended to answer this question:

$$\begin{aligned} Rep_{mc} = a_0 + a_1 Competitive_{mc} + \sum_{s=3,4,5} \left[ b_s Cycle_s \times Competitive_{mc} \right] \\ + \sum_{o \in \mathbb{O}} \Big\{ c^o Share^{o,2003} \times Competitive_{mc} + \sum_{s=3,4,5} \left[ d_s^o Share^o \times Cycle_s \right] \\ + \sum_{s=3,4,5} \left[ e_s^o Share^{o,2003} \times Cycle_s \times Competitive_{mc} \right] \Big\} \\ + \eta_m + \theta_t + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{mc}. \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Here, $Rep_{mc}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if municipality $m$ in electoral cycle $c$ has a councilor born in a given origin country. Considering Romania's accession in 2007 and the 5-year electoral cycle in municipal elections, we define the cycles around 2007 to include 5 years of observation. The variable $Competitive_{mc}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if municipality $m$ had a competitive election in cycle $c-1$. We define a competitive election as an election in which the difference in the vote shares of the party that received the most votes and the one that came in second is less than 5 percentage points. The origin countries considered in this specification are again $\mathbb{O}$ ={Romania, Albania, Morocco}. We include municipality and cycle fixed effects, which are denoted respectively as $\eta_m$ and $\theta_c$.

We hypothesize that if political parties anticipate a tight election, they are more likely to include minority candidates in their list of councilor candidates to gain votes from minority constituents, especially in municipalities where minority communities are large. The coefficient $e_s^o$ for the triple interaction term $Share^{o,2003} \times Cycle_s \times Competitive_{mc}$ for each cycle is shown in Figure 14. We see a significant increase in the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor in municipalities that were expecting competitive elections in electoral cycles 2013-2017 and 2018-2020 as the share of Romanians in the given municipality increases. The coefficient is not significant in the 2008-2012 electoral cycle, which was the first cycle after Romanians gained the right to vote and stand for municipal elections. This could be because it takes time for parties to learn about the effectiveness of having a Romanian-born candidate on their slate. We do not find any effect in our placebo specifications in which the dependent variable is the likelihood of having an Albanian-born or Moroccan-born councilor. Table 6 shows coefficient estimates of a selection of independent variables. The double interaction between Romanian share in 2003 and indicator variables for cycles show that Romanian share has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor, yet the triple interaction terms exhibit a positive and significant effect in addition to the former effect.

To ensure that it was plausible for parties to consider including a minority candidate, we

analyze whether the newly enfranchised Romanians registered to vote. Although voter registration is not required for Italian citizens to vote, it is required for residents with citizenship from another EU member state voting for the first time. Unfortunately, we do not observe the number of Romanians who are registered to vote in each municipality until 2011. To circumvent this issue, we exploit the fact that only Italian citizens can vote in the regional elections and focus on the dates on which the regional elections took place simultaneously with municipal elections. We estimate the following regression:

$$DifVoters_{mt} = b_0 + b_1 Immig_m^{2003} + \big[\sum_s b_s Immig_m^{2003} \times \mathbb{1}_t\{t = s\}\big] + \eta_p + \theta_t + e_{mt}. \quad (5)$$

The dependent variable $DifVoters_{mt}$ is the difference in the level of registered voters as a percentage of the municipality population between municipal and regional elections. We divide the level difference by the population because more populous municipalities will mechanically show a larger difference otherwise. The years in which we observe the municipality election taking place on the same day as the regional election for some municipalities are 2000, 2005, 2010, 2014, 2015, 2019, and 2020.[12] We normalize the estimate for 2005 to be zero. Province and year fixed effects are included.

The coefficients $b_s$ and their corresponding confidence intervals at the 95 percent are plotted in Figure 15. We observe a significant and large difference between the number of voters registered for municipal elections and that for regional elections as a share of the municipal population in 2010 and 2014 in municipalities with a higher share of Romanians. The estimates for the placebo groups, Albanians and Moroccans, are close to zero and insignificant. In later years—2015, 2019, and 2020—the significance dissipates, but the point estimate is still positive and greater than that for the placebo groups. If the gap in the number of registered voters between municipal and regional elections in municipalities with more Romanians arises because Romanian residents registered to vote in municipal elections,

[12]The exact dates are April 26, 2000; April 3, 2005; March 28, 2010, November 17, 2013; May 25, 2014; May 31, 2015; May 26, 2019; and September 20, 2020. We dropped the two municipalities whose municipal and regional elections were simultaneously held on November 17, 2013, because of the small number.

then the number of constituents in municipal elections must have increased. This would be consistent with the conjecture that political parties consider running Romanian candidates to earn the votes of registered Romanian voters. Figure 16 also plots coefficients $b_s$ except the dependent variable is now the difference between the number of actual voters in municipal elections and that in regional elections. If more Romanians turn up in municipal elections, the estimates should be significant and positive. However, we only find the estimate for the 2010 election to be positive. Although most of the estimates for the remaining years in the post-2007 period also have positive point estimates, they are not significant.

We now analyze the partisan affiliation of the elected Romanian-born candidates. The political orientation of the Romanian-born councilors is illustrated in Table 5. We do not see a statistical difference between Romanian-born and non-Romanian-born councilors in terms of which type ideology they belong to. However, we do see that the Romanian-born councilors are significantly more likely to belong to the winning party than the non-Romanian councilors. We then split the sample of councilors into pre- and post-2014 elections. We find that Romanian councilors were significantly less likely to belong to the winning party before 2014. This indicates that in the first cycle of municipal elections after the enfranchisement in which Romanian-born candidates were elected (2009-2013), those who were elected belonged to the opposition. Over time, either they were included in the parties with more support from the municipal population or having a Romanian candidate led the parties to win.

### 5.1.3 Enfranchisement of the Preexisting Immigrant Population vs. Arrivals of New (Enfranchised) Immigrants

Using the IV approach and instrumenting for $New_{mt}$ in equation (2) with the expression in equation (3), we disentangle whether the increase in the likelihood of having a Romanian-born councilor is driven by the enfranchisement of the preexisting population or by the arrivals of newly enfranchised Romanians. The first stage results are presented in Table 7. The instrument strongly predicts the share of new Romanians at the municipality-by-

year level, thus satisfying the relevance condition. In column (1), we use Romanian share at the 2003 level for $Early_{mt}$, whereas in column (2), we let $Early_{mt}$ equal to the current Romanian share in year $t$ up to 2007 and fix the share at the 2007 share from 2008 onward to see whether fixing the share of early Romanians in 2003 was driving the result. In both specifications, the relevance of the instrument is strong. The coefficient for $New_{mt}$ is positive and statistically significant. Further, the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic ranges from 42.70 to 47.74 and shows that we do not suffer from a weak instrument problem.

Table 8 presents a comparison of the OLS and 2SLS specifications of equation (2). The first two columns present the results from the OLS specification. Columns (3) and (4) are 2SLS results that correspond to columns (1) and (2) from the first stage specifications in Table 7. In both columns (1) and (2) the OLS estimates are significant for both the preexisting share of Romanians and the new Romanian arrivals. However, once we instrument for the inflow of new arrivals, the 2SLS estimates for new arrivals are no longer significant, and if anything, their point estimates are negative. On the other hand, the effect for the preexisting share remains significant and positive. This means the IV specification corrected for a downward bias for the effect of preexisting Romanian share and an upward bias for the effect of Romanian share of new arrivals in the OLS specification. In the preferred specification in column (3), the estimate states that a municipality with 1 more percentage point of preexisting Romanian population increases its likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor by 0.472 percentage points. We conclude that the effect of enfranchisement on Romanian-born political representation is mainly driven by Romanians who were already living in Italy prior to the accession.

Based on the survey data on Romanian migrants in Italy from WIIW (2012) weighted for national representation, we find that 23.89% of Romanian migrants who arrived in Italy during the years 2004-2006 were registered to vote, whereas only 5.36% of Romanian migrants that arrived between 2007 and 2010 had registered to vote.[13] This comparison of voter

[13]The unweighted percentages of registered to vote are 23.48% and 5.32% respectively.

registration rate between preexisting and newly arrived Romanians corroborates our finding. Overall, our findings suggest that enfranchisement of preexisting Romanian population is what caused Romanian-born political representation to increase.

## 5.2 Prosocial Behavior

Proponents of expanding immigrant rights argue that extending the franchise to resident immigrants and ensuring a more secure residency status would increase civic participation and benefit the entire community, but there is not sufficient evidence to support this claim. We test whether social capital increases when Romanian immigrants obtain European citizenship.[14] Following the literature, we use data on organ-donation-consent (from AIDO) to gauge the level of social capital.[15] The AIDO dataset contains information on those who have registered to be potential organ donors. Most importantly, it allows us to observe where the individuals are born and in which municipality they resided at the time of registration.

We slightly modify the specification from equation (1) to study the level of prosocial behavior so we can incorporate the individual-level data we have on registering as potential organ donors.[16] The outcome variable is the number of immigrants from a given country that registered in municipality $m$ in year $t$. Instead of controlling for a time-invariant share of immigrants from a given origin country, we control for the time-variant immigrant count from the origin country to rule out the possibility that the number of donors increases mechanically simply because of an increase in the total number of Romanians after 2007. Further, we focus on whether the number of consents increased after the accession in each municipality after controlling for the number of all nationals in the municipality from the origin country of interest. That is, we focus on the coefficients for the year dummies.

[14] According to the Oxford English Dictionary, social capital refers to *the interpersonal networks and common civic values which influence the infrastructure and economy of a particular society; the nature, extent, or value of these.*

[15] Putnam (2000) and Guiso et al. (2004) use blood donation and Bartscher et al. (2021) use blood and organ donation along with other measures to capture social capital.

[16] $DonorConsent_{mt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 ImmigCount_{mt} + [\sum_{s=2003}^{2018} \pi_s \mathbb{1}_t\{t = s\}] + \eta_m + \nu_{mt}$

The event-study analysis is presented in Figure 17. We find a significant increase in the number of Romanian immigrants registering as potential organ donors despite controlling for the total number of Romanian immigrants in each municipality. Thus, the increase we observe after 2007 is not a mechanical increase following the influx of Romanians after the accession. We do not observe a significant increase in the number of immigrants from either Albania or Morocco registering as potential organ donors around 2007. Hence, we believe the increase in organ donation consent among Romanian-born residents is specific to Romanians and not a general trend among immigrants.

## 5.3 Winning Party

Barone et al. (2016) find that an increase in the share of immigrants increased the likelihood of electing a right-wing mayor in Italian municipalities. Most right-leaning parties in Italy have maintained an anti-immigration stance at the national level during our observation period. Right-leaning parties that are not strictly considered anti-immigrant have been in coalitions with a right-wing party that had a strong anti-immigrant stance. In this subsection, we investigate whether enfranchising the largest immigrant community balances out the increase in support for a right-wing mayoral candidate documented by Barone et al. (2016). We analyze the ideology of the winning party in municipal elections around the 2007 accession. As mentioned in Section 2, the mayor, vice mayor, and councilors are chosen in municipal elections. Candidates can individually be elected as councilor, but the majority of the councilors and the mayor come from the winning party or coalition. Thus, investigating the winning party tells us how the municipality voted in general and who gained control over the steering wheel of the municipal government.

We categorize the parties into five different types: right-leaning, centrist, left-leaning, civic, and Five Star Movement. To classify the parties into these five categories, we analyze the name of the party and confirm using the party's Wikipedia page. We classify a party as left-leaning when (1) the term *Left (Sinistra)* appears in the name, (2) the party participates

in a coalition with a party that has been traditionally categorized as left-leaning, such as the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico), or (3) the party is categorized as left-leaning by Wikipedia. Similarly, we classify a party as right-leaning when (1) the term *Right (Destra)* appears in the name, (2) the party participates in a coalition with a party that has been traditionally categorized as right-leaning, such as Forza Italia or National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale), or (3) the party is categorized as right-leaning by Wikipedia. The center parties are those that are not in a coalition with any parties classified as left- or right-leaning and contain the term *Center (Centro)*, such as the Union of the Center (Unione di Centro). Finally, a party is considered civic if it is not in a coalition with any party classified as left- or right-leaning and contains either the word *Civic (Civico)* or *Independent (Indipendente)*.

Figure 18 shows that the likelihood of a right-leaning party winning in municipal elections increases over time in municipalities that are home to more immigrants from any of the three largest immigrant communities—Romanian, Albanian, or Moroccan. Since the pattern is very similar across all three groups, even though Romanians gain voting rights and the other two groups do not, we believe enfranchisement of Romanians in itself did not cause the ideology of the winning party to change. Instead, the presence of any immigrant community, whether it had the franchise or not, played a greater role. We observe a slight decrease in the likelihood of civic parties winning for a few years after 2007, but the likelihood returns to its previous level soon after. We do not observe any significant and consistent patterns for the other types of parties.

## 5.4 Local Public Finance

Research studying women's suffrage and the U.S. Voting Rights Act has found a significant change in public finance after franchise was extended to a new subset of the population.[17] We examine whether there are any distinct patterns in local public finance for municipalities with

[17]See Lott and Kenny (1999), Abrams and Settle (1999), Washington (2008), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Funk and Gathmann (2015), Cascio and Shenhav (2020), and Kose et al. (2020) for how women's suffrage led to a change in budget allocation. See Cascio and Washington (2014) for how the U.S. Voting Rights Act influenced government transfers.

more Romanians after their right expanded. First, we look at the evolution of the property tax and waste tax as shares of total revenue for each municipality to see whether the tax burden on homeowners changes.[18] Figure 20 shows an increase in the property tax and a decrease in the waste tax over time in municipalities with more Romanians compared to those with fewer. However, we do not see any statistical difference between municipalities with more Romanians in comparison to those with more Albanians or Moroccans. Consequently, we conclude that the local tax-revenue composition is unaffected by extending voting rights to Romanian immigrants.

We then investigate the breakdown of expenditure. In Figure 20, we present an event-study analysis of the expenditure shares of five main categories of local expenditure: education, public housing, public security, social programs, and transportation. Once again, we do not observe a statistical difference between municipalities with more Romanians in comparison to those with more Albanians or Moroccans. We find that in municipalities with a large presence of at least one of the three immigrant communities, the expenditure share on public security increases over time and the expenditure share on social programs decreases. This finding is consistent with our finding of an increase in the likelihood of a right-leaning party or coalition winning the municipal election when there is a large presence of any of the three largest immigrant communities.

# 6 Conclusion

We study the effect of expanding political and residency rights of immigrants—through the acquisition of European Union citizenship—on political representation, prosocial behavior, the political orientation of the winning party, and local public finances. Exploiting Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007, we find that the likelihood of electing a Romanian-born councilor increases in municipalities with a larger share of Romanian immigrants. To explore the underlying mechanisms, we first examine competitive elections and

[18] In 2016, 20 percent of foreigners owned a house compared to 77 percent of Italians.

find that municipalities expecting a tight race are even more likely to elect a Romanian-born councilor. This suggests that political parties are more inclined to nominate minority candidates when anticipating a close contest. Next, we investigate whether the increase in political representation is driven by the enfranchisement of the existing Romanian population or by newly arrived enfranchised Romanians. Our instrumental variable strategy indicates that the latter is the primary driver.

We find that the impact of expanding immigrants' rights extends beyond political outcomes and into social behavior. Specifically, we observe an increase in prosocial behavior, proxied by consent rates for organ donation, among Romanians after their country's EU accession. Regarding electoral outcomes and public finance patterns, we find no significant differences between municipalities with Romanian residents and those with Albanian and Moroccan communities, our comparison groups. In all municipalities with substantial immigrant populations, a higher share of immigrants is associated with a greater likelihood of a right-leaning party victory, increased spending on public security, and reduced spending on social programs. We believe that future research should further investigate how the political preferences of newly enfranchised groups may differ from those of communities without voting rights and study effects on public spending that target more closely different ethnic communities.

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# Figures and Tables




Figure 1: Number of Foreign Nationals Living in Italy by Nationality

The figure shows the evolution of the yearly number of foreign nationals living in Italy by their nationality from 2003 to 2018. (Source: ISTAT)




Figure 2: Maps of Immigrant Shares at the Municipality Level




Figure 3: Share of Romanians Among Immigrants by Municipality and Year

The maps above display the number of Romanians as a fraction of total immigrants within a given municipality in years 2003, 2007, and 2011 respectively.




Figure 4: Distribution of Municipality Population

The graph above shows the distribution of municipality population for all municipalities up to the 99th percentile by population. The median municipality has 2,293 residents. (Source: 2001 Italian Census)




Figure 5: Turnout for General vs. Municipal Elections in Italy

The graph above compares the turnout for general vs. municipal elections in Italy. (Source: Department of Interior of Italy)




Figure 6: Event Study for Political Representation with Romanian Share Fixed at its 2003 Level

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between Romanian share fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for share of Romanians at its 2003 level, as well as province and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 7: Municipal Election Cycle

The graph above displays the number of municipal elections that took place in each year from 1986 to 2020. Although the municipal election cycle is asynchronous, the majority of municipalities have their election during the biggest cycle.




Figure 8: Event Study for Political Representation with Romanian Share Fixed at its 2003 Level (Municipality Fixed Effect)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between Romanian share fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 9: Event Study for Political Representation with Romanian Share Fixed at its 2003 Level Collapsed to Electoral Cycles (Municipality Fixed Effect)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study where the years are collapsed to electoral cycles. The plotted coefficients are for the interaction terms between Romanian share fixed at its 2003 level and cycle dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 10: Event Study for Likelihood of Having a Romanian-Born Councilor with Fixed Immigrant Shares (Controlling for the Presence of Other Immigrant Communities)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Romanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between Romanian share and year dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 11: Event Study for Likelihood of Having a Albanian-Born Councilor with Fixed Immigrant Shares (Controlling for the Presence of Other Immigrant Communities)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Albanian-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between Albanian share and year dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 12: Event Study for Likelihood of Having a Moroccan-Born Councilor with Fixed Immigrant Shares (Controlling for the Presence of Other Immigrant Communities)

The graph above plots the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the year dummies. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a Moroccan-born councilor in the given year and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between Moroccan share and year dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 13: Annual Naturalization Count in Italy by Origin Country

The graph above displays annual naturalization count in Italy for migrants from Romania, Albania, and Morocco respectively.










Figure 14: Foreign-born Councilors in Competitive Elections

The graph above plots the coefficients from the triple-difference specification for the interaction terms between immigrant shares fixed at their 2003 level and the cycle dummies. The dependent variable is stated above each graph. It is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the given municipality has a councilor who was born in the country stated in the given cycle. In each graph, the coefficients are from a single regression where the main coefficients of interest are those for interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest and cycle dummies and the presence of other immigrant communities are controlled for. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively.




Figure 15: Difference Between the Number of Registered Voters in Municipal vs. Regional Elections as a Share of Municipal Population

The above graph displays the coefficients for interaction terms where the interaction is between immigrant share of interest at its 2003 level and year dummies in equation (5). The dependent variable is the difference in the level of registered voters as a percentage of the municipality population between municipal and regional elections. The red dot refers to the regression where the immigrant share of interest referred to Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest referred to Albanian and Moroccan share respectively.




Figure 16: Difference Between the Number of Actual Voters in Municipal vs. Regional Elections as a Share of Municipal Population

The above graph displays the coefficients for interaction terms where the interaction between immigrant share of interest at its 2003 level and year dummies in equation (5). The dependent variable is the difference between the number of actual voters in municipal elections and that in regional elections. The red dot refers to the regression where the immigrant share of interest referred to Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest referred to Albanian and Moroccan share respectively.




Figure 17: Event Study of Organ Donation Registration Rate

The graphs above illustrate the coefficients for year dummies in $DonorConsent_{mt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 ImmigCount_{mt} + [\sum_{s=2003}^{2018} \pi_s \mathbb{1}_t\{t = s\}] + \eta_m + \nu_{mt}$ where standard errors are clustered by municipality. In three different regressions, the dependent variable is the number of consents given by those who were born in Romania, Albania, and Morocco respectively in a given municipality and year. The dependent variable $ImmigCount_{mt}$ corresponds to the number of residents in a given municipality and year who are nationals of Romania, Albania, and Morocco respectively in accordance with the dependent variable.




Figure 18: Event Study of Winning Parties/Coalitions

The graphs above plot the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The red dot refers to the regression in which the immigrant share or interest is Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest is Albanian and Moroccan share respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the winning party in the municipal election has a political ideology mentioned in the title of each graph and 0 otherwise. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 19: Local Tax Revenue Composition

The graphs above plot the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The red dot refers to the regression in which the immigrant share or interest is Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest is Albanian and Moroccan share respectively. The dependent variable is the tax collection corresponding to the title of the graph as a share of municipal government revenue. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.




Figure 20: Local Expenditure Breakdown

The graphs above plot the coefficients from the event study for the interaction terms between the immigrant share of interest fixed at its 2003 level and year dummies. The red dot refers to the regression in which the immigrant share or interest is Romanian share whereas the light blue diamond and the blue triangle correspond to separate regressions where the immigrant share of interest is Albanian and Moroccan share respectively. The dependent variable is the level of spending corresponding to the title of the graph as a share of municipal government total expenditure. The regression separately controls for municipality and year fixed effect respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

Table 1: Characteristic Comparison Between Preexisting and Newly Arrived Romanians

| Arrival in Italy: | 2004-2006 | 2007-2010 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16-24 | 0.1044 | 0.2158 | 0.1113*** |
| 25-34 | 0.3746 | 0.3710 | -0.0037 |
| 35-44 | 0.3654 | 0.2885 | -0.0768** |
| 45+ | 0.1556 | 0.1247 | -0.0309 |
| Married | 0.6058 | 0.4927 | -0.1131*** |
| Single | 0.1438 | 0.2761 | 0.1323*** |
| Living with Partner | 0.1266 | 0.1171 | -.0095 |
| Divorced | 0.1048 | 0.0903 | -0.0145 |
| Widowed | 0.0191 | 0.0239 | 0.0047 |
| Has dependent children | 0.5031 | 0.4193 | -0.0838** |
| Primary | 0.0352 | 0.0694 | 0.0342** |
| Vocational | 0.2651 | 0.2921 | 0.0268 |
| Secondary | 0.4611 | 0.4209 | -0.0405 |
| College | 0.1149 | 0.0775 | -0.0375* |
| Graduate Degree | 0.1237 | 0.1401 | 0.0162 |
| Less than 400 EUR | 0.0202 | 0.0378 | 0.0176 |
| 401-500 EUR | 0.0292 | 0.0359 | 0.0067 |
| 501-600 EUR | 0.0398 | 0.0580 | 0.0182 |
| 601-700 EUR | 0.0401 | 0.0804 | 0.0403** |
| 701-800 EUR | 0.0994 | 0.1340 | 0.0346 |
| 801-900 EUR | 0.1152 | 0.0696 | -0.0457* |
| 901-1000 EUR | 0.1136 | 0.1530 | 0.0394 |
| 1001-1200 EUR | 0.1903 | 0.1916 | 0.0013 |
| 1201-1500 EUR | 0.2205 | 0.1480 | -0.0725** |
| 1501-2000 EUR | 0.0874 | 0.0604 | -0.0270 |
| Above 2000 EUR | 0.0442 | 0.0314 | -0.0128 |
| Registered to Vote | 0.2389 | 0.0536 | -0.1853*** |

The table displays the characteristic comparison between Romanian migrants that arrived in Italy during 2004-2006 and those that arrived during 2007-2010, which is after Romania's accession to the EU. The statistics come from the survey on Romanian migrants in Italy before and after the EU Accession, provided by WIIW. We use the national weights given by WIIW for this table to show the nationally representative characteristics of Romanian migrants.

Table 2: Employment Share of Romanian Migrants by Sector

| Arrival in Italy: | 2004-2006 | 2007-2010 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture, hunting, and forestry | 0.0110 | 0.0144 | 0.0073 |
| Construction | 0.2019 | 0.2429 | 0.0410 |
| Domestic services for families | 0.1372 | 0.1575 | 0.0204 |
| Education | 0.0053 | 0 | -0.0053 |
| Financial intermediaries | 0.0042 | 0 | -0.0042 |
| Healthcare and other social services | 0.0476 | 0.0424 | -0.0052 |
| Hotels and restaurants | 0.0618 | 0.0328 | -0.0290** |
| Manufacturing | 0.1070 | 0.0570 | -0.0500*** |
| Other public social services | 0.0138 | 0.0140 | 0.0002 |
| Public administration and defense | 0.0004 | 0 | -0.0004 |
| Professional and entrepreneurial activities | 0.0625 | 0.0453 | -0.0171 |
| Transportation and distribution | 0.0373 | 0.0472 | 0.0099 |
| Wholesale and retail trade | 0.2250 | 0.1867 | -0.0383 |
| Staying at home or looking after children | 0.0197 | 0.0332 | 0.01352 |
| Student | 0.0273 | 0.0410 | 0.0137 |
| Looking for work | 0.0102 | 0.0716 | 0.0614*** |
| Other | 0.0279 | 0.0141 | -0.0138 |

The table displays the employment share of Romanian migrants by sector divided into two groups—Romanian migrants that arrived in Italy during 2004-2006 and those that arrived during 2007-2011, which is after Romania's accession to the EU. The statistics come from the survey on Romanian migrants in Italy before and after the EU Accession, provided by WIIW. We use the national weights given by WIIW for this table to show the nationally representative characteristics of Romanian migrants.

Table 3: Summary Statistics

| Variable | Period | #Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Share of Romanian Population | 2003 | 7,861 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0 | 0.167 |
| Share of Albanian Population | 2003 | 7,861 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0 | 0.126 |
| Share of Moroccan Population | 2003 | 7,861 | 0.006 | 0.010 | 0 | 0.148 |
| Has Romanian Councilor | 1986–2020 | 273,961 | 0.002 | 0.042 | 0 | 1 |
| Has Albanian Councilor | 1986–2020 | 273,961 | 0.001 | 0.027 | 0 | 1 |
| Has Moroccan Councilor | 1986–2020 | 273,961 | 0.001 | 0.028 | 0 | 1 |
| Romanian Donors per Municipality | 2003–2018 | 128,205 | 0.009 | 0.112 | 0 | 7 |
| Albanian Donors per Municipality | 2003–2018 | 128,205 | 0.004 | 0.071 | 0 | 4 |
| Moroccan Donors per Municipality | 2003–2018 | 128,205 | 0.002 | 0.045 | 0 | 5 |
| Native Donors per Municipality | 2003–2018 | 128,205 | 2.650 | 11.884 | 0 | 896 |
| Right-Leaning Mayor | 2003–2020 | 138,080 | 0.095 | 0.293 | 0 | 1 |
| Left-Leaning Mayor | 2003–2020 | 138,080 | 0.137 | 0.343 | 0 | 1 |
| Centrist Mayor | 2003–2020 | 138,080 | 0.013 | 0.113 | 0 | 1 |
| Civic Party Mayor | 2003–2020 | 138,080 | 0.665 | 0.472 | 0 | 1 |
| Five Star Movement Mayor | 2003–2020 | 138,080 | 0.002 | 0.049 | 0 | 1 |
| Revenue Share: Property Tax | 2003–2015 | 99,839 | 0.713 | 0.154 | 0 | 1 |
| Revenue Share: Waste Tax | 2003–2015 | 99,839 | 0.287 | 0.154 | 0 | 1 |
| Expenditure Share: Transportation | 2003–2020 | 122,919 | 0.137 | 0.096 | 0 | 0.961 |
| Expenditure Share: Social Policies | 2003–2020 | 122,919 | 0.095 | 0.080 | 0 | 0.903 |
| Expenditure Share: Public Security | 2003–2020 | 122,919 | 0.031 | 0.025 | 0 | 0.571 |
| Expenditure Share: Public Housing | 2003–2020 | 122,919 | 0.008 | 0.036 | 0 | 0.905 |
| Expenditure Share: Education | 2003–2020 | 122,919 | 0.095 | 0.071 | 0 | 0.991 |

The table displays the summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses throughout the paper.

Table 4: Political Representation (Pooled)

| Dep var: presence of | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| councilor born in | Romania | Romania | Romania | Albania | Albania | Albania | Morocco | Morocco | Morocco |
| Romanian share in 2003 | -0.024 | 0.006 | | 0.005 | 0.007 | | 0.028 | -0.004 | |
| | (0.040) | (0.025) | | (0.021) | (0.023) | | (0.033) | (0.022) | |
| Albanian share in 2003 | 0.065* | 0.042 | | 0.025 | 0.025 | | 0.000 | 0.017 | |
| | (0.036) | (0.039) | | (0.032) | (0.030) | | (0.031) | (0.027) | |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | -0.029 | -0.020 | | 0.014 | 0.002 | | -0.050*** | -0.013 | |
| | (0.025) | (0.016) | | (0.016) | (0.014) | | (0.017) | (0.012) | |
| Romanian share in 2003 | 0.497*** | 0.456*** | 0.558*** | -0.006 | -0.008 | 0.003 | -0.044 | 0.001 | -0.045 |
| × Post2007 | (0.140) | (0.157) | (0.133) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.028) | (0.039) | (0.026) | (0.041) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | -0.008 | 0.025 | 0.039 | 0.237*** | 0.236*** | 0.242*** | 0.024 | 0.002 | 0.029 |
| × Post2007 | (0.071) | (0.081) | (0.065) | (0.069) | (0.082) | (0.066) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.038) |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | 0.035 | 0.023 | 0.073 | -0.040* | -0.024 | -0.035 | 0.096*** | 0.045* | 0.098*** |
| × Post2007 | (0.049) | (0.053) | (0.047) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.031) | (0.027) | (0.029) |
| Province FE | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | |
| Year FE | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Province × Year FE | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | |
| Municipality FE | | | ✓ | | | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| N | 137,916 | 137,916 | 138,120 | 137,916 | 137,916 | 138,120 | 137,916 | 137,916 | 138,120 |
| Dep var mean | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.272 | 0.020 | 0.023 | 0.225 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.271 |

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a given municipality has at least one councilor born in the origin country specified in the second row in a given year.

Table 5: Political Orientation of Romanian Councilors

| | Non-Romanian-born | | | Romanian-born | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | n | mean | sd | n | mean | sd | Diff |
| Winning party | 790030 | 0.60 | 0.49 | 265 | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0.083*** |
| Civic | 1326900 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 369 | 0.72 | 0.45 | -0.021 |
| Center | 1326900 | 0.01 | 0.11 | 369 | 0.01 | 0.07 | -0.007 |
| Left | 1326900 | 0.12 | 0.32 | 369 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0.007 |
| Right | 1326900 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 369 | 0.11 | 0.32 | 0.017 |
| Winning party(year<2014) | 268089 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 53 | 0.30 | 0.46 | -0.137** |

The table above reports a summary statistics of the partisan affiliation of the elected Romanian-born candidates. The last row reports statistics on the non-Romanian-born and Romanian-born councilors who were elected before 2014 and were a member of the winning party or coalition in their municipality.

Table 6: Likelihood of Electing Romanian-Born Councilor in Competitive Elections

| Dep var: presence of | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| councilor born in | Romania | Romania | Albania | Albania | Morocco | Morocco |
| Romanian share in 2003 | 0.932*** | 0.952*** | | 0.003 | | -0.052 |
| × Cycle 3 | (0.154) | (0.156) | | (0.114) | | (0.113) |
| Romanian share in 2003 | 0.241 | 0.287* | | 0.063 | | -0.121 |
| × Cycle 4 | (0.155) | (0.158) | | (0.115) | | (0.114) |
| Romanian share in 2003 | 1.755*** | 1.830*** | | -0.140 | | -0.145 |
| × Cycle 5 | (0.181) | (0.183) | | (0.134) | | (0.132) |
| Romanian share in 2003 | **-0.479** | **-0.380** | | 0.327 | | 0.036 |
| × Cycle 3 × Competitive Election | **(0.670)** | **(0.693)** | | (0.505) | | (0.499) |
| Romanian share in 2003 | **1.793***** | **1.949***** | | -0.206 | | 0.375 |
| × Cycle 4 × Competitive Election | **(0.647)** | **(0.670)** | | (0.489) | | (0.483) |
| Romanian share in 2003 | **1.413*** | **1.786**** | | 0.045 | | 0.501 |
| × Cycle 5 × Competitive Election | **(0.733)** | **(0.761)** | | (0.555) | | (0.548) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | | -0.057 | 0.164* | 0.165* | | 0.019 |
| × Cycle 3 | | (0.131) | (0.093) | (0.095) | | (0.094) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | | -0.173 | 0.333*** | 0.349*** | | 0.180* |
| × Cycle 4 | | (0.135) | (0.096) | (0.099) | | (0.097) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | | -0.420*** | 1.140*** | 1.173*** | | 0.134 |
| × Cycle 5 | | (0.162) | (0.115) | (0.118) | | (0.117) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | | -0.154 | **0.466** | **0.362** | | -0.023 |
| × Cycle 3 × Competitive Election | | (0.603) | **(0.416)** | **(0.440)** | | (0.434) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | | -0.417 | **-0.308** | **-0.348** | | -0.725 |
| × Cycle 4 × Competitive Election | | (0.623) | **(0.430)** | **(0.454)** | | (0.449) |
| Albanian share in 2003 | | 0.192 | **-0.482** | **-0.740** | | -0.297 |
| × Cycle 5 × Competitive Election | | (0.662) | **(0.456)** | **(0.483)** | | (0.477) |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | | -0.049 | | -0.011 | -0.023 | -0.021 |
| × Cycle 3 | | (0.096) | | (0.070) | (0.068) | (0.069) |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | | -0.081 | | -0.094 | 0.029 | 0.012 |
| × Cycle 4 | | (0.098) | | (0.072) | (0.070) | (0.071) |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | | -0.062 | | -0.067 | 0.511*** | 0.500*** |
| × Cycle 5 | | (0.125) | | (0.091) | (0.088) | (0.090) |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | | -0.158 | | 0.186 | **-0.061** | **-0.071** |
| × Cycle 3 × Competitive Election | | (0.478) | | (0.349) | **(0.327)** | **(0.344)** |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | | -0.141 | | 0.209 | **0.551*** | **0.616*** |
| × Cycle 4 × Competitive Election | | (0.479) | | (0.349) | **(0.326)** | **(0.345)** |
| Moroccan share in 2003 | | -0.912* | | 0.704* | **-0.147** | **-0.150** |
| × Cycle 5 × Competitive Election | | (0.516) | | (0.376) | **(0.349)** | **(0.372)** |
| $N$ | 24,916 | 24,916 | 24,916 | 24,916 | 24,916 | 24,916 |
| Adj. $R^2$ | 0.12995 | 0.13019 | 0.02315 | 0.02312 | 0.07202 | 0.07212 |

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a given municipality has at least one councilor born in the origin country specified in the second row in a given year.

Table 7: First Stage

| | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
| Romanian share in 2003 | 0.7581*** | |
| × Post2007 | (0.0541) | |
| Early Romanian Share | | -0.0385 |
| | | (0.0574) |
| Early Romanian Share | | 0.5726*** |
| × Post2007 | | (0.0431) |
| Instrument | **0.0068**** | **0.0075**** |
| | **(0.0010)** | **(0.0011)** |
| Municipality FE | ✓ | ✓ |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ |
| Number of observations | 115887 | 115897 |
| Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic | 42.70 | 47.74 |

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The table above reports the first stage result for the 2SLS IV regression in equation (2). In column (1), we use Romanian share at the 2003 level for $Early_{mt}$, in column (2), we let $Early_{mt}$ equal to the current Romanian share in year $t$ up to 2007 and fix the share at the 2007 share from 2008 onward.

Table 8: IV Results: Likelihood of Electing Romanian-Born Councilor

| | (1) OLS | (2) OLS | (3) 2SLS | (4) 2SLS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Romanian share in 2003 | 0.271** | | 0.472* | |
| × Post2007 | (0.130) | | (0.276) | |
| Early Romanian Share | | 0.124*** | | 0.102 |
| | | (0.033) | | (0.106) |
| Early Romanian Share | | 0.218** | | 0.518* |
| × Post2007 | | (0.099) | | (0.274) |
| New Romanian Inflow | 0.152** | 0.133* | -0.117 | -0.398 |
| | (0.066) | (0.065) | (0.336) | (0.473) |
| Municipality FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Obs | 115,887 | 115,897 | 115,887 | 115,887 |
| Dep var mean | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |

Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The table above presents a comparison of the OLS and 2SLS specifications of equation (2). The first two columns present the results from the OLS specification. Columns (3) and (4) are 2SLS results that correspond to columns (1) and (2) from the first stage specifications in Table 7.

# Appendix



| LISTA N. 1 | LISTA N. 2 | LISTA N. 3 | LISTA N. 4 | LISTA N. 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **ROBERTO RIGHETTINI**<br>nato a Salò il 12.1.1966<br>Candidato alla carica di Sindaco | **DELIA MARIA CASTELLINI**<br>nata a Toscolano Maderno il 6.2.1954<br>Candidato alla carica di Sindaco | **PAOLO ELENA**<br>nato a Brescia il 21.5.1951<br>Candidato alla carica di Sindaco | **MARCO GIOVANNI MANFREDI**<br>nato a Rovereto (TN) il 6.4.1944<br>Candidato alla carica di Sindaco | **DAVIDE GAZZOLI**<br>nato a Brescia il 17.3.1968<br>Candidato alla carica di Sindaco |
| MARCO BASILE<br>nato a Bovezzo il 25.4.1962 | ANDREA ANDREOLI<br>nato a Gavardo il 23.10.1968 | FAUSTO USARDI<br>nato a Brescia il 16.8.1967 | MICHELA BERTASIO<br>nata a Desenzano del Garda il 4.9.1990 | LUCA TRENTINI<br>nato a Toscolano Maderno il 1.4.1955 |
| AGOSTINO BERTASIO detto AGO<br>nato a Toscolano Maderno il 15.11.1957 | MARIA GRAZIA BOSCHETTI<br>nata a Toscolano Maderno il 19.11.1956 | FRANCO SANESI<br>nato a Lugo di Vicenza (VI) il 7.8.1934 | PAOLA GOTTARDI<br>nata a Salò il 15.7.1972 | SONIA BRIGHENTI<br>nata a Desenzano del Garda il 3.10.1972 |
| IDA BRESCIANI in FRAZZINI<br>nata a Brescia il 13.10.1966 | DAVIDE BONI<br>nato a Gavardo il 20.1.1985 | GIOVANNA CAMPANARDI<br>nata a Toscolano Maderno il 16.8.1953 | ELISA PASINI<br>nata a Desenzano del Garda il 5.12.1984 | GIUSEPPE SECCAMANI<br>nato a Bagolino il 9.11.1966 |
| ERMES BUFFOLI<br>nato a Polaveno il 11.7.1956 | VIRNA CIVIERI<br>nata a Salò il 27.2.1973 | FEDERICA SERESINA<br>nata a Brescia il 19.3.1982 | EMILIA PASINI<br>nata a Salò il 26.2.1966 | MARIA TERESA CAVESTI<br>nata a Arco (TN) il 12.8.1956 |
| GIULIANA CAPUCCINI<br>nata a Salò il 3.3.1968 | ALESSANDRO COMINCIOLI<br>nato a Desenzano del Garda il 21.12.1978 | STEFANO COMINELLI<br>nato a Salò il 26.4.1949 | SILVANO BENDINELLI<br>nat | FABIO BREGOLI<br>izzera) il 31.1.1964 |
| MARIA CRISTINA KLEIN<br>nata a Desenzano del Garda il 20.8.1984 | ELISA COZZAGLIO<br>nata a Gavardo il 5.6.1986 | MARIO SIMONI<br>nato a Toscolano Maderno il 23.8.1954 | VINC<br>nat | LLA<br>(PV) il 23.6.1960 |
| SILVIO OGNIBENI<br>nato a Gargnano il 29.9.1959 | FABIO GAETARELLI<br>nato a Salò il 4.5.1965 | RAMONA NICOLETA HUSERAS<br>nata a Oradea (Romania) il 1.5.1979 | ANTO<br>nat | LLA<br>TP) il 13.10.1960 |
| VITO PASINI<br>nato a Brescia il 1.1.1965 | ALICE SGANZERLA<br>nata a Gavardo il 10.11.1988 | CINZIA TALLON<br>nata a Milano il 21.11.1974 | ALFREDO GAIONI<br>nato a Salò il 7.1.1962 | MARCO MAZZELLA<br>nato a Verona il 7.5.1989 |
| MASSIMO STUCCHI<br>nato a Merate (Co) il 10.2.1961 | MAURIZIO RIGHETTI<br>nato a Zurigo (Svizzera) il 29.12.1957 | GIOVANNI CALDANA<br>nato a Desenzano del Garda il 16.12.1986 | SERGIO MINONI<br>nato a Montichiari il 4.11.1958 | ALESSANDRO FORESTI<br>nato a Salò il 17.7.1964 |
| TERESA MARIA TRANCHIDA detta TERRY<br>nata a Mazara del Vallo (TP) il 29.9.1959 | PIETRO SCONTRINO<br>nato a Brescia il 16.10.1962 | PIER LUIGI PASINI<br>nato a Toscolano Maderno il 23.2.1946 | GIOVANNI PERSAVALLI<br>nato a Salò il 16.12.1966 | |

Place of birth mentioned below the name of the candidate

*Toscolano Maderno, 18 maggio 2013*

IL SINDACO
*Roberto Righettini*

Figure 21: Roster of Candidates in a Municipal Election




Figure 22: Donation for other large influx, christian orthodox countries (and Romanian or Bulgarians). Coefficients for (Romanian or Bulgarians, Russians, Ukrainians)




Figure 23: Likelihood of having a Romanian or Bulgarian-born councilor. Coefficients for sum of Romanian and Bulgarian