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

Towards autonomous digital twins:
uncertainty, data, computing, simulation, and ethics
ESRA Symposium
University of Strathclyde
Glasgow, UK
30th November – 1st December
2023

Modelling dependencies in complex systems: Dynamic and Dependent Tree Theory (D²T²)



Dr Silvia Tolo



Why system safety?



→ 40s





→ 50s







Why system safety?




→ 40s

→ 50s





Why system safety?



> 60s

WEATHER
Forecast for Tucson generally fair, little change
Temperature
Yesterday: HIGH 74 LOW 36
Today: HIGH 83 LOW 39
U.S. WEATHER BUREAU

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THIRTY PAGES

622 5855

The Arizona Daily Star

Apollo Training Craft Explodes

VIRGIL I. GRISCOM ... Yester command pilot
EDWARD H. WHITE II ... Spacewalk hero
ROGER B. CHAFFEE ... Radio altimeter

ASTRONAUTS DIE IN FIERY CAPSULE

3 Spacemen Trained In Arizona

Three Astronauts were killed last night by a flash fire that trapped them aboard the huge spacecraft designed to take a man to the moon by 1970.

Repeating with the Gemini 6-A astronauts, the three had spent many hours at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station west of Titusville on the Florida peninsula preparing to fly in the capsule.

Minutes before it was an inspiring moment in the history of the space program, the capsule exploded, killing the three men who had signed a treaty as a "first firm step toward the peaceful exploration of outer space from the implements of war."

Similar ceremonies were held earlier in Moscow and London. But the treaty will not go into effect until ratified by the U.S. Senate. It is expected to do so next year.

The three were hooked into a pure oxygen breathing system in their capsules. They were wearing pressure suits, which made it difficult for the workers trying to rescue the trapped men to pull them one by one as they fought through dense, acid smoke from the burning capsule.

Although the tragedy postponed indefinitely the Apollo's scheduled Feb. 21 blast off, space officials and

U.S. Signs Outer Space N-Treaty
Inspiring Moment Hailed By Johnson

By MAY FRANCIS
Washington Bureau Chief
JOHNSON has signed a presidential treaty with the Soviet Union and Britain, at which the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain have agreed to sign a treaty to ban the use of nuclear weapons in space.

Johnson held it as an "epochal moment in the history of the space program," and said the treaty will not go into effect until ratified by the U.S. Senate. It is expected to do so next year.

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
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Tragedy Will Hurt



Why system safety?





Why system safety?

Failure mode and effects analysis
(FMEA, 50s)

Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHL, 60s)

Fault Trees
(FTs, 1962)

Event Trees
(ETs, 1974)

> 60s

> 70s



Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP, 60s)

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA, 70s)



Different systems...different tool?

LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS

- High level of complexity
- Enormous number of components
- Low probability values
- Multiple stakeholders



Different systems...different tool?

LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS

- High level of complexity
- Enormous number of components
- Low probability values
- Multiple stakeholders



EFFICIENCY

A vertical blue arrow pointing upwards, labeled "EFFICIENCY" vertically along its side.



Different systems...different tool?

TRADITIONAL
TECHNIQUES

EFFICIENCY





Different systems...different tool?




HIGH LEVEL OF AUTOMATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY

- systems un-negligibly dynamic
- human-technology interface
- increasingly complex maintenance strategies

Dependencies between failure events



Different systems...different tool?




HIGH LEVEL OF AUTOMATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY

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


Different systems...different tool?





Different systems...different tool?





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
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D²T²

Dynamic and Dependent Tree Theory




D²T²: The Big Picture






D²T²: The Big Picture





D²T²: The Big Picture




→ Tailored use of 'expensive' dynamic models

→ Preserves effectiveness of traditional techniques

→ Enhances modelling accuracy and flexibility





Modelling Hierarchy






Modelling Hierarchy



Event Tree [ET]:


- Accident Sequence
- Subsystems interaction

Modelling Hierarchy



Event Tree [ET]:



- Accident Sequence
- Subsystems interaction



Fault Tree [FT]:

- Sub-system failure

Modelling Hierarchy



Event Tree [ET]:

- Accident Sequence
- Subsystems interaction

Fault Tree [FT]:

- Sub-system failure


Sub-Tree [FT]:

- Trains of identical components
- Redundancy



Modelling Hierarchy

SYSTEM HIERARCHY ↑



Event Tree [ET]:

- Accident Sequence
- Subsystems interaction

Fault Tree [FT]:

- Sub-system failure

Sub-Tree [FT]:

- Trains of identical components
- Redundancy

Basic Event [BE]:

- Component Failure Mechanism
- Reliability Metrics



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
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Hands on

D²T² application






D²T²: Components Dependency





COMPONENTS

D²T²: Components Dependency







D²T²: Components Dependency



COMPONENTS





D²T²: Components Dependency



COMPONENTS






D²T²: Components Dependency



COMPONENTS



D²T²: Components Dependency






COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT PROBABILITY = 0.003701



D²T²: Components Dependency






COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT PROBABILITY = ?




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


TOP EVENT PROBABILITY
= ?

Joint Event	Probability
$\overline{EFW1Pop}, \overline{EFW2Pop}$	$9.9 \cdot 10^{-1}$
$\overline{EFW1Pop}, EFW2Pop$	$1.80 \cdot 10^{-4}$
$EFW1Pop, \overline{EFW2Pop}$	$1.79 \cdot 10^{-4}$
$EFW1Pop, EFW2Pop$	$2.96 \cdot 10^{-8}$






D²T²: Components Dependency



COMPONENTS




TOP EVENT PROBABILITY = 0.0040

Joint Event	Probability
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D²T²: Trains Dependency






TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
= 0.00541457



D²T²: Trains Dependency






TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
=?



D²T²: Trains Dependency






TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
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





TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
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


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








TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
=?





D²T²: Trains Dependency



TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
=?




ECC1 Repair

ECC2 Repair

ECC1 Failure

ECC2 Failure

D²T²: Trains Dependency





TRAINS

COMPONENTS




TOP EVENT PROBABILITY

=
?





D²T²: Trains Dependency





TRAINS
COMPONENTS

TOP EVENT
PROBABILITY
= 0.0035

Joint Event	Probability
$ECC1\ fail, ECC2\ fail$	$9.996 \cdot 10^{-1}$
$ECC1\ fail, ECC2\ fail$	$1.26 \cdot 10^{-5}$
$ECC1\ fail, \overline{ECC2\ fail}$	$5.20 \cdot 10^{-2}$
$ECC1\ fail, \overline{ECC2\ fail}$	$1.39 \cdot 10^{-5}$





D²T²: Subsystems Dependency







D²T²: Subsystems Dependency







D²T²: Subsystems Dependency





D²T²: Subsystems Dependency






$$P_{top} = \sum_i^n path_i = 0.0035$$

$$\overrightarrow{P_{top}} = \{p_{ss0}, p_{ss1}, \dots, p_{ssn}\}$$






D²T²: Subsystems Dependency








D²T²: Subsystems Dependency







D²T²: Subsystems Dependency





D²T²: Subsystems Dependency



SUBSYSTEMS	TRAINS	COMPONENTS
$B1, CC1, B2, CC2$	1	
$B1, CC1, B2, \overline{CC2}$	0	
$B1, CC1, \overline{B2}, CC2$	1	
$B1, CC1, \overline{B2}, \overline{CC2}$	$3.30 \cdot 10^{-02}$	
$B1, \overline{CC1}, B2, CC2$	0	
$B1, \overline{CC1}, B2, \overline{CC2}$	0	
$B1, \overline{CC1}, \overline{B2}, CC2$	0	
$\overline{B1}, CC1, B2, CC2$	0	
$\overline{B1}, CC1, B2, \overline{CC2}$	1	
$\overline{B1}, CC1, \overline{B2}, CC2$	0	
$\overline{B1}, CC1, \overline{B2}, \overline{CC2}$	1	
$\overline{B1}, CC1, \overline{B2}, \overline{CC2}$	$3.30 \cdot 10^{-02}$	
$\overline{B1}, \overline{CC1}, B2, CC2$	$3.30 \cdot 10^{-02}$	
$\overline{B1}, \overline{CC1}, B2, \overline{CC2}$	0	
$\overline{B1}, \overline{CC1}, \overline{B2}, CC2$	$3.30 \cdot 10^{-02}$	
$\overline{B1}, \overline{CC1}, \overline{B2}, \overline{CC2}$	0	
$B1, CC1, B2, CC2$	$5.62 \cdot 10^{-04}$	

P_{top}




D²T²: Subsystems Dependency

SUBSYSTEMS

TRAINS

COMPONENTS






D²T²: Subsystems Dependency

SUBSYSTEMS

TRAINS

COMPONENTS



$$\vec{W}_{partial1} = \vec{W}_{MFW} \cdot \vec{P}_{EFW} \cdot \vec{P}_{RHR} \cdot \vec{P}_{SS}$$




D²T²: Subsystems Dependency

SUBSYSTEMS

TRAINS

COMPONENTS



$$\vec{W}_{none2} = \vec{W}_{MFW} \cdot \vec{P}_{EFW} \cdot \vec{P}_{DPS} \cdot \vec{P}_{ECC} \cdot \vec{P}_{RHR} \cdot \vec{P}_{SS}$$




D²T²: Subsystems Dependency

SUBSYSTEMS

TRAINS

COMPONENTS



$$\vec{W}_{none} = \vec{W}_{none1} + \vec{W}_{none2}$$

$$\vec{W}_{partial} = \vec{W}_{partial1} + \vec{W}_{partial2}$$


$$\vec{W}_{total} = \vec{W}_{total1} + \vec{W}_{total2}$$

D²T²: Subsystems Dependency

SUBSYSTEMS

TRAINS

COMPONENTS



$$W_{none} = \sum_i \overrightarrow{W^i}_{none} = 2.371 \cdot 10^{-6} \text{ } h^{-1}$$

$$W_{partial} = \sum_i \overrightarrow{W^i}_{partial} = 9.977 \cdot 10^{-9} \text{ } h^{-1}$$

$$W_{total} = \sum_i \overrightarrow{W^i}_{total} = 5.345 \cdot 10^{-9} \text{ } h^{-1}$$



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Nottingham

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Summing Up

Conclusions

Conclusions

- Umbrella methodology integrating flexible modelling techniques within traditional system safety methodologies
- Retains modelling framework familiarity, intuitivity and efficiency while enhancing accuracy
- High potential for modularization
- Dependencies included at any level of system safety modelling
- Algorithms and computational tools available (*NxGen Tool*)
- Removing hidden assumptions



REFERENCES

- Andrews, John, and Silvia Tolo. "*Dynamic and dependent tree theory (D2T2): A framework for the analysis of fault trees with dependent basic events.*" Reliability Engineering & System Safety 230 (2023): 108959.
- Tolo, Silvia, and John Andrews. "*Fault Tree analysis including component dependencies.*" *IEEE Transactions on Reliability* (2023).
- Tolo, Silvia, and John Andrews. "*An integrated modelling framework for complex systems safety analysis.*" Quality and Reliability Engineering International 38.8 (2022): 4330-4350.

Thank you

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