Rationalizing the Irrational: Artistic Realism as Cognitive Reality in Károly Makk’s Szerelem/Love

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“Perceptions are probably not constructed; motion pictures most certainly are.” (Joseph D. Anderson, 1998: 52)

In the last four decades, many interpretations of Károly Makk’s Love (1971) have dealt with descriptions of historical, stylistic or sometimes adaptational values. [1] In the following article, I enrich the prevailing literature on this film by approaching it from a less conventional perspective. My aim is twofold. My argument not only offers an alternative take on the movie that complements existing readings, but, with the same determination, it highlights the relevance of its advocated analytical approach for a more complete understanding and further acknowledgement of Makk’s cinema. The cognitive psychological analysis of the perception of moving images, and more specifically of edited moving images, is a lively approach within the contemporary study of film. Recent trailblazing ecological research, claiming compatibility between natural and cinematic perception, considers exclusively the Hollywood style of moviemaking (Smith et al., 2012). My take on the film, which uses visual manners beyond the rules and norms of this style’s classical narration (Bordwell, 1985), can be seen as an extension of these studies’ scope and applicability. In the following, utilizing a cognitive-ecological approach, I analyze the stylistically distinct moments of Makk’s Love to reveal equivalences between real-life perception and the film’s cinematic representation, thereby shedding new light on the function of the film’s montage technique. [2]

In support of my analytical explanation I focus solely on one of the last, but definitely key scenes of Makk’s movie; that is, on the emotionally climatic moments of reunion of the separated couple, Luca (Mari Töröcsik) and János’s (Iván Darvas). To fully understand the scene’s artistry, I approach its non-classical rapid montage by cognitive means and, by extension, point out its effect as a “true” cognitive experience. The following argument incorporates insights about the non-linear, predictive nature of visual mental imagery in relation to the process of causation in perception.

Before I address these issues, I must stress that I am well aware that to some it may sound anachronistic to discuss cognitive processes and the
functioning of visual mental imagery in connection with a film from 1971 (especially if the film in question is such a well-discussed, highly acclaimed drama like Makk’s Love). We might struggle with this discomfort, particularly once we read substantial analyses of the film’s famous montage technique, which “does not follow the workings of the mind […] but creates a unique structure leaving the conventions of motion picture’s implements of expression” (Gelencsér, 1999: 102; my translation). This statement concerns the process of narrative creation from the single angle of historical poetics (Bordwell, 1989), neglecting the chance to understand the representation from a cognitively appropriate perspective. This means that Gábor Gelencsér’s approach implicitly ties the filmmaker’s artistic choices to relevant analytical angles available in the early 1970s. Ignoring explanations that could construe something from the film’s traditional narration, his approach arguably downplays representational anomalies as poetic expressions. However, as argued herein, most of the cases of disrupted representations are more than poetic markers of a “unique structure.” Their effectiveness is rooted in our biological, cognitive-embodied makeup. Their production is based on creative intuitions that feed upon our psychological-cognitive processes of making sense. Cognitive-ecological studies have proved extensively operational relations between our rich biological heritage and classical narrative films’ “complex set of nested illusions” (Anderson, 1998: 167) that help to create the cinematic experience. [3] My point here is to extend this argument, claiming that not only classical representations’ realism, but also their seemingly non-mimetic artistic representations, are able to create the illusion of reality.

Importantly, I do not argue that Makk or his working partner cinematographer János Tóth [4] had the knowledge to translate any kind of cognitive aspect or functioning of the mind into film language (the way, for instance, contemporary filmmakers such as Christopher Nolan consciously visualize and narrativize insights coming from cognitive studies, but at least close the gap between academic and folk psychology). [5] Nevertheless, I uphold the idea that Makk’s film language provides a distinguished example for contemporary recipient theories. I argue too that the film’s non-traditional narrative representation stems from the director’s cognitive hunch turned into storytelling aesthetics. Here I agree with Carl Plantinga’s (2011) assumptions about how folk psychology guides filmmakers in crafting narratives and emotional experiences. Moreover, I echo Jerry Fodor’s (1987) assertion that folk psychology is a reliable entry point to deal with real perceptual-cognitive processes. In line with these claims, I hope to prove that Makk’s artistic take on reality (while following a film-aesthetically accepted form of expressing emotional turmoil, although probably intuitively), more or less precisely visualizes real perceptual-cognitive processes. Regardless of the director’s knowledge or intention, I use expressions such as “cognitive hunch” or “probable intuition” only to
highlight the creation of visual representations that reconcile the cognitive-psychological experience of film and reality.

Let me start with an insightful argument by Gelencsér, who provides a thorough analysis outlining the traditional position of the film’s primary approach. For Gelencsér, the film’s montage technique is the tool used to create a subject placed into a certain historical, political situation. The argument’s starting point is a film-historical contextualization, in which the use of disjunctive editing in Makk’s film may be linked with general modernist, “left-bank” tendencies in European cinema. Gelencsér describes this modernist montage technique as an aesthetic servant of the film’s main concern, which is its multi-layered political perspective. The story that takes place in 1950 refers covertly to the disastrous consequences of the failed revolution of 1956 and comments on the time of the film’s production (1969-1970). [6] Notwithstanding the relevance of the historical reading, the present article’s primary interest and scope do not allow speculation about the possible connection between the film’s political context and its visual language. Instead, I focus purely on the latter by explaining the disjunctive editing’s emotional intensity through its perceptual and cognitive operations. To further support the relevance of my interest, it is pivotal to understand that Makk’s montage technique is used in two different ways in the film. First I briefly describe the disjunctive montage as a poetic element in the film’s linear narration, which will be followed by an explanation of another function of the montage as an expression of the non-linearity of perception. Gelencsér’s exclusive focus on the montage’s relevance in serving historical contextualization through aesthetic embellishments takes only the first category into consideration. My work, however, concentrates mainly on its second function.

Montage as the Poetic Element of Linear Narration

The film’s montage technique functions primarily as an aesthetic embellishment to create diegetic subjectivities within a completely linear story. Gelencsér’s summary convincingly covers this aspect:

Both in Love and in Cat’s Play [Macskajáték]—and Sinbad’s narration undeniably is the most irregular from this respect—we, eventually, see a traditional narration with exposition, conflict, climax and resolution, with a consistently built plot, a comprehensible one, though sometimes interrupted in its linearity, chronology and causality. What gives a different kind of sensitivity [...] to these films is in fact in the parts, or more precisely, in the whole building from the parts. The rapid montage of close-ups enriches, while the associative relations of pictures extend the meaning of the story. They do not have a life on their own, they are not illustrations for the story, they do
not become subjective visions, they do not reconstruct the temporal and spatial structure of the story, but they, as it were, bend time and space around the characters and their environment (see the use of distorted extreme close-ups photographed behind glasses or magnifying glasses) and so in this manner, along with the viewpoint of the narration, we can see the story parallel, in a "non-Euclidian" geometrical system. This "double exposition" is the ideal of the feature film cinematographer, when the story is tracked from such a viewpoint, parallel to the narration, which seemingly imitates the idea of free flow of associations. (2000: 44-45; my translation)

This analysis makes clear that the film’s montage technique, notwithstanding its lyrical effect operating with stylised flashbacks and other associative flashes of imagination that brings about an extended perspective in time, only serves a linear, chronological, causal story after all. The drama of the story portrays the irreversible and obstinate chronology and causality of the tragedy of passing, as represented by the death of the mother. The rapidly alternating images of János Tóth are fitted together in such a way that, although their “spatial bends” (Gelencsér, 2000: 45) create a non-linear perceptual experience by representing the associative functioning of the mind, their playfulness is subordinated to an unquestionably linear story.

Henceforward the associative montage in the film, utilizing rapid flashbacks, is only poetically motivated and not determined by the manner in which narrative information is conveyed to the viewer:

János Tóth detaches some pictures both from external and internal viewpoints, he leaves the “narrative” path of dreams and fantasies stepping out from linearity, and he also makes the non-narrative compositional principle of film art a servant of telling the story. Still, he does not leave the plot’s world (we do not take the quick montages, macros of Love, Cat’s Play and Sinbad as “short film-like” inserts separate from the whole film partly because of this, and partly because of their narrative embeddings), which however, makes it necessary to include adequate motives and descriptions of the environment into the film’s story. (Gelencsér, 2000: 45)

The conclusion of this train of thought is that, despite the sudden flashbacks and other wedged images, the film challenges neither the category nor the experience of linear narration. However tempting it is to approach the film from the associative functioning, and to interpret the narration as disrupted because of its rapid flashbacks, it would be far-fetched to regard Makk’s film as a form of non-linear storytelling. Nevertheless, within one of the last scenes of Love, which otherwise seemingly follows the film’s already established poetic editing style, the
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function of montage becomes different from the narrative use explained by Gelencsér. Whilst the approach of linearity and non-linearity is insignificant for narrative aspects, in this key scene of the film it becomes meaningful on an emotional level.

Montage as Expression of the Non-Linearity of Perception

The poetic montage technique is reconfigured in the film’s dramatic climax. [7] At the moment of Luca and János’s reunion, the film highlights the powerful moment in a different way from the previously used associative, flashback logic. The representation of the dramatic climax of extreme relief mixed with heartbreaking tragedy looks similar technically to the rapid flashbacks and associative images earlier in the film. Here, however, it is not the poetic element stylising the story any more, but rather the representation of the workings of the emotionally fraught mind.

At this point it is worth considering the editing technique Ralph Rosenblum employed in Sidney Lumet’s *The Pawnbroker* (1964), which uses indirect causality through close-to-subliminal imagery, some years before Makk’s film. [8] As Louis Gianetti explains:

In *The Pawnbroker* [...] Sidney Lumet exploits the art of editing to produce a series of parallels that are thematically rather than chronologically related. He uses a kind of subliminal editing. [...] Lumet suggests this psychological process by intercutting a few frames of the memory shots during a scene that is occurring in the present. [...] [T]he flickering memory shots endure longer, until a flashback sequence eventually becomes dominant. (2001: 152)

The very short flashbacks of Rod Steiger playing Sol Nazerman are not explanatory narrative clues, but elements that help to illustrate the way memory functions. The unconscious, associative helplessness of the brain, taken over by traumatic experiences, undermines linear processes from both the perspective of the syuzhet’s structure and the meaning constructing process of reception. [9] What makes Makk’s editing in his film’s dramatic climax interesting is the progressive way he uses Lumet’s already advanced technique. In the final scene of the movie, Makk creates a psychologically intense situation for his protagonists, similar to Nazerman’s. However, instead of showing flashes of discomforting memories from the past, Makk’s dynamic montage builds exclusively from the heightened emotional state of the characters’ present moment. This intense scene visualizes traumatized characters’ mental states through disintegration of the chronological order of events (as discussed in detail below). In essence, during the final scene, the editing technique, by disrupting the scene with rapid flashes, remains visually the same, but its function changes. In the moment of climax, the representation of the
exaggerated, subjective emotion replaces the intrusive flow of objective memories. Here the traumatized past, Luca’s and János’ forced separation, is not the content, but a trigger for shattering the representation of the present.

In the following, taking my cue from Levin and Simons’ acclaimed theory (2000), I point out the connection between the film-language solutions of the scene’s visual structure and cognitive theory, and compare the shattered montage of this scene with the complex functioning of human perception and cognition. [10] I start with Per Aage Brandt’s study (2004) of the relationship between causality and narration. Brandt’s theory—based on Hume’s skepticism and Michotte’s insights (1946)—deal with the causal relationship between consecutive situations, the switch of their transitions and the recipient inferential interpretation of these connecting processes. [11] Accordingly, the precondition of causality between differing situations is a change-causing agent entering a relationship with another entity representing another situation (in Brandt’s example, when we throw a hammer [agent] at a window, the glass will break as a consequence of this action). The observer of causality does not have to witness the whole causal process (e.g. one does not have to see the exact moment of the breaking glass), it is enough that one notes the difference between the initial and altered state. In doing so, one infers the causal process. As a consequence, the causality that is sensed rather than actually observed depends only on the knowledge connected to the interaction between the situations entering into a relationship (for further distinction of causal inference and causal perception as two distinct mental processes, see Kovács, 2011). Causality, as an inference, is therefore the state of mind of the recipient: from a cognitive point of view, it is not a physical connection, but an intellectual one. In other words, causality is a mental process, in which the most important force is not necessarily the changing reality of the physical world, but the subjective intention of the one perceiving the change as causal. In Kovács’ words, “Causal inference is at least partly driven from inner rather than exterior stimuli” (2011: 59). Consequently, in the majority of cases, Brandt considers causal meaning a response to a past situation, as working backwards, retrospectively, opposed to the model taking it as linear, reading forward, as prospective. The phrase “in the majority of cases” refers to the majority of occasions where we seem to know beforehand what reaction an action will have (detailed by theories of top-down processes of probability). Causality in this case articulates as an additional affirmation to a mental expectation already existing as an intention. As Brandt sums it up, “intention is inverted causation,” that is, our intentions handle the otherwise linear process of causality in a converse order, “Causation is born in the past” (2004: 76). Brandt’s theory of causation brings together an explanatory cognition (working backwards) with a predictive one (forward looking). Our forward-looking perceptive functioning precedes the information and
evaluates the given situation ahead of the unfolding interaction of cause and effect.

Let us translate this to the field of viewer activity. If we look at the narrative film’s diegesis as a narrative chain of causality, it can be accepted that our film viewing functions—using film-theoretical terminology—as a proactive process of making hypotheses. Here, I must consider the background of hypothesis theory. According to its very essence, translated to the interest of film studies (Sternberg, 1978; Bordwell, 1985), the individual perceiving the physical reality of the surrounding world tries to anticipate the information coming from this environment through a series of interpretive tests. The viewer makes hypotheses, and this active functioning is the cognitive basis for film-analyzing and interpreting mechanisms. Steven Johnson connects possibility-creating hypotheses with a common ability to make decisions as one does on a daily basis. Decision-making is the basis for any kind of communication, to have priorities and furthermore to be able to choose. In this context, unconscious socialization or conscious learning is the acquisition of this ability. As Johnson puts it, “learning how to think is ultimately about learning to make the right decisions” (2006: 41).

Giorgio Ganis, William L. Thompson and Stephen Kosslyn provide a rational background for the findings of Sternberg, Bordwell or Johnson by referring to the notion of visual mental imagery. In their words, “During visual mental imagery, perceptual information is retrieved from long-term memory, resulting in the subjective impression of ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’” (Ganis, Thompson and Kosslyn, 2004: 226). The idea is presented by introducing two general theories within its definition, namely perceptual anticipation theory and propositional theory. In order to justify film studies’ conceptions of forward-looking, goal-oriented hypothesis making, perceptual anticipation theory provides a convincing explanatory frame. Kosslyn and Thompson connect perceptual anticipation theory with the formation of mental images, arguing that “According to perceptual anticipation theory, mental images arise when one anticipates perceiving an object or scene so strongly that a depictive representation of the stimulus is created in early visual cortex” (Kosslyn, 2003: 724).

With the help of our visual mental imagery, one can preview possible answers to a given situation and, following further processes of evaluation, choose the seemingly most adequate action as a reaction. The theory of visual mental imagery assisting goal-oriented cognition is clearly exemplified in Marc Forster’s Stranger Than Fiction (2006), where the possibilities of Harold Crick’s previewed reactions are literally visualised on the screen. However, in this case the strength of anticipation does not emerge from vital needs. After getting up in the morning, Crick processes in his mind the possible actions he may take to continue his morning routine. The small animated icons (brushing his teeth, going to the toilet, knotting his tie, catching the bus, etc.) are visualized equivalents of a proactive cognitive process controlled by visual
mental imagery. After running some routines of cognitive scripts, probably based on evaluating priorities and order, Crick chooses to go to the toilet first.

Mental articulations of our emotional reactions to certain situations first take place in our imagination, in our minds, and later materialize in our actions (or with films, through images that follow one another). Beyond deliberate fantasies or thoughtful evaluations of situations, the trigger of forming mental imagery may also be cognitively impenetrable. Hallucination is an example of cognitively uncontrolled mental imagery. Its vividness is caused by the fact that “hallucinations [...] produce a very similar pattern of brain activity to that occurring in visual perception” (Eysenck and Keane, 2005: 102). With the help of its rapid, non-linear editing, the chosen key scene from Love translates this mental process into a montage-driven film language. What first seems as an artistic representation actually turns out to be a rather precise illustration of uncontrolled perceptual workings (foregrounding processes as they unfold in reality against representational norms manifested in classical narrative’s realism).

The film’s montage at the reunion of Luca and János and the momentary delinearization of the narrative demonstrate the processes mentioned above. Analyzing the dramatic effect from the woman’s point of view, the unexpected, shocking moment uproots Luca from the catatonia of the world’s hopeless, monotonous interpretation. [12] The character played by Mari Töröcsik becomes cognitively paralyzed for a moment, but at least freezes in a perplexed state of mind. Unlike Harold Crick, she is unable to search for an adequate response to the emotionally overloaded situation. The technically shattered scene is not only a poetic marker, but also a cognitively precise visual equivalent for her highly emotional state. Prior to her actual response (as an embrace and kiss), Luca’s confusion is represented in a form of vibrant alternation of shots. The rapid editing, mirroring the fragile moment, fluctuates back and forth between zero focalization (the scene’s objective reality), Luca’s internally focalized point of view (the scene’s objective reality from her point of view), and her internally focalized flashforwards from an external point of view (the scene’s subjective reality).

Actually, merely externalizing the woman’s emotionally overwhelmed mental imagery would not significantly influence our understanding of the situation. Ostensibly the two films have no connection, though Harold Crick’s emotionally empty, mentally organized and visually lazy CGI projections are functionally comparable with Luca’s externalized mental imagery. On the other hand, both emotionally and at the level of representation, Foster’s illustration is highly unlike the vibrating montage-sequence of uncontrolled images in Makk’s scene, where the drama’s eruptive energy transforms into expressive form. Notwithstanding their
similar cognitive operations, Luca’s highly tense moment is not about a pondering character that searches for a proper reaction. Here the scene’s emotional intensity feeds upon the chosen artistic representation. Emotional intensity and visual pace are cognitively alike; their closeness is rooted in ecological dimensions and reflected by the norms of classical editing, where the represented situation’s tension is inversely proportional to the shots’ length. [13] This “vibration” is already present in the original novel of *Love*. Tibor Déry describes the woman’s psychological state by physiological actions as a puzzling dynamism, manifest in confused action such as disturbed stopping and running of the character:

Soon afterwards his wife turned the corner with four or five little boys around her. She came towards the gate, her steps suddenly slackening. She even stopped short for a second, then ran towards him. B. also started running without knowing it. As they neared each other the woman slowed up, as if uncertain, but soon ran forward. (1958: 65) [14]

Through the use of hectic montage, Makk and Tóth translate the text’s physically expressed emotional climax (sudden bursts and stops in characters’ movements) into the moment’s intermittent chronology that is a visualization of the mind’s emotional fluctuation. Therefore the scene not only depicts the physical consequences of the confused moment, it also represents the evolution of the thought and its subsequent action. In effect, the flickering non-linear chronological representation of the situation mirrors, not only artfully, but arguably even cognitively, the functioning of an emotionally overwhelmed mind. With the aim of expressing an excessive emotional discharge, the film approximates its montage technique to the real processes of uncontrolled mental imagery.

Strengthening my assumption about the perception’s fragmentary nature, by following Todd Berliner and Dale Cohen’s line of thought, I would here merely like to reemphasize the untenable notion about one of the strongest myths of one’s access to reality:

Common sense says that because the physical world is continuous, whereas cinema edits together image fragments (or shots), our perception of cinema must differ greatly from our perception of the physical environment. Common sense is wrong. When we look at our environment, our eyes do not see continuity; they see fragments. (Berliner and Cohen, 2011: 49)

Physical reality and its ultimate experience might be linear and chronologic, but the perception of this reality is non-linear, and achronological. This insight is echoed by András Bálint Kovács, who in analyzing Godard’s *À bout de souffle/Breathless* (1960) argues that in the entangled non-linear Godardian montage “primarily not the narrative meaning of the events, but their unexpectedness and hectic emotional
content is emphasized. [...] Godard here does not describe a narration, but conveys a narration’s emotional content through the fracturing of space and time” (Kovács, 1992: 177; my translation). Richard Brody confirms this by quoting Godard: “Godard was claiming that spatial discontinuity itself generated a sense of ‘psychological reality, meaning that of the emotions’” (Brody, 2008: 29). Similarly, Makk’s montage technique is not a narrative representation of experiencing reality, but a film language demonstrating the cognitive state of perceiving reality. It is clear that in the given scene of Love, as Kovács describes, non-linearity has no narrative meaning whatsoever (rearranging shots into narrative linearity would not bring us closer to understanding the scene). Rather, Makk’s montage scene represents and makes visually apparent those mental processes that take place during the emotional contents. [15]

The viewer’s reception of the reunion scene in Makk’s film works on the analogy of what Kovács summarizes about Godard’s use of montage. Still, it is worth noting the slight differences between the workings of Makk’s and Godard’s mutual method (space and time cut into non-linear units by rapid editing), various purposes (reality of real feelings vs. artistic reflexivity), yet creating the same effect (hectic emotional content). The similarity of these functions only emerges in the final effect, but this effect is the result of distinct cognitive processes. The climax scene’s montage, deliberately opposing known patterns of mimetic realism, appropriately visualises the very workings of perception and cognition. The artistic element in Makk’s editing seems to function as a viscerally apt cognitive hunch, where creative intuition overlaps real mental processes.

Notes

[1] The story is based on personal experiences of the writer, Tibor Déry, in connection with his participation in the Hungarian revolution in 1956. “In 1957, at the age of sixty two, Déry was arrested for his writings and speeches during the revolution. Fearing that his mother would not overcome the idea of never seeing her son again, his imprisonment had to be kept a secret. Therefore, Déry’s wife pretended that her husband was not in prison, but in America due to very important business. In his letters to his mother, he fabricated stories of his success in America. His elderly mother, whose main language was German, passed away before her son was released from prison. Until the end of her life, she lived with the misapprehension that her son had built a successful life for himself in America. (The correspondence between the writer and his mother has been published since under the title, Liebe Mutter!” (Bikácsy, 2004; my translation). Déry later wrote the script combining two of his short stories (Szerelem/Love, 1956), Két asszony/Two Women, 1962) (Déry, 1967).

[3] A recent example is Todd Berliner and Dale Cohen’s article on editing, which deals with the aforementioned overlaps between anachronism and artistic intuition: “through trial-and-error [...] the filmmakers in the early twentieth century who first developed the conventions of the classical editing system, without directly studying psychology, discovered the structure of human perception” (2011: 61).

[4] János Tóth “was not only the director of photography in many of the films of Károly Makk, but—according to the director as well—a co-author too. Although he is credited as script editor, based on the visuals and the structure, he was probably more closely connected to *Szindbád*/Sinbad as well” (Gelencsér, 1999: 98; my translation). Gelencsér quotes István Zsugán’s interview with Makk here: “János Tóth is a co-author in the truest sense of the word. He is indispensable in every phase of the work” (Zsugán, 1974: 10; my translation).

[5] Since I am aware of the difference between symbolic and iconic signs, which distinguish textual and visual representations, in this article I simply use the expression “film language” as a communication tool (a medium) between the visual information to be understood and the person who understands.

[6] According to Hirsch, at the beginning of the 1970s, the period of "Hungarian history between 1949 and 1953 became an acceptable subject in films, though the actual years in which *Love* was produced (1969 and 1970) were a period of greater censorship. [...] The political climate at this time led to censorship of representations of 1956 convicts, who could not be depicted as heroes in Hungarian cinema, or indeed portrayed at all” (n.d., my translation).

[7] The scene’s expressive visual representation underlines the emotionally crucial moment of the film. János, one of the victims of the typically political show trials in 1950s Hungary, arrives home unexpectedly after his release from jail. The reunion between husband and wife is a moving mixture of fearful uncertainty and bittersweet surprise. It causes emotional turmoil, and none of the characters grasp the full drama, only the viewer does: On the one hand, János does not feel “the joy of freedom but the fear of finding that those he loves have forgotten or somehow freed themselves from him” (Malcolm, 2000). On the other hand, Luca is shocked by the unexpected appearance of her husband and the realization that János arrived too late, as his mother died just few days earlier.

[8] The rapid flashbacks in Lumet’s film exemplify the disjunctive editing’s modernist tendency as a general trend beyond the technique’s
specific historical context. Another illustration is Jan Němec’s use of elliptical flashes in his 1964 movie *Démanty noci /Diamonds of the Night*, through which the fugitive boys visualize their possible future (which never comes true in the linear narrative) in a very similar way to the last scene of Makk’s *Love*.


[11] Michotte (1946) observes that those objects that seemingly get into physical contact, according to our perception, enter into a cause and effect relationship with each other. For example, when a moving object touches a static one, which then starts to move, we infer a cause and effect phenomenon (the launching effect). What actually happens is that one object stops next to the other, which starts to move in that very moment. Michotte believes this to be an innate skill; an idea that is refined later by Leslie and Keeble (1987), who state that causal perception is fundamentally innate, but that learning and experience have a great role in its development.

[12] The dramaturgy forms a scene in which János, waiting hours for his wife, expects the meeting, thus the emotional shock is on Luca’s side.

[13] The statement’s ecological background is based on our ancestors’ necessity to process and react rapidly to intense situations in order to survive. The film language’s dynamic visual representation, through rapid cutting, translates these tense emotions tangibly.

[14] Déry’s figure of B., becomes János, a character from the other novel, *Two Women*.


**Bibliography**


**Filmography**


