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# THE INTELLIGENCE MACHINE

## Report to the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

	Page
I.—Introduction ... ..	2
II.—The Existing Organisation ... ..	5
III.—Organisations whose Policy is now under the Direction of the J.I.C.—	
The Inter-Service Topographical Department ... ..	6
The Intelligence Section (Operations) ... ..	8
The Inter-Service Security Board ... ..	8
The Combined Service Detailed Interrogation Centre ... ..	9
The Central Interpretation Unit ... ..	10
IV.—Departments and Organisations not Directed by the J.I.C. which deal with Intelligence—	
The Political Warfare Executive ... ..	11
Postal and Telegraph Censorship ... ..	13
The Secret Services ... ..	13
The "Y" Services ... ..	15
The Special Operations Executive ... ..	15
Secret Communications ... ..	15
R.S.S. ... ..	16
V.—The Post-War Intelligence Organisation ... ..	16
ANNEX A.—Survey of Activities of the Information and Records Branch of Imperial Censorship ... ..	20
ANNEX B.—Chart of proposed Central Intelligence Organisation.	



## I.—Introduction.

THE Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee invited us to prepare a report on the post-war organisation of intelligence. "Intelligence," in the military sense, covers all kinds of information required for the conduct of war. By natural extension, it has come to cover also security—preventing an enemy or a potential enemy from obtaining information which might help him or harm us. With the coming of total war, the meaning of warfare has been extended to cover a wide area, embracing such fields as those of economic warfare, political and psychological warfare and deception. Those responsible for these latter forms of warfare, no less than those directing our main operations at sea, on land and in the air, require intelligence. Intelligence covers also the means by which information is conveyed, *i.e.*, communications.

2. Before the present war, the Intelligence Branches were not much favoured parts of the Staff in any of the three fighting Services. Indeed, it would be foolish to pretend that even now, in the sixth year of the war, intelligence has not many critics. Intelligence is, however, of high importance as a servant of those conducting military operations. It is no more. It cannot win battles, but if it is absent or faulty, battles may easily be lost. It is important, therefore, that the Intelligence Branch, no less than the branches responsible for the supply of ammunition, fuel and food, and the branches responsible for reinforcement of the forces in the field, should be as efficient as we can make it. Yet no one would be so bold as to contend that our Service Intelligence Staffs entered this war adequately equipped for the task confronting them. There existed no sufficient trained cadre of intelligence officers. Our topographical information was woefully lacking. Fortunately, there existed in the product of the Government Code and Cypher School one certain channel of first-class information, but its full value could not be got unless the machine at the centre was properly equipped to collate and assess it against cognate intelligence from other sources. In the War Office in peace time there was no separate Directorate of Intelligence, and in the Air Ministry the peace-time intelligence organisation was, frankly, not impressive. In the Admiralty, the position was rather better. There existed a system of naval reporting centres in ports all over the world. Moreover, the Naval Intelligence Division, even in peace, was a senior division of the Naval Staff under the direction of a senior officer and, accordingly, carried more weight within the Navy than did the parallel organisations in the other two services. In no Service was there a school of intelligence. There was a tendency to employ officers in intelligence, not because they were particularly suited to the work, but because they possessed a language qualification. In the Army, at any rate, intelligence was a dangerous branch of the Staff for an ambitious officer to join.

3. It is sometimes forgotten that the Directors of Intelligence in the Service Departments are in a different position from that of any of the other heads of divisions. The Directors of Intelligence are responsible to their Chiefs of Staff and, as members of the J.I.C., to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, for advice in war as to the probable intentions of the enemy, and in peace as to the development of warlike actions or policies on the part of foreign countries. In addition to this responsibility the Directors of Intelligence are the heads of great organisations with world-wide ramifications. This combination of advisory and administrative function places upon them a heavy burden.

4. While we believe that it is right to record the situation described above, so that it may not be reflected in the conditions obtaining in the future, we recognise that the decision to allow the Intelligence Branches, which had achieved much in the last war, to wither in the period between the wars, was a natural decision. The fighting Services had terribly scanty financial provision out of which to ensure the security of the country and the Empire. Those in control could not be blamed if they decided that as there was not enough to go round, ships, aircraft, guns and warlike stores must be brought before intelligence. We all hope the country will have learned its lesson and that, in future, it will be publicly recognised that it is poor economy to save on the armed forces to such an extent as to encourage potential enemies to become actual enemies, and then to pay at shortage rates in life and treasure for our unreadiness. It would, however, be rash to assume that the lesson will be remembered. Therefore, "taking the worst case" as we are taught to do in our appreciations for the Chiefs of Staff, it is clear that we should strive not merely to ensure that



our Intelligence Service after the war is the most efficient possible, but to ensure that it is as economical as can be without sacrifice of efficiency.

5. One of the most vivid of the impressions we have gained in the course of our association with the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, and, particularly, during our recent enquiry, has been of the great volume of the available material and of the number and variety of the Departments and organisations interested in it as producers or consumers of intelligence, or both.

6. Intelligence reaches this country in war-time through many channels, of which the following are the principal:—

- (a) The reports reaching the Foreign Office from our Diplomatic and Consular officers abroad.
- (b) The reports reaching the Service Ministries from Naval, Military and Air Attachés, Naval Reporting Stations, the interrogation of prisoners of war, captured documents and equipment, &c.
- (c) The product of the "Y" Services.
- (d) The product of the Government Code and Cypher School.
- (e) The reports from agents of S.I.S.
- (f) The reports received through the channels of the Security Service, including the interrogations of persons entering the United Kingdom.
- (g) The product of Postal and Telegraph Censorship.
- (h) The product of aerial photographic reconnaissance received in the Air Ministry.
- (i) The reports reaching the Dominions Office from our High Commissioners in the Dominions.
- (j) The reports reaching the Colonial Office from our Governments in Colonial and Mandated Territories.
- (k) Reports to S.O.E. from their agents.
- (l) The foreign press—reading organisation of P.W.E.

7. In addition to these official channels, a deal of information reaches this country both in peace and war through private channels. There is correspondence between the representatives of British commercial and financial organisations abroad, and their head offices in this country. There is the information obtained from the correspondence of individual scientists and academic figures as well as that of learned societies. Learning knows no boundaries. There is the information collected by newspaper correspondents abroad and by private travellers. In war-time, much valuable information is drawn from this mine of unofficial intelligence. In peace-time, however, much of it is wasted as far as the Government machine is concerned. Even the information reaching this country through official channels, as outlined in the last paragraph, has rarely, till recently, found its way to all those who could put it to the best use.

8. War-time relaxation of financial control and the urgent need of the different organisations engaged directly in military operations to be sure of getting quickly the intelligence they require, have resulted in some overlapping of responsibilities and duplication of work which should not be acceptable or permissible in peace-time, and should, if possible, be avoided in war. The remarkable diversity of controls during most of the war both in intelligence producing and intelligence consuming organisations, has fostered the tendency to duplication. The three principal fighting Services, though they have their own Ministries as in peace, are operationally directed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee under the ultimate control of the Minister of Defence. S.O.E. (which developed into an intelligence producing agency) has, however, been under the ministerial direction of the Minister of Economic Warfare; the Political Warfare Executive under that of the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Information; the S.I.S. under that of the Foreign Secretary; the Security Service, until recently, under the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, though now under the Foreign Secretary; and the Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department, under the Minister of Information. There were, no doubt, excellent reasons for the decisions that led to this state of affairs. It may well have been right under the pressure of war to avoid the dislocation that any attempt at rationalisation would have caused. Goodwill, and the national genius for making the best of anomalies, has produced remarkably good results from this strange machine. None the less, we believe that a more symmetrical organisation could have done at least as well at less cost. Certainly, if we are to plan an organisation for peace capable of ready adaptation to the needs of a future war, something simpler and more economical must be devised.



9. In the international field it is now generally recognised that the price of peace and security in the modern world is some surrender of national sovereignty. Hence such experiments as the League of Nations and the Dumbarton Oaks concept. The pressure of war has led to the remarkable innovation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the various integrated Allied Headquarters. It is, however, noteworthy that this country, which has taken the lead in these directions, pays perhaps more regard to departmental sovereignties than any other. This is explained by the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament for the conduct of their Departments. Yet, in defence matters, the war has brought about a considerable degree of inter-departmental co-operation through the machinery of the Chiefs of Staff organisation. We believe that few now would contend that this development had been anything but advantageous. If, therefore, in this report we recommend its extension, involving the surrender of some departmental sovereignties, we do so in the firm belief that it is essential. We recognise that each Department affected could make a convincing case for the retention unimpaired of its own sole authority, but we are confident that whatever disagreement there may be with our individual recommendations, any objective study of the problem confronting us would have led to the same general conclusion, namely, that we cannot afford to start another war unprovided with the necessary intelligence; and that we cannot afford in peace (or even perhaps in war) the kind of intelligence organisation we have to-day.

10. We have not, in this report, dealt in detail with the internal organisation of the intelligence directorates in the three Service Departments. To have done so would have destroyed the balance of the report and laid us open to the charge of making proposals on insufficient evidence and superficial enquiry. We have preferred instead to propose a certain amalgamation of existing inter-service and inter-departmental bodies so as to provide a central intelligence agency and to leave it to Departments to work out the alterations in their own organisation that would be possible and desirable were that proposal accepted.

11. Enquiries under other auspices have been or are being made into the two principal branches of our Secret Service, and we do not, therefore, propose in this report to deal in detail with this aspect of the problem, save in so far as it is necessary for our purpose. We believe, however, that there will be general acceptance of the contention that the secret vote should be relieved of as much as possible of the expenditure on intelligence. A great part of the expenditure now, in war-time, borne on the secret vote for, for example, P.W.E. and S.O.E., represents acknowledgeable activities. The more that expenditure on intelligence can be placed on the public vote, the less temptation there will be in future to raid the secret vote in times of financial stringency. It is because we are convinced of the need for the strongest possible Secret Service in peace-time in preparation for our war needs, that we urge that everything possible should be done to protect the Secret Service from having to bear responsibility for activities that need not of themselves be regarded as secret.

12. As regards the other peace-time intelligence producing Departments, there is one general observation that we desire to make. Whereas in the Service Departments intelligence is the sole responsibility of certain officers specially selected for dealing with it, in the Political Departments, *e.g.* the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, the officials who receive, collate and assess information are also responsible for formulating policy. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the system does possess a serious weakness. One who is concerned in devising and recommending policy, and in assisting in its execution is likely, however objective he may try to be, to interpret the intelligence he receives in the light of the policy he is pursuing. To correct this possible weakness, it is clearly desirable that some quite objective check be placed on all intelligence received. So far as intelligence affecting the conduct of the war is concerned, the problem has been to some extent solved in the Foreign Office by the establishment of the Services Liaison Department, whose function it is to take part at all levels in the deliberations of the J.I.C. in the preparation of intelligence appreciations, and to interpret to the Planning Staffs the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government. This departure has justified itself in war, and we hope that it will be decided to continue it in peace. We believe that no Department, however experienced and well staffed, has anything to lose by bringing the intelligence directly available to it to the anvil of discussion and appreciation among other workers in the same field.

13. To sum up, the machine that it is our task to devise should, we suggest, have the following characteristics. It should ensure that the agency best fitted

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for the collection of a particular type of intelligence continues to collect it. It should ensure that, as far as possible, no other agency should collect the same material from the same source. It should ensure that the material collected is collated with other material bearing on the same subject, so that the best possible evaluation may be made. It should ensure that the information, when received and collated, is made available to all those with a legitimate interest in it and whose work will profit from its receipt. It should be controlled at the top by a strong inter-service and inter-departmental body, representing the needs of producers and consumers of intelligence.

## II.—The Existing Organisation.

14. The Chiefs of Staff Committee receive their advice on intelligence matters from the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, which is the principal inter-service and inter-departmental body dealing with intelligence and security. The J.I.C. is composed of an Assistant Under-Secretary of State from the Foreign Office, as Chairman, together with "C," the three Service Directors of Intelligence, one of the Directors of the Security Service and the Director-General of the Economic Intelligence Organisation, which, until recently, formed part of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, and has now been absorbed by the Foreign Office.

15. Under the J.I.C. a number of inter-service bodies have grown up during the war, such as I.S.T.D., C.S.D.I.C., and C.I.U. Owing to the lack of any central organisation to which they could all be attached, these bodies have been grafted on to existing Departments or fathered on to some particular Minister as an individual. Their policy has, however, been generally directed by the J.I.C. The authority acquired by the J.I.C. has come about largely through force of circumstances. The J.I.C. has never been formally invested with any executive authority. Yet in practice it has been found convenient that it should acquire such authority, and no objection has been raised in any quarter. It would be disastrous if the lessons in co-operative working between the Services which have been learned during the war should be lost in peace. Yet we must face the prospect of the disappearance of most of these inter-service bodies unless some central home can be found for them in peace. Departments, particularly Defence Departments, struggling to carry out their own individual responsibilities in peace time within a rigid financial provision, will be most unwilling to bear the cost of inter-service organisations from which they only derive a partial benefit.

16. In war the J.I.C. has developed into a forum of discussion of all matters of common "intelligence" interest to its members, and thus into a kind of Board of Directors laying down inter-service intelligence and security policy at home and abroad. It has come to be consulted in the establishment of similar organisations in the Middle East and Iraq, and at the various Combined Allied Headquarters. Its representatives at Washington form with the United States J.I.C. (which has been modelled on it) the "Combined Intelligence Committee" which reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

17. While it may be that in peace the composition of the Committee may have in some respects to be modified, we are satisfied that the organisation has sufficiently justified itself and shown sufficient vitality for it to be right to recommend that it should be the controlling body for the inter-service and inter-departmental machine that we advocate, and that so far as possible all intelligence producing and using agencies should be represented on it or have access to it according to their needs.

18. We have, during the war, formed within the Joint Intelligence organisation a whole-time staff responsible for preparing for the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee the appreciations required by the Chiefs of Staff and other authorities of enemy intentions and capabilities, and for giving advice on these matters at all times to the Planning Staffs. It was not until the spring of 1943 that the Joint Intelligence Staff was set up. Before then the appreciations of the J.I.C. were prepared on an *ad hoc* basis. Experts from the different Departments concerned were summoned to meetings, and the Secretary drafted reports as a result of their discussions. This was a clumsy system. It resulted in delay in the production of reports and in considerable interference with the work of Departments. Moreover, the permanent Planning Staffs established in the Cabinet Office had no Joint Intelligence advice at their own level. Each Planner sought the opinion of the Intelligence Directorate in his own Ministry.



Frequently one or other of the Directors of Intelligence found himself in disagreement with the intelligence assumptions upon which the Directors of Plans advised the Chiefs of Staff. Now the Joint Intelligence Staff is composed of whole-time officers from the three Services and both the political and economic intelligence sides of the Foreign Office. This Staff works in offices adjoining those of the Joint Planning Staff. The Joint Intelligence Staff is thus constantly informed of operational events and requirements, and the Joint Planning Staff is equally constantly provided with intelligence advice. This system has worked so well in war that we urge that it be retained in peace, in whatever shape the Joint Staff organisation emerges after the war.

19. While the Joint Intelligence Staff is well equipped to prepare for the J.I.C. papers on enemy intentions generally, there exists no similar inter-service body to draft papers for the J.I.C. on enemy technical developments. Each of the three Intelligence Directorates has within it a technical section, but we are not satisfied that this is enough. We believe that there should be more inter-departmental discussion on technical intelligence. With the perfection of modern weapons, the responsibility as between the Services for watching particular developments is increasingly ill-defined. Moreover, now that on the operational side the Joint Committee on Research and Development Priorities and the Joint Technical Warfare Committee have been established, it is desirable that inter-service technical intelligence should be similarly integrated.

20. The information of military importance collected by the agencies referred to in paragraph 6 is collated separately in "country sections" or corresponding divisions in the Departments concerned. Generally speaking, each Department considers that it requires the information for its own special purpose, and therefore employs its own separate staff to study and interpret it. In war time, the final interpretation of most of this intelligence is made by the J.I.C., who use the Joint Intelligence Staff for the purpose. Before the war, no such final interpretation was ever made. Each Department reached its own conclusion, and, unless the matter was of sufficient importance to be brought either to the Cabinet or to the Committee of Imperial Defence, each Department proceeded on its own interpretation, which might well differ from that of other Departments. It is as well to remember how recent has been the growth of the appreciating organisation as we know it to-day, since, unless a positive decision to retain it is made, it is highly likely that in peace it will be allowed to disintegrate.

21. It should be noted that the J.I.C., which grew up as a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has no representation from a number of intelligence-producing agencies, *e.g.*, Postal and Telegraph Censorship. P.W.E., S.O.E. and the Colonial Office. This is because some of those agencies were set up to meet special needs during the war and were not, at the time of their creation, brought within the framework of the Joint Staff organisation which has grown up under the Chiefs of Staff. Others which existed before the war were not represented on the J.I.C. at the time of its foundation because it could not be foreseen how it would develop under the impetus of war. In later paragraphs of this report we consider in some detail the various intelligence organisations now in existence, including those which have grown up during the war, and discuss the extent to which it is proper that their activities should be continued in peace time, and the organisation in which these activities should be conducted.

### III.—Organisations whose Policy is now under the Direction of the J.I.C.

22. Apart from the Joint Intelligence Staff, there are now the following inter-service organisations whose policy is directed by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, but which are administered by one or other of the Service Departments:—

The Inter-Service Topographical Department (Admiralty).

The Intelligence Section (Operations) (War Office—but housed in the Offices of the War Cabinet).

The Inter-Service Security Board (War Office).

The Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (War Office).

The Central Interpretation Unit (Air Ministry).

#### *The Inter-Service Topographical Department.*

23. At the time of the German invasion of Norway, when a rapid decision had to be taken to send forces to that country, it was found that only a small



part of the intelligence required by the Commanders of those forces was ready to hand. It was as a result of that experience that the Chiefs of Staff, upon the recommendation of the J.I.C., authorised the establishment of the Inter-Service Topographical Department at Oxford. Owing to the fact that there existed no central organisation upon which the new Department could be grafted, it was necessary to invite one of the Service Departments (who were the principal consumers) to undertake the formation and administration of it. A branch (N.I.D. 16) of the Naval Intelligence Division had been engaged since 1915 in the production of geographical handbooks on various parts of the world. The purpose of these handbooks was to supply, by scientific research and skilled arrangement, material for the discussion of naval, military and political problems, as distinct from the examination of the problems themselves. By the end of 1918, upwards of 50 volumes had been produced in handbook and manual form, as well as short-term geographical reports. These handbooks acquired considerable popularity not only in Naval circles, but in the other Services and in Embassies and Legations abroad. The Admiralty had been able to secure the services of distinguished figures in academic life in the preparation of the books. The present series is very comprehensive and though produced by the Admiralty is of interest to nearly all Departments, and would indeed be suitable for general publication—though we understand this might involve some copyright difficulties. Perhaps largely because of their experience in organising their own geographical section, it was upon the Admiralty that fell the responsibility for organising the new Topographical Department. A Royal Marine officer was given charge of the Department, and a large inter-service and civilian staff has been employed. The principal function of the Department has been the production and keeping up to date of handbooks in the I.S.I.S. series and also special reports called for at short notice by Theatre and Force Commanders. The handbooks are designed for the use of Commanders, and provide up-to-date information covering the topography, details of the administration, the economy and the defences of areas which may become the theatre of military operations. While the Department is administered by the Admiralty, its policy is directed by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee through a Topographical Sub-Committee composed of the Deputy Directors of Intelligence and officers of comparable position in the other Departments concerned. The priorities given to the work of the Department are laid down from time to time by the Directors of Plans, who are in a position to judge of the areas which may become operationally important.

24. A separate report is being prepared by the Topographical Sub-Committee on the peace-time requirements of the Services from the Topographical Department. This report will be of considerable value as a yardstick by which to measure peace-time defence requirements for intelligence generally. At the same time we think that the Inter-Service Topographical Department should be regarded as the nucleus of the Central Intelligence Agency whose creation after the war we believe to be desirable and which is outlined later in this report. The information that has been amassed by the Department since its creation, on a wide variety of subjects, not all of them directly related to defence, is of great volume and, we believe, of much potential value. To take one example. Before the United Nations turned to the offensive in 1942, a broadcast appeal was made over the wireless to the general public to send in copies of photographs in private possession covering all parts of the world. The response to this appeal was remarkable, and much valuable data was collected. The Department now possesses a library containing 600,000 photographs, all indexed and cross-indexed, which must be the most comprehensive collection of its kind in the world. Another task the Department have undertaken is that of maintaining an index of people possessing special knowledge of different parts of the world. This is known as the Contact Registry. The Department itself, in building up its reports on topographical information about foreign countries, naturally found it necessary to get into contact with as many people with accurate knowledge of the areas concerned as possible. Therefore, in April 1941, they set up a registry, recording the essential particulars of all civilian refugees who reached this country and claimed special knowledge, topographical or otherwise, of places abroad. From this beginning there has grown up the present index, to which contributions have been made by the Services, the Civil Departments, shipping companies, industrial concerns, British Chambers of Commerce, tourist agencies, learned societies and universities. The present index of contacts covers nearly all parts of the world and includes particulars of over 70,000 people. Here again the information in the Registry is indexed and cross-indexed and is a mine of potentially useful information.



25. It is because the information already recorded in the publications of I.S.T.D. and that to be found in their files and in their registries seem to us to provide the best possible basis for the Central Bureau we have in mind, that we recommend that the Bureau should be built up around the organisation of the Department.

*Intelligence Section (Operations).*

26. This body is a clearing house for factual intelligence of all kinds. The Joint Planning Staff, Force Commanders, numerous branches of the Service Departments concerned with operations, Combined Operations Headquarters and many other organisations all require detailed intelligence on numerous questions. In the past it was found that the Intelligence Branches in the Service and other Ministries often received from a number of different quarters the same request in a number of slightly differing forms within a short space of time. It was, therefore, found convenient to institute a kind of information bureau, to which any duly authorised authority was entitled to go to seek factual intelligence. The result has been a noticeable reduction in duplication and a considerable saving of time. It will be evident that a good deal of the material produced by the Intelligence Section (Operations) is the kind of material that is also produced by the Inter-Service Topographical Department at Oxford, and that the material acquired by I.S. (O) and given to its customers is also the kind of material that finds its way into I.S.T.D. In fact, it is probable that if I.S.T.D. had been in London instead of at Oxford, it would not have been necessary to establish I.S. (O) as a separate organisation. The central secretariat of I.S.T.D. would seem to have been the appropriate body to deal with this work. If our recommendation that I.S.T.D. should form the nucleus of a Central Intelligence Bureau is accepted, we believe that it will be unnecessary for I.S. (O) to continue its separate existence. In any case, it is doubtful whether I.S.T.D. could remain at Oxford owing to problems of accommodation. They now occupy premises which will shortly be required by the University and College authorities. In parenthesis, we would point out that the fact that there was a demand for such an organisation as I.S. (O) is a strong argument for the maintenance of the principle of factual intelligence being available for all authorised consumers in a central place.

27. As a matter of convenience, I.S. (O) has been found accommodation in the Cabinet War Room, alongside the Joint Planning and Intelligence Staffs. Though it is an inter-service body with representatives from the three Services and from the Political and Economic branches of the Foreign Office, its general administration is in the hands of the War Office, who provide the necessary junior staff.

*The Inter-Service Security Board.*

28. "The inception of security measures during the preparatory stages of an operation planned at home is the joint concern of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry. Co-ordination is effected by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee through the Inter-Service Security Board."\* The I.S.S.B. has fulfilled, during the war, a most useful task in dealing with the day-to-day problems of operational security. They meet daily and are served by a strong secretariat, established in the War Office. A link with the Civil Ministries is provided by the Advisers to the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments, who are *ex officio* members of the Board. The Board's principal function is the co-ordination of measures for preventing leakage of information to the enemy in connexion with special operations. They have developed a close liaison with the parallel organisation in the United States, and with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. They also maintain close contact with the London Controlling Section, whose operational deception measures have to be closely co-ordinated with our security policy. Local inter-service Security Boards have been established in the different theatres of war.

29. While in time of war there is clearly need for such an organisation as the I.S.S.B., we do not consider it necessary in peace-time. The normal machinery of the J.I.C. should be competent to deal with the inter-service security problems that will then arise. Arrangements should, however, be made for the re-creation of the Board upon a resumption of hostilities.

30. It is convenient to deal under this head with another organisation which deals with military security matters, though it does not come under the J.I.C.,

\* Manual of Combined Operations, 1938 (Amendment 3, 1942).



and forms no part of the Chiefs of Staff organisation. At the time of the fall of France, when this country lay under immediate threat of invasion, a body was established called the Security Executive, under the Chairmanship of Viscount Swinton. Its function was to advise on the measures to be taken against any possible "fifth column." In practice, it extended its function very widely and has provided a useful forum for discussion and agreement between civil and military interests affected by the rigid security restrictions that it has from time to time been necessary to impose. It is unnecessary in this report to examine in detail the functions that the Security Executive came to perform, since during the last two years it has largely ceased to perform them, and it now exists practically only in the form of its junior committee known as the Liaison Officers Committee, who advise on such questions as the entry into this country of foreign technical missions, the restrictions on the publication of official statistics, and a number of similar minor matters. The Liaison Officers Committee are at present more than usually active, since they are engaged in recommending the "unwinding" of a number of restrictions that it is now possible to relax. The Secretariat of the Security Executive also is responsible for the direction of some aspects of the work of an organisation established in Washington called the British Security Control, which did most valuable work before the United States came into the war in dealing with the security of merchant shipping in the Western Atlantic. This arose through Viscount Swinton having been given a personal responsibility under the then Lord President of the Council for certain of the activities abroad of the Secret Services.

31. It will be seen that the inter-service and inter-departmental organisation for security in war, though it has been remarkably effective, has followed no clear-cut plan. The principal agency for general security at home is, of course, the Security Service. An inter-departmental body under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of the War Cabinet, called the Panel on Security Arrangements in Government Departments is, as its name implies, responsible for ensuring co-ordination in the security practice of Government Departments in this country and, so far as possible, with Government agencies in the United States and the Dominions and Colonies. On this body the Service Departments are represented, and co-ordination with the J.I.C. is effected in the person of the Chairman and the Secretary, who is also the Secretary of the Joint Staff. The Inter-Service Security Board does come under the J.I.C., and though its responsibilities are primarily connected with operational security, its work necessarily affects many civil authorities. The Security Executive, on which again the Service, as well as the Civil Departments, are represented, is concerned primarily with the impact of the security measures made necessary by war-time conditions on the general public.

32. We believe that the lesson to be learnt from our experience of security during this war has been that an attempt to draw a distinction between military and civil security must fail, and that it would be wise so to arrange things in future that a single authority be established to deal with these problems. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, since it includes representatives not only of the Services, but of the Foreign Office and the two principal Secret Intelligence organisations, is probably best fitted for the task. It is true that as the J.I.C. is part of the Chiefs of Staff organisation, it might be thought that it would give excessive weight to military considerations. We believe that it should be possible to give satisfactory guarantees to avoid this criticism being justified in practice.

#### *The Combined Service Detailed Interrogation Centre*

33. This organisation, which is administered by the War Office under one of the Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence, is responsible for the maintenance of certain camps in which selected prisoners of war are detained. Measures are taken at these camps for overhearing and recording the conversations of the prisoners. Each Service Department maintains a section responsible for analysing the reports produced in the Centre. The collation of these reports has provided much valuable operational, technical, economic and political intelligence. While it is hard to see much scope for such an organisation in peace time, it is clear that the experience gained must not be lost, since it is bound to be of value in any future war. It may be that the technique which has been developed will, however, be of value to the security authorities in peace-time. It might, therefore, be possible both to obtain immediate advantage and to provide the nucleus for a war-time organisation if S.I.S. or the Security Service were to be responsible



in peace for research in this field. We cannot make a firm recommendation on this matter in the absence of a decision as to the organisation of our Secret Services in peace-time. We wish, however, to record our opinion that steps should be taken to ensure that we do not lose the profit of our experience.

*The Central Interpretation Unit.*

34. Air photography has proved a valuable aid not only to tactical reconnaissance, but to intelligence generally. For example, air photographs, since they provide an accurate and permanent record of the study of a particular area at a certain time can, by comparison with photographs subsequently taken, indicate the effect of damage by bombing, shelling or sabotage, and the degree of reconstruction that an enemy has been able to carry out. They can similarly provide most useful information as to particular developments, both military and industrial. They provide the quickest and, in the case of any inaccessible country, the only way of obtaining material for the construction of new maps. The Central Interpretation Unit, which is administered by the Royal Air Force, is under the policy direction of the J.I.C. It is so closely linked with the Royal Air Force organisation for taking aerial photographs, that it is necessary to consider the two together. The present photographic reconnaissance organisation provides every branch of the Government at war with such information as can be extracted from photographs. The organisation has five tasks to perform—

- (1) To decide on the priority of the demands for reconnaissance and the manner in which particular tasks shall be carried out.
- (2) To fly the necessary sorties in order that the photographs be taken.
- (3) To carry out the technical processing (developing, printing, &c.) of the photographs.
- (4) To undertake the first interpretation of the photographs.
- (5) To carry out the distribution of the photographs and their interpretations to the interested authorities.

35. The Air Ministry have established a special Photographic Reconnaissance Group (No. 106) to carry out the necessary flights. The decision on priorities is at present carried out by an inter-service committee subordinate to the J.I.C. The remaining functions of the organisation are those of the Central Interpretation Unit. So high a degree of efficiency has already been achieved that in favourable conditions of weather the customer who urgently requires information can be provided with the prints and interpretational reports within 24 hours of the photographs being taken.

36. It would be invidious, even if it were possible, to assess the relative values of different types of intelligence. All are complementary. Intelligence obtained by one means may give to intelligence obtained by other means a value which it would not otherwise possess. Yet in sheer volume, the product of aerial photographic reconnaissance has probably provided the greatest single contribution. It requires but little imagination to recognise that the scope of this particular branch of intelligence will greatly extend in the future with the development of aircraft of improved performance and the technical advance that is to be expected in photography. There are few branches of governmental activity in peace or war which may not in future benefit from the products of photographic reconnaissance.

37. While the principal part in aerial photographic reconnaissance must, we recognise, be undertaken by the Royal Air Force, since it is they who have to operate the aircraft, the interest of the consumers is so considerable that we do not believe that any one Ministry should be burdened with the exclusive responsibility for the general control and direction of this branch of intelligence. Moreover, the interest of the consumers will be such that it is to be hoped that they will be able to exercise influence in obtaining the resources in aircraft, technical equipment and personnel which the organisation will require. In proposing that the organisation should come under centralised control for general policy, while remaining under the operational control of the Royal Air Force, we are not, we believe, making any very revolutionary proposal. We have in mind that the policy direction should be in the hands of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. In this case the J.I.C. would normally operate through a special photographic reconnaissance committee, on which all consumer, as well as operational, interests should be represented. It is for consideration whether the Photographic Reconnaissance Organisation ought to enter the commercial field and be available to provide material, not only for Government agencies, *e.g.*, the Ministry of Town



and Country Planning, the Colonial Office, &c., but also for industrial and commercial concerns. It would be right, if this proposal found favour, for His Majesty's Government to buy out the principal independent company working in this field in peace time. If the organisation did undertake non-official work, the revenue obtained would provide useful relief to the expense of the intelligence organisation as a whole, or could be used towards meeting the expense of research and development in aircraft production.

38. The organisation we have in mind would cover the needs of the United Kingdom, India, Burma and the Colonial Empire. It should, however, be possible to make mutually satisfactory arrangements with the Dominions whereby it undertook certain work on their behalf in return for relief in some non-Dominion areas which could conveniently be covered by organisations within the Dominions. It is hoped, shortly, to come to an arrangement with the United States whereby they undertake the principal responsibility for aerial reconnaissance in the Far Eastern war. It would undoubtedly be in the common interest if a similar rationalisation of responsibilities between ourselves and America could be maintained in peace.

39. While, as we have said, we recognise that the operational control of flying units can hardly be vested in any inter-service committee and must remain with the Royal Air Force, we believe that the Central organisation might well take over such responsibilities as the following:—

- (1) The training of photographic reconnaissance interpreters, pattern makers and model makers.
- (2) The School of Photography and the Photographic Interpretational Wing of the School of Military Intelligence.
- (3) The Photographic Reconnaissance Development Unit and the Army Photographic Research Centre.
- (4) The Technical Organisation required for the selection and installation of photographic equipment in reconnaissance aircraft.

40. A development of the existing organisation has been that No. 106 Group has undertaken the responsibility for certain high-speed courier air services. This has followed from the need to distribute the product of aerial photographic intelligence without delay to consumers in war theatres. During recent international conferences No. 106 Group has flown urgent despatches between the United Kingdom and the scene of the Conference, *e.g.*, Moscow and Athens. It is evident that the need for this Service will exist in peace. We understand that the Foreign Office are already considering the advisability of equipping certain of their missions abroad with aircraft. The need for a high-speed courier service, however, is likely to be felt by other Departments, including the Service Departments and the Colonial and Dominions Offices. It is for consideration whether it would not be economical for such a service to remain the responsibility of the organisation charged with the distribution of air photographs and in peace time be directed by the J.I.C. in common with secret telecommunications—with which we deal later.

#### IV.—Departments and Organisations not Directed by the J.I.C. which Deal with Intelligence.

##### *The Political Warfare Executive.*

41. The intelligence organisation of the Political Warfare Executive was started when an intelligence requirement became apparent for the production of leaflets and clandestine broadcasting. The clandestine broadcasts are designed to give the impression of coming from inside enemy or enemy-occupied country. It was therefore necessary to ensure that they should be based on the most accurate intelligence, so as to carry conviction. P.W.E. also undertook on behalf of other organisations responsibility for training certain agents. This created a need for further detailed information. With the growth of P.W.E. it became necessary to provide a considerable volume of intelligence as the background for policy-making and for the output for open, as well as clandestine, broadcasting. In course of time, P.W.E. Intelligence accumulated much detailed information about contemporary administration and political conditions in German Europe. This in turn led to a somewhat anomalous arrangement under which the handbooks on these subjects required by those planning for Civil Affairs tasks were



prepared and produced by P.W.E., since P.W.E. had the information and it was not so readily available elsewhere. The present P.W.E. intelligence organisation, which is a large one, is designed to carry out the following tasks :—

- (a) The provision of background intelligence (political and social) in enemy and enemy-occupied countries on which to base political warfare policy and action, for propaganda output.
- (b) The service of quick information for immediate use in propaganda.
- (c) The provision of intelligence on governmental and administrative machinery (this relates principally to the requirements of Civil Affairs).

42. While it is evident that in any future war the technique of political warfare will play a considerable part, it is uncertain how far it will be thought necessary for His Majesty's Government to engage in open or secret propaganda in time of peace. The tendency will certainly be to close down on these activities. At the same time, it is important that the benefit of the experience gained in this field during the present war should be preserved and that plans should be laid for the creation of an appropriate organisation for war purposes. Here again it is to be hoped that if war comes again it will be possible for political warfare to be conducted under some more closely integrated arrangements with the staffs dealing with other forms of warfare than at present. The only reason why P.W.E. found it necessary to build up the considerable intelligence organisation now in existence was that they could not obtain their needs from any one other source. We have had the advantage of visiting their organisation and studying some of their files. We were impressed by the volume of the material that had been collected and the care that had been taken in collating it. A considerable effort is made to provide other interested organisations with the product of the P.W.E. intelligence, in the form of intelligence summaries made up of extracts from the enemy, enemy-occupied and neutral press, and of summaries of broadcasts, &c. Similarly, a fair volume of material collected by other agencies finds its way to P.W.E., there to be collated and assessed for political warfare purposes.

43. While the reason for the creation of this organisation is easy to understand, it is, in our opinion, highly regrettable that any such organisation should have been necessary. It provides a vivid example of the expense that results from unco-ordinated effort. The handbooks produced for Civil Affairs cover, in some respects, a rather different type of material to that included in the operational handbooks of I.S.T.D. At the same time, we find it hard to believe that, had it been administratively possible for a single organisation to meet both needs, a considerable economy in man-power and effort would not have resulted.

44. We think it is useful to record that the P.W.E. intelligence organisation possesses some 7,000 files and records of some 190,000 personalities. The files cover a wide range of subjects, of which the following are examples :—

- (1) Public opinion abroad as to foreign and domestic issues and the organisations or forces moulding it.
- (2) Enemy propaganda output and the policy underlying it.
- (3) Political parties and activities.
- (4) The machinery of Government, central and local.
- (5) Social and cultural organisations and influences.
- (6) Economic information to illustrate living conditions.

45. While some of the information in this great library is of ephemeral interest, much must be worth preserving. We understand that P.W.E. will shortly be closing down that part of their intelligence organisation which provides material for Civil Affairs handbooks. We think it would be regrettable if these handbooks were not kept up to date and the work of maintaining the files were abandoned. We recommend, therefore, that these records, as a temporary measure, be handed over to I.S.T.D., and that, pending the creation of a Central Intelligence Bureau, I.S.T.D. should accept responsibility (and should take over the necessary staff from P.W.E.) for keeping alive such part of this work as it is desired to preserve. It is recognised that, if the files are to be handed over to I.S.T.D., it will be necessary to arrange for the continuation of the flow of material from which they have been built up. Certain of the records of P.W.E. should, we believe, be handed over to other organisations for them to examine and, where necessary, to retain. For example, the personality records should, we suggest, be handed over to S.I.S., and the files relating to social and economic intelligence be accepted by the Enemy Advisory Branch of the Foreign Office.



*Postal and Telegraph Censorship.*

46. The Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department is, in its present form, a war-time creation. It is, in our opinion, in many ways a model of what an intelligence collecting and distributing organisation should be. At the same time, its position in the war machine is as anomalous as that of many of the other organisations with which we have dealt. It is controlled by a Director-General who is responsible to the Minister of Information in his personal capacity, though not to the Ministry of Information. There exists an inter-departmental committee on censorship at the official level. Although its primary functions are the collection of intelligence and the prevention of intelligence from reaching the enemy, the Censorship Department is not represented on the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, nor is it part of the Chiefs of Staff organisation. In practice, the Department has worked in close contact with the J.I.C. as well as with the Service Departments individually, and owing largely to the efficiency of its administration and the wisdom with which it has been directed, it has given general satisfaction and met with very little criticism.

47. The Information and Records Branch of the Postal and Telegraph Censorship organisation has aimed at providing for simultaneous distribution of the product of censorship to all interested Departments in accordance with the requirements submitted by and agreed with those Departments. It has been so devised as to operate with great speed and flexibility. The user Departments appoint officers, provided with small staffs who serve within the Censorship organisation and there handle the volume of material and ensure that all divisions within their Departments receive what they require. Censorship Stations in all parts of the globe are provided with what are called "allocation lists," which are continually revised by an Allocations Committee. Annexed to this report (Annex A) is a detailed description of the method of working of the Information and Records Branch of Imperial Censorship. This method appears to us to provide a simple and speedy method of ensuring that the collectors of intelligence know what to look for and that intelligence received goes to those interested in receiving it. From the Annex it will be seen what a formidable volume of material is dealt with by censorship, and how rapidly it has been found possible to deal with it.

48. Save for the needs of the Security Service and the police, censorship has no place in the life of this country in peace-time. The complex but remarkably effective system whereby practically no cable traffic in the world escapes the control of our censors could not be maintained in peace. The internal censorship carried out unobtrusively, has revealed much useful information during the war, but since its legal basis was something very like one of those "general warrants" on which the Courts since the days of John Wilkes have frowned so heavily, there can be little likelihood of retaining it in peace. It therefore behoves us to ensure that the records of the Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department are preserved and that machinery be devised which can be rapidly set in motion and expanded in an emergency. We believe that censorship is just as much an instrument of defence intelligence as, for example, C.S.D.I.C., and that the present divorce of the Department from the central defence organisation cannot be justified. The nucleus of the war-time censorship department should in peace have its home in the Central Intelligence Organisation whose establishment we recommend. There would, we believe, be much to be gained by closer integration of censorship with other intelligence producing agencies—and this could be achieved by the method we advocate. Censorship is concerned with the product of intercepted wireless traffic and hence with the activities of the "Y" Services and R.S.S.; with the product of cryptography and hence with the Government Code and Cypher School; with the technique of secret inks, and hence with some of the technical activities of S.I.S.

*The Secret Services.*

49. We understand that other authorities have been or are being made responsible for detailed examination of the working of the two main branches of the Secret Service, and will submit recommendations as to their future. It would, therefore, be inappropriate for us to attempt in any way to cover the same ground. There are, however, certain general points which have come to our notice and which we feel it useful to record. It is stated in an earlier paragraph that we believe that it should be axiomatic that the Secret Services should not be called upon to provide intelligence that can be obtained by acknowledgeable means. We recognise that there is a certain type of intelligence relating to the internal



security of this country itself which is not, and may not become the responsibility of the Defence Organisation. Subject to that, we doubt whether any case can be made for the retention of the present system, under which the responsibility for counter-espionage is divided between two authorities with no better basis for division than that of geography. The work of foreign agents is not limited by political boundaries, and it can only hamper the effectiveness of our machine for such boundaries to determine the means by which we combat the activities of foreign agents.

50. We think it safe to say that after the end of the present war, by far the most important intelligence requirement for a country such as ours will be accurate information rapidly acquired of scientific and technical developments in other countries. Our geographical position, our enormous commitments and our limited man-power will make it essential for us to obtain a technical lead over the rest of the world in compensation for our weaknesses in other directions. That being so, we will have to husband our resources in intelligence and ensure that the different branches of the Secret Service, if the Secret Service remains divided, shall not bid against each other for the limited amount of technical talent that will be available.

51. While we do not propose in this report to make specific recommendations for the organisation of liaison between the fighting Services and S.I.S. and the Security Service, we do wish to record our conviction of the importance of careful selection of officers of high quality from the Services before attachment to these bodies. Whether or not the criticism is justified, it is unfortunate that in the early days of this war there existed an impression in Whitehall which came to our notice, that certain of the officers lent to the Secret Services by the Service Departments were officers for whom it was not easy to find employment elsewhere. If that were true, or even appeared to be true, the effect on the prestige of the Secret Services and therefore on the support they enjoy, must have been deplorable.

*The Government Code and Cypher School.*

52. In this war the value of the product of the Government Code and Cypher School has been beyond price. While it is true that we cannot be sure that we will be able in future to retain this great advantage over our competitors in the same field, we have no doubt that it is of high importance that research in cryptography in peace time should be energetically pursued. Here again, however, some pulling together of the strings appears to us to be desirable. We can see no case for the S.I.G.I.N.T. Board, which under C.'s Chairmanship is made up of members of the J.I.C., remaining apart from that organisation. It can only be to the interest of the consumers of intelligence generally, no less than that of the cryptographers, that a single high-level organisation should deal with the policy directing this specialised branch of intelligence as well as all other work in the intelligence field. The School, though it is, and should in our opinion remain, under the direction of "C.", is not a part of S.I.S. We are not satisfied that there is any valid case for the school continuing to be carried on the Foreign Office vote. By far the greater part of its work in war is carried out for the Defence Services. In peace the proportion of political to military work will shift, but we feel that it would be both logical and advantageous for the expenses of the school to be borne on whatever vote carries the other inter-service and inter-departmental intelligence agencies.

53. There has been during the war a natural tendency to insist that each cobbler should stick to his last, to refuse to permit S.I.S. to circulate their appreciations of the intelligence they produce or G.C. and C.S. to contribute views on the meaning and importance to be attached to the messages they have decyphered. In view of the rather haphazard way in which these various organisations have grown up and of the different authorities to which they are now responsible, this has probably been the right policy. We do believe, however, that it should be possible under a new dispensation to obtain value from the contributions of many outside the Foreign Office and Service Departments in the assessment of intelligence received. The experienced cryptographer can make useful deductions from the cyphering characteristics of the traffic with which he deals, just as R.S.S. have developed a remarkable skill in analysis of signalling characteristics. The telegraph censors, with their unrivalled knowledge of commercial signalling traffic, have also something to contribute to the appreciators, the interceptors and the decoders. We have had the advantage of seeing appreciations written within



S.I.S., which under the present rules cannot receive a general circulation, which struck us as being valuable and important.

54. Apart from the positive value to be obtained from seeking contributions from all who offer them, there is advantage in stimulating those working in particular parts of the intelligence machine to an interest in the wider picture to which they are contributing. This would induce a healthy rivalry and should do much to counteract the ill-effects of a mechanical routine. We discount the argument that any such policy would endanger the security of the highly secret material in question. It is not by treating intelligent men and women as robots that security is best assured.

*The "Y" Services.*

55. At first sight, it appeared to us anomalous that permanent Interception Stations should be maintained separately by the three Services, the Radio Security Service and the Post Office. We understand, however, that the requirements of the three Services differ so greatly, and the technique involved varies so much, that any proposal to provide a single interception service for all users would fail to secure support. None the less, the fact that the Radio Security Service does attempt to cover for its purposes the whole field of interception, leads us to believe that there is an area of common interest in which the specialised techniques of the Services should not be concerned. We are not qualified, nor have we had the time to make sufficient study, to express a firm opinion on this matter, but we believe that there is a sufficient *prima facie* case for a separate enquiry to be justified into the possibilities of economy in this direction.

*The Special Operations Executive.*

56. The Special Operations Executive, during the period before it was placed under the operational control of the several Theatre Commanders, had to build up a considerable intelligence organisation of its own. This was the inevitable result of its separate existence. Moreover, since it is an organisation which employs agents, it is natural that a considerable flow of intelligence from foreign countries has found its way into S.O.E. headquarters. Arrangements are made for this information to be available for other organisations, but only on condition that it is distributed to those organisations by S.I.S. This is a sound arrangement under existing conditions, since only thus can a check be put upon the information by the wider intelligence resources of the latter organisation. Despite the real contribution that S.O.E. has made during this war, we cannot believe that the experiment of running special operations as a separate military function outside the direct control of the Chiefs of Staff and under the direction of a non-service Minister, will be repeated. We understand that it is likely to be proposed that the nucleus of a Special Operations Organisation should be maintained within S.I.S. With this proposal we cordially agree. The intelligence requirements of those responsible for special operations in any future war should, we feel sure, be met in the same way as the intelligence requirements of any other body engaged in military operations.

*Communications.*

57. The present Secret Communications Organisation dates back only to 1938, and first took the form of linking up the London headquarters of S.I.S. with its chief representatives abroad by a special wireless network. At the same time the foundations were laid of an organisation for designing and producing wireless transmitting and receiving sets for the special purposes of S.I.S. The history of the subsequent development of the Special Communications Organisation is fascinating, but it would be out of place in this report to do more than indicate its present responsibilities. These may be summarised as follows:—

- (a) *Direct Communications.*—Machinery exists to-day not only for communication with the fixed branch establishments of S.I.S. in different parts of the world, but also for communication with many S.I.S. agents equipped with light portable sets capable of the requisite range. At the terminal points of the main line system to the branch offices of S.I.S. further networks radiate to sub-stations operated by agents.
- (b) *Interception.*—This is the function of the Radio Security Service, which is dealt with separately below.
- (c) *Distribution to Theatre Commanders, &c.*—It will be evident that much of the value of the product of the Government Code and Cypher



School would have been lost were it not possible to transmit it by most rapid means and under conditions of the highest secrecy to Theatre Commanders. Moreover, when military operations are unsuccessful, the normal signal communications of armies in the field may collapse, as occurred at the time of the fall of France. Therefore, it was found necessary to set up a channel for conveying urgent operational intelligence to the fighting commanders by special channels of communication. The system has reached a high degree of efficiency, and has the added advantage of providing a specially secret signals link for certain communications by the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff, &c.

- (d) *Production*.—Nearly all the equipment used by the Special Communications Organisation is designed, developed and produced within the organisation itself, and the results achieved have been impressive. At the same time it is to be noted that the S.O.E. have carried out a similar policy of designing and manufacturing their own communications equipment. While we recognise that in communications with agents S.I.S. are concerned more in the provision of efficient receivers and S.O.E. in the provision of efficient transmitters, we doubt whether the country is so rich in technicians and qualified artisans as to be able to afford this division of effort. In the Services, the Signals Directorates are, for good reasons, not controlled by the Directors of Intelligence. Therefore, it might be difficult under existing arrangements to bring about a complete centralisation of research, development and production of radio equipment. We do feel, however, that consideration should be given in future to means of devising economies in this direction.
- (e) *"Black" Broadcasting*.—The Special Communications Organisation provides, maintains and operates the equipment with which the Political Warfare Executive carries out a large part of its distribution of propaganda. The technique of conveying the illusion that broadcasts in fact made from this country are made from stations established in enemy, or enemy-occupied country, has reached a high degree of efficiency. We have not yet seen the full capability of this technique. The very high-powered transmitter that is used for certain "black" broadcasts may before the end of the war play an important part by carrying out the "intruder" operation known as "Aspidistra." It is hard to see how use can be made of this technique in peace-time, but its value in this war has in our opinion been sufficiently proved for it to be right that the Secret Communications Organisation should continue research in this field and should make preparations in peace to enable it to carry out similar responsibilities in any future war or international emergency.

#### *The Radio Security Service.*

58. The organisation from which the Radio Security Service has grown was originally established to act as policemen of the air to detect illicit wireless communication. In developing our own secret communications channels, experience was gained which showed the need for a protective security organisation to ensure that the messages passed over these channels did not become compromised. Now the Radio Security Service is responsible for a general inter-service scrutiny of wireless traffic to cover all communications not covered by the other "Y" Services. In particular, the Service intercepts and passes to the Government Code and Cypher School, which interprets and distributes a mass of valuable information originating from the enemy secret services. The knowledge that has been acquired by R.S.S. of methods of identification of signals traffic by characteristics of procedure and technique is now considerable, and has made a valuable contribution to intelligence and to the work of interpretation of intercepted communications generally. The experience that has been gained must not be lost, and the technique must in peace, as in war, continue to develop.

#### **V.—The Post-War Intelligence Organisation.**

59. In paragraph 13 above, we gave an outline of the characteristics which our post-war intelligence organisation should, in our opinion, display. The proposal which we now put forward is designed to create an organisation



possessed of those characteristics. At the head of the organisation and directing its general policy we propose should be the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. The J.I.C. should remain directly responsible to the Chiefs of Staff, though we think that the practice that has grown up, of the Committee giving advice on request to other Departments and authorities, should be preserved. Under the J.I.C. we propose that there should be a system of standing sub-committees dealing with all the various aspects of intelligence. We think it essential that all the intelligence authorities should be brought under the J.I.C. umbrella. In addition to these sub-committees, we propose the establishment of a Central Intelligence Bureau. Into this bureau should be fed information from all existing intelligence sources. Within the bureau, this information should be brought together and reproduced in the form required by the different customers of the intelligence machine. We have in mind that each intelligence-producing organisation should continue to collect intelligence from its own sources, but should not normally receive intelligence from other Departments or organisations save through the medium of the Central Bureau.

60. In peace-time, a certain limited amount of officially acquired intelligence is made available to the general public either in the form of official publications, such as the commercial reports issued by the Department of Overseas Trade, or in answer to direct enquiries generally addressed to that Department by particular commercial firms. We believe that there is scope for a considerable extension of this practice. It is evident that the revival of our export trade after the war will be as difficult as it is important. It is no part of our responsibility to make recommendations to this end, but we believe that we can serve both the interests of defence and the wider economic interests of this country in peace-time by providing a comprehensive intelligence agency. Even in war, much of the information which is of value to the Foreign Office and the Defence Services is in no way secret. We propose, therefore, that the Central Intelligence Bureau should be available, not only to Government Departments and agencies, but also to the general public. While its services, like those of any other Government agency, would be provided free of cost to official customers, there is no reason why members of the public making use of it should not pay for its services. His Majesty's Stationery Office make a charge for their publications, as does the Ordnance Survey for those of its maps that are made publicly available. This proposal would have a twofold advantage. In the first place, as has been said, it should provide trade and industry with much information which should assist them in their normal business. Secondly, it should provide a revenue which should assist the Defence organisation in meeting its expenditure on intelligence.

61. We fully recognise that no Department or Service can absolve itself from direct responsibility for the technical assessment of the intelligence relating directly to its own constitutional responsibilities. We are satisfied, however, that there is a wide field of common interest where it should be possible to avoid duplication of effort. This field covers some highly secret matters as well as a large area of matters which are hardly, if at all, secret.

62. If the J.I.C. is to take over the responsibility for the direction of the kind of organisation that we have outlined above, it may be that its constitution should be to some extent modified. In particular, the Board of Trade should, we think, at any rate in peace be represented. In any case, the Foreign Office, "C" and the Directors of Intelligence must clearly continue to be members. Separate representation on the J.I.C. of the Economic Intelligence Organisation within the Foreign Office should not, in our opinion, be necessary. Representation of the Security Service must evidently be a matter to be decided in the light of the decisions taken on the future of that body.

63. A committee as large as the J.I.C., while competent to lay down policy, is evidently unsuited to the day-to-day administration of a large organisation. This task requires the whole time services of a single individual aided by a competent departmental staff. Here a special difficulty confronts us. We have little doubt but that the best arrangement would be for "C," who is the head of S.I.S. and G.C. and C.S., the Chairman of the S.I.G.I.N.T. Board and the ultimate head of the Special Communications Organisation, to accept responsibility for the direction of the new Central Intelligence machine. Since the Central Bureau will, if our recommendations are accepted, be the principal clearing house for the product of "C's" organisations, it would, in our opinion, be both administratively convenient and correct from the point of view of



security for "C" to be in charge. At the same time, "C" for obvious reasons may not be a public figure, known to the world at large. Perhaps it would be possible to arrange for a deputy to be appointed to "C," who would be responsible to him for the public side of his activities, but would bear a title which would not disclose to the outside world that he was a subordinate. In the following paragraphs we refer to the head of the organisation as the "Director-General."

We propose that the Director-General and, in his absence, his deputy, should be *ex-officio* members not only of the J.I.C., but of all its various sub-committees, though it should not be necessary for them to attend all sub-committee meetings. The Director-General would have the services of a permanent secretariat common to the J.I.C. and its sub-committees. The secretariat should be responsible, under the Director-General, for ensuring the co-ordination of the activities of the different branches of the national intelligence machine. The sub-committees we have in mind are the following, but the list is not intended to be exclusive. Moreover, there should be power to establish *ad hoc* sub-committees when need arises.

#### *The S.I.G.I.N.T. Board.*

64. This Board should be composed as at present, but its responsibility should cover not only G.C. and C.S., but also Special Communications and R.S.S., and ensure co-ordination between them. Should it, in future, be found possible to bring about some further integration of the "Y" Services, it would be proper that it should be under the Board.

#### *Joint Intelligence Staff.*

65. We have in mind that a Joint Intelligence Staff should exist as at present to draft strategic intelligence appreciations for the J.I.C. and to advise the Planning Staffs. Its members would take their instructions, as at present, from their own Ministries.

#### *Joint Technical Intelligence Committee.*

66. We propose that there should, in future, be established a permanent committee representative of the technical sections of the three Service Departments, which should be responsible for giving joint advice on foreign technical developments in the defence field to the Planning Staffs and the research and development organisations working under the Chiefs of Staff. In the light of experience it could be decided whether this committee should itself be served by a whole-time inter-service staff on the lines of the Joint Intelligence Staff.

#### *Security Committee.*

67. This Committee as its name implies, would advise the J.I.C. on all questions of military security in peace, and form the nucleus for the war-time Inter-Service Security Board. We propose that it should have sufficient contacts with the remainder of the Government machine for it to be unnecessary at any future date to re-establish anything on the lines of the Security Executive.

#### *Photographic Reconnaissance Committee.*

68. This Committee should, under the J.I.C., be responsible for the policy direction of aerial photographic reconnaissance and for the production, interpretation and distribution of aerial photographs. If it is agreed that a special air communications service can properly be run by the Intelligence Organisation, its policy direction should be in the hands of this sub-committee.

#### *War Planning Committee.*

69. We contemplate that a sub-committee with a small staff should be charged with planning and making all preparations for the expansion and modification of the intelligence machine that would be required for war. Such war-time needs as censorship and political warfare intelligence should be catered for by this sub-committee.

#### *General Intelligence Requirements Committee.*

70. This sub-committee's task would be to lay down the priorities to be accorded to the nation's "intelligence effort," to co-ordinate the work of the



different collecting agencies, to allot responsibilities between those agencies and to exercise general supervision over the Central Intelligence Bureau described below.

*The Central Intelligence Bureau.*

71. We propose that the inter-service, inter-departmental intelligence organisations, such as the Postal and Telegraph Censorship, I.S.T.D. and the intelligence side of P.W.E., should find their home in peace-time in the Central Bureau, which should be so constituted as to permit of their expansion in time of war to fulfil their full functions. It would be wrong to attempt to produce a detailed blue-print at this stage, of the bureau, but there may be advantage in providing a rough outline. We have in mind that the bureau should be organised on the lines of the Information and Records Branch of the Postal and Telegraph Censorship Department. That is to say that it should provide machinery, through liaison sections staffed by the consumer Departments, for conveying the needs of the consumers to the bureau, who would be responsible for ensuring that the information was collected by the agency best fitted to collect it. The bureau would also be responsible for ensuring that the material it produced was distributed to all those with a legitimate interest in it. The bureau should be divided into two parts, one of which would deal with secret information, and the other with information that is not secret. It is suggested that in both its secret and its non-secret parts the bureau should be organised both by geographical areas and by subjects. We have in mind that information required as a basis of high policy by, for example, the Foreign Office or the Chiefs of Staff should be collected and collated in the first instance in the non-secret branch of the bureau. It should then be tested in the light of any secret information that is available. The next stage, if appropriate for inter-service or inter-departmental assessment, would be for the material to be dealt with by the Joint Intelligence Staff, and the final assessment would be made by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee itself. The bureau would be responsible for providing in the shape of memoranda or reference books such factual information as was required. It will be for Departments to determine how far they will wish to maintain their own collating and appreciating machinery once the Central Bureau has been established. We believe that if our recommendation is accepted, the central machine will sufficiently justify itself to encourage Departments to refrain from duplicating its work.

72. Our proposals are illustrated in the Chart attached to this report (Annex B).

*Ministerial Responsibility.*

73. The centralised intelligence machine described in the preceding paragraphs will be a fairly large organisation, and it will be necessary for its expenses to be carried on the vote of some Department, though we believe that some of its expenses may be met from revenues produced by itself and that, in any case, its creation should result in some saving. Much will depend on the organisation of which the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee itself forms a part. If we revert to a system similar to that which existed before the present war, with no central defence organisation other than the Committee of Imperial Defence and its sub-committees and secretariat, it would perhaps be most convenient for the Treasury vote to carry the unified intelligence organisation. The Treasury carries the vote for His Majesty's Stationery Office, which is an existing semi-autonomous Government agency. On the other hand, if a Defence Ministry were created, it would be logical for the intelligence organisation to form part of that Ministry.

(Signed)

V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.  
DENIS CAPEL-DUNN.

*Offices of the War Cabinet.*  
10th January, 1945.



## ANNEX A.

GENERAL SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS BRANCH,  
IMPERIAL CENSORSHIP.

The main function of this Branch is to ensure that basic intelligence material from the public communications system is properly selected and made available for use in the Government Departments served by this Branch with the minimum possible delay.

Military, Naval, Air Force and financial material is handled by specialist sections, which are not included in the organisation of I.R.B., but which work in close liaison.

In order to carry out this function, I.R.B. has to ensure that—

- (1) The Requirements of user Departments are properly disseminated to and understood by various branches of Censorship.
- (2) The channels along which the material flows are clear and defined.
- (3) The material is adequately recorded.

I.R.B. is not an intelligence section, that is to say, they do not collate the material, except in certain specially defined categories, where experience has proved that collated reports provide the most economical result, *e.g.*, conditions in enemy and enemy-occupied territories, and other similar categories of material.

Information material arrives in I.R.B. in the shape of—

- (1) Letter submissions, reports and information slips from United Kingdom Postal, British Dominions, British Colonial and Allied Censorships.
- (2) Telegrams from United Kingdom Telegraph Censorship, Dominion, Colonial and Allied Censorships and from the organisation responsible for monitoring commercial radio communication circuits.
- (3) Reports of telephone conversations.

In order to deal with this the following organisation has been evolved :—

1. *Cable Section* (the full title of this is “ Translation, Scrutiny and Sorting of Telegrams Section ”).

The three principal classes of telecommunications are handled :—

- (1) *Terminal Telegrams*.—These are screened by the censor on duty in the telegram office before being forwarded to I.R.B.
- (2) *Transit Telegrams*.—All transit telegrams are sent to I.R.B. They are then scrutinised against Watch Lists and examined.
- (3) Copies of all monitored *Radio Intercepts*.

Material of interest under (1), (2) and (3) is passed to the appropriate liaison sections for allocation to Government Departments.

NOTE.—The total traffic through the Cable Section amounts to about 75,000 items a week. These are handled by some 60 linguists and cablese experts.

Overseas stations screen messages before sending copies to I.R.B.

NOTE.—In most urgent cases the routine can be by-passed by Senior Officers, and the copy passed direct to the Department or Section interested.

## 2. *Liaison Sections* (Trade and General).

These two Sections deal with the information liaison between Censorship and Government Departments and are responsible for the final allocation of information material.

They are divided into the Trade Liaison, which deals with all the Government Departments responsible for Trading Controls, and the General Liaison Section, which deals with all Government Departments of a non-trading nature.

There is inevitably some overlap in certain categories of information and officers of the Trade and General Sections exchange opinions and determine between themselves which will handle borderline cases.

The material handled by these two Sections includes letter submissions from British Dominion, Colonial and Allied Censorships, telegram copies passed to them by the Cable Section and reports of telephone conversations.



United Kingdom Postal Censorship submissions are allocated direct by Postal Censorship and only come to I.R.B. for mechanical distribution in Records Section (see 6 below).

Each Liaison Section is in charge of an Assistant Censor.

Each Section has its own Reports Sub-section.

Senior Officers of these sections act as liaison officers and establish and maintain personal contacts with their respective Government Departments.

They are responsible for seeing that the Government Department is satisfied with the information which has reached it, and that Censorship is satisfied that the requirements of the Government Departments are fully understood and being acted upon.

A consistent and persistent effort is made to keep the information requirements of Government Departments within bounds.

It has been found by experience that Government Departments are inclined to make use of the Censorship machine as an administrative convenience regardless of the nature of the Censorship's limitations.

It is therefore one of the responsibilities of liaison officers to protect Censorship from undue demands by Government Departments.

The Trade Section is staffed with gentlemen experienced in foreign and home trading affairs.

The General Section, whose interest can be divided into:—

- (1) The Security Services;
- (2) The Propaganda Ministries;
- (3) The Domestic Ministries, *i.e.*, Home Office, &c.;
- (4) The Ministries for Colonies, Dominions and the Foreign Office;
- (5) The Services;

is staffed with ladies whose background knowledge enables them to deal with questions relevant to their work.

The General Section also compile reports on home opinion and conditions in enemy-occupied territory, and other matters derived from the information passing through this Section.

### 3. Requirements Officer.

This gentleman is the Secretary of the Allocation Committee, which, in turn, is composed of:—

- (a) The Requirements Officer.
- (b) The A.C. of the Trade Liaison Section.
- (c) The A.C. of the General Liaison Section.
- (d) The A.C. of the Control Section.
- (e) The Chief Postal Censor's representative.
- (f) The representative of the Chief of the Overseas Section, Secretariat.  
(The Chief of the Overseas Section, Secretariat, is the channel for correspondence with Overseas, Dominion, Colonial and Allied Censorships. It is a separate organisation within Imperial Censorship and is responsible to the Director-General through the Secretary.)

The Requirements Officer clarifies requirements received from Ministries, and consults with other members of the Allocation Committee as to the *form* in which requirements are passed on to examiners through the Allocation List. His work is internal to Censorship, outside contacts being maintained by the Liaison Sections. Informal consultation is maintained in the interval between Committee meetings. The Requirements Officer depends directly from Liaison Censor, who is *ex officio* Chairman of the Allocation Committee, at the same level as the A.C.'s of the Trade Liaison Section, the General Liaison Section and the Cable Section.

### 4. Control Section.

This Section reviews all the products of Censorship received by I.R.B. from whatever source they may come, and assesses their value, with the object of estimating the efficiency of the Censorship machine, particularly in its information aspect. It divides its activities geographically into regions.

- (1) The United Kingdom. (Control and review is maintained by correspondence supplemented by personal contact.)
- (2) The Eastern Hemisphere. (This includes all territories in which Imperial Censorship operates or has affiliates, in Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia.)



- (3) The Western Hemisphere. (Including the United States, Canada, British Colonies and the Independent American Republics.)

The activities of this section have to do with control in the broadest sense. The work of Censorship is kept up to the standard required by means of advice contained in reports and memoranda. This section depends directly on the Deputy Chief Officer and has a finger in practically everybody's pie.

#### 5. Central Watch List Section.

This Section is a clerical Section whose function is to produce names supplied by the Departments for Watching in the form most suitable for the work of the Department.

Names suspected by Censorship are always checked back with Government Departments.

- (1) Watch List Names comprise—

- |  |                        |
|--|------------------------|
| (a) those contained in M.E.W.'s War Trade List (about 20,000 names) and Supplements; | } approximately 5,000. |
| (b) those submitted by Ministries, Departments, Services                             |                        |
| (c) those submitted by Chief Postal Censor ... ..                                    |                        |
| (d) those submitted by "Security" ... ..   |                        |

2. All names are issued, in the form of lists or otherwise as experience has found to be the most convenient form to:—

- (a) Sorters at P.O. centres;
- (b) Postal Censorship;
- (c) Telegraph Censorship;

as follows, viz.:—

- (a) *For Sorters.*

Duplicated copies (from a stencil) containing *all* names listed in paragraph 1 are supplied on foolscap sheets, about 30 names to a page; these sheets are known as "Masters" and are stuck on thick cardboard at the P.O. centres for convenience of handling. A separate "Master" is maintained for each country. The letters picked out are passed to a special scrutiny room where they are bundled and passed to the Censorship Section concerned, *i.e.*, Trade, Private, Security or Services. These "Masters" are kept up to date by manuscript from Supplements issued by Central Watch List Section and when any sheet or "Master" becomes too congested it is restencilled. The "Masters" used by the sorters in the first stage give no indication whatever as to the Ministries, &c., for which the names are on watch; the copies of the "Masters" used in the special scrutiny room referred to merely have a code letter against each name, to indicate the class of mail into which the letter falls, *i.e.*, Trade, Private, Security, War Trade List, &c.

- (b) *For Postal Censorship.*

Four lists are issued, viz.:—

- (1) The printed War Trade List and Supplements.
- (2) The T.M.L. (Trade Miscellaneous List) and Supplements.
- (3) The P.M.L. (Private Miscellaneous List) and Supplements.
- (4) The Security List and Supplements.

In addition to these four main lists, Postal Censorship receives the following advance notices of names which are coming on "watch," which notices give the "story" connected with the watch and enable Examiners to recognise the type of correspondence required from the body of the letter, viz.:—

*W.L.M.'s* (Watch List Memoranda) on names submitted by Ministries, Departments and Services. Issued by I.R.B. H.Q., who receive the requests.

*S.L.A.N.'s* (Security List Advance Notices). These concern Security names only. Issued by Central Watch List Section.

*M.L.A.N.'s* (Miscellaneous List Advance Notices). Refer to names submitted by C.P.C. and are issued by C.P.C. H.Q.

The T.M.L., P.M.L. and Security Lists do not contain the full stories as given by the Advance Notices, but reference numbers to the latter are given against the entries on the list. (Q) appearing after the W.L.M., S.L.A.N. or



M.L.A.N. reference number indicates to the Examiner that the respective Advance Notice must be consulted, whereas (U) placed after the number signifies that there is no need to consult the Advance Notice, since all letters are wanted without any restrictions. (The W.L.M.'s are issued in the form of copies made by the "Banda" process. S.L.A.N.'s and M.L.A.N.'s are duplicated copies from a wax stencil.)

On the four main lists is indicated against each name the Ministry, Department or Service for whom the watch has been put on.

Recently, for Trade Tables only, of Postal Censorship, a card index has been introduced, which contains all names on the T.M.L., P.M.L., Security List and *Supplements* to the War Trade List. This index is being issued, as an experiment, in place of those separate lists and *Supplements*.

A further change which will take place in the near future is the amalgamation into one combined list of the P.M.L., T.M.L., and Security List, for use on Postal Censorship Tables, other than Trade, instead of those three separate lists.

(c) *For Telegraph Censorship.*

(1) A "Kalamazoo" Binder containing names (on strips) from Ministries, Departments, Services and Security.

(2) Main War Trade printed List.

(3) A supplementary "Kalamazoo" Binder for names from War Trade Lists *Supplements* pending their inclusion in the main List.

(The strips on the "Kalamazoo" Binder (1) have brief notes of any qualifications to the "Watch," thus obviating the necessity which would otherwise exist, of referring to W.L.M.'s and S.L.A.N.'s.)

6. *Records Section.*

1. *Receipt and Release Section.*—(This includes also (A) Distribution and (B) Records Sections.)

Receipt and Release is divided as follows:—

(1) *Mail In Table.*—Handles all incoming letter submissions.

(2) *Ministerial Returns Clerical Table.*—Handles, on return, all submissions and/or originals sent to Ministries for action. Transcribes the action given onto Records copies.

(3) *Ministerial Releases Examiners Table.*—Central point for the release, condemnation, &c., of letters emanating from any British Censorship Station which have been submitted to, and returned with, action by Ministries. All letters are examined for Censorship violations which might conflict with Ministerial decisions.

(4) *Ministerial Reminders Clerical Table.*—Handles matter of "reminding" Ministries of outstanding submissions requiring action. Reminders are sent weekly.

A. *Distribution Section.*

1. *Letter Distribution* divided as follows:—

(a) Main split of records into five (5) main Ministries, for convenience in handling only.

(b) Trade and General. This is also sub-divided for Foreign Office, B.B.C., Ministry of Information.

2. *Cables and Reports Distribution* (also reports from overseas stations).

3. *Photostat Section.*

4. *Re-submission to Ministries Sections.*

5. *Dispatch to Division of Reports.*—Washington to Ottawa and other main Censorship Agencies.

B. *Records Section.*

This Section has three main files:—

(1) Sender file;

(2) Numerical file;

(3) Card index of addresses.



The Records Section receives two copies of each submission. One of these is filed by sender, the other by records number which is put on the submission by the originating unit.

Prefixes are used by different units and consist principally in groups of 3 letters (for example, a submission from Palermo, Italy, might be numbered ITA/PAL 234), *i.e.*, the submission originates in Italian Censorship, the Palermo station. A card file for addresses is cross-indexed to the sender file.

*Notes.*—Some *subject matter* folders are maintained for submissions which are of purely temporary interest and will be referred to only for the preparation of reports. Submissions regarding letters of complaint about the slowness of the mails at Christmas time is one example of the material contained in the Subject Matter folder. (Registered letters and originals are never put in Subject Matter File.)

*Third Party Files.*—No attempt is made to maintain Third Party Files.

Action copies of submissions of held originals are kept in Receipt and Release Section. Numerical receipts are filed in Records Section.

Ministries' and Departments' actions in regard to submissions are forwarded back to unit originating submission for their information. (This is a matter of morale. For the same purpose D.A.C.'s occasionally visit I.R.B.).

Cables filed only by numbers. These are sorted into terminals, transits, wireless intercepts (received from monitors) and cables received by mail (from Ottawa, Malta, &c.). Cables can be located only by number, and consequently requests for copies can come only through some Ministry or Department to which an allocation of that same cable has been made.

Telephone intercepts are handled in the same manner as cables.

Reports are filed by stations preparing them and by number.

*Captured Mail* is filed separately. It is divided into *Italian* and *German*. This mail is received in bags which in turn contain bundles of letters. Each bundle is numbered in London.

When a numbered bundle is sent to files, it is called a Transfer. Reference to letters in different bundles is therefore made by "Transfer Number." All letters bearing the same transfer number are filed in the same file. The Control Section's reviews of stations' work is facilitated by this filing system.

*Alphabetical Filing Guides.*—Underline names of addressor and addressee as guides for the filers, and is therefore responsible for seeing that all correspondence relative to individuals or companies is properly filed together. This is important, especially in the case of individuals and companies operating on an international scale, where some variation in name occurs, as between one country and another (for example, Svenska Tandstiker becomes Swedish Match Company in English). All their correspondence is filed together.

#### COUNTER-ESPIONAGE SECTION.

This Section was established as a result of a Conference held at Miami, Florida, in August 1943.

It works under the executive control of the Chief Officer, I.R.B., who is Chairman of the Censorship Counter-Espionage Committee which consists of Chief Officer, I.R.B., the Deputy Chief Postal Censor and the head of the Secretariat.

The function of the Committee is to co-ordinate Censorship action on all counter-Espionage matters.


The function of the Section is to ensure that all information concerning Counter-Espionage which would assist in the detection or interception of communications of enemy agents is made available to those Overseas or Allied Stations handling the material in which these communications may occur.

There is a special Censorship Liaison Officer in Section V, M.I. 6 and, in addition, the Officer-in-Charge maintains close contact with M.I. 5, the Trade and General Liaison Sections in I.R.B., and with specially appointed Counter-Espionage Officers at certain agreed Overseas Stations.


Through the office of the Director, Western Area, New York, it is in close touch with its opposite number in United States Censorship, known as the Technical Operations Division.




## FLOW OF MATERIAL THROUGH I.R.B.

I.—*Submissions, Information Slips, Reports.*


United Kingdom submissions by-pass Liaison and go direct to the Users allocated by Postal Censorship. They are, however, seen by Reports. Information Slips go only to Reports where they are collated and embodied in reports on special topics. Overseas and D.R.W. submissions are allocated by Trade and General Liaison Sections and are seen by Reports.

II.—*Telegrams.*

W.T.s are Wireless intercepts; C.S.s are W.T.s selected, decoded and translated by the Foreign Office. Cables Section scrutinises for Listed names, sorts the telegrams into categories, *e.g.*, Oils and Fats, Metals, Textiles, Chemicals, rejects obviously useless material, translates messages in foreign languages and, as Cables Section, does not allocate, passes the telegrams on to Liaison for allocation. Shipping telegrams go direct to Liaison, by-passing Cables Section so as to save time.

III.—*U.K. Telephone Intercepts.*

As Telephone intercepts are used for Operational security only, they are allocated by Liaison in collaboration with the Services.


IV.—*Requirements.*

The Users inform Liaison of any change they wish to be made, or Liaison suggest changes to the users. Liaison passes the new requirements or amendment to the Requirements Officer, who studies them from the Censorship angle. As Chairman of the Allocations Committee he submits them to that body for discussion by the members, who include representatives of the C.P.C. (and of the C.T.C. and Overseas if necessary), and representatives of Liaison and Control Sections. A version agreed unanimously by the Committee and the User is finally arrived at and this is issued by H.Q., I.R.B., to the C.P.C., the C.T.C. and Overseas, who transmit it to their officers in the form best adapted to their needs. In Postal Censorship it appears as an amendment to the Allocations List. If




Control, in its Reviews of U.K. submissions, finds weaknesses in the A.L., it passes the information to the Requirements Officer who takes appropriate action to have the A.L. amended if necessary.

#### V.—Watch Lists.




Users fill in a form giving all the relevant particulars of the firm or person to be watch-listed. This is vetted by H.Q. and Liaison and passed back to H.Q. for the Central Watch List Section which again checks up and incorporates the names in the appropriate List.

#### VI.—Action.



A submission "For action" is returned by the User to Liaison with the former's recommendation for disposal. This recommendation is vetted by Liaison who pass the slip to Release Point which works in contact with an A.C. at Holborn representing the C.P.C. who is alone ultimately responsible for the final disposal of all postal matter. If the original has been retained in I.R.B., Release Point obtains it from Held Office; if the original has been submitted, it has come into Release Point with the submission slip. Release Point then carry out the action recommended and approved.

#### VII.—U.S. Liaison Mission in I.R.B.



I.R.B. Liaison sends all the material allocated by them to D.R.W.—telegrams, telephone intercepts, overseas submissions and reports—direct to U.S. Liaison, whilst Distribution sends all the U.K. submissions allocated to D.R.W. The U.S. Liaison Officers, screen this material, send copies direct to the U.S. Agencies in the U.K., *e.g.*, O.S.S. and O.W.I., whilst the master copies go to D.R.W., Washington, via Distribution. For D.R.W. Requirements, the U.S. Liaison Officer concerned contacts the Requirements Officer I.R.B. and an agreed version is issued by H.Q., I.R.B., as in Diagram IV above.

#### VIII.—Control Section.

Control Section, whose function is to examine objectively, statistically and critically all censorship material, is sited in I.R.B. because it can examine the material at any point in its flow: as it reaches Distribution; as it arrives at or leaves Cable Section or Liaison Section; as it lies in Records. It can thus work on current material, allocated or unallocated, or on past material allocated or unallocated. It is divided into four sub-sections: U.K.; Western Hemisphere; Eastern Hemisphere; Foreign Censorship. Each sub-section looks after and analyses from time to time the quality and quantity of the material produced in its own area, in the case of Foreign Censorship, collates its special material.