

TOP SECRET

NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

PROPAGANDA/COUNTER-SUBVERSION

It would be better to divide these two subjects and if possible to take counter-subversion first as it is the wider.

Counter-subversion

It is easiest to think of this in terms of concrete examples, e.g. Indonesia, the Lebanon, the Yemen.

On the British side there is a fairly expert staff covering the Foreign Office, M.I.6, the Information Research Department, and to an increasing degree the Ministry of Defence (and Service Departments), the Colonial Office, and the Commonwealth Relations Office. The basic principle is the direct responsibility of the Minister concerned and the planning is best carried out at the working level, general and specific political or financial approval being given as required.

On the American side the organisation is not so tight and the co-ordination between the State Department and the C.I.A. is not complete. Neither side trusts the other.

There is a need on both sides for better forecasting of possible trouble spots, quicker provision of the type of intelligence required to launch counter-subversive operations, and above all quicker financial and logistic provision of military and other supplies for all these operations. This can best be done on a national basis.

As between the Americans and ourselves the best way to proceed is to develop the Working Group principle in Washington /and



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and <sup>Passage deleted & retained under Section 3 (f)</sup>  
J.R. Green <sup>2/9/96</sup> in the field. If the Working Group system is to work properly the Working Groups must be attended by suitably high level people who can speak authoritatively on policy or operational matters and they must meet at frequent intervals. In the case of the Lebanon the Working Group met but the State Department representation was inadequate.

In the case of Indonesia the preliminary intelligence was not very much good and the logistic support was *in general* inadequate and too late.

If an operation is to be mounted in the Lebanon we shall need much more intelligence and more careful planning.

To sum up, no new machinery is required but a development and strengthening of the existing procedures, particularly at the Working Group level.

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Moreover we have to produce most of the ideas and



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Propaganda

On the British side the relationship between the policy-making Departments (F.O., C.O., and C.R.O.) on the one hand and the overt Information Departments and the Information Research Department on the other is beginning to develop fairly well. More resources are needed but given the difficulties of getting the Western case over in some of the uncommitted countries a good deal of progress has been made recently.

On the American side the man responsible for U.S. overseas propaganda policy is so pre-occupied with immediate problems and personal work for Mr. Dulles that there is little co-ordination between the various agencies concerned or with us.

The U.S.I.A. "Projection of America" and the C.I.A. grey and black operations are in practice conducted almost independently.

There is a similar lack of co-ordination between the political desks in the State Department and the Public Affairs Bureau which is responsible for State Department information.

This lack of co-ordination on the American side led to failure to mount an Anglo/U.S. joint propaganda effort in the Lebanon. *crisis.*

Moreover we have to produce most of the ideas and though the American agencies are friendly and grateful *they*

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they very seldom take the initiative in joint consultation.

The best course seems to be to develop the Information Working Group, which should meet much more often either in London or in Washington.

Preparation for such meetings would tend to produce more co-ordination of the American effort and might induce them to set up a central point where their information policy could be genuinely co-ordinated and where we could exchange ideas and plans with them. We have already made a special appointment here in the Embassy for this purpose.

Again, no new machinery is required but a development of the present Working Group system and better co-ordination, particularly on the American side. Perhaps officials on both sides could be instructed to study what can be done to improve matters in the near future on the above lines.