Alex Possajennikov

Contact

• workRoom B17 Sir Clive Granger Building
  University Park
  Nottingham
  NG7 2RD
  UK
• work0115 95 15461
• fax0115 95 14159
• alex.possajennikov@nottingham.ac.uk
• https://sites.google.com/view/alex-possajennikov

Biography

Alex joined the School of Economics at the University of Nottingham in September 2002 as Lecturer, after getting undergraduate and masters degrees in Russia, PhD degree in the Netherlands, and working as a post-doc researcher in Germany. He became Associate Professor in the School in 2012.

Alex's complete cv can be downloaded from here in pdf format. Alex's Facewall page.

Expertise Summary

Alex's research interests are in the area of interactive decision making in economic situations, known as game theory. His recent research focuses on the co-evolution of preferences and strategies and the formation of beliefs in such situations. Work on evolution of preferences, which combines evolution and rationality, allows to endogenise the formation of preferences in certain interactive situations. Work on belief formation tackles questions of how beliefs can be formed and how equilibria can be obtained by an adaptive process. Since many economic situations can be described in the form of games, these questions are important for economic analysis.

Teaching Summary

Alex has teaching interests in Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics, as well as in more specialised areas of Game Theory, Computational Economics, Economics of Information, Public Economics and… read more

Research Summary

Currently Alex works on the theoretical and experimental analysis of behavior in bargaining situations with hidden information and communication, and on strategic effects of different beliefs in… read more

Selected Publications

• MONTERO, M. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2024. “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games Annals of Operations Research. 336, 1461-1478
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A. and SARAN, R., 2023. (In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: theory and experiment Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 216, 42-61
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2018. Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment Theory and Decision. 84(3), 483-505
• DONG, L., MONTERO, M. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2018. Communication, leadership and coordination failure Theory and Decision. 84(4), 557-584

• View all publications

Alex has teaching interests in Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics, as well as in more specialised areas of Game Theory, Computational Economics, Economics of Information, Public Economics and Industrial Organisation. Alex has taught several modules in some of these areas at the School of Economics at Nottingham.

Currently, Alex is involved in teaching the following modules:

• Advanced Mathematical Economics (3rd UG)
• Public Sector Economics (2nd UG)

Previously, Alex also taught

• Numerical Methods in Economics (3rd UG)
• Microeconomic Theory (MSc)
• Industrial Economics (2nd UG)
• Advanced Microeconomic Theory (MSc)
• Mathematical Economics (1st UG)
• Pre-sessional Mathematics (MSc)
• Pre-sessional Econometrics (MSc)

Current Research

Currently Alex works on the theoretical and experimental analysis of behavior in bargaining situations with hidden information and communication, and on strategic effects of different beliefs in interactive situations. Alex has also started or continued research projects on the performance of economic mechanisms for eliciting information from a behavioral point of view, and on foundations of solution concepts in economic games.

• MONTERO, M. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2024. “Greedy” demand adjustment in cooperative games Annals of Operations Research. 336, 1461-1478
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A. and SARAN, R., 2023. (In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: theory and experiment Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 216, 42-61
• MONTERO, M. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2022. An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games Games. 13(1), 5
• DONG, L., MONTERO, M. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2018. Communication, leadership and coordination failure Theory and Decision. 84(4), 557-584
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2018. Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment Theory and Decision. 84(3), 483-505
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2017. Evolution of Consistent Conjectures in Semi-aggregative Representation of Games, with Applications to Public Good Games and Contests. In: BUCHHOLZ, W. and RUEBBELKE, D., eds., The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods: Essays in Memory of Richard C. Cornes Springer. 85-105
• MONTERO, M., POSSAJENNIKOV, A., SEFTON, M. and TUROCY, T., 2016. Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: An experiment on apex games Economic Theory. 61, 55-89
• MATROS, A. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2016. Tullock Contests May Be Revenue Superior to Auctions in a Symmetric Setting Economics Letters. 142, 74-77
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2015. Conjectural variations in aggregative games: An evolutionary perspective Mathematical Social Sciences. 77, 55-61
• DROUVELIS, M., MUELLER, W. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2012. Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection Games and Economic Behavior. 74(1), 102-119
• HEHENKAMP, B., POSSAJENNIKOV, A. and GUSE, T., 2010. On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 73(2), 254-258
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2010. On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics). 10(1), Article 25
• AMANN, E. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information Mathematical Social Sciences. 58(3), 310-321
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. Commitment in Symmetric Contests Economics Bulletin. 29(1), 376-384
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 72(1), 21-29
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2005. Cooperation and Competition: Learning of Strategies and Evolution of Preferences in Prisoners' Dilemma and Hawk-Dove Games International Game Theory Review. VOL 7(NUMB 4), 443-460
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2004. Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences In symmetric games Theory and Decision. 57(3), 227-263
• HEHENKAMP, B., LEININGER, W. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2004. Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation European Journal of Political Economy. 20(4), 1045-1057
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2003. Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior Economic Theory. 21(4), 921-928
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2003. Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities International Game Theory Review. VOL 5(PART 3), 291-305
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2001. Equilibrium Selection in a Merger Game Economics Letters. 72, 255-261
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2000. On the Evolutionary Stability of Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 42, 97-100