Alex Possajennikov

Contact

• workRoom B17 Sir Clive Granger Building
  University Park
  Nottingham
  NG7 2RD
  UK
• work0115 95 15461
• fax0115 95 14159
• alex.possajennikov@nottingham.ac.uk
• http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~lezap

Biography

Alex joined the School in September 2002 as a Lecturer. His research interests are in game theory, in particular in evolutionary game theory. His recent research focuses on such topics as the evolution of preferences and the evolution of strategies and the formation of beliefs in incomplete information games. Work on evolution of preferences, which combines evolution and rationality, allows to endogenise the formation of preferences in certain interactive situations. Work on incomplete information games tackles questions of how beliefs can be formed and how equilibria can be obtained by adaptive process. Since many economic situations can be described by such games, these questions are important for economic analysis. Alex has published results of his research in several academic journals.

Alex's complete cv can be downloaded from here in pdf format.

Teaching Summary

Alex has teaching interests in Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics, as well as in more specialised areas of Game Theory, Computational Economics, Economics of Information, and Industrial… read more

Research Summary

Currently Alex works on the experimental analysis of behavior and the formation of beliefs in signaling games, on strategic effects of different beliefs in interactive situation, and on the analysis… read more

Selected Publications

• DROUVELIS, M., MUELLER, W. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2012. Signaling without a Common Prior: Results on Experimental Equilibrium Selection Games and Economic Behavior. 74(1), 102-119
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2010. On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics). 10(1), Article 25
• HEHENKAMP, B., POSSAJENNIKOV, A. and GUSE, T., 2010. On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 73(2), 254-258
• AMANN, E and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. On the Stability of Evolutionary Dynamics in Games with Incomplete Information Mathematical Social Sciences. 58, 310-321

• View all publications

Alex has teaching interests in Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics, as well as in more specialised areas of Game Theory, Computational Economics, Economics of Information, and Industrial Organisation. Alex has taught several modules in some of these areas at the School of Economics at Nottingham.

In 2011/12 academic year, Alex is involved in teaching the following modules:

• Numerical Methods in Economics (3rd UG)
• Microeconomic Theory (MSc)
• Industrial Economics (2nd UG)
• Advanced Microeconomic Theory (MSc)

Previously, Alex also taught

• Mathematical Economics (1st UG)
• Pre-sessional Mathematics (MSc)
• Pre-sessional Econometrics (MSc)

Current Research

Currently Alex works on the experimental analysis of behavior and the formation of beliefs in signaling games, on strategic effects of different beliefs in interactive situation, and on the analysis of behavior on a setting representing a lobbying situation. Alex has also started or continued research projects on the stability of best-response dynamics in games, on contest with incomplete information about the value of the prize, and on the performance of economic mechanisms for eliciting information from a behavioural point of view.

• DROUVELIS, M., MUELLER, W. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2012. Signaling without a Common Prior: Results on Experimental Equilibrium Selection Games and Economic Behavior. 74(1), 102-119
• HEHENKAMP, B., POSSAJENNIKOV, A. and GUSE, T., 2010. On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 73(2), 254-258
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2010. On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics). 10(1), Article 25
• AMANN, E and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. On the Stability of Evolutionary Dynamics in Games with Incomplete Information Mathematical Social Sciences. 58, 310-321
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. Commitment in Symmetric Contests Economics Bulletin. 29(1), 376-384
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2009. The Evolutionary Stability of Constant Consistent Conjectures Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 72, 21-29
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2005. Cooperation and Competition: Learning of Strategies and Evolution of Preferences in Prisoners' Dilemma and Hawk-Dove Games International Game Theory Review. VOL 7(NUMB 4), 443-460
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2004. Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences In symmetric games Theory and Decision. 57(3), 227-263
• HEHENKAMP, B., LEININGER, W. and POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2004. Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation European Journal of Political Economy. 20(4), 1045-1057
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2003. Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior Economic Theory. 21(4), 921-928
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2003. Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities International Game Theory Review. VOL 5(PART 3), 291-305
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2001. Equilibrium Selection in a Merger Game Economics Letters. 72, 255-261
• POSSAJENNIKOV, A., 2000. On the Evolutionary Stability of Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 42, 97-100