Department seminars and reading groups

What if the error theory about practically normative thought and discourse is correct?  Given the kinds of creatures we are, some form of normative thought and discourse seems inevitable for us, so "abolitionism" seems unlikely to be a promising response in this case, whatever its merits if the error theory were true only of specifically moral thought and discourse.  In this paper we explore some of the thorny methodological difficulties surrounding a so-called "reforming definition" approach in the event that a more global error theory is true.  An obvious worry here is that the reforming definition is presumably put forward as something that we *ought* to accept, but then a dilemma looms.  Either the 'ought' deployed in the reforming definition is understood qua defective discourse or in terms of the proposed reform.  If the former then the claim itself is equally defective, but if the latter then the argument is circular.  So far as we know, this methodological problem for reforming definitions about the normative more generally has gotten very little discussion.  With a tentative solution to this problem in place, we then argue for a form of "revolutionary expressivism," itself an option not much discussed in the literature on the error theory - typically mentioned en passant or relegated to a footnote but never given a systematic defense.  We argue that this solution is better than abolitionism, fictionalism, reforming naturalism and conservationism, the main options discussed in the current literature

J. L. Mackie’s arguments from queerness against moral realism have been at the centre stage of the metaethical debate for more than three decades. Although well-known the arguments from queerness are not always adequately understood and are sometimes discarded on insufficient grounds. No doubt, this is in part due to Mackie’s own opaque presentation, ranging over no more than four compressed pages.  My aim in this paper is to sort out how the arguments from queerness are best understood and to assess even-handedly their strengths and weaknesses. I discern four distinct arguments from queerness. I shall argue that the first three are ultimately unsuccessful, whereas the fourth has considerable force.

In this paper I defend the claim that substances can be causes. My hope is to show that this view is not as implausible as is often thought.