Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Theme 1 - Self Regarding Incentives

First, we investigate how incentives influence strong reciprocity: Under which conditions do incentives undermine or enhance strong reciprocity and thereby cooperation?



Works in Progress:

  • Gächter, Simon, Kyeongtae Lee, and Martin Sefton, “Risk, Temptation, and Efficiency in Prisoner's Dilemmas”, CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2020-15
  • Avrahami, Judith, Simon Gächter, Yaakov Kareev, and Ilana Ritov "Is There a Bystander Effect in Punishment of Free Riders in Social Dilemmas?"
  • Gächter, Simon, Felix Kölle, and Simone Quercia "Preferences and Perceptions in Maintenance and Provision Dilemmas"
  • Eisenkopf, Gerald, Simon Gächter, and Natalia Montinari "Incentive Spillovers on Voluntary Cooperation"

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Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD

telephone: +44 (0)115 951 5458
Enquiries: jose.guinotsaporta@nottingham.ac.uk
Experiments: cedex@nottingham.ac.uk