CeDEx workshop - Bernardo Moreno (Universidad de Málaga)

Date(s)
Tuesday 18th March 2014 (13:00-14:00)
Description

Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation

Abstract: We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of de.nition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top trading cycle solution, respectively. We embed these three types of problems into a general framework. We then notice that the three rules, as well as many others, do share a common set of properties, which together imply their (partial) group strategy-proofness. This proves that the equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness in all these cases is not a fortuitous event, but results from the structure of the functions under consideration.

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
University of Nottingham
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Nottingham, NG7 2RD

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