Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

CeDEx 2020-11: Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment


We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a treatment where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify with one where the sender has this verification control. We find significant differences in outcomes across treatments. However, receivers’ payoffs do not differ significantly across treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that in both treatments the receiver’s best reply to senders’ observed behavior is close to the optimal commitment strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein.

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This is a revised version of 2018-07


Valeria Burdea, Maria Montero & Martin Sefton


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Posted on Thursday 28th May 2020

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