For the next Department of Philosophy Research Seminar (DPRS) we are very lucky to have our very own Penelope Mackie on “Non-cognitivism, Rationality, and Wishful Thinking”. The abstract for the talk is:
“In his ‘Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking’ (2002) Cian Dorr argues that, even if non-cognitivists about ethics have a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, they cannot explain the rationality of certain inferences from moral premises to non-moral factual conclusions that intuitively should count as rational. He concludes that non-cognitivism about ethical discourse, and (by an extension of the argument) non-cognitivism about other evaluative discourse such as humour, is false. I argue that the principle upon which Dorr’s argument relies, which I call the No-change Principle, is demonstrably false – for reasons that can be derived from Dorr’s own discussion. I also argue that, if the Principle were true, it would prove too much for Dorr’s purposes, since it would undermine the rationality of too many arguments from moral premises to non-moral factual conclusions even when the moral premises are given a cognitivist construal.”
This talk aligns well with the Department’s Normative Philosophy, and Mind, Psychology, and Mental Health research clusters!
Please note that all talks will take place virtually, not on campus. All are welcome. The seminars will take place Wednesdays at 3pm.
To sign up for our mailing list, please email the seminar convenor, Craig French.
(We require your email to send you an invitation to the online seminar.)