I joined the University of Nottingham in 2014. My research and teaching is in moral, legal, and political philosophy. In particular, I am interested in normative issues underlying the criminal law. My book, Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction, was published by Oxford University Press in 2019.
I earned my Ph.D. in 2011 from Washington University in St. Louis, in Missouri. My dissertation examined the justification of punishment, and I have since published numerous articles on this topic. Before coming to Nottingham, I was a research fellow for three years in the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, at the University of Minnesota.
My personal website is at https://zacharyhoskins.weebly.com/.
I teach generally in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Previously I have taught Philosophy of Criminal Law, Political Philosophy, Biomedical Ethics, Applied Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Social… read more
My current research is in the philosophy of the criminal law. I am focusing on collateral restrictions on those with criminal records. It is well-known that people convicted of crimes may be subject… read more
ZACHARY HOSKINS, 2021. Hybrid Theories of Punishment. In: FARAH FOCQUAERT, ELIZABETH SHAW and BRUCE N. WALLER, eds., The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment Routledge. 37-48
ZACHARY HOSKINS, 2020. Anger and Punishment. In: COURT D. LEWIS and GREGORY L. BOCK, eds., The Ethics of Anger Rowman and Littlefield. 227-49
ZACHARY HOSKINS, 2019. Against Incapacitative Punishment. In: Predictive Sentencing: Normative and Empirical Perspectives Bloomsbury. 89-105
I am interested in supervising postgraduate work in the areas of moral, legal, and political philosophy generally, and especially in the application of philosophy to law and public policy debates. My research focuses on normative criminal law theory, so I would be particularly happy to supervise projects dealing with punishment, criminalisation, collateral legal consequences of conviction, and other dimensions of how society responds to conflict.
I teach generally in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Previously I have taught Philosophy of Criminal Law, Political Philosophy, Biomedical Ethics, Applied Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Social Philosophy, Introduction to Human Rights, Philosophy of Punishment, Ethics in the Media, and Great Philosophers. Beginning in spring 2019, I am teaching a new module with Dr. Chris Woodard on John Rawls's political philosophy and its critics.
My current research is in the philosophy of the criminal law. I am focusing on collateral restrictions on those with criminal records. It is well-known that people convicted of crimes may be subject to punishment (incarceration, fines, community service, etc.); what is less well-known is that these people also face a host of other 'collateral' legal restrictions, on housing, employment, the vote, public assistance, and other goods. My interest is in whether, when, and why these collateral restrictions are morally justified. After all, if it is through punishment that offenders 'pay their debts' to society, then what justifies the state in imposing additional burdens that extend beyond the scope and duration of punishment itself? My book, Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of a Conviction, was published in March 2019 by Oxford University Press. In addition, I have published several papers on the collateral consequences of conviction, including 'Ex-offender Restrictions,' Journal of Applied Philosophy (2014), and 'Criminalization and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction,' Criminal Law and Philosophy (2017).
I am generally interested in moral, political, and legal philosophy. Beyond my current research on collateral restrictions, I am interested in other normative questions underlying the criminal law and punishment. In particular, I am interested in the use of the criminal law and punishment at the international level, as a response to genocide and other mass crimes. Such crimes are often said to be committed by groups, rather than by individuals, but the prosecution and punishment of groups as groups raises normative questions about the role of individuals within group endeavours. The worry is that some members of the group may not have been responsible, or may have been at least less responsible, for the wrongdoing. Thus punishing groups as groups risks subjecting innocent (or less culpable) members of the group to guilt by association.