The Changing Global Politics of Nuclear Weapons: Taiwan’s Decisive Role 

Policy paper by Cameron Hunter

Taiwan’s position in the Global Nuclear Order is important but underappreciated. Observers might mistakenly assume that the only way to influence nuclear stability or practice deterrence is by possessing nuclear weapons. Taiwan has no plans or capability to develop them. Despite this, Taiwan is at the forefront of global trends in conventionaldeterrence. In the 21^st century, the country has developed a small number of long-range weapons to support its more traditional capacity to counter the Chinese military in the Taiwan Strait itself. A direct nuclear strike by China against Taiwan is highly unlikely, but this is not the only scenario where Taiwan interacts with global nuclear politics. Due to the nature of China’s dual-use (nuclear and non-nuclear) weapons, such as missiles and aircraft, Taiwanese counterstrikes against Chinese missile and bomber units will also degrade China’s nuclear deterrent against the US. This conventional deterrence posture enables Taiwan to influence the nuclear threshold in future crises and conflicts. This fact is underestimated in public discourse in the Anglosphere and Europe.

Despite enormous pressures and limited support from international institutions, Taiwan has disavowed responding to the threat of China with nuclear weapons. It has also made significant efforts to stop the malicious export of Taiwanese technologies for weapons production.[i] These efforts have largely gone unnoticed in the international disarmament community.

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Moving Beyond the Grey Zone: Evidence-Based Policy for Maritime Security in the Taiwan Strait (Part II)

Policy Paper by Jérôme Gapany

This two-part policy paper examines how evolving patterns of maritime activity in and around the Taiwan Strait create escalation risks, and how Taiwan authorities can respond with clearer concepts and more systematic evidence. Part I suggests that the increasingly elastic use of “grey zone” as a catch-all label makes it harder to distinguish between different types of pressure at sea, their indicators and appropriate responses. As an alternative working lens, the paper uses “maritime coercion”: the sustained use of non-war maritime activities to influence another actor’s choices through pressure or disruption, while remaining short of open conflict. Viewed this way, the Strait appears as a setting of cumulative risk rather than isolated crises. Large-scale exercises, the expanded influence of Chinese Coast Guard authorities, the growing role of militia-type actors and recurrent disturbances affecting subsea cables and other infrastructure all add friction, uncertainty and room for misreading intent. Managing this environment requires the ability to tell routine activity from meaningful change in posture, to connect observable patterns to proportionate, non-escalatory responses, and to communicate facts credibly to domestic and external audiences. Part II, therefore, advances a practical, evidence-led agenda centred on a “Taiwan Maritime Transparency Hub” (TMTH) that would draw together incident data from defence, coastguard and infrastructure operators under common templates and validation rules. It also outlines how a clearer domestic evidence base could feed into status-neutral channels, both regionally and internationally. In combination, the following policy recommendations are intended to make well-documented incidents, rather than contested narratives, the organising principle for how Taiwan tracks maritime risks, calibrates its responses and contributes to wider regional resilience.

Download the policy paper by Jérôme Gapany (PDF)