Department of Philosophy

Seminars and conferences

Research seminars

We run weekly research seminars every Wednesday during term time, at 3pm.

Please sign up for these seminars by emailing Craig French - this is so we can send you a link to the event.

Arii Matamoe painting shows a mans severed head on a pillow displayed before mourners. The room has decorative wallpaper and a rug.

 

Postgraduate Research Seminar

There is also a Postgraduate Research Seminar which meets weekly. Usually, a research student presents their research, although occasionally we set a paper to read and discuss, or a member of staff presents.

For details of other events organised by the Department and research centres see our news and events page.

New reading groups?

Anyone interested in starting a new reading group is encouraged to do so. Try an email to the staff and research students to find people sharing your research interests.

Research seminars

 

John Danaher- Autumn research seminar

John Danaher- Autumn research seminar
Date
Wednesday 8 December 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting

Steve Barker- Autumn research seminar

Steve Barker- Autumn research seminar
Date
Wednesday 15 December 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
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Past seminar series

Autumn 2021

Errol Lord- Autumn research seminar

Errol Lord- Autumn research seminar
Date
Wednesday 6 October 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Errol Lord, University of Pennsylvania, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Quill Kukla- Autumn research seminar

Quill Kukla- Autumn research seminar
Date
Wednesday 13 October 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Quill Kukla, Georgetown University, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Penelope Mackie- Autumn research seminar

Penelope Mackie- Autumn research seminar
Date
Wednesday 20 October 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Penelope Mackie, University of Nottingham, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Federica Malfatti- Autumn research seminar

Federica Malfatti- Autumn research seminar
Date
Wednesday 27 October 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Federica Malfatti, University of Innsbruck, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar
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Spring 2021

Sam Wren-Lewis- Spring research seminar

Sam Wren-Lewis- Spring research seminar
Date
Wednesday 17 March 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Sam Wren-Lewis, University of Nottingham (visiting), is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Nicholas Shackel- Spring research seminar

Nicholas Shackel- Spring research seminar
Date
Wednesday 24 March 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Nicholas Shackel, Cardiff University, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Matt Duncombe - The Origins of the Liar, the Sorties, and Some Less Popular Paradoxes

Matt Duncombe - The Origins of the Liar, the Sorties, and Some Less Popular Paradoxes
Date
Wednesday 21 April 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Department of Philosophy Spring research seminar

Zach Hoskins- Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment

Zach Hoskins- Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment
Date
Wednesday 28 April 2021
Location:
Online - 365 Teams Meeting
Description
Department of Philosophy Spring research seminar
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Autumn 2020

Research seminar - 30 September - Nat Hansen

Date
Wednesday 30 September 2020
Description
Nat Hansen, University of Reading, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 7 October - Paulina Sliwa

Date
Wednesday 7 October 2020
Description
Dr Paulina Sliwa, University of Cambridge, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 21 October - Ann Whittle

Date
Wednesday 14 October 2020
Description
Dr Ann Whittle, University of Manchester, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 14 October - Mark Jago

Date
Wednesday 14 October 2020
Description
Mark Jago, University of Nottingham, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 28 October - Rachel Handley

Date
Wednesday 28 October 2020
Description
Rachel Handley, University of Liverpool, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 4 November - Marcus Lee

Date
Wednesday 4 November 2020
Description
Marcus Lee, University of Nottingham, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 11 November - Maggie O'Brien

Date
Wednesday 11 November 2020
Description
Maggie O'Brien, University of Edinburgh, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 18 November - Annina Loets

Date
Wednesday 18 November 2020
Description
Annina Loets, University of Oxford, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 25 November - Neil Sinclair

Date
Wednesday 25 November 2020
Description
Dr Neil Sinclair, University of Nottingham, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar

Research seminar - 2 December - Neil Turnbull

Date
Wednesday 2 December 2020
Description
Dr Neil Turnbull, Nottingham Trent University, is the speaker at this Department of Philosophy research seminar
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Spring 2020

Philosophy Research Seminar - Neil Williams

Date
Wednesday 5 February 2020
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Neil Williams (University of Roehampton) - The Role of Temperament in Philosophical Inquiry: A Pragmatic Approach

Philosophy Research Seminar - Christine Tiefensee

Date
Wednesday 12 February 2020
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Christine Tiefensee (Frankfurt School)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Louise Richardson

Date
Wednesday 19 February 2020
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Louise Richardson (University of York)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Jim Cargile

Date
Wednesday 26 February 2020
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Jim Cargile (University of Virginia)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Denise Vigani

Date
Wednesday 4 March 2020
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Denise Vigani (Seton Hall University)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Alex Grzankowski

Date
Wednesday 4 March 2020
Description
*Event cancelled due to coronavirus precautions* Philosophy research seminar: Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Lorna Finlayson

Date
Wednesday 11 March 2020
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Lorna Finlayson (University of Essex)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Ann Whittle

Date
Wednesday 25 March 2020
Description
*Event cancelled due to coronavirus precautions* Philosophy research seminar: Ann Whittle (University of Manchester)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Guiliano Torrengo

Date
Tuesday 31 March 2020
Description
*Event cancelled due to coronavirus precautions* Philosophy research seminar: Guiliano Torrengo (University of Milan)

Philosophy Research Seminar - Sophia Connell

Date
Wednesday 1 April 2020
Description
*Event cancelled due to coronavirus precautions* Philosophy research seminar: Sophia Connell (Birkbeck)
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Autumn 2019

Philosophy Research Seminar - Mark Jago

Date
Wednesday 2 October 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Mark Jago - Metaphysical Structure

Philosophy Research Seminar - Michael Hannon

Date
Wednesday 9 October 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Michael Hannon - Political Disagreement or Partisan Badmouthing? The Role of Expressive Discourse in Politics

Philosophy Research Seminar - Jonathan Knowles

Date
Tuesday 15 October 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Jonathan Knowles, NTNU - Metaphysics for Anti-representationalists.

Philosophy Research Seminar - Laura D'Olimpio

Date
Wednesday 16 October 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Laura D'Olimpio - Critical Perspectivism: Social Media and Moral Education

Philosophy Research Seminar - Jessica Brown

Date
Wednesday 23 October 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Jessica Brown, St Andrews - Profiling, Doxastic Wrongs and Encroachment

Philosophy Research Seminar - Jess Leech

Date
Wednesday 30 October 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Jess Leech, King's College London - Metaphysical Necessity

Philosophy Research Seminar - Chris Cowie

Date
Wednesday 13 November 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Chris Cowie, Durham University

Philosophy Research Seminar - Sara Uckelman

Date
Wednesday 20 November 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Sara Uckelman, University of Birmingham

Philosophy Research Seminar - Sophie Allen

Date
Wednesday 27 November 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Sophie Allen, University of Keele

Philosophy Research Seminar - Lee Walters

Date
Wednesday 4 December 2019
Description
Philosophy research seminar: Lee Walters, University of Southampton
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Spring 2019

30 January 2019

Andrew Stephenson (Southampton)

06 February 2019

Michael Hannon (Nottingham)

13 February 2019

Ursula Coope (Oxford)

20 February 2019

Rowland Stout (University College Dublin)

27 February 2019

Joanna Burch-Brown (Bristol)

06 March 2019

Jules Holroyd (Sheffield)

20 March 2019

Fiona Ellis (Heythrop College)

27 March 2019

Simona Aimar (UCL)

03 April 2019

Emma Gordon (Edinburgh)

 
Autumn 2018

03 October 2018

Helen de Cruz (Oxford Brookes)

10 October 2018

Anil Gomes (Oxford)

17 October 2018

Mihaela Popa (Birmingham)

24 October 2018

Koshka Duff (Nottingham)

31 October 2018

Alex Gregory (Southampton)

14 November 2018

Patrick Todd (Edinburgh)

21 November 2018

Louise Hanson (Durham)

28 November 2018

Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (Sheffield)

05 December 2018

Benedict Rumbold (Nottingham)

 
Spring 2018

31 January 2018

Joel Smith (Manchester)

The First Person Plural Perspective

Language and thought can be first-personal. That is, one can utter the words ‘I’ or ‘me’, and one can employ the first-person concept I in one’s thinking. More generally, philosophers often speak of the first-person perspective: a perspective from which one speaks, or thinks, first-personally. But language and thought can be first-personal in both the singular and the plural. That is, one can not only utter ‘I’ or ‘me’, but also ‘we’ and ‘us’, and one can employ the first-person plural concept we in one’s thinking. Is there, then, a first-person plural perspective; a perspective from which one speaks, or thinks, plural first-personally? I argue that there is and that much of what can be said about the first-person singular perspective carries over to the plural case.

7 February 2018

Stephen Bero (Surrey)

Blame, Shame, and the Emotional Economy of Responsibility

It has become a commonplace in the growing theoretical literature on blame to say that blame is something more than adverse assessment yet something less than adverse treatment. But this commonplace has proven resistant to explanation; the difficulty is sometimes described as the challenge of accounting for the distinctive force of blame. Attention has tended to focus on what the blaming party is doing, resulting in various suggestions that the force of blame is a matter of (for instance) judging, desiring, expressing, or feeling in some special way.

But we might approach blame’s force from a different direction. Rather than focusing on what the blaming party is doing, we could focus instead on how the blamed party reacts. If blame has a special force then we should expect those on the receiving end of it to feel that force, and by considering how the force is felt we might better appreciate what it amounts to.

To this end, I examine the interaction between blame and shame. Philosophers usually associate blame with guilt rather than shame. But shame, I contend, is responsive to blame in a way that guilt is not, and this reveals a dimension of blame’s force that has not been adequately reckoned with, due in part to a theoretical tendency to intellectualize and de-personalize blame. More generally, the blame/shame link provides a promising point of entry into a larger emotional economy of responsibility.

14 February 2018

Claire Mac Cumhaill (Durham)

Still Life, a Mirror

I explore a candidate form of recollection that is akin to episodic recollection but which may be better cast as ‘phasic’, at least insofar as one can be said to remember what it was like to be oneself at an earlier stage or phase in one’s subjective history. I suggest that episodes of re-encountering certain kinds of artworks (re-listening, re-reading) can sometimes occasion such ‘phasic remembering’. The kinds of works that enable such recall I call ‘still lives’ – they are self-limiting wholes the formal properties of which are stable over time. Unlike standard cases of episodic recollection however, the phasic recollection which might be said to be occasioned by ‘still lives’, so understood, requires the temporal presence of the artwork.

Cast differently, the experience must be partly temporally transparent to its object. But to this extent, re-encounters with still lives can be likened to perceiving with a mirror. In specular experience, direction and location are cleaved apart. One can see things located behind one by looking in the direction of the mirror. In part analogy, I test the idea that one can sometimes seem to experience times behind one – in particular, past phases in one’s subjective history – through re-experiencing artworks temporally located at the present time. I consider whether this suggests a reason for valuing the formal features of artworks.

21 February 2018

Julian Dodd (Manchester)

Authenticities and normative conflict

In this talk I distinguish three kinds of authenticity that are candidates to be performance values governing the performance of works of Western classical music. These are, respectively, score-compliance authenticity (accurately rendering the composer's instructions, as explicitly and implicitly expressed in the score, into sound), interpretive authenticity (delivering a performance that evinces a deep or profound understanding of the work), and Kivy's notion of personal authenticity (performing the work in a way that is faithful to the performer's artistic persona).

I defend the following claims: that only score-compliance authenticity and interpretive authenticity are genuine performance values within Western classical music; that these two performance values are constitutive norms of work performance in that tradition; and that when interpretive authenticity and score-compliance authenticity conflict, the former trumps the latter.

21 March 2018

Alison Fernandes (Warwick)

The Time Traveller’s Guide to Causation

Causation has an uneasy place in the picture of the world presented by fundamental physics. It’s unclear, for example, how we can explain the pervasive temporal asymmetry of causation, given that candidate laws are, for the most part, temporally symmetric. I’ll argue that considering the evidential relations relevant to time travelling agents can help. On the negative side, time travel cases provide reasons for thinking we can’t evaluate counterfactuals (from which causal relations might derive) by holding the state of the world outside the antecedent fixed.

This creates trouble for certain statistical mechanical explanation of causal asymmetry. On the positive side, thinking about time travel cases suggests other standards for evaluating counterfactuals: hold fixed the states that a relevant deliberating agent has (external) evidence of, and consider what her decisions are further evidence for. This approach makes good sense of the relevance of causal relations for decision-making, and can use resources from evidential decision theory to explain causal asymmetry. It also offers a new diagnosis for what is puzzling about causal loops: they systematically undermine the possibility of rational agents making use of the causal relations of which they’re composed.

25 April 2018

Shyam Nair (Arizona State)

The Explanatory Power of Probabilistic Analyses of Reasons

One popular albeit controversial idea in ethics and epistemology is that we can explain what we ought to do and ought to believe in terms of our reasons for action and reasons for belief. In this paper, I argue that in order to make good on the explanatory ambitions of this project those who accept it should also accept an analysis of reasons that has a probabilistic structure. I do this by showing that there are classes of ordinary cases involving the competition of reasons that can be smoothly explained by such an analysis.

These are cases of so-called "accrual" of reasons, cases where what we ought to do cannot be settled just by comparing the strengths of individual reasons but instead comparison among collections of reasons is also needed (eg, a case where two reasons are individually worse than another reason but collectively are better than another reason). I then show that a variety of popular views in metaethics can be implemented so that they have a probabilistic structure. I do not offer any argument or proof that a non-probabilistic analysis or quietism about reasons cannot explain these cases. But I close by giving some grounds for pessimism.

2 May 2018

Chon Tejedor (Valencia)

The Ethics of Belonging as a Form of Honesty in One’s Position in the World

In this paper, I explore an idea which I believe to be central to ethics but which has proved surprisingly elusive, at least in Anglophone (mostly analytic) moral philosophy: the idea that some of my individual ethical responsibilities and dues (that which I am ethically owed) arise from my being part of interlocking structures (eg, cultures, markets, natural or artificial environments, institutions, social groups) that condition me. Crucially, the ethical responsibilities and dues in question arise by virtue of my belonging to (i.e. here: being conditioned by) these structures, regardless of whether I belong to them voluntarily or am even aware of my belongings. In analytic philosophy, the idea that ethical responsibilities and dues could arise in this way has sometimes been discussed (and, typically, found wanting) as part of debates on Marxism and Communitarianism, or in discussions relating to collective and associative responsibility. I aim to show that the ethics of belonging goes much further than these debates would suggest: indeed, insofar as it taps directly onto an ethical requirement of honesty in our position in the world, it can be seen as constitutive of the very possibility of our ethical agency.

 
Autumn 2017

4 October 2017

Kirsten Walsh (University of Nottingham) 

Newton's Epistemic Triad

11 October 2017

Elinor Mason (University of Edinburgh) 

Rape, Harassment and Refusal

18 October 2017

Mark Jago (University of Nottingham)

Real Contingent Identity

25 October 2017

Åsa Burman (Stockholm University)

Telic Power

1 November 2017

Kathleen Stock (University of Sussex)

8 November 2017

Alison Wylie (University of British Columbia)

What Knowers Know Well: Why Feminism Matters to Archaeology – and to Philosophy

15 November 2017

Jenny Saul (University of Sheffield)

Dogwhistles and Figleaves: Techniques of Racist Linguistic Manipulation

22 November 2017

Stephen Ingram (University of Manchester)

Realism, Anti-Realism, and Arbitrariness in Ethics

29 November 2017

Derek Matravers (Open University)

Visualising

6 December 2017 

Matt Duncombe (University of Nottingham)

Thinking of an object: Transparency and Demarcation in Plato

 
Spring 2017

1 February 2017

Heather Widdows (University of Birmingham)

Beauty, Choice and Exploitation

8 February 2017

Chris Woodard (University of Nottingham)

Knowing What is Good for You

11 February 2017

A one-off extra seminar from  Stephen Grimm, who will be visiting the UK from from Fordham University in New York.

Understanding as an Intellectual Virtue

15 February 2017

Aness Webster (University of Nottingham)

What's Bad About Casual Racism?

22 February 2017

David Owens (King's College London)

Property and Authority

1 March 2017

Lea Ypi (London School of Economics)

The Moral Ought in 'As If' Politics

8 March 2017

Jon Robson (University of Nottingham)

Omni-beauty as a Divine Attribute

15 March 2017

Jessica Begon (University of Oxford)

Disability: A Justice-Based Account

22 March 2017

Neil Sinclair (University of Nottingham)

Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology

5 April 2017 

Emily Thomas (Durham University)

The Nature of Space and Time in John Locke

 
Autumn 2016

28 September 2016

Karen Simecek (Warwick)

Claudia Rankine's 'Citizen' and the value of intimacy in poetry

12 October 2016

Ian Kidd (Nottingham)

Following the Way of Heaven – Exemplars, Emulationism, and Daoism

19 October 2016

Rachel Fraser (Peterhouse College, Cambridge)

The Ethics of Metaphor

26 October 2016

Lina Jansson (Nottingham)

Newton’s Methodology Meets Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature

2 November 2016

Jonathan Tallant (Nottingham) and David Ingram (Milan)

Nefarious Truth

9 November 2016

Jonathan Way (Southampton)

Creditworthiness and Matching Principles

16 November 2016

Peter Vickers (Durham)

The Sommerfeld Miracle

23 November 2016

Rosanna Keefe (Sheffield)

Essentialism and logical consequence

30 November 2016

Matt Matravers (York)

Rootless Desert and Unanchored Sanctions

7 December 2016
NB: Seminar will take place
in Humanities, A02.  

Philipp Rau (University of Nottingham)

The Person and the Self

 
Spring 2016

27 January 2016

Stacie Friend, Birbeck

The Real Foundation of Fictional Worlds

I argue that judgements of what is ‘true in a fiction’ presuppose the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is (really) true is also fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work. By contrast with the more familiar Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption is not a rule or ‘principle of generation’ for inferring implied content from what is explicit in a text. Instead it provides an array of real-world truths that can be used in making such inferences. I claim that the Reality Assumption is essential to our ability to understand stories, drawing on a range of empirical evidence. However, the Reality Assumption has several unintuitive consequences, not least that what is fictionally the case includes countless facts that neither authors nor readers could (or should) ever consider. I argue that such consequences provide no reason to reject the Reality Assumption.

3 February 2016

Katharine Jenkins, Cambridge/Nottingham 

Ontic Injustice

In this talk, I argue that there is a distinctive type of injustice, ontic injustice, which occurs when someone is wronged by the social construction of categories, such as race categories or gender categories. A victim of ontic injustice suffers a wrong in virtue of being made into a member of the social category in question; that is to say, it is the very fact of category membership that constitutes the wrong, not any particular negative experiences that may follow. This wrong consists of a failure of recognition respect: the victim of ontic injustice instantiates morally relevant properties that warrant certain sorts of responses from others, but her category membership serves to license contrary sorts of responses. Although the notion of ontic injustice can be combined with different accounts of the ontology of social categories, here I draw on John Searle’s account of institutional reality to offer a more detailed explanation of ontic injustice. Finally, I apply the notion of ontic injustice to the Black Lives Matter movement, showing that interpreting the slogan ‘Black Lives Matter’ with reference to ontic injustice helps to fend off some confused and obstructive responses.

10 February 2016

Fiona Macpherson, Glasgow 

Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding

If beliefs and desires affect perception—at least in certain specified ways—then cognitive penetration occurs. Whether it occurs is a matter of controversy. Recently, some proponents of the predictive coding account of perception have claimed that the account entails that cognitive penetrations occurs. I argue that the relationship between the predictive coding account and cognitive penetration is dependent on both the specific form of the predictive coding account and the specific form of cognitive penetration. In so doing, I spell out different forms of each and the relationship that holds between them. Thus, mere acceptance of the predictive coding approach to perception does not determine whether one should think that cognitive penetration exists. Moreover, given that there are such different conceptions of both predictive coding and cognitive penetration, researchers should cease talking of either without making clear which form they refer to, if they aspire to make true generalisations.

17 February 2016

Natalja Deng, Cambridge 

Does Time Seem to Pass?

One of the current philosophical debates about the nature of temporal experience concerns whether or not we (perceptually) experience time as passing in a certain sense. That sense is as follows. According to (some) A-theoretic views of time, the most fundamental description of the world is tensed; it includes such claims as that it’s Wednesday today. On such views, time passes in a ‘robust’ sense. For example, only the present exists and which time exists constantly changes, or the past and the present exist and which time is the latest time constantly changes, or times constantly move into the present and then into the more and more distant past. I defend veridicalism, which denies that we (perceptually) experience time as passing in this sense. The talk has two parts. In the first part, I take the debate at face-value. I show that veridicalism gains indirect support from a close inspection of rival proposals. Moreover, I point out that veridicalists can offer good explanations for why we are nevertheless sometimes inclined towards A-theoretic views. In the second part, I suggest that a deflationary view of the debate can provide further support for veridicalism. Finally, I offer some McTaggart-style reasons to adopt this deflationary view and respond to a recent objection.

24 February 2016

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vji, Kent 

Epistemic Heroes and Duties to Inform

We owe duties to others, and those duties include a duty to help. Our duty to address other people’s need for information is a special case of this more general duty of beneficence. Taking Goldberg’s recent proposal regarding the nature of our duty to inform as my starting point, I will argue that the principle Goldberg is defending is demanding, since it (a) makes for an upward shift of the bar between duty and epistemic charity, and (b) is consistent with our in some cases having a duty to change our fundamental commitments if that would make us more useful to others. But it’s not too demanding—so long as it’s properly reformulated to handle cases of epistemic heroism.

2 March 2016

James Ladyman, Bristol 

An Apology for Every Thing Must Go

In this paper I enumerate the main positive and negative theses of Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised. I will explain and defend some of them in more detail and clarify the version of Ontic Structural Realism the book advances replying to some objections.

9 March 2016

Naomi Thompson, Southampton 

Irrealism about Grounding

Grounding talk has become increasingly familiar in contemporary philosophical discussion. Most discussants of grounding think that grounding talk is useful, intelligible, and accurately describes metaphysical reality. Call them realists about grounding. Some dissenters reject grounding talk on the grounds that it is unintelligible, or unmotivated. They would prefer to eliminate grounding talk from philosophy, so we can call them eliminitivists about grounding. This paper outlines a new position in the debate about grounding, defending the view that grounding talk is (or at least can be) intelligible and useful. Grounding talk does not, however, provide a literal and veridical description of mind-independent metaphysical reality. This (non-eliminative)irrealism about grounding treads a path between realism and eliminativism. 

16 March 2016

Nathan Wildman, Hamburg 

For Contingent Necessity-makers

Are there true grounding claims of the form, 'P's necessity is  grounded in Q', for some absolute necessity P and some contingent Q?  Or, to rephrase, are there any contingent necessity-makers for  absolute necessities? Here, I argue that there are. More specifically,  I argue that, for every contingent Q that is a partial grounds of some  absolute necessity P's truth, there is a contingent plurality G,  consisting of Q plus some (possibly empty) D, that is P's  necessity-maker. And while this result doesn't show that all  necessities, let alone all absolute necessities, are grounded in  contingencies, it does show that the necessity of some absolute  necessities are fully grounded in contingent matters.

13 April 2016

Marcello Oreste Fiocco, University of California Irvine 

Time as a Substance

In this paper (the third chapter of a book in draft), I lay out the framework for a metaphysics of time by deriving some ontological principles of a more general metaphysical theory whose crux is a certain account of what a thing is.  A thing is a natured entity, something constrained in what it is by its very existence and, via this existence, constraining other things.  This account is derived from a unique methodology, one that assumes nothing about the world, confronting it as merely the impetus to inquiry.  Applying this methodology as the first step in a wholly critical metaphysics of time, I argue that time itself is a thing, more specifically, a substance.  In so doing, I examine the most obvious phenomena associated with time, providing accounts of change and what a moment is, and considering the relations among these and time per se.  The resulting account of time summarily resolves several much-discussed controversies in the metaphysics of time.  This just shows, however, that the most contentious and interesting issues here are not about time itself, but about temporal reality—the world in time.

20 April 2016

Christopher Bennett, Sheffield 

Why and How to Express One's Emotions

'My point of departure is an interest in actions that are expressive of emotion. Recently philosophy has concentrated on expressions of emotion that are automatic and involuntary, such as facial expressions. My focus is different. I would like to understand expressions of emotions that are deliberate and intentional (though not normally done with some further purpose in mind). In particular, I am interested in the idea that expressive actions ‘symbolise' the way in which the person experiencing the emotion sees the salient features (the ‘gravity’) of their situation. After providing some examples by way of illustration I will consider two potential objections: what is the point of expressing one’s emotions in this sense; and is the vehicle for expression merely conventional? In exploring the beginnings of an answer to this question, I turn to the history of ideas - in particular to the Romantic or post-Kantian tradition - for a range of understandings of 'expressive needs,' that is, our alleged need to express our emotions. I provide a taxonomy of five different answers to the question of why we have expressive needs. One of these understandings is the tradition of Symbolism, and I suggest that this tradition may help in understanding the claim that expressions of emotion symbolise the intentional content of the emotion. I suggest that the idea of symbolising the content of one’s emotions in external form has some advantages over the alternative answers as a way of explaining the value of expressing the emotions. I conclude by considering how this history can help us begin to answer the two objections to the idea of symbolic, expressive action with which we started.’

27 April 2016

Katherine Hawley, St Andrews 

Are You Trying to Tell Me Something?

To learn from what others say, we need to understand the content of their utterances, and also to grasp the force with which they are expressed: who is joking around, who is asking rhetorical questions, who is trying to tell me something?  In the first part of this talk, I investigate some obstacles to the communication of force, paying particular attention to obstacles which arise from power imbalances, social stereotypes, and clashes of localised conventions.  In the second part, I explore why some of us sometimes need to use non-standard speech acts to achieve our perlocutionary goals, for example persuading by speculating rather than telling.

4 May 2016

Jeff McMahan, Oxford 

 

 

 

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